CRIMEAN TATARS SEEK SUPPORT FROM COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Inci Bowman of the International Committee for Crimea charged in a 20 January letter to Council of Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer that the Slavic majority and local authorities in Crimea were pursuing a policy of comprehensive discrimination against Crimean Tatars. Bowman cited an 11 January incident when 200 armed militiamen surrounded the Crimean Tatar Mejlis building in Simferopol (see "RFE/RL Watchlist," 13 January 2000) to confiscate some records, for which the Ukrainian Interior Ministry later apologized. Bowman said that "the current political and social conditions in Crimea are not conducive to maintaining a pluralistic and democratic society where the cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of ethnic groups is respected."

...AND REGRETS CALL FOR INDEPENDENT UKRAINIAN BRANCH. Aleksii also commented on a statement by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, who has called for the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Aleksii noted that such a statement "causes regret" and "one cannot tear apart the spiritual ties between our churches which have a millennium-long history." He added: "I reminded the president of Ukraine that we had granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine independence in financial and administrative issues. Only the spiritual ties remain which various forces are trying to tear apart." JAC

At the Moscow summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States this week, acting Russian President Vladimir Putin used a new vocabulary with which few could disagree in the pursuit of an old goal which far fewer support.

Putin said that the post-Soviet states must band together in "the fight against international terrorism, extremism, and separatism." Such goals, stated in this way, drew little dissent either from the participants of the CIS meeting or among leaders of the international community as a whole.

But recent Russian rhetoric about Chechnya suggests that Putin is using these words less as a precise statement of Moscow's specific intentions than as a means of increasing Russian power over the 11 other former Soviet republics now part of the CIS, something most appear likely to oppose.

Indeed, Putin's remarks this week appear to reflect the difficulties Moscow has had in trying to justify both its efforts to develop the power of the Russian state and its struggle to find a way to describe its campaign in Chechnya in a palatable manner.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders regularly talked about the importance of building democratic institutions, a position they saw as enhancing their chances of getting Western aid but ones that put Russia at odds with the even more authoritarian regimes in some post-Soviet countries.

But in recent months and especially since the appointment of Putin as acting president, Russia's rhetoric has shifted away from democratic norms to the need to build state power in the name of fighting terrorism and extremism.

Such a shift might have been expected to cost Moscow support in the West, except for the fact that many Western leaders have accepted the notion that the Russian state had become too weak to achieve anything and that its strengthening was thus a priority.

But such a shift clearly could and did win support both from authoritarian leaders in some post-Soviet states who were looking for a justification for their style of rule and from more democratic ones who face real challenges on the ground.

Thus, the highly authoritarian president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, greeted Putin's words this week as an indication that Russia now represented the only power capable of foiling "the geopolitical plans of the supporters of extremism and terrorism."

And more reformist but increasingly threatened leaders in several other post-Soviet states saw Putin's words as a kind of justification for their adoption of tougher positions toward their own populations.

All of these tendencies have been exacerbated by the Chechen war. Moscow began its campaign there in the name of blocking an independence movement and opposing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

These slogans initially appeared to confer certain advantages, but each of them entailed serious drawbacks. Talking about opposition to national independence did not play well in many of the post-Soviet states that only a decade ago had been a part of the Soviet Union.

And opposing Islam, while acceptable as a principle of action in some Western countries, was less and less plausible for a country with a rising percentage of Muslims in its own population and one that seeks to recover its influence over neighboring states with predominantly Muslim populations.

Consequently, Putin in particular and Moscow leaders in general have recast their campaign in Chechnya as a struggle against bandits, terrorists, and extremists--a goal which few either in the West or in the post-Soviet states are prepared to reject as illegitimate.

That helps to explain why there has been such muted Western criticism of Russia's actions in Chechnya compared to five years ago. And it also helps to explain why so many of the participants in the CIS summit appeared to be such enthusiastic supporters of Moscow's current line.

Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to suggest that Putin won an important victory at this meeting. After all, they note, all the CIS presidents came out against the same things Moscow said it was against.

But that is a misreading of both what the leaders of the non-Russian countries actually feel and what Moscow all too clearly hopes to achieve. Many leaders, including Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma, were very explicit that the CIS was far from being an effective institution, even though they and he backed Putin's language on "bandits."

Moreover, Putin's use of the CIS summit to celebrate the new Russian-Belarusian "union" shows that his intentions are not limited to fighting terrorism.

For both these reasons, the agreement at this CIS summit, as has been true at so many earlier ones, was more apparent than real, a reflection of Putin's rhetorical skill and also of the near certainty that many of the leaders at this meeting will ultimately likely see through it.

SPLIT UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT FAILS TO CONCILIATE... The 27 January talks between the opposing factions of the split parliament brought no results, Interfax reported. Oleksandr Zinchenko, from the center-right majority, told the agency that the left minority demands that all the resolutions passed by the majority be subject to repeat voting. The sides also did not agree on how to begin the 1 February session and who is to chair it. Meanwhile, the minority's Oleksandr Moroz commented that both parallel sessions held by the split lawmakers on 21 January (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 24 January 2000) were "illegitimate." JM

NATO CHIEF PRAISES 'DISTINCTIVE' TIES WITH UKRAINE. NATO Secretary-General George Robertson told journalists in Kyiv on 27 January that "the special, distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine continues to develop extremely well," Reuters reported. During his meeting with Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, Robertson stressed Ukraine's essential role as "a core of stability in the center of Eastern Europe." Robertson pledged to continue developing NATO-Ukraine relations under the mutual special partnership accord. JM

FORMER UKRAINIAN PREMIER ALLEGES UKRAINE MISUSED IMF MONEY. The 28 January "Financial Times" reported that former Ukrainian Premier Pavlo Lazarenko is preparing to testify to the U.S. House of Representatives that President Leonid Kuchma's government was engaged in embezzlement and money laundering. Lazarenko maintains that $613 million in IMF funds were diverted from the central bank in December 1997 and invested in speculative government bonds, reaping interest rates of up to 66 percent. Some $200 million in proceeds were allegedly deposited in the Belgian and Swiss accounts of people close to Kuchma, including his aide Oleksandr Volkov. The "Financial Times" notes that Lazarenko's testimony could stall his extradition to Switzerland and complicate the resumption of the IMF loan program to Ukraine. JM

...AS DOES LITHUANIAN PREMIER. Also at the Holocaust conference in Stockholm on 27 January, Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius stressed his commitment to prosecuting war criminals. Kubilius said that pursuing war criminals is "a moral duty that must be fulfilled in the 21st century as well," adding that "forgiving or forgetting [the culprits] is out of the question," ELTA reported. Kubilius told the conference that the Holocaust is especially painful in Lithuania, as Jewish culture flourished in that country before World War II. Kubilius also held bilateral meetings with Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, Finnish Premier Paavo Lipponen, Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, and Israeli Premier Ehud Barak. MH

At the Moscow summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States this week, acting Russian President Vladimir Putin used a new vocabulary with which few could disagree in the pursuit of an old goal which far fewer support.

Putin said that the post-Soviet states must band together in "the fight against international terrorism, extremism, and separatism." Such goals, stated in this way, drew little dissent either from the participants of the CIS meeting or among leaders of the international community as a whole.

But recent Russian rhetoric about Chechnya suggests that Putin is using these words less as a precise statement of Moscow's specific intentions than as a means of increasing Russian power over the 11 other former Soviet republics now part of the CIS, something most appear likely to oppose.

Indeed, Putin's remarks this week appear to reflect the difficulties Moscow has had in trying to justify both its efforts to develop the power of the Russian state and its struggle to find a way to describe its campaign in Chechnya in a palatable manner.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders regularly talked about the importance of building democratic institutions, a position they saw as enhancing their chances of getting Western aid but ones that put Russia at odds with the even more authoritarian regimes in some post-Soviet countries.

But in recent months and especially since the appointment of Putin as acting president, Russia's rhetoric has shifted away from democratic norms to the need to build state power in the name of fighting terrorism and extremism.

Such a shift might have been expected to cost Moscow support in the West, except for the fact that many Western leaders have accepted the notion that the Russian state had become too weak to achieve anything and that its strengthening was thus a priority.

But such a shift clearly could and did win support both from authoritarian leaders in some post-Soviet states who were looking for a justification for their style of rule and from more democratic ones who face real challenges on the ground.

Thus, the highly authoritarian president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, greeted Putin's words this week as an indication that Russia now represented the only power capable of foiling "the geopolitical plans of the supporters of extremism and terrorism."

And more reformist but increasingly threatened leaders in several other post-Soviet states saw Putin's words as a kind of justification for their adoption of tougher positions toward their own populations.

All of these tendencies have been exacerbated by the Chechen war. Moscow began its campaign there in the name of blocking an independence movement and opposing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

These slogans initially appeared to confer certain advantages, but each of them entailed serious drawbacks. Talking about opposition to national independence did not play well in many of the post-Soviet states that only a decade ago had been a part of the Soviet Union.

And opposing Islam, while acceptable as a principle of action in some Western countries, was less and less plausible for a country with a rising percentage of Muslims in its own population and one that seeks to recover its influence over neighboring states with predominantly Muslim populations.

Consequently, Putin in particular and Moscow leaders in general have recast their campaign in Chechnya as a struggle against bandits, terrorists, and extremists--a goal which few either in the West or in the post-Soviet states are prepared to reject as illegitimate.

That helps to explain why there has been such muted Western criticism of Russia's actions in Chechnya compared to five years ago. And it also helps to explain why so many of the participants in the CIS summit appeared to be such enthusiastic supporters of Moscow's current line.

Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to suggest that Putin won an important victory at this meeting. After all, they note, all the CIS presidents came out against the same things Moscow said it was against.

But that is a misreading of both what the leaders of the non-Russian countries actually feel and what Moscow all too clearly hopes to achieve. Many leaders, including Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma, were very explicit that the CIS was far from being an effective institution, even though they and he backed Putin's language on "bandits."

Moreover, Putin's use of the CIS summit to celebrate the new Russian-Belarusian "union" shows that his intentions are not limited to fighting terrorism.

For both these reasons, the agreement at this CIS summit, as has been true at so many earlier ones, was more apparent than real, a reflection of Putin's rhetorical skill and also of the near certainty that many of the leaders at this meeting will ultimately likely see through it.