UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN YEREVAN... Hennady Udovenko held talks in Yerevan on 11 July with his Armenian counterpart, Alexander Arzoumanian, and with President Levon Ter-Petrossyan, Armenian and Russian agencies reported. Udovenko called for increased bilateral and trilateral economic cooperation, with Russia as the third partner, and undertook to support Armenia's stated wish to participate in the TRASECA transport project. He also expressed support for proposals by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk group aimed at resolving the Karabakh conflict.

...AND TBILISI. Also on 11 July, Udovenko met with Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili and President Eduard Shevardnadze in Tbilisi. He assured them that Kyiv still backs Georgia's claim to part of the Black Sea fleet, according to ITAR-TASS. Interfax quoted Udovenko as telling journalists that Russia should continue to play the key role in mediating a settlement of the Abkhaz conflict, but ITAR-TASS quoted the Georgian presidential press service as saying Ukraine wished to participate in a proposed peace conference on Abkhazia convened by Western states. Udovenko said Ukraine is prepared to provide a contingent of peacekeeping forces to serve in Abkhazia under UN auspices if the Security Council decides to deploy such a force.

The timetable for NATO expansion announced at the Madrid summit on 8-9 July may break down even before the alliance takes in its first new members two years from now. The summit invited three countries--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--to begin accession talks leading to membership by 1999. The alliance leaders indicated they will consider inviting a second group of countries in that year and that they will keep the process of including ever more East European countries in the alliance both open and deliberate after that time.

This carefully worked-out timetable reflected calculations by some NATO leaders about how both their own populations and Moscow would react. Many NATO leaders noted that they could not hope to win popular support for the costs of expansion if the alliance tried to take in too many countries too quickly. Even more NATO leaders suggested that a slow, step-by-step expansion is the only way to avoid offending Moscow and pushing Russia back into an adversarial role.

But there are already at least three indications that the Western alliance may have a number of difficulties in holding to that script.

First, many of the countries that had hoped to be invited into the alliance now or in the near future are stepping up their campaigns for membership rather than accepting the Madrid timetable. The countries that had hoped to make it into the first round--Slovenia, Romania, and the three Baltic States--indicated that they will increase their efforts to be included sooner than the Madrid schedule. Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, for example, pointed out on 9 July that "a long-term cataclysm could occur in three, four, or five years." As a result, he said, Vilnius wanted "guarantees for the future" sooner rather than later.

Other East European countries that were not expected to be included took courage from the alliance's decision to expand and indicated that they, too, might press for membership far sooner than the NATO leaders had planned. Buoyed by their charter with the Western alliance, several Ukrainian political figures said they hoped Ukraine will achieve NATO membership in the not too distant future- -something no one in the alliance now appears to be contemplating.

Second, the three countries that were invited to join at Madrid reportedly have agreed to press for the more rapid inclusion of the Baltic States into the Western alliance. The presidents of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary met with their counterparts from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on 9 July and told them they will press for Baltic membership in the alliance as soon as possible. Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis said he and his Baltic colleagues looked to the three Madrid invitees "to become advocates" of the rapid inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Such support for Baltic membership may be more difficult to resist than the NATO planners expected. In addition to Polish, Hungarian, and Czech support, the Balts received backing from Thomas Siebert, the ambassador to Sweden. Siebert told the Swedish newspaper "Dagens Nyheter" on 9 July that "we will not consider the expansion of NATO to be accomplished or successful unless or before the Baltic States' ambitions are fulfilled."

Both the efforts of those who hope to join and the attitudes of those already invited to do so will put pressure on the alliance to move more quickly than it had planned, especially since those on the outside are likely to view any delay as a sell-out of their security.

But the third indication that the Madrid timetable may not be kept suggests that NATO may not expand as quickly as the Madrid summit planned. The pressure on NATO from both those included and those not yet in inevitably raises the stakes of the first round of alliance expansion and thus virtually guarantees increased opposition to any growth in the alliance from both Moscow and many in the West.

Russian leaders, including President Boris Yeltsin, have indicated that they can accept NATO's expansion only if it is both limited and deliberate. Consequently, at least some in Moscow are likely to consider the statements of those countries not invited in and especially of those invited to join at Madrid to pose a threat--one, moreover, that Russia is likely to respond to.

Such a response will have an impact on the ratification debates in the current NATO member countries and provide ammunition to those who oppose any growth in the alliance. As a result, the euphoria about the Madrid NATO summit could quickly evaporate, as some countries discover that their own enthusiasms threaten their own interests.

U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY IN UKRAINE. William Cohen, meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in Kyiv on 12 July, said the special partnership charter with NATO "illustrates Ukraine's commitment to integration into the West." Cohen also praised Ukraine for its contributions to European security. At the same time, he urged the country's leaders to press ahead with economic reforms. Cohen told reporters after his meeting with the president that the relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine is strong and enduring. He said the two countries will share information, technology, and expertise on setting up female units in the armed forces. Kuchma offered the use of a training ground in western Ukraine for international exercises for military peace missions. Cohen also met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Olexander Kuzmuk. After their talks, he told a news conference that Ukraine needed to spend more to modernize its armed forces.

The timetable for NATO expansion announced at the Madrid summit on 8-9 July may break down even before the alliance takes in its first new members two years from now. The summit invited three countries--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--to begin accession talks leading to membership by 1999. The alliance leaders indicated they will consider inviting a second group of countries in that year and that they will keep the process of including ever more East European countries in the alliance both open and deliberate after that time.

This carefully worked-out timetable reflected calculations by some NATO leaders about how both their own populations and Moscow would react. Many NATO leaders noted that they could not hope to win popular support for the costs of expansion if the alliance tried to take in too many countries too quickly. Even more NATO leaders suggested that a slow, step-by-step expansion is the only way to avoid offending Moscow and pushing Russia back into an adversarial role.

But there are already at least three indications that the Western alliance may have a number of difficulties in holding to that script.

First, many of the countries that had hoped to be invited into the alliance now or in the near future are stepping up their campaigns for membership rather than accepting the Madrid timetable. The countries that had hoped to make it into the first round--Slovenia, Romania, and the three Baltic States--indicated that they will increase their efforts to be included sooner than the Madrid schedule. Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, for example, pointed out on 9 July that "a long-term cataclysm could occur in three, four, or five years." As a result, he said, Vilnius wanted "guarantees for the future" sooner rather than later.

Other East European countries that were not expected to be included took courage from the alliance's decision to expand and indicated that they, too, might press for membership far sooner than the NATO leaders had planned. Buoyed by their charter with the Western alliance, several Ukrainian political figures said they hoped Ukraine will achieve NATO membership in the not too distant future- -something no one in the alliance now appears to be contemplating.

Second, the three countries that were invited to join at Madrid reportedly have agreed to press for the more rapid inclusion of the Baltic States into the Western alliance. The presidents of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary met with their counterparts from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on 9 July and told them they will press for Baltic membership in the alliance as soon as possible. Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis said he and his Baltic colleagues looked to the three Madrid invitees "to become advocates" of the rapid inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Such support for Baltic membership may be more difficult to resist than the NATO planners expected. In addition to Polish, Hungarian, and Czech support, the Balts received backing from Thomas Siebert, the ambassador to Sweden. Siebert told the Swedish newspaper "Dagens Nyheter" on 9 July that "we will not consider the expansion of NATO to be accomplished or successful unless or before the Baltic States' ambitions are fulfilled."

Both the efforts of those who hope to join and the attitudes of those already invited to do so will put pressure on the alliance to move more quickly than it had planned, especially since those on the outside are likely to view any delay as a sell-out of their security.

But the third indication that the Madrid timetable may not be kept suggests that NATO may not expand as quickly as the Madrid summit planned. The pressure on NATO from both those included and those not yet in inevitably raises the stakes of the first round of alliance expansion and thus virtually guarantees increased opposition to any growth in the alliance from both Moscow and many in the West.

Russian leaders, including President Boris Yeltsin, have indicated that they can accept NATO's expansion only if it is both limited and deliberate. Consequently, at least some in Moscow are likely to consider the statements of those countries not invited in and especially of those invited to join at Madrid to pose a threat--one, moreover, that Russia is likely to respond to.

Such a response will have an impact on the ratification debates in the current NATO member countries and provide ammunition to those who oppose any growth in the alliance. As a result, the euphoria about the Madrid NATO summit could quickly evaporate, as some countries discover that their own enthusiasms threaten their own interests.