Economic failures, geopolitical isolation, and electoral experience are combining to bring an end to the rule of the "party of power," one of the most characteristic features of the post-communist transition in the former Soviet republics.

An amorphous and non-ideological group consisting of a non-party president, a politicized bureaucracy, and a depoliticized government closely linked to non-official groups, the party of power serves as a buffer between Communists on the left and nationalists on the right in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, and other post-Soviet states.

At the present time, the party of power, both as a concept and a reality, still dominates the political landscape. But as Vladimir Bruger writes in the 26 May issue of the Moscow newspaper "Nezavisimaya gazeta-Sodruzhestvo," its days may be numbered because of forces beyond its control. He suggests that it is likely to be replaced by a politicized politics and a more pragmatic political style.

The first such force working against the continued dominance of the "party of power" in these countries is the continuing if not accelerating collapse of their economies. Because the parties of power have justified their remaining in office by pointing to the evils that either the nationalists or Communists may bring, they have often escaped public attack even if they have not received much public support.

But as the economic situation in these countries has deteriorated, the parties of power no longer can make that argument work to their advantage. "In contrast to ideology or PR," Bruger writes, "economics demands an accounting for everything that is done and not done." And ever more people and politicians are deciding that the alternatives denounced by the party of power may in fact not be worse than the incumbents.

The second force undermining the continuation of this form of governance is the changing geopolitical position of these countries. Immediately after the collapse of communism, the first post-Soviet governments--which included secondlevel party nomenklatura officials as well as a thin stratum of reformers--expected that the West would not only provide substantial aid but would work to integrate these countries into Western organizations.

Neither has happened, at least as far as the population can see, Bruger notes. As a result, ever more people in these countries are prepared to consider supporting parties of the left or the right advocating policies that can be variously described as committed to self-reliance or going it alone.

And the third force is the growing electoral experience of both politicians and the population in these states. The parties of power were able to coopt many politicians, and these ideologically based leaders were all too willing to be coopted--because the party of power had all the power--and all too willing not to challenge the bases of the party of power because they hoped eventually to use its levers themselves.

One distinguishing characteristic of this tendency, Bruger notes, is that in both Russia and Ukraine, the political parties that form the parliamentary majorities in parliament have accepted the designation of opposition and have behaved as such.

But that pattern is beginning to change as a result of the pressures of electoral politics. Some of those now aspiring to office were earlier cast out of the party of power and have since changed their views. After being fired as Russian premier, Viktor Chernomyrdin's political party adopted a very different stand on the constitutional arrangements that have allowed the Russian party of power to control all decision-making.

Even more important, as the populations of these countries gain experience with elections, those politicians who hope to win support are now being forced to distance themselves from the failings of those currently in power. Thus, as Bruger points out, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov immediately declared that his new party "cannot be held responsible for everything that was done before us." None of this necessarily sounds an immediate death knell for the parties of power. The authoritarian traditions of these countries mean that many leaders, even those who head more ideologically based parties, prefer the informal and backroom dealings that the parties of power have practiced over the last few years. And in the past, the parties of power have shown their ability to manipulate the media and the political system during elections and successfully maintain their positions of power by portraying their opponents as more dangerous than themselves.

But economic collapse, international isolation, and experience with elections have fragmented the parties of power in all these countries, Bruger notes, thus reducing their ability to respond to challenges. That makes it ever more likely that over the next decade, the current "party of power" system will give way to a more ideologically and interest-based politics.

That may produce bad things as well as good, Bruger concludes. But he adds that it will at least mean that the post-communist transition will enter a new phase, one that will put still more distance between where these countries will be and where they were in the communist past.

SLAVIC LAWMAKERS MULL INTEGRATION IN KYIV... Addressing a forum of deputies from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in Kyiv on 10 June, Ukrainian speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko said the breakup of the USSR has led to a significant decline in living standards in all three countries. He appealed to the three to work together to overcome the current crisis. Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadii Seleznev said the three post-Soviet countries and Yugoslavia should unite to form a union in the 21st century. Russian Federation Council speaker Yegor Stroev said Russia sees no contradiction between the Slavic states' belonging to a union and simultaneously maintaining their sovereignty. Stroev added that the key task today is "to remove barriers impeding the integration of the economies" of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. JM

...WHILE UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LOOKS WEST. Borys Tarasyuk on 10 June held a meeting with parliamentary deputies of the North-Atlantic Assembly, ITAR-TASS reported. Tarasyuk said the development of a "parliamentary dialogue with NATO has become an important lever for Ukraine to gain a foothold on the world arena." The minister stressed that "European and European-Atlantic integration" remains Ukraine's top priority. Referring to Kiev's bilateral ties with neighboring states, he emphasized that they are aimed at establishing a "safe zone of peace and stability" around Ukraine. JM

UKRAINE SEEKS TO RESCHEDULE DEBT PAYMENT TO ING-BARINGS. The Ukrainian government failed to pay $163 million to the Dutch-based ING-Barings this week, but still hopes to persuade the lender to reschedule the payment, AP reported on 10 June. Ukraine has entered negotiations with the bank, proposing to pay off only 20 percent of the loan and convert the rest into state bonds. According to the agency, ING Barings is reluctant to accept the offer. Commenting on Ukraine's huge foreign debt (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 10 June 1999), Finance Minister Ihor Mityukov said there is a "large difference between the obligations and means available to cover them." JM

POLAND WANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN BALKAN RECONSTRUCTION. Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek on 10 June said that the Balkans need a new Marshall plan to build democracy and stability in the region. Geremek stressed that the most urgent thing now is to assist the Albanian refugees and Serbs who suffered in the Kosova conflict. "Poverty in the Balkans should cease to be a source of destabilization for the entire continent," he told Polish Radio. Geremek added that Poland could help in the reconstruction of the Balkans, proposing that a government commission be set up to draw up a plan for such assistance. Geremek also announced that Poland and Ukraine are considering the participation of a joint battalion in the Kosova stabilization force. JM

An amorphous and non-ideological group consisting of a non-party president, a politicized bureaucracy, and a depoliticized government closely linked to nonofficial groups, the party of power serves as a buffer between Communists on the left and nationalists on the right in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, and other post-Soviet states.

At the present time, the party of power, both as a concept and a reality, still dominates the political landscape. But as Vladimir Bruger writes in the 26 May issue of the Moscow newspaper "Nezavisimaya gazetaSodruzhestvo," its days may be numbered because of
forces beyond its control. He suggests that it is likely to be replaced by a politicized politics and a more pragmatic political style.

The second force undermining the continuation of this form of governance is the changing geopolitical position of these countries. Immediately after the collapse of communism, the first post-Soviet governments--which included second-level party nomenklatura officials as well as a thin stratum of reformers--expected that the West would not only provide substantial aid but would work to integrate these countries into Western organizations.

Even more important, as the populations of these countries gain experience with elections, those politicians who hope to win support are now being forced to distance themselves from the failings of those currently in power. Thus, as Bruger points out, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov immediately declared that his new party "cannot be held responsible for everything that was done before us."
None of this necessarily sounds an immediate death knell for the parties of power. The authoritarian traditions of these countries mean that many leaders, even those who head more ideologically based parties, prefer the informal and backroom dealings that the parties of power have practiced over the last few years. And in the past, the parties of power have shown their ability to manipulate the media and the political system during elections and successfully maintain their positions of power by portraying their opponents as more dangerous than themselves.