Regime Incoherence in Yanukovych’s Ukraine
By Alexander J. Motyl
How can you
explain the jaw-dropping incoherence of the Yanukovych regime? They blithely give
away the store to the Russians in the April 2010 Kharkiv Accords, but they’re skittish
about joining the Russian-led Customs Union. They pursue integration with the European
Union, but crudely violate European legal standards by persecuting their political
opponents. They declare an anticorruption drive, but retain fantastic villas and
shamelessly fix tenders. They pass a law on freedom of information, but constrict
freedom of the press. With this kind of record, can anyone be certain that the Parliament’s
recently passed endorsement of a free-trade zone with the EU represents an irreversible
turn toward Europe?
There are three
possible explanations of this incoherence. Let’s look at them, in order of increasing
likeliness.
It could be
that these aren’t examples of incoherence, but of profound cleverness. Accordingly,
President Yanukovych and his buddies know exactly what they’re doing: They’re trying
to strike a balance between competing interests and priorities, while following
a centrist policy devoted to Ukraine’s
interests only. Sound plausible? Maybe for relations with Russia, with the
Kharkiv Accords representing Yanukovych’s attempt to make nice with the Kremlin
and the skittishness about the Customs Union representing a justifiable fear of
the Kremlin’s embrace. But this rationale just doesn’t work for the other examples
of incoherence. If you’re serious about the EU, you don’t arrest your former Minister
of the Interior, Yuri Lutsenko, keep him in jail for close to half a year, and respond
indifferently to his brush with death during his just-discontinued hunger strike.
That’s callous or stupid or both. Nor do you go about harassing former Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko on trumped-up charges. A clever regime would have dealt with the
political threat posed by these individuals by appointing Lutsenko and Tymoshenko
as ambassadors to Lichtenstein and Andorra.
Let’s consider
a second explanation. Incoherence could be symptomatic of a cognitive inability
to recognize contradictions as contradictions. This would bespeak an inability to
think logically and to understand that A
and minus-A are incompatible. Sound plausible?
You betcha. Neither Yanukovych nor any of his ministers is a genius. More
important, they are all members of the Donetsk
political elite, whose roots extend to Soviet times and whose mentality is still
Soviet. Despite incessant Soviet invocations of the Marxian dialectic, the USSR’s planners
and policy makers had little sense of contradiction. After all, everything they
did was, by definition, correct and every revision of the Communist Party line was,
by definition, also correct. That arrogance and ignorance are equally characteristic
of the Yanukovych folks. They’re right even when - or especially if - they are wrong.
So why worry
about contradictions that cannot, by definition, be contradictions?
The third explanation
is simplest and probably most persuasive. Accordingly, “the regime” isn’t contradictory,
because “the regime” isn’t adopting decisions as a unitary actor. Instead, different
factions or power holders within the regime are going in different directions, with
the result that “the regime” looks like
it’s going in different directions. Thus, the pro-Russian faction goes for the Kharkiv
Accords and gives away basing rights in Sevastopol
for a song, while the pro-Ukrainian faction tries to move Ukraine away from
the Customs Union and toward the EU. The hard-line authoritarians crack down on
Lutsenko and Tymoshenko, while the quasi-democrats court the EU and push for anticorruption
measures and freedom of information. Sound plausible? Absolutely, but this explanation
is also least flattering and most worrisome for Yanukovych. It suggests that, despite
having amassed enormous powers, Ukraine’s
President is unwilling or unable to keep his subordinates in line. And if Yanukovych
really has lost control of a divided regime, its incoherence - and instability -
can only grow.
Incoherent
regimes are doomed to ineffectiveness and prone to breakdown. Unfortunately for
Yanukovych, he cannot afford to sit back and have a beer, while watching the boys
duke it out. Ukraine’s
economy is a mess, his popularity is almost nil, and the people are no longer afraid
to say no to the thugs running the country. Bold choices and radical reform really
are necessary. And Yanukovych’s choices are essentially two. He can opt for the
status of a corrupt, non-democratic, and permanently backward hinterland of Russia or he can try to join Europe
and the world economy as a struggling democracy and modernizing economy. The former
choice means becoming another Belarus.
The latter choice means becoming another Poland. You can’t be both. Nor can you
flip-flop back and forth between Russia, authoritarianism, and corruption
on the one hand, and the world, democracy, and decency on the other. You gotta choose
once and for all - not just for the sake of logic, but because the longer you wait,
the longer the contradictions fester, the angrier society will get, and the more
likely will your regime collapse.