KAZAKH PLANE WITH RADIOACTIVE CARGO GROUNDED IN UKRAINE. An Il-76 cargo plane belonging to a Kazakh airline has been grounded by Ukrainian authorities after police found 40 tons of "unidentified" radioactive material aboard, Interfax reported on 6 June. The plane, which was bound for Russia from Germany, stopped at Ukraine's Rovno airport for refueling when the discovery was made. The material was in metal barrels and measurements near the containers showed radioactivity levels "seriously above the norm." BP

The transition from Communism in the post-Soviet states currently finds some countries with a strong president, others with a strong parliament, and a growing number in which real power lies outside the government itself.

Examples of each have been very much in evidence recently. In Azerbaijan, where the executive is clearly in charge, President Heidar Aliev has dominated the discussions at a Baku meeting of Western oil companies interested in gaining access to the petroleum of the Caspian basin.

In Ukraine, where the parliament is predominant, the failure of the parliament to elect a new speaker has sent shock waves through the political system and prompted predictions that Kyiv will remain unable to address the country's numerous economic problems.

And in Russia, the country's economic crisis has highlighted just how much power has passed from the government to institutions beyond its reach. Instead of calling in bankers, journalists, and others and giving them directions, as would have been true only a few years ago, Russian officials from President Boris Yeltsin down have been consulting with them and requesting their assistance.

Such variations are entirely natural and up to a point welcome. There is no one model for how democratic political regimes should organize themselves, nor for what should be the balance of power between the executive, the legislative, and society as a whole. The devolution of power from the executive, always the most powerful--in fact, if not on paper--in the Soviet era, is a necessary part of the transition from the communist past.

But if this pattern is both natural and welcome, it also presents some real problems for the countries themselves, for their interactions with one another, and for other countries that seek to deal with them.

For each of the countries of the region, this pattern has created two very different problems. On the one hand, most people living in these states began their postcommunist existence with a belief that only a strong legislature could guarantee democracy. But experience has taught many of them that legislatures may, in fact, block further change and that only a strong executive can help them institutionalize the arrangements that make democracy possible.

On the other hand, everyone in this region recognized that the all-embracing Soviet state was too strong. But ever more countries confront a situation in which the state is so weak that it cannot defend the interests of the population against uncontrolled private power or outside interference.

For the region as a whole, such variations make it increasingly difficult for these countries to cooperate. Most immediately, it makes it difficult to decide who should meet with whom--sometimes the president in one country is the appropriate representative and sometimes the prime minister or speaker of the parliament. And perhaps more important, it means that even when the appropriate officials are brought together--which does not always happen--they lack the power to implement any of the commitments they make.

For outsiders who want to work with the governments of this region, this incredible variety also creates some serious problems. Not only does it introduce a certain confusion over whether ambassadors focus on presidents, prime ministers, or someone else but it also means that outside governments may create problems by the choice they make in this regard.

Some Western governments have promoted a "presidentialization of politics" in these countries, both for simplicity and out of a sense that it is easier to deal with one person rather than a group. While understandable, that approach carries with it some real dangers. Not only may it restrict the transition to democracy by consolidating executive power at the expense of the legislative; it also tends to ignore the real devolution of authority away from the governments to other centers of power in the society.

Democracy, as any number of analysts have pointed out, is often a very messy form of government. But as the experience of the post-Soviet states shows, it can be even messier if those involved with it fail to understand just how many forms that messy system can take.

TAX CHIEF SAYS UKRAINE HAS 150,000 MILLIONAIRES. Ukrainian Tax Administration chief Mykola Azarov has said only seven persons declared incomes exceeding 1 million hryvni ($500,000) in Ukraine last year, Ukrainian Television reported. According to Azarov, the number of millionaires who made false declarations totals some 150,000. He also estimated that some 10-12 billion hryvni is circulating in Ukraine's shadow economy. Azarov said the tax bodies will be able to collect some 3.5 billion hryvni from that sector by the end of this year if the Supreme Council adopts a package of new tax legislation. JM

The transition from Communism in the post-Soviet states currently finds some countries with a strong president, others with a strong parliament, and a growing number in which real power lies outside the government itself.

Examples of each have been very much in evidence recently. In Azerbaijan, where the executive is clearly in charge, President Heidar Aliev has dominated the discussions at a Baku meeting of Western oil companies interested in gaining access to the petroleum of the Caspian basin.

In Ukraine, where the parliament is predominant, the failure of the parliament to elect a new speaker has sent shock waves through the political system and prompted predictions that Kyiv will remain unable to address the country's numerous economic problems.

And in Russia, the country's economic crisis has highlighted just how much power has passed from the government to institutions beyond its reach. Instead of calling in bankers, journalists, and others and giving them directions, as would have been true only a few years ago, Russian officials from President Boris Yeltsin down have been consulting with them and requesting their assistance.

Such variations are entirely natural and up to a point welcome. There is no one model for how democratic political regimes should organize themselves, nor for what should be the balance of power between the executive, the legislative, and society as a whole. The devolution of power from the executive, always the most powerful--in fact, if not on paper--in the Soviet era, is a necessary part of the transition from the communist past.

But if this pattern is both natural and welcome, it also presents some real problems for the countries themselves, for their interactions with one another, and for other countries that seek to deal with them.

For each of the countries of the region, this pattern has created two very different problems. On the one hand, most people living in these states began their postcommunist existence with a belief that only a strong legislature could guarantee democracy. But experience has taught many of them that legislatures may, in fact, block further change and that only a strong executive can help them institutionalize the arrangements that make democracy possible.

On the other hand, everyone in this region recognized that the all-embracing Soviet state was too strong. But ever more countries confront a situation in which the state is so weak that it cannot defend the interests of the population against uncontrolled private power or outside interference.

For the region as a whole, such variations make it increasingly difficult for these countries to cooperate. Most immediately, it makes it difficult to decide who should meet with whom--sometimes the president in one country is the appropriate representative and sometimes the prime minister or speaker of the parliament. And perhaps more important, it means that even when the appropriate officials are brought together--which does not always happen--they lack the power to implement any of the commitments they make.

For outsiders who want to work with the governments of this region, this incredible variety also creates some serious problems. Not only does it introduce a certain confusion over whether ambassadors focus on presidents, prime ministers, or someone else but it also means that outside governments may create problems by the choice they make in this regard.

Some Western governments have promoted a "presidentialization of politics" in these countries, both for simplicity and out of a sense that it is easier to deal with one person rather than a group. While understandable, that approach carries with it some real dangers. Not only may it restrict the transition to democracy by consolidating executive power at the expense of the legislative; it also tends to ignore the real devolution of authority away from the governments to other centers of power in the society.

Democracy, as any number of analysts have pointed out, is often a very messy form of government. But as the experience of the post-Soviet states shows, it can be even messier if those involved with it fail to understand just how many forms that messy system can take.