Democracy and Rome Weren't Built in a Day

BOOK REVIEW: Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC: 2006, 216 pp.

 Reviewed By Orest Zakydalsky

In the history of every nation, there are seminal moments that shape and define that nation’s development. For Ukraine, independence in 1991 was one such moment; the Orange Revolution, despite all the disappointments since and the current crisis facing the government, is another. While in the short term, there may be widespread disillusion with the Orange camp, especially with the distinct possibility that Victor Yanukovych, defeated by Yushchenko in 2004, will again become Prime Minister, in the longer term, the trends and developments in Ukrainian society that fuelled the revolution are impossible to reverse.

Revolution in Orange, edited by Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, examine these trends and developments, and other factors, in attempting to explain why the revolution in November-December 2004 happened, and why it succeeded.  The two editors and ten other scholars and experts, in a series of essays, examine eight factors that influenced the revolution's outcome: the nature of the old regime; the strength, strategies and tactics of the political opposition; societal attitudes in Ukraine; the role of civil society; the student movement PORA; the role of the media; the role of the West; and the role of Russia.

Anders Aslund, of the Institute for International Economics in the United States discusses the nature of the old regime. He points out that there was no unity among its members and that Kuchma’s attempts to play one oligarchic clan against the other led to a weakening of the regime and the inability to build a fully authoritarian system. This, in turn, allowed for the development of a strong, united political opposition centred around Victor Yushchenko.

The development of the opposition is outlined by Adrian Karatnycky, of Freedom House. According to Karatnycky, the opposition was able to rally support among the people because of the unpopularity of the incumbent regime.

The societal attitudes that led to widespread backing of the opposition are examined by Taras Kuzio, a visting professor at George Washington University.  Nadia Diuk, of the National Endowment for Democracy, explores the inability of the old regime to consolidate authoritarianism, and how its unpopularity led to the development of a strong civil society movement. 

From 2001 to 2003 the relationship between civil society and the political opposition became closer and closer. The most important of the civil society groups was the student movement PORA, which played a key role in both organizing the Maidan protests and in disseminating information before the election. The role of PORA is covered in an essay by Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbrig, both with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

The editor-in-chief of Ukrainska Pravda, Olena Prytula, in her essay, focuses on the role of the media.

The role of the West is covered by Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, of the Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.  The West, they assert, put continual pressure on Ukrainian authorities to ensure a clean and fair election. When it became obvious that the November run-off was neither, the West played an important role in two respects: first, by not recognizing the results, and second, by mediating a compromise solution to the crisis. Western forces were all in favour of a Yushchenko victory as he represented the values the West holds dearest. Yet, there was no interference, the two authors assert, by the West in the election process, and Western politicians and diplomats scrupulously stayed clear of endorsing either candidate.

The role of Russia, as outlined by the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, in contrast, was much different. The Kremlin continually interfered in the election campaign to the benefit of Yanukovych, with President Putin even paying a visit to Kyiv to endorse him.  Importantly, Russia’s interference and attempts to influence the election process were a complete failure. According to Petrov and Ryabov, the principle reason was that Russian political technologists and spin doctors used Russian-style strong-arm tactics in the campaign, which, while effective in Russia, proved of little use in Ukraine. 

Finally, Michael McFaul, in his conclusion, puts the Orange Revolution in comparative perspective, comparing it to the Serbian, Georgian and Kyrgyz revolutions.

Included in the back of the book is a useful pull-out section on the most important political players in Ukraine, as well as a chronology of the most important events of the Orange Revolution.

Revolution in Orange provides a good outline for both scholarly and general-interest readers. Undoubtedly, its greatest strength is that it shows that the Orange Revolution remains part of a long-term process of the development of democracy in Ukraine.  As I was reading the book, the Maidan was again full of tents. Although Ukraine is currently in a very serious crisis, we would do well to remember that democracy, like Rome, was not and cannot be built in a day. The process, though painful, frustrating and, at times disheartening, is surely better than the alternative.

Orest Zakydalsky is a Canadian graduate student.