Bracing for Failure

Before the Vilnius Summit

By the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation

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On November 8 the Verkhovna Rada adopted bills “On the Prosecutor General’s Office” and “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Improvement of Laws on Holding of Elections”. Both laws are on the list of three conditions that the EU has put to Ukraine for signing of the Vilnius Agreement. The third key requirement of resolving the issue of the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko remains at a standstill. Parliamentarians agreed only to form a working group that must draft a single bill on the treatment of Tymoshenko abroad, after members of the Party of Regions declined to support any of the four bills proposed.

The events of this past week confirmed the apprehensions of many political experts that President Yanukovych is not planning to release Tymoshenko from prison or send her to Germany for medical treatment even for the sake of getting the consent of all EU member countries for signing of the Association Agreement with Ukraine. The rhetoric of members of the PoR began the week making statements that they have no plans of supporting the bill on the treatment of Tymoshenko abroad submitted by the independent MP Anzhelika Labunska, which the Cox-Kwasniewski mission of the European Parliament recommended. The logical extension of this matter was the meeting of the VR committee held on November 6 during which the members of the PoR voted down with a majority of votes any of the aforementioned bills and sent them back for revision. The events of this past Friday, when the parliament decided to form a working group that is to determine the further destiny of a law to allow Tymoshenko’s medical treatment abroad, were the natural conclusion to these processes. Given the fact that President Yanukovych has full control over members of the PoR, it is no secret that the decision to sabotage the approval of any decision regarding Tymoshenko was the end result of the directives of the presidential administration. This, in turn, means that Yanukovych still hopes to convince the European side of the need to sign the Association Agreement even without resolution of the Tymoshenko issue. Clearly, he believes that the formal fulfillment of two other requirements will help in this matter. In many ways progress in these areas is quite illusory. On the one hand, the law on the prosecutor’s office drafted by the Presidential Administration contains a number of flaws that could be a detriment to the reform of this body. On the other hand, the text of new election regulations approved on November 8 de facto does not differ much from the current law in effect, which is why it will not significantly change legislative regulation of the electoral process. Despite this, European politicians are ready to turn a blind eye even to the slow pace of reform in these two critical spheres if the Tymoshenko matter is resolved. But the chances that Yanukovych will agree to free Tymoshenko before the summit in Vilnius remain slim to none. The working group formed presumably to draft a bill on this issue is mainly made up of members of the PoR, meaning that it will become an instrument for biding for time for Yanukovych, this scenario is clearly the most convenient one as it will give him hope to achieve at least one of two objectives.

On the one hand, by continuing to promise Europeans that he will find a resolution to the Tymoshenko matter and doing nothing about it, Yanukovych still hopes to get their consent to signing the Association Agreement in Vilnius. However, the chances that this tactic will work are not very high.

Clearly understanding this, the president is also trying to use the time left before the summit to find possible ways of placing the responsibility for the possible failure of signing of the agreement on the shoulders of other politicians. Given that Tymoshenko publicly agreed to any option proposed by the Cox-Kwasniewski mission, blaming her for blockading the European integration of Ukraine is, at the very least, illogical. This is why as of late members of the PoR have been actively trying to put the blame on the shoulders of the parliamentary opposition.. For this very reason, it is understood that Yanukovych’s attempts to “clean his hands” on the eve of the summit in Vilnius will not change the fact that he himself is the main obstacle to signing of the agreement. While earlier it seemed that the finalization of this critical stage of European integration was for Yanukovych in essence more important than the possible harmonization with Russia, today the situation does not look as ambiguous. Perhaps this can be attributed to the dire financial situation that Ukraine has fallen into over recent months due to the problem with repayment of debts for Russian gas.

Accordingly, in order to patch the holes in the budget and guarantee social payouts leading up t the presidential elections, the government desperately needs considerable funds. It is quite obvious that Yanukovych and his team are considering the possibility of receiving funds from both EU institutions and Russia. However, if European structures will demand that Ukraine undertake concrete reforms in exchange for funding, Russian money may be allocated without such painful conditions for Ukraine. Another factor altogether is that Russia could in turn put requirements to Ukraine of a different political kind, though for Yanukovych they may be more acceptable. Whether the Ukrainian president is ready to sacrifice the Association Agreement with the EU for the sake of receiving financial aid from Russia will very soon become clear.