Roundtable on Ukraine’s 2010 Presidential Elections

By Orest Zakydalsky

A roundtable discussion, Ukraine’s Presidential Elections: Analysis of the Results was held on February 24 at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. The event was sponsored by the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine and the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto. Participating in the roundtable were Oleh Havrylyshyn (University of Toronto), Jakob Hedeskog (Swedish Defence Research Agency), Serhiy Kudelia (Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Petro Jacyk Post-Doctoral Fellow), and David Marples (University of Alberta). The roundtable was chaired by Lucan Way (University of Toronto).

Oleh Havrylyshyn began the discussion by offering several explanations for  newly-elected President Viktor Yanukovych’s victory over Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in the February 7 presidential election run-off vote. He posited several non-economic factors in the election: Yanukovych has successfully remade his image and is no longer seen as a threat to democratic values by the Ukrainian electorate; pro-Yanukovych voters were more active in this election; and President Yushchenko actively undermined Tymoshenko’s election campaign. The best non-economic explanation for Yanukovych’s victory, Havrylyshyn argued, is the deep disappointment of the electorate in the political development of the country since the Orange Revolution; this disappointment increased bitterness, and led to many ‘Orange’ voters simply staying home on Election Day. Havrylyshyn contended that economic explanations for the outcome were less convincing than the explanation that disillusion with the Orange forces led to Yanukovych’s victory. Although Tymoshenko’s popularity suffered as a result of her being Prime Minister during the global economic crisis, economic issues were rarely discussed in the public discourse on the elections; commentary and opinions was largely focused on personalities and not on economic programs or platforms.

Havrylyshyn also offered some short-term predictions: President Yanukovych will be more Europe-oriented than expected; the International Monetary Fund-supported aid program to Ukraine, which was cut off in October 2009, will be renewed under Yanukovych; Tymoshenko will soon be removed as Prime Minister; and  the issues of federalism and regional autonomy will be revived in Ukraine. In his long-range outlook, Havrylyshyn argued that the Yanukovych Presidency will re-orient Ukraine more to Moscow.  However, this will not be a formal shift but will be more in terms of what is not done with the European Union and the West. The long-range issue will not be the loss of Ukrainian sovereignty, but rather a shift of spheres of influence and dependence.

Jakob Hedeskog spoke about the Western perception of the Ukrainian presidential elections. He argued that this perception is substantively different from what it was in 2004 – the two candidates did not offer a stark choice between pro-Western and pro-Russian policy, as was the case in 2004. Furthermore, the indifference to the result by the European Union was caused largely by its disappointment in Orange political forces. Five years of Orange leadership did little to bring Ukraine closer to the EU, largely because Ukrainian policy towards the EU was unrealistic. The Ukrainian political class paid little attention to implementing real reforms, or dismantling the Soviet-bureaucratic model, and instead focused on Ukraine’s image in the EU. Hedeskog argued that Yanukovych will focus on more practical issues with the EU such as the implementation of a visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens. For the EU, the most important concern is energy, mainly the delivery of Russian gas through Ukrainian pipelines. With respect to the position of the United States, the Obama Administration is seeking closer and friendlier relations with Russia.  Thus, Ukrainian membership in NATO will not be pushed by President Obama as it was by the Bush Administration.

Serhiy Kudelia discussed the trends and prospects in Ukrainian politics that emerged during this presidential election vote. He argued that Ukraine is less polarized than it was in 2004. Yanukovych gained more support in Ukraine’s western regions than he had in 2004, while losing support in his core constituency in the east and south of Ukraine. On the other hand, Tymoshenko did better than Yushchenko in the east, while losing support in Western and Central Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine has become more politically diverse. In the first round elections, second tier candidates Serhiy Tihipko and Arseniy Yatseniuk garnered some twenty percent of the vote. Kudelia also discussed some positive and negative outcomes from the elections. On the positive side, the elections were recognized as free and fair by the international community and there was no regional mobilization to contest the results. On the negative side, the defeated candidate refused to concede; this undermines Ukrainian institutions and the very cause of the Orange Revolution. The election result was tarnished by manipulation of the election rules – the Election Law was changed two days before the run-off – which sets a very bad precedent. Still further, the political elite are divided on the legitimacy of the new President – this may lead to the phenomenon of a disloyal opposition.

Kudelia went on to speak about the post-election dilemma facing Yanukovych. Should he try to form a new majority coalition in Parliament and reshuffle the government, which, given the distribution of seats in the Verkhovna Rada, would be very difficult to do. If he were to call for new parliamentary elections, these may bring gains in seats for the Party of Regions, but also carries several risks.  For example, new actors would be present in any new Rada – including Tihipko - which would necessitate accommodation of more political forces. Kudelia argued that either option would likely lead to continued policy making paralysis.

David Marples discussed Russian reactions to the Ukrainian presidential elections. He noted that Russia did not interfere in the 2010 elections, mainly because both candidates were acceptable to Russia. The Putin-Medvedev attitude continues to be that Ukraine is an artificial state that will one day return to its ‘historic’ unity with Russia. Several issues in Russian-Ukrainian relations will continue to cause strain, primarily, the price of Russian gas for Ukraine and continued Russian attempts to gain control over Ukrainian gas lines, as well as, the fate of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. Any extension of the lease for the base beyond 2017 would require Ukraine to amend its constitution. Relations between Russia and Ukraine will continue to be very difficult, even with President Yanukovych, who is still seen as much more pro-Russian than his predecessor. These relations will be that much more difficult if Russia continues its maximalist demands on Ukraine in  economic, gas and military spheres, and continues to support separatism in Crimea.

The roundtable presentations were followed by a spirited and lively discussion with the capacity crowd.