Did we just sidestep a war in the Black Sea?

By Walter Derzko

There are many early warning signals pointing to this.

At the end of May, Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg was interviewed on Russian radio Kommersant.  Schwarzenberg recounted the problems between Russia and Europe. When asked by the interviewer about Russia’s ambitions to regain its superpower status (“Does Russia’s aspiration to play this sort of equal role with the United States in international affairs concern you?”), his reply was categorical:  “To a certain degree, it does concern me - above all Russia’s attitude to its neighbours. Georgia is one of the examples. One can also recall problems in relations with Belarus or Estonia. Today, when we are discussing the subject of missile defence with our Russian partners, they, as it were, quite confidently declare their readiness to include in their sector of responsibility to countries lying between the EU and Russia [which includes Ukraine too]. You understand, all this talk about the ‘near abroad’ and ‘zones of special interests belongs to the past.” 

The interviewer then focuses specifically on Georgia. He prods further: “You mentioned Georgia. Three years ago you, on the one hand, rigorously condemned the actions of Russia, and on the other, you did not support the idea of introducing EU sanctions against Moscow. What has changed since that time?” Schwarzenberg replies: “A lot has changed. Russia has stationed serious military contingents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This has seriously changed the balance of power in the region. After all, these forces are far more than enough not only for the defence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also potentially for a new war against Georgia. The question is: Why are such large garrisons needed on these disputed territories?”

That begs the obvious question: What other direct evidence is there that Russia is gearing up for a new war against Georgia? There are several solid indications that Russia may be preparing for a military engagement in Georgia in 2011, or 2012 at the very latest.  The three main signs are:

1. Military exercises and the deployment of rocket attack systems in South Ossetia;

2. Construction of a railroad between Sukhumi and Ochamchira in Abkhazia; and

3. Increased NATO presence in the Black Sea Basin.

At the end of May 2011, the Russian Black Sea Fleet conducted one of its largest military exercises over the past three years, one that was designed around the scenario of a large-scale landing operation. Such training only may be necessary if it is planning a landing operation in Georgia, since there are no other potential targets. Interestingly, the exercise coincided with the planned peak of pro-Russian opposition rallies in Tbilisi.  In December 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defence disclosed the deployment of “Smerch” in South Ossetia. These long-range (up to 90km) multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have missiles capable of reaching the suburbs of Tbilisi, and completely destroying the city of Gori. Its destructive power approaches that of a small tactical nuclear weapon. Note that “Smerch” has a minimum range of 20km. This makes it unsuitable for protecting Tskhinvali, but suitable for supporting an offensive towards Georgia’s Tbilisi and Gori, if Russia decides to repeat their 2008 war. At the end of January 2011, the Russian Defence Ministry also confirmed the deployment of “Scarab B” (“Tochka-U”) tactical missiles in South Ossetia. These systems have a minimum range of 15km and a maximum of 70km, and are designed for destroying high value targets. The same considerations as those for “Smerch” apply to this deployment.

Reconstruction of the railroad in Abkhazia started in 2011. Unlike in 2008, the government-controlled “Russian Railways” company is doing the job this time. The railroad will link the Russian city of Adler (near Sochi) to the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi, and further south to the Ochamchira Township on the Black Sea Coast. Linking Adler to Sukhumi is well justified commercially due to the summer tourist season. On the other hand, tourist interest in Ochamchira is insignificant and cannot justify extending the railroad. However, such an extension might be justified if one considers that Ochamchira is the front-line base of the Russian Navy, and the last station on Abkhazian territory of the former Caucasus rail line before the current Abkhazia-Georgia border. Linking Ochamchira to Adler allows for the rapid deployment of considerable military forces to the front line between Georgia and Abkhazia.

We know that NATO is significantly increasing its military presence in the Black Sea, according to the head of European Command of the Armed Forces, US Admiral James Stavridis, testifying before Congress.

If Russia was actually planning to attack Georgia, the arrival of the US cruiser USS Monterey in the Black Sea recently put a serious crimp into their plans. It is not accidental that Russia vehemently protested against its deployment.  A Moldovan newspaper writes: “The recent presence of the USS Monterey in Romania’s territorial waters has put an end to Russia’s dominance in the Black Sea.” While stationed in Batumi, the US cruiser would be able to provide superb air defence and vessel movement radar to the Georgians. The Russians would be unable to disable Georgian Air Defence Radar as they did during the 5-day war in 2008. We may see many more such “friendly” NATO visits until the mountain passes in Georgia get closed in by snow in the fall.

Summer 2011 promises to be an interesting one in the Black Sea Region, indeed.