Yushchenko's
Behaviour Ruins NATO Chances
By
Taras Kuzio, Kyiv Post
Harbouring
Yuliaphobia is hampering the Ukrainian president’s ability to govern.
A
leading Western ambassador in Kyiv told me recently that he and others had
repeatedly warned President Victor Yushchenko that he had to choose between
removing Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, thereby ruining the 2004 Orange
Revolution coalition, or advancing the nation toward NATO membership. He could
not have both.
Maintaining
a united pro-democratic coalition and government in place has been the West’s
demand since the military alliance first began to consider allowing Ukraine to
enter a membership action plan, a concrete step towards NATO membership, after
Yushchenko visited Washington in
April 2005. Only a year later, Ukraine
failed the test of political stability and Orange
unity in 2006 during NATO’s Riga
summit. It failed again in April, during the Bucharest NATO summit and a NATO
review meeting.
Still,
in September, Yushchenko incredibly said: “Everyone needs to understand that
everything Ukraine
needed to do to obtain a positive answer (on NATO), if we speak openly and
honestly, has been done.” That is not true. The main obstacle to Ukraine’s
successful drive to join NATO is Yushchenko’s inability to place national
interests above his personal animosity toward Tymoshenko. The president’s
undermining of political stability will lead to Ukraine
having five governments during his term in office, instability that has
prevented any government from launching an effective NATO awareness campaign.
Yushchenko
also removed the most pro-NATO and most effective military reformer that Ukraine
has possessed, former defence minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who is untainted by
corrupt allegations.
Ukraine’s
pre-term parliamentary elections, now in doubt, were originally called for the
same weekend in December that NATO foreign ministers are due to meet to review
Ukraine and Georgia’s “progress” toward meeting NATO criteria. Obviously, NATO
will postpone a decision on Ukraine
until next year.
If
Yushchenko follows Leonid Kravchuk in serving only one presidential term, then
the last chance he has of fulfilling his dream of being the president who takes
Ukraine into the preparatory stage of NATO membership will be in 2009, his last
year in office. Ukraine,
though, could also fail the test of political stability in April 2009, during
NATO’s 60th anniversary summit when Ukraine
and Georgia
could again come under consideration for membership action plans.
Yushchenko’s
preference for pre-term elections over compromise, because of his loathing of
Tymoshenko, means that a new parliamentary coalition and government will not be
in place until March 2009, a month before the NATO anniversary and too little
time to show NATO doubters, like Germany,
that Ukraine is
politically stable.
Ukraine’s
chances of advancing toward NATO membership next year, even after an election,
might be thwarted by Yushchenko’s own actions. In recent years, the West has
pushed for Orange unity
as a stepping stone to NATO and European Union membership. This, though, is no
longer likely. That train has left the station.
Ukraine’s
chances of moving closer to NATO membership will be derailed, as in 2006, if an
anti-crisis coalition is formed with Yanukovych returning as prime minister in
2009. Next year will also be the year of the presidential election campaign.
NATO membership is an unpopular topic for candidates to campaign on. The irony
is that the August crisis in Georgia
has made NATO membership more popular in Ukraine.
In recent polls, 31 percent of Ukrainians now support membership.
To
have any chance of making progress toward NATO, Yushchenko will have to place
national interests above personal conflicts by restoring the Orange
union in order to show NATO and the EU that a pro-Western coalition is in
place. Yushchenko must also summon the will to battle corruption and establish
the rule of law. Instead, as senior Western officials advising Ukraine
have complained, Ukraine
has stagnated in both areas since the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko has often
not abided by the law, does not understand the importance of the equality of
all citizens before the law and blocks the prosecution of members of the elite
for abuse of office.
Instead,
the president’s ostensible support for Ukraine’s
NATO membership has been completely undermined by his own inability to contain
his deep “Yuliaphobia.” After the 2007 parliamentary elections, Yushchenko
eventually agreed to support an Orange
coalition and Tymoshenko as prime minister, but then proceeded to immediately
undermine it. He appointed Party of Regions parliamentary faction leader Raisa
Bohatyriova to chair the National Security and Defence Council, which, again,
became misused as an alternative government rather than as what it is
constitutionally defined to do: coordinate foreign and security policy.
It
is supremely ironic that the president’s support for Ukraine’s
NATO membership is undermined by his own actions. Yushchenko has made a choice:
namely, that it is more important for him to destroy and remove Tymoshenko from
government than it is for Ukraine to
join NATO. The president and Ukraine
will have to live with the consequences.
Taras
Kuzio is president of Kuzio Associates, an independent consultancy based in
Washington, D.C., and Kyiv.