The most remarkable feature of the current Russian economic crisis is one that most commentaries have overlooked: namely, that the Russian collapse has not spread to the other post-Soviet states.

Even five years ago, most of the former Soviet republics were still sufficiently integrated that difficulties in the largest of them would inevitably have a large and immediate impact on all the others.

Now that has changed. More and more post-Soviet countries have succeeded in diversifying their trading partners so that problems in Russia will not be the determining factor in their development.

That is not to say that the problems in Moscow will not have an impact. Rather, the ways in which these Russian problems will affect the non-Russian countries are very different and more indirect than many are now assuming.

First, some but by no means all of the post-Soviet states remain sufficiently integrated with the Russian economy that problems in Moscow will have precisely the kind of impact that some are assuming will happen across the region. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, for example, will be under enormous pressure to devalue their national currencies if the Russian ruble continues to fall.

Second, many of the post-Soviet states have not yet completed the reform of their economic and legal systems that would make them able to withstand negative trends abroad. These countries--which are in the majority--thus suffer from many of the same kind of problems that Russia does and for the same reasons. Without reforms, they cannot attract the kind of investment that will help power their future development. Indeed, the exceptions to this general pattern-- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--prove the rule.

The three Baltic countries rapidly liberalized their economies and now enjoy some of the highest rates of Western investment and economic growth anywhere in the region. Those that have failed to reform their economies, on the other hand, are in increasing difficulty. But the primary cause of their problems is the absence of reform rather than difficulties in the Russian marketplace.

Third, all of these countries are profoundly affected by the attitudes of Western investors. Because the Russian market is the best-known, many in the West have concluded that all post-Soviet states and indeed all emerging markets are in the same situation. That is absolutely wrong. In the most recent quarter for which economic statistics are available, virtually all the post-Soviet states did better than Russia on virtually every measure of economic development, relative to the size of their markets.

But while those judgments are incorrect, they have an impact on the economies of the other countries in the region, an impact that some analysts in both Moscow and the West will undoubtedly suggest shows just how "integrated" the region remains.

To a large extent, this misreading of the economic situation in the post-Soviet states reflects a larger misunderstanding of the situation there. Nearly seven years after the Soviet Union collapsed, all too many in the West continue to refer to the countries there as "new independent states" and to think about the region as a single whole rather than as 12 new countries and the three restored Baltic States.

Such observers thus have missed the broad diversification over the last few years in a region dominated until a decade ago by a single center. If the Russian economic crisis does in the end have an impact across all these countries, it is far more likely to be the result of Western misperceptions than the product of integration left over from Soviet times.

PUSTOVOYTENKO SEIZES CARS FROM BUDGET DEBTORS. Ukrainian Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko is continuing his crackdown on budget debtors (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 13 August 1998) by ordering the authorities to seize personal cars from directors of non-paying companies and to impose severe fines on non-payers, ITAR-TASS and AP reported on 14 August. More than 11,000 cars have been listed for confiscation and 97 cars have already been seized, according to ITAR-TASS. The tax police have fined tax defaulters a total of 3.7 million hryvni ($1.8 million). The previous day, the cabinet appealed to all government employees to surrender 50 percent of their August salaries to the pension fund. JM

WIVES OF UKRAINIAN PILOTS BLOCK MILITARY AIRFIELD. Some 30 wives of military pilots have been picketing the military airfield in Myrhorod, Poltava Oblast for the past week to prevent their husbands from conducting duty flights, Ukrainian Television reported on 12 August. The wives are demanding that their husbands wages for the past six months be paid and are threatening to launch a hunger strike. The Myrhorod airfield is the base for Ukraine's largest group of SU-27 fighters, which protect the country's air space. According to the station, the pilots--who are prohibited from striking by military law--support the action and are letting their wives into the airfield despite the fact that military authorities have dug ditches and set up additional sentry posts. JM

ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ON HUNGARIAN UNIVERSITY. Emil Constantinescu said in Cluj on 13 August that he is backing "multiculturalism" for universities in Romania and that the setting up of a state university in the Hungarian language is a "Romanian internal problem" that "cannot be the object of transactions" with other states. He added that the "multicultural model" of the Cluj university is one he is attempting to persuade Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to introduce at the Cernivici [Cernauti] university for the benefit of Romanian students. In reply to a question by a journalist concerning Hungarian suggestions that double citizenship be granted to ethnic Hungarians abroad to ensure links after Hungary joins the EU, Constantinescu said that the "time for responding" has not yet come but that consideration will have to be given to "our interest in Romanians in neighboring countries who face difficult conditions." MS

The most remarkable feature of the current Russian economic crisis is one that most commentaries have overlooked: namely, that the Russian collapse has not spread to the other post-Soviet states.

Even five years ago, most of the former Soviet republics were still sufficiently integrated that difficulties in the largest of them would inevitably have a large and immediate impact on all the others.

Now that has changed. More and more post-Soviet countries have succeeded in diversifying their trading partners so that problems in Russia will not be the determining factor in their development.

That is not to say that the problems in Moscow will not have an impact. Rather, the ways in which these Russian problems will affect the non-Russian countries are very different and more indirect than many are now assuming.

First, some but by no means all of the post-Soviet states remain sufficiently integrated with the Russian economy that problems in Moscow will have precisely the kind of impact that some are assuming will happen across the region. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, for example, will be under enormous pressure to devalue their national currencies if the Russian ruble continues to fall.

Second, many of the post-Soviet states have not yet completed the reform of their economic and legal systems that would make them able to withstand negative trends abroad. These countries--which are in the majority--thus suffer from many of the same kind of problems that Russia does and for the same reasons. Without reforms, they cannot attract the kind of investment that will help power their future development. Indeed, the exceptions to this general pattern-- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--prove the rule.

The three Baltic countries rapidly liberalized their economies and now enjoy some of the highest rates of Western investment and economic growth anywhere in the region. Those that have failed to reform their economies, on the other hand, are in increasing difficulty. But the primary cause of their problems is the absence of reform rather than difficulties in the Russian marketplace.

Third, all of these countries are profoundly affected by the attitudes of Western investors. Because the Russian market is the best-known, many in the West have concluded that all post-Soviet states and indeed all emerging markets are in the same situation. That is absolutely wrong. In the most recent quarter for which economic statistics are available, virtually all the post-Soviet states did better than Russia on virtually every measure of economic development, relative to the size of their markets.

But while those judgments are incorrect, they have an impact on the economies of the other countries in the region, an impact that some analysts in both Moscow and the West will undoubtedly suggest shows just how "integrated" the region remains.

To a large extent, this misreading of the economic situation in the post-Soviet states reflects a larger misunderstanding of the situation there. Nearly seven years after the Soviet Union collapsed, all too many in the West continue to refer to the countries there as "new independent states" and to think about the region as a single whole rather than as 12 new countries and the three restored Baltic States.

Such observers thus have missed the broad diversification over the last few years in a region dominated until a decade ago by a single center. If the Russian economic crisis does in the end have an impact across all these countries, it is far more likely to be the result of Western misperceptions than the product of integration left over from Soviet times.