Dear Colleagues,

We address ourselves to you in response to the decree of the president of Ukraine dated 13 March 2002 “On the Commemoration of the 350th Anniversary of the Pereiaslav Cossack Council of 1654.” The decree’s contents, as well as the membership of the organizing committee, indicate the serious nature and breadth of scope of the intended undertaking. The 2004 commemoration of the Pereiaslav Council, if actually carried out according to the plan outlined in the decree, will not, of course, equal the scale of the 300th anniversary “commemoration” in 1954, but will significantly outdo the 325th anniversary “commemoration” of 1979. The previous anniversaries were commemorated in Ukraine as a constituent of the Soviet Union; this new “commemoration” is to take place in independent Ukraine. The main feature that seems to distinguish the proposed 2004 event from those of 1954 and 1979 is the use of the more neutral term “commemoration” in the 2002 decree as opposed to the previous Communist Party-prescribed term “celebration.” In the main, the Soviet tradition of fawning before Moscow and the “elder brother” is being continued.

Do the authors of the decree and members of the organizing committee not understand that they are preparing to commemorate the anniversary of an event that led to the abolition of the independent Ukrainian state formed under Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s leadership? The March decree calls into question not only the historical legitimacy of Ukraine’s current independence, but also the official genealogy of the Ukrainian government. That government’s traditions go back to Ukraine’s first president, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who regarded Pereiaslav as a mistake and declared an “end to [our] orientation on Moscow” in 1918. The decree also calls into question Ukraine’s official declarations in favour of European integration. When it comes to the historical calendar, the decree ignores the 750th anniversary of Prince Danylo’s coronation (symbolizing Ukraine’s orientation on the West) in 2003, but “commemorates” the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council, which marked the beginning of the Russian Empire’s westward expansion. Will the “commemoration” of Pereiaslav be followed by similar elaborate “commemorations” of the Ukrainian-Swedish alliance of 1656, the Hadiach Agreement of 1658, or Ivan Mazepa’s break (“betrayal,” in official Soviet terminology) with Moscow in 1708? The answer to this question will be given, most likely, during the presidential elections of 2004, for which the “commemoration” of Pereiaslav is undoubtedly intended to set the tone.

The organizing committee of the “commemoration” includes not only politicians and government officials, for whom elections are the alpha and omega of their existence, but also leading scholars who have done much in the past decade to demolish the Pereiaslav myth created by Russian imperial and Soviet historiography. Their careers will not begin or end with the 2004 elections, while scholarship—their “electoral district” —is no place for dramatic shifts in conclusions and orientations every few years. To a degree, we understand the motives that guide many of them. For directors of scholarly institutes, the decree is a means of obtaining funds from the state, of which there is a great dearth and which are constantly lacking for scholarly pursuits, particularly conferences, publications, and other activities for which provision is made in the presidential decree. Besides, taking money earmarked for “commemorations” makes it possible to hold genuine conferences, undermine the “Pereiaslav myth,” and underscore the true motives and significance of the Pereiaslav Council—a real turning point in Ukrainian history. These arguments, which we have had occasion to hear, were certainly valid in a state that did not belong to us. But reverting to this way of thinking in independent Ukraine is equivalent to one more attempt at outfoxing oneself.

Intentionally or not, the presidential decree of 13 March 2002 politicizes historical scholarship in order to legitimize a possible change in the foreign policy of Ukraine and reorient the historical consciousness of the Ukrainian people. Your participation in these measures—commemorating an event that most historians on the organizing committee continue to regard as a decision forced upon our “great Bohdan”—will lend legitimacy to those forces in Ukraine and beyond that seek to resurrect the empire which Pereiaslav helped create. That would be a disservice to Russia and Ukraine, whose progress requires not the rebuilding of the empire but the development of democratic nation-states.