The Slavic Triangle: Between the EU and Eurasia

By Orest Zakydalsky

The Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine, the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs held an academic forum entitled The Slavic Triangle: Between the EU and Eurasia, at the Munk Centre for International Studies in Toronto on January 26-27. The event brought together several leading international scholars. The main focus was the economic interaction and foreign policy choices of the three countries that make up the so-called “Slavic Triangle”: Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Within this framework, the recent gas crisis was discussed in detail in the larger context of Ukraine’s and Belarus’ dependence on Russian energy supplies.

The event opened with a keynote address by Arkady Moshes, of the Finnish Institute for International Affairs, who began by explaining why he thought the idea of a “Slavic Triangle” was a useful conceptual categorization. The defining characteristic of this Triangle, he argued, was not relations between the three states, but the intensity of historical, cultural and societal ties among its citizens. These ties continue to exist despite changes in the relations between the states.

Dr. Moshes then outlined the changing relationships. He argued that Russian foreign policy towards its neighbours has shifted to a less pragmatic and more assertive approach. One of the triggers for this was the victory of Our Ukraine/Nasha Ukraina in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections. This was the first non-Russian backed winner of an election in Ukraine. From the fall of 2003, Russia’s ‘European Choice,’ a policy of closer cooperation with the EU and NATO was put on the shelf in favour of attempting to regain power in its ‘near abroad.’

 Dr. Moshes then discussed the future relationships in the post-Orange Revolution context. According to him, Russian-Belarusian relations will continue in stalemate and Ukraine and Belarus will drift further apart because Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka does not want the ‘Orange disease’ infecting his country. However, if the regime in Belarus should change, the relationship between Ukraine and Belarus likely will change.

The Orange Revolution, argued Dr. Moshes, presented a crisis for Russian policy; Ukraine could no longer be viewed as Russia’s “little brother.” However, Russia does not want a protracted conflict with Ukraine, because of the European factor. The EU must, since the gas crisis, take a position on conflict between Kyiv and Moscow.

Dr. Moshes concluded with the hypothesis that for the short and medium term, the Slavic Triangle will remain an important concept, but will continue to erode slowly. Russia, Dr. Moshes argued, will have to adapt to this reality.

The second day began with a panel on the “Economic Relations and Foreign Policy Choices.” The first speaker, Dr. Vladimir Popov, of Carleton University, spoke about the comparative economic performances of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, focusing on the fact that the strength of each country’s economic and sociopolitical institutions was responsible for their economic performance.

Next, Professor Paul D’Anieri of the University of Kansas delivered a talk entitled “Economic Prosperity and Power.” He pointed to the fact that Russia’s use of economic coercion has not worked well because it has allowed for a crystallization of the opposition. In Belarus, the holdup of the privatization process has led to much frustration for Russia and its business sector, which would like to gain more control over the Belrusian economy by buying up state assets.

In Ukraine, playing the pipeline card led to the involvement of international actors, most notably the EU, to Russia’s disadvantage. Ukrainian strategy in this sense has also been a failure, said D’Anieri, because overdependence on Russian energy subsidies has led to the corrosion of Ukrainian state structures. Dr. D’Anieri argued that the issue of economic coercion must be understood on both the geopolitical and microeconomic levels, and the interplay between these two levels should be taken into account.

The second panel, entitled “Energy Issues and Foreign Policy Choices” began with a talk by Margarita Balmaceda, of the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI), Harvard University. She discussed Energy Business and Foreign Policies in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, pointing out that there is a continuing interplay between private interests within corporations such as Gazprom and state interests of the leadership of the four countries. The energy sector is the primary area for this relationship. Gazprom, for example, loses money by selling subsidized gas; however, it gains ‘points’ that can be used to gain influence within the Russian government. Thus, a symbiotic relationship develops.

Dr. Balmaceda also discussed the gas crisis. She argued that it started out as a case of Ukraine’s state interests versus Russia’s, but became much more complex, going beyond simply a matter of price, and taking the form of political pressure by Russia to force Ukraine to join institutions such as the Single Economic Space.

The resulting deal represented an alternative to succumbing to Russian pressure to join institutions. It is problematic for several reasons. It is a private document, and there is no mechanism for ensuring that it will be fulfilled. Second, it represents the monopolization of gas imports by one company, RosUkrEnergo. Third, there is no contractual diversification: the whole deal is contained within one document. Thus, should the deal fall apart, both parties would be right back at the beginning.

Oleksandr Sushko of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine and the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, spoke next on “Energy Factors in High Politics.” He argued that since Ukraine’s independence, energy issues have been at the core of national politics and the economy. He went on to say that it is difficult to separate politics from economics. The gas crisis has proven that this remains an important challenge. Exacerbating this problem is the lack of knowledge about the process of separating big business from politics.

According to Sushko, energy policy is a mechanism used to keep the post-Soviet space integrated, and that keeping business integrated is a way to keep politics integrated. Part of the problem is that while Europe can only offer Ukraine abstract values, Russia can offer real economic benefits in the form of subsidies. The gas crisis, Sushko said, has made Russian-Ukrainian gas relations an issue for European energy security, and this reality will inevitably change the Russian-Ukrainian relationship.

The last panel was entitled “The Slavic Triangle in a Broader Perspective.” Sergey Plekhanov, of York University and the University of Toronto spoke on “East Slavs between East and West.” He discussed the dichotomous historical identities of the region and how these identities affect the current sociopolitical situation in the region. Kataryna Wolczuk, of The University of Birmingham, delivered a talk entitled “Ukraine and European Integration: Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?” in which she discussed the changing relationship between the EU and Ukraine. She argued that despite some progress since the Orange Revolution, integration into Europe must be viewed at best as a long-term foreign policy goal.

The last address, delivered by Oleh Havrylyshyn of the International Monetary Fund, was called “Globalization Options for the Western CIS: Triangles, Polyhedron West, Polyhedron East, or All Three?” Dr. Havrylyshyn spoke about the economic options available to Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Integration into the world and the adoption of free trade structures seemed to be the best way likely to deliver them prosperity in the future.

All of the panels were followed by provocative discussions between the panelists and the capacity crowd.  Those who attended left with an enhanced knowledge of the social, political and economic situation in the Slavic Triangle. This conference produced more questions than answers; precisely because of this it was a success. It is hoped that the questions raised will lead to the continuation of the stimulating dialogue on this very important and timely subject.

Orest Zakydalsky is a graduate student at the Centre for European Russian and Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto. He is studying institutional changes in the democratization process in Ukraine.