Part 1 of a series by the president of the Ukrainian World Congress

Askold S Lozynskyj

The Ukrainian diaspora as a clearly defined phenomenon has been in existence since the early eighteenth century after the battle of Poltava, although emigration to foreign lands began even earlier. However, numbers have been very difficult to estimate in the past. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, and, in particular, the demise of the USSR, as well as the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, the diaspora has become much more viable as a separate entity and certainly, much easier to define. Today, Ukrainians residing outside of Ukraine, by relatively conservative estimates number more than 18 million people, with approximately 10 million within the Russian Federation alone. Its most striking characteristics are its lack of homogeneity and the fact that it truly encompasses the entire globe.

Aside from the Russian Federation, large numbers of Ukrainians populate Belarus 1.5 million, the United States of America 1 million, Canada 1 million, Kazakhstan 0.7 million, Moldova-Trandniester 0.65 million, Brazil 0.5 million, Poland 0.4 million, Argentina 0.3 million, Uzbekistan 0.3 million, and Portugal-Spain 0.3 million. The remainder are found in Western Europe (United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, France, Scandinavia, Benelux), Eastern Europe (Romania, Slovakia, Baltic states, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia) and Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and Australia.

The lack of homogeneity is illustrated best, perhaps, within the Russian Federation. The Federation is quite diverse and its Ukrainian element is a result of immigrations, forced settlements and dislocations varied in time and cause. A glaring example in this respect are the three Siberian oblasts of Omsk, Tomsk and Novosibirsk. Some of the earliest Ukrainians settled there some time after the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654. Most recently, a number of emigrs have arrived following Ukrainian independence, since Siberia with its vast resources and a vibrant economy offers economic opportunities. In between are descendants of economic opportunities in the latter half of the 19th century, the early part of the twentieth as well as heirs of political enemies of the USSR from the 1930s through the 1950s sent to Siberia for punishment and rehabilitation. National awareness is often a result of these two variables: time and cause. For example, many descendants of the earliest economic settlers call themselves khakhly, a term which we [in the western diaspora - Ed.] deem derogatory, but which seems acceptable to them. They define it as a term which merely means little Russian or Ukrainian, different from a great Russian within the context of a brotherhood of peoples who trace their roots to Kyivan Rus. On the other hand, descendants of political settlers and new immigrants erect community structures, establish lines of communication with government officials and attempt to avail themselves of democratic processes, i.e. raising national awareness for the October 2002 census.

The city of Moscow is a phenomenon unto itself. It is impossible to compare living conditions in the capital and almost anywhere else in Russia, and, especially in the villages. Some 75% of Russias wealth is concentrated in Moscow. Ukrainians in Moscow tend to be better off economically, more nationally astute and even politically connected, with access to Russian ministries and Ukraines diplomatic missions. A Ukrainian cultural center funded by the government of Ukraine is a prominent edifice in the center of Moscow on the old Arbat Street with a bookstore and restaurant. Additionally, the community boasts a library and now a modest Ukrainian language class at the Linguistics Lyceum.

Another distinction in diaspora communities deals with the indigenous versus emigr phenomena. The Russian Federation, Belarus, Romania, Slovakia and Romania today include lands considered by Ukrainians, at least, ethnographically Ukrainian. Thus a Ukrainian in Kuban, Russian Federation is indigenous, while one in Siberia is an emigr. Similarly, a Ukrainian in Brest, Belarus is indigenous, while one in Minsk is an emigr. A Ukrainian in southern Bukovyna, Romania is indigenous while one in Bucharest in an emigr. A Ukrainian in Presov, Slovakia is indigenous, while one in Bratislava is an emigr. A Ukrainian in Przemysl, Poland is indigenous while one in Warsaw is an emigr. Aside from a higher concentration in the case of the indigenous populations, this distinction is becoming largely irrelevant given the world communitys recognition of existing borders, as almost every country includes lands formerly belonging to another.

The differences between the various Ukrainian diaspora communities are even more palpable in terms of economic deficiencies. This is true particularly, with communities in the Eastern diaspora, and more in the former USSR than the satellites. Ukrainians in Kazakhstan are at the bottom of the economic ladder. The average income for pensioners there is somewhere between US $15-20 per month. This may appear surprising given Kazakhstans plentiful natural resources. Unfortunately, the countrys potential is overwhelmed by government corruption at the highest levels. The demise of soviet communism and the introduction of a market economy has resulted in an oligarchic society with little attention to the needs of the masses. While Ukraine has received much criticism in the West for being corrupt, Ukraines oligarchs are benign by comparison with many of the central Asian republics. Additionally, Ukraine does possess an anti-corruption program, however ineffective. Historically, corruption has inhibited real progress over the long term. South America, despite its potential and the existence of entrenched democratic institutions, has failed to achieve economic prosperity because of corruption. In Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela South American countries inhabited by Ukrainians one finds some very rich people, including Ukrainians, but a middle class hardly exists. Thus even some Ukrainians in the Western diaspora (South America) seek, rather than offer assistance.

Cultural deficiencies are next in terms of needs that require attention. Again, Russia is a glaring example. Despite the large number of Ukrainians, the Russian government does not fund a single full-time Ukrainian language primary school. Compare that with 3,500 Russian language full time primary schools funded by the Ukrainian government in Ukraine. Russian law allows for Ukrainian language classes in Russian schools where 25 parents sign a petition. As a result, several Ukrainian language classes have sprouted in the Russian Federation, in Moscow, Tomsk and elsewhere. Unfortunately, that law is not promulgated widely and therefore Ukrainian communities do not avail themselves of this option. In any event, learning Ukrainian seems to be a dead end for two main reasons: higher education in Ukrainian is not possible in Russia; and, continuing studies at higher education institutions in Ukraine itself is not an alternative given Ukraines economic malaise, its own struggle to develop Ukrainian scholarship and the lack of programs for foreign students of Ukrainian ethnicity.

Askold S. Lozynskyj, president of the Ukrainian World Congress, is a lawyer living in New York. The UWC traditionally holds its main fundraising driving during the month of May. For more information about the organization and its wide ranging activities, visit ukrainianworldcongress.org