Part 2 a series by the president of the Ukrainian World Congress

Askold S Lozynskyj

Similar problems exist in other countries where no funding is available and Ukrainian is not an attractive option. Even in Poland, which has manifested a strong resolve to become democratic (and despite the overwhelming support of President Kwasniewski), being Ukrainian is not an avenue towards career advancement. In Belarus, government policies are stifling development and Ukrainians are viewed negatively as potential separatists. In the Slovak Republic the government attempts to play the Ukrainian vs Rusyn dichotomy in order to weaken both, assimilate and eliminate any potential separatism involving the region of Pryashivshchyna although that is hardly a consideration for the Ukrainian or Rusyn element.

Also suffering is freedom of religion as a human right and an element of cultural development. Religious persecution is so apparent in Russia’s law on religion that it has been criticized widely by the world community. The Russian Federation’s law on religion in theory recognizes four denominations: Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. In practice, regional administrations register other denominations such as Protestant, Roman Catholic etc. However, Ukrainian Orthodoxy or Ukrainian Catholicism is not tolerated. In certain instances Ukrainians worship as Russian Orthodox or Roman Catholics. An attempt to register a Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) in Noginsk, Russia was met by violent repression from the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian government officials refused to intervene, disingenuously, motivating their restraint with church-state separation arguments. Ukrainian Catholics in Omsk oblast are registered as a German Roman Catholic Church. Less egregious but still persecutory are Poland and Slovakia. Both try to “Latinize” Ukrainian Catholicism. Restitution of community and church property to Ukrainians is a laborious and often abortive process. Compare that with Ukraine where some 8,500 parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate operate freely with government sanction and support.

Finally, assimilation is a problem even in the United States, Canada, Western Europe and Australia. Demographic studies have shown that in these countries, less than 20% of the Ukrainian population speaks Ukrainian fluently. This has been ameliorated somewhat by an influx of new immigrants from Ukraine at the expense of Ukraine itself where the population has fallen below 49 million. This influx, however, has not resulted in an appreciable increase in activity by the Western diaspora, since the “old guard” is in decline and its children are nowhere. Baby boomers in the West have distinguished themselves with little except self-gratification. Perhaps, the problem stems from relevance to what degree is being Ukrainian relevant to one’s existence, and, in addition, how important is it to speak and write Ukrainian. The establishment of an independent Ukraine even with all its deficiencies, but with geo-strategic importance has done much to foster a national awareness within the Western diaspora. Ukraine’s future as a significant democratic market or a “banana republic without bananas” will determine the level of enthusiasm within its Western diaspora.

The Ukrainian diaspora indeed stretches the globe. Locations unknown as Ukrainian enclaves, albeit small, such as Zurich, Tokyo, Beijing have sprouted. To date these enclaves lack structures. Nevertheless, representatives of these communities participate often in all-Ukrainian events such as the most recent III World Forum of Ukrainians held in Kyiv, August 2001. The significance of this phenomenon is that demographics are dynamic and require constant attention.

Unfortunately, Ukraine’s relationship with its diaspora has been erratic at best. With independence, the government of Ukraine initiated the formation of a hybrid governmental/non-governmental organization, the World Ukrainian Coordinating Council (WUCC). The WUCC has been a disaster. One theory suggests that this structure was instituted in order to provide the government with some measure of control over the diaspora. The leadership put in place was chosen for its malleability, rather than competency. Others have suggested that the WUCC was instituted strictly to create a perception of concern with no regard as to efficacy. Equally disappointing has been the juggling of ministries, state committees and now the foreign ministry in order to deal with the diaspora. A program for the diaspora ending in 2000 was never implemented. So in September 2001 a more ambitious new program earmarked until 2005 was introduced, however bereft of budgetary allocations. A bill on the status (rights and privileges) of foreign Ukrainians (residing outside Ukraine) has been introduced in the Verkhovna Rada and has stalled there.

The most significant deficiency has been Ukraine’s apparent lack of concern for the diaspora, particularly, the Eastern segment. The Western diaspora has offered a measure of financial and political support to the government of Ukraine and the government upon occasion has availed itself of that support. It is important to note that even in efforts of mutual concern and cooperation, each side (Ukraine and Western diaspora representatives) proceed most gingerly, not so much careful so as not to overstep as careful not trusting the other side fully. The Eastern diaspora offers Ukraine neither political clout nor financial resources. Altruism or national awareness and concern is not the mantra of today’s leadership in Ukraine. Ukraine shies away from intervention with other governments on behalf of its diaspora, i.e. Russian Federation, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, citing “internal affairs”, “good neighbour diplomacy” and even ignorance. Ironically, both Russian presidents to date have been significantly less squeamish, diplomatic or ignorant when dealing with issues relating to their diapora. This example is not a result simply of Russian arrogance. The Bulgarian government for example voices its concern about some 250 thousand Bulgarians residing in Ukraine. Germany and Poland offer assistance to its brethren residing in foreign countries. Ukraine’s leadership simply fails to recognize its role as the Ukrainian government.

In 1967 Ukrainians from the United States, Canada, South America, Western Europe and Australia established a global Ukrainian coordinating body, naming it the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, now the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC). With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the USSR, the UWC has expanded its role to reach out to less fortunate Ukrainians in the East. The support offered by the UWC has been mostly contact and intervention. In addition to existing Western communities, UWC representatives have visited Ukrainian communities in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Belarus (Minsk and Brest), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (Moscow, Bashkortostan, Tyumen, Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk). The UWC has communicated with the Slovak government regarding its policy of dividing Ukrainians and Rusyns; the Polish government regarding compensation of concentration camp inmates, condemnation of “Akcija Wisla”, property restitution; the Belarus government regarding registration of Ukrainian non-governmental organizations and the Russian government regarding Ukrainian religious freedom and Ukrainian language schools. Some minimal humanitarian aid as well as other financial support has been given, i.e. flood victims in Romania, support for the elderly, construction of a school and church in Kazakhstan, support for Ukrainian language publications in Belarus and Russia etc. Most significant, however, has been the inclusion of the Eastern diaspora within the membership roll of the UWC. The UWC has established systematic communication via newsletters and bulletins, telephone and e-mail communication as well as visits. Belonging to the UWC has strengthened the psychological makeup and political position of the Eastern diaspora communities. UWC representatives have made a point of meeting with government officials during their visits to the Eastern diaspora, underlining their concern with the community’s well-being. Additionally, the UWC is reaching out to sprouting Ukrainian diaspora communities in the West, most recently, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece.

There’s much more ahead. We’re just getting started!