Russia’s Master Plan for Ukraine: Part 1

by Wolodymyr Derzko

Exactly three years ago this month, I published an opinion story calling for the creation of a “Think Tank” for the Ukrainian diaspora.  (Can Ukrainian Canadians “See FAR”? http://www.infoukes.com/newpathway/10-2007_Page-7-2.htm ) 

The goal of this “Think Tank” would have been to predict and anticipate emerging opportunity windows and threat scenarios that could affect the Ukrainian diaspora world-wide in the short and medium term. The proposal received wide ranging positive feedback from the public at large in both Canada and the USA but didn’t resonate at all with the leadership of the Ukrainian community. I suspect, largely due to the lack of serious funds needed to launch such an ambitious, non-traditional and forward looking project. The inherent community bias to only fund small, safe, traditional and conservative projects was also a deciding factor. If such a fully-staffed think tank already existed today, it would have likely flagged the possibility of the current political and economic turmoil in Ukraine and the threat of democratic backsliding reversing into Soviet-styled authoritative rule.

Numerous public warnings of this threat to democracy appeared in the Ukrainian media in 2009, up to nine months before the election of the current Yanukovych government and still further back in 2008 in Russia.  Writing in the popular Kyiv Russian-language paper Den, (23 May 2009; p. 3) the author, Yuriy Raykhel observes:

“The Kremlin has essentially stated its policy towards Ukraine ahead of the latter’s forthcoming presidential election.” Raykhel pointed out that the influential Russian MP [and director of the Russian Think Tank Institute of CIS Countries (Institute for Diaspora and Integration)], Konstantin Zatulin is a key figure to watch. “Zatulin’s speech at a conference on Russian language in Ukraine showed that Moscow wants to eventually pull Kiev into a ‘military-political union’,” stated Raykhel.

Zatulin proposes: “Ukraine should meet certain conditions in order for the two countries to build a ‘special relationship’.”  Raykhel provides details: “The first thing Zatulin mentioned was the “special relationship” between Ukraine and Russia.  “In order for such a special relationship to be established between the predominantly Slavic Russia and Ukraine, certain guarantees and conditions are needed for both countries”. What exactly? They are fairly well-known: “First, official declaration and a legislative act on Ukraine’s neutral, non-bloc status. The second condition is to promote a constitution making Ukraine a federal state. The third one is giving the Russian language the status of a state language alongside Ukrainian. And finally fourth, safeguarding orthodox Russian-Ukrainian unity in the bosom of the Moscow Patriarchate”

Check for all four above. Raykhel goes on to mention that the Kremlin wants to push anti-Russian politicians “off the stage” and is even prepared to debate a bill in parliament that would make it easy for Russia to prosecute former CIS leaders with whom it disagrees.  Note the recent audit of the previous Tymoshenko government, but not the corrupt RosUkrEnergo or the previous or current Yanukovych regime.

What else can Ukraine look forward to? What about “setting up a currency and customs union and moving towards a unified rouble-denominated currency for inter-state payments.” Interfax reported that Ukraine is being invited into a Customs Union but just as an observer for now. “We think that Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan may take part in the board’s activities as observers,” said the Russian Federal Customs Service head Andrei Belyaninov.  He said that he had no doubts about Ukraine’s involvement in the Board.

We now see that in the eight short months since the inception of the Yanukovych government and in the nine follow-up, face-to-face meetings between Yanukovych and Medvedev that the Ukrainian government has been dutifully following instructions from the Kremlin to the letter and slowly turning itself into a passive, colonial administration under Moscow.

Had the diaspora picked up on these warnings back in 2008 and 2009, and taken the warnings seriously, it would have had more lead time to prepare a response to these evolving predictable events. But, thanks to wide-spread public protests and the expert briefs from the Kyiv Mohyla Academy on the Russian language question, the Verkhovna Rada decided to put the proposed bill giving  Russian equal status to the Ukrainian language on indefinite hold ( well, at least for now).

A bigger question still looms: Does the Kremlin have a master plan or a grand scheme for Ukraine in the medium and long term, (say over the next 10-15 years), which is even more dire for Ukrainian statehood and integrity?

Next time, I will explore this intriguing scenario and its consequences in more detail.

Wolodymyr (Walter) Derzko is a senior fellow at the Strategic Innovation Lab (sLab) and a lecturer in the master’s of arts program in Strategic Foresight and Innovation, Ontario College of Art & Design University in Toronto, Canada.