CIS PREMIERS MEET. Addressing his CIS counterparts in Moscow on 6 March, Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin called for "unconventional measures" to expedite economic integration among CIS countries. At the same time, he argued there are "no political differences" between member states. Chernomyrdin advocated the creation of a free trade zone and told journalists after the meeting that participants had agreed to the Russian-Ukrainian proposal to convene a CIS inter-state conference to drafting guidelines on reforming the commonwealth. Of the 25 documents submitted for discussion at the meeting, 11 were signed, including accords on trans-national corporation, a common agrarian market, and cooperation between law enforcement agencies. However, those accords were not signed by all members. Georgia, for example, declined to sign an agreement on developing military cooperation within the CIS. LF

CONFUSION OVER RUSSIA'S COMMITMENT TO BUSHEHR. Russian Atomic Energy Ministry spokesman Georgii Kaurov confirmed on 6 March that Moscow and Tehran have agreed "in principle" that Russia will build a third and fourth reactor at Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, Reuters reported. But another ministry spokesman, Vitalii Nasonov, told ITAR-TASS the same day that no talks have yet taken place on building those reactors. Nasonov also said Russia will not sign any further nuclear energy agreements with Iran until the Bushehr plant is completed. He added that Russian contractors will supply the required turbines for Bushehr following Ukraine's 6 March decision not to do so (see Part II). On 9 March, "The New York Times" quoted unnamed senior U.S. officials as saying Washington is prepared to offer Russia the chance to increase launches of commercial satellites if it undertakes to stop selling nuclear missile technology to Tehran. LF

KYIV CANCELS DEAL OVER IRANIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko announced that Ukraine will cancel a deal to supply turbines to an Iranian nuclear power plant (see also Part I). That statement followed a 6 March meeting in Kyiv with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at which the two leaders signed a 30-year nuclear cooperation agreement. Under that agreement, U.S. companies will be allowed to aid in the completion of two Ukrainian nuclear reactors needed to secure the permanent closing of Chornobyl. Iran responded by saying it has "no need for Ukraine's unreliable partnership" and by criticizing Ukrainian leaders for "succumbing to America's humiliating attitude and threats." Also on 6 March, Albright urged President Leonid Kuchma to accelerate economic reforms and to increase the battle against corruption to ensure a more stable environment for foreign investors. PB

UKRAINE AGREES TO REPAY GAZPROM DEBT. Ukrainian Prime Minister Valery Pustovoytenko said on 6 March in Moscow that he has reached agreement with Gazprom and Russian officials to pay $750 million of Ukraine's debt to the Russian gas giant, ITAR-TASS reported. The agreement, which followed two days of talks between Pustovoytenko and Gazprom head Rem Vyakhirev, calls for that sum to be paid by 1 October. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin also participated in the talks. Ukraine owes some $1.2 billion to Gazprom. In other news, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development says it has approved additional funding for the repair of the leaking sarcophagus over Chornobyl's fourth reactor. PB

In obtaining its invitation to be among the first wave of NATO entrants and in achieving recognition as a candidate in the first round of accession talks to the EU, Poland is on track to achieve two of its main strategic goals in the post-Soviet era. At the same time, it faces challenges that arise from its relations with neighboring countries and that are incompatible in the short-term with invitations to those Western clubs. Sharing borders with the former Soviet bloc states of Ukraine, Belarus, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Russia (the Kaliningrad Oblast), Poland is preparing to face disputes that could upset the current delicate regional balance.

While building its networks to EU member countries and managing a heavy foreign-policy workload in preparation for entry into Western institutions, Poland is forging new relations with its Eastern neighbors. By virtue of its key geographical position and size, it has a special responsibility to build a new post-Soviet framework for effective security and economic ties in the region.

Security and economic matters are no longer determined by a bipolar European order but rather by still-forming regional spheres. Crises that are local in nature can quickly become of regional concern. As a result, Poland must take into consideration that a crisis in Ukraine or Belarus, for example, could spill over, thus negatively affecting relations with Warsaw's future NATO and EU allies.

With regard to regional security, Belarus is a particularly difficult case. Should Minsk choose to engage in a more assertive military relationship with Russia, the security landscape of the region would be significantly altered. Such a development would be of direct concern to the expanding NATO alliance and would influence the behavior and response of other post-Soviet countries in the area, requiring them to more clearly declare their status within the evolving regional security structure. Moreover, Poland, the key alliance member on NATO's new "front line," would find itself in an especially sensitive position.

As regards the economy, Poland is rapidly being absorbed into the Western zone of trade. With the exception of the Czech Republic, all the traditionally Central and East European states sharing borders with Poland are currently outside this zone. Those "second-tier" countries are likely to remain outside for some time to come.

Slovakia, once mentioned in the same breath as candidates invited in the first round of EU and NATO talks, has now slipped into the second group. Its advancement is conditioned on the country's adapting to international norms of political behavior. The incorrigibility of Slovakia's "old-style" leadership has all but assured a place further down the line of accession to many key Western institutions.

To address the challenges presented by some of its neighbors, Poland has negotiated a host of bilateral agreements with its neighbors. Most recently, it concluded an agreement to enhance cooperation in a range of areas--including economics, agriculture and transportation--with regions from six countries bordering the Baltic Sea. That accord, along with others like it, is a constructive step toward creating an atmosphere of confidence in the area.

At present, the likelihood of violent conflict is minimal among the countries of the region, many of which have been adversaries in the past. Economic instability, organized crime, and migration-related issues are more likely to pose short-term threats. Recent friction between Poland and Belarus over visa requirements for Belarusian nationals is just one example of such disputes. Meanwhile, to the West, Polish-German relations continue to develop, with unified Germany eager to institutionalize Poland's integration into the Western community.

The success of that integration will depend on the Polish leadership's ability to deal with the challenges posed by its neighbors to the East while simultaneously preparing for economic competition within the EU and the responsibilities of military participation in NATO. The West should bear that burden in mind as it presses Poland to meet its obligations for admission into Western institutions.