Ukraine: A Second Chance

By Oksana Bashuk Hepburn

As the first anniversary of the squandered March parliamentary election was drawing near in Ukraine, the chief concern of the Orange opposition focused on the aggrandizement of power by Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych to whom their former hero, President Victor Yushchenko, had handed the reins of power.  By calling a snap election, likely for after June, Yushchenko is put in the most favourable light with Ukraine’s pro-West Orange population since starting his presidential watch.  He is showing leadership, placing himself firmly in the Orange camp, rallying supporters, reconfirming pro-West positions, and challenging the Party of Region’s pro-Russia government.

It remains to be seen whether the Orange forces can win whose current rankings in the polls are low. Then there’s always the issue of a fair election. They have succeeded before by winning with slight majorities both in the 2004 Presidential and 2006 Parliamentary Elections proving that the people want Orange power in Ukraine.  However, the Orange coalition has yet to demonstrate the know-how required to translate election victories into government and political power. 

The snap election offers them a second chance. Sober skeptics point to the legacy of squabbling and to the President’s two-year inaction.  These attributes rather than the electorates’ yearning for a pro-West Ukraine and their distaste for Russian political dominance may translate into an Orange loss. The Orange forces must convince Ukrainians that they will do the job right this time.  This means providing assurance that an Orange-elected parliament and President will abide by the Orange revolution principles -- the rule of law, punishment of violators, pro-Ukraine economic policies ranging from privatization of its industrial capital to control of the energy sector, and a pro-West foreign policy orientation.  It means ensuring that the 8% economic growth cursing through Ukraine trickles down to the furthest reaches of the nation’s impoverished majority, its voters.

To win the elections, Orange strategists need to bring greater clarity to Ukraine’s electorate on the country’s key and most divisive internal issues by: stating plainly the reasons for the election call - still much misunderstood; downplaying the East-West geographic divide in Ukraine, underscoring such nation-building fundamentals as its common history, culture, religion, language which have endured despite centuries of foreign oppression; setting out clearly, particularly in Eastern Ukraine, reasons why the Orange coalition is pro-West, offering such persuasive arguments as the West’s proven pro-people record, individual high standard of living and, its governments’ respect for human rights and freedoms; identifying changes the Orange government aims to implement if elected.

In order to bring Eastern Ukrainians into the fold, Orange forces need to diffuse the divisive pro/anti-Russia scenario, convincing voters from Luhansk to Donetsk of the benefits of a “Ukraine first, last and always policy” by explaining: Russia’s hungry determination to control Ukraine’s energy, Black Sea, its entrance to WTO and NATO, among others, for Russia’s own ends is detrimental to Ukraine’s people; benefits of independent trade versus the role of being Russia’s provider of raw material, human intellect and labour force; benefits of good relations with geographic neighbours, regardless of past history and offer a vision of Ukraine as a “Canada” in the midst of the former Soviet Union in that Canada has excellent relations with the United States and equally fine ones with Europe and other parts of the world. 

Despite recent advances in the President’s popularity, strategists must get him to seek the people’s forgiveness for betraying the Orange Revolution.  Not clearing the air further of past inactions may be a liability during the election campaign.  The good news for the Orange side is that Ukraine’s pro-West voter has no alternative to the Orange parties.  However, about half of Ukraine’s electorate is uncommitted.  A clear majority for the Orange side requires votes from them, some of whom may have been former supporters.  

Moreover, the Orange coalition needs to work at the grass-roots level.  Elections are won by candidates who keep in touch with the people.  The Committee of Voters, Ukraine’s election watchdog, commends only the Party of Regions for solid performance in meeting with constituents.  Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of the Opposition, dresses expensively yet is generally viewed as speaking from the heart, her party’s symbol.  The entire Orange election machine might wish to adopt more heart in their campaign by telling the people how an Orange government will close the gap between rich and poor. The people are the real “political elite” in a democracy who hold power during the elections and not some pin-striped politician.

Vitally important, the Orange forces must turn their attention to ensuring cohesion and party discipline beyond the elections. Post election strategists need to get to work now and prepare for a smooth change-over of power scenario, develop a power–sharing approach in parliament among the Orange members (at the risk of losing power as before) and, compose a shadow cabinet which, in Western democracies, develops expertise and clarifies policies.

If given a second chance and elected, the hope of the Orange forces is to get the job done for the people and the country, not to join a self-serving high life of the many in the so called “political elite.”

Oksana Bashuk Hepburn, President U*CAN Ukraine Canada Relations Inc. is and a several-time OSCE elections observer and commentator.