NATO expansion and EU expansion, long assumed to be complementary processes, are having an increasingly contradictory impact on those countries seeking to join one or the other or both, on the current members of these two key Western institutions, and on those countries like Russia that are unlikely ever to get into either.
These unintended contradictions, British defense analyst James G. Sherr concludes in a recent paper released by the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst's Conflict Studies Research Centre, reflect less the different purposes of the two organizations--NATO is a security alliance and the EU is an economic one--than the specific mix of policies they have adopted over the last decade concerning potential new members.
Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, Sherr notes, NATO has done everything it can "to soften the distinction between members and non-members," thereby successfully avoiding the drawing of new lines in Europe while extending a penumbra of security to countries whose national sovereignty has been at risk.
NATO, Sherr points out, has been willing and able to tailor its relationships with all Partnership for Peace countries, developing close links with some countries like the Baltic states and Ukraine and maintaining somewhat looser ties with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. And because it is concerned with national defense, NATO has insisted that fundamental change inside these countries be a precondition for cooperation.
Indeed, Sherr implies, this willingness of the Western alliance to accept such diversity in the countries with which it is cooperating has become one of NATO's greatest strengths.
The EU has taken a very different approach. Sherr notes its main focus throughout this period has been the deepening of the integration of current members. And consequently, it demands that those countries that want to become members transform themselves at home and be willing to impose tighter border controls vis-a-vis their neighbors who cannot or do not want to join.
In that way, the EU draws precisely the kind of lines in post-Cold War Europe that NATO has sought to avoid. Moreover, because the accession process takes so long, this EU approach has the potential to dramatically expand the size of the gray zone of political and economic uncertainty between East and West. That, in turn, undercuts NATO's approach.
Not surprisingly, these differences between NATO and the EU have had a serious impact on countries interested in joining one or the other or both. Many of those countries' leaders view NATO as the primary source of military security but are increasingly concerned by NATO's efforts to work out a cooperative relationship with Moscow, whose policies are the primary reason these countries seek a relationship with the Western alliance.
At the same time, many aspirant countries see EU membership as the primary source of economic well-being. But they are nervous both about the impact of the demands of membership on their own societies and the tariff and visa walls the EU requires its members erect. Such tight borders will often cut these countries off from traditional partners, even after certain special transitional arrangements are approved.
But because NATO and the EU have such different purposes, few in Eastern Europe accept the notion, often promoted in the West, that the expansion of one is the equivalent of the expansion of the other. Indeed, they are ever more sensitive to the distinctions than are current members or those who oppose both institutions.
These distinctions are having an impact on NATO and the EU as they exist today. The approach of each of these institutions often undercuts the approach of the other, thereby reducing the effectiveness of both NATO's approach and the common European security and defense policy and also exacerbating tensions between the two groups.
And this contradictory impact of the two approaches also has a major impact on countries like Russia, which are unlikely to join either. That impact is all the greater because the Russian government does not appear to fully understand the distinctions.
Focusing on NATO's military past, Russian officials have largely ignored the alliance's variegated approach and its efforts to avoid drawing lines. And consequently, they have been almost unanimous in opposing the eastward expansion of the alliance, even as the alliance seeks to cooperate with Moscow.
And focusing on the EU's economic role, these same Russian officials have largely ignored the tight borders EU membership requires and the impact such borders might have on the Russian economy. Not surprisingly, most of them have welcomed EU expansion as a substitute for NATO growth, even though EU expansion might be more damaging to some Russian interests.
As Sherr notes, neither NATO nor EU leaders appear to be fully aware of the impact of such contradictions. Unless they consider them in the near future, both organizations will be helping to create a world in Eastern Europe very different from the one they and the countries of that region say they want.
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
A Survey of Developments in Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine by the Regional Specialists of RFE/RL's Newsline Team.
PRIMARY COLORS. Former Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, who inaugurated his presidential election campaign last week (see "RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report," 20 June 2000), has called for the first round of the presidential polls to become primaries for candidates of the right wing. According to Walesa, Poland's right-wing should support one rightist candidate who is able to make it to the second round to face the post-communist incumbent, Aleksander Kwasniewski. Walesa is leading his campaign under the slogan "Black is black, white is white."
The Solidarity trade union and its political arm, the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), have both thrown their support behind the AWS's current leader, Marian Krzaklewski. Krzaklewski commented on Walesa's bid to regain presidency in the following way:
"I would like us to adopt an agreement before the ballot in order not to split the electorate. We will not force each other to withdraw from the running, but we should remain in close touch. We are from the same roots. There should be no struggle between us, because we could lose all our strength before the most important stage."
Asked to comment on Walesa's election slogan, Krzaklewski said it is "as particular as Lech Walesa," adding that it smacks of political "color-blindness."
Judging by Walesa's reaction to Krzaklewski's remarks, both politicians will find it very hard to strike any election deal. "I must say that it is probably Marian Krzaklewski who does not distinguish colors, since he cannot distinguish a trade union from a party: he leads [the AWS] for four hours and then takes part in a [Solidarity trade union] demonstration for four hours--that is political color-blindness," PAP quoted Walesa as responding on 20 June. "And it is possible to find more such color-blindness in this campaign. I would ask him not to make digs at me, and then I won't respond [by] indicating his weak spots." Walesa emphasized that he will conduct a positive campaign but pledged to respond to attacks aimed against him, his Christian Democracy of the Third Republic of Poland, or his slogans.
PUBLIC INSULTS PERMISSIBLE, IN SOME CASES. A Minsk district court on 16 June dismissed a lawsuit filed by pensioner Vera Tserlyukevich against Alyaksandr Zimouski, moderator of Belarusian Television's "Rezanans" program, which combines news with political commentaries. Zimouski is notorious among state media journalists for his unwavering loyalty to the Lukashenka regime and highly abusive language with regard to the regime's opponents.
Tserlyukevich, who took part in the opposition Freedom March last fall (see "RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report," 19 and 26 October 2000), felt insulted by remarks Zimouski made in his program. In particular, Zimouski called the demonstrators "a bunch of blockheads" (Russian: gruppa otmorozkov). She sued Zimouski and demanded that both he and the Belarusian National Television and Radio Company apologize and pay damages.
The court sent footage of Zimouski's televised assessment of the Freedom March to the Institute of Linguistics, Ethnography, and Folklore for linguistic expertise. The institute replied that its experts are not equal to the job and advised the court to turn to the Institute of Literature of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences. The court, however, chose to send the footage to the pro-government Belarusian Union of Journalists, of which Zimouski is a member.
The union's Ethics Committee concluded that expressions like "a bunch of blockheads" are permissible in media "in some cases." Additionally, Zimouski's colleagues pointed out that his remarks were addressed to those aggressive demonstrators who clashed with police, not to Tserlyukevich. The court approved these conclusions and rejected Tserlyukevich's claims as "groundless."
MAKE HAY OR, BETTER, RECEIVE PAY. Teachers in Pinsk (Brest Oblast) have sent a letter to the city authorities protesting the practice of exacting payments from those who do not want to go to the countryside to help collective farms during haymaking, RFE/RL's Belarusian Service reported on 21 June. Earlier, they had send similar letters of protest to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Brest Oblast Executive Committee head Vasil Dalhalyou. "State livestock needs hay, not bank notes from the Belarusian National Bank," the teachers wrote, adding that exacting money from them grossly violates the labor code and discredits the idea of public assistance to the agricultural sector.
Under last year's directive from the Brest Oblast Executive Committee, all state enterprises and organizations in the oblast's cities and towns are obliged to send their staffs to the countryside in the summer to take part in haymaking. The minimum required output is 200 kg of hay per capita (see "RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report," 22 June 1999).
According to Pinsk teachers, the idea of paying money for the right to avoid obligatory haymaking came from kolkhoz managers: the transportation of largely unskilled city hands to collective fields as well as the provision of working tools and food costs the kolkhozes more than the hay that the city dwellers produce is worth. Besides, kolkhozes in Brest Oblast need cash. No less than 77 percent of them have run up wage arrears.
UKRAINE
YUSHCHENKO KEPT IN CHECK? The Kyiv City Prosecutor's Office on 13 June instigated criminal proceedings against "a number of officials" in the National Bank, charging them with misuse of the bank's hard currency reserves in 1997- 1998. The investigation was launched on the basis of materials collected last year by a special parliamentary commission headed by lawmaker Viktor Suslov. Some of those materials were published in Western media early this year, causing the IMF and the World Bank to request international audits of the National Bank's handling of foreign loans.
One audit, completed in early May, showed that the National Bank--headed by current Premier Viktor Yushchenko- -overstated its hard-currency reserves "by an amount that varied from $391 million in September 1997 to $713 million in December 1997." The IMF commented that the amount was overstated to help Ukraine gain $200 million in loans that might otherwise have been denied. However, the audit did not find that the bank misused IMF loans, as alleged by Western media reports.
"Kievskii telegraf" reported on 12 June that the allegations of abuse of office "refer directly" to Yushchenko, but the newspaper did not elaborate.
Yushchenko commented on 22 June that none of the 13 June charges pertains to him personally. He added, however: "Everybody understands: everything pertaining to the National Bank pertains to Yushchenko, too. There is a tactical game under way: To what extent the actions of the National Bank's officials and board complied with the legislation in force? I am absolutely convinced that they complied with the legislation in force. But there will be several months of intrigues, since without them life in Ukraine would be uninteresting."
RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report is prepared by Jan Maksymiuk on the basis of a variety of sources including reporting by "RFE/RL Newsline" and RFE/RL's broadcast services. It is distributed every Tuesday.
UKRAINIAN EX-PREMIER ADMITS MONEY LAUNDERING. Pavlo Lazarenko, currently in detention in the U.S., admitted through his Swiss lawyer on 26 June that he laundered $9 million in stolen money through Switzerland, AP reported. Lazarenko's confession appears aimed at securing a less harsh sentence from the Geneva court that is trying him on charges of money laundering. "This hearing is the result of negotiations with the defense to find a way out of a tangled case which seemed to be heading toward a dead end," Swiss prosecutor Bernard Bertossa told the court. Bertossa demanded a 18-month suspended prison term for Lazarenko. Investigators told the court that Lazarenko is believed to have embezzled a total of $880 million from Ukraine between 1994 and 1997. According to them, the money passed through more than 80 banks and some $170 million through Switzerland. JM
OSCE EXAMINES SITUATION OF UKRAINE'S RUSSIANS. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel has wrapped up a fact-finding mission in Ukraine aimed at assessing the situation of the country's Russian minority. Van der Stoel visited Odesa, Kharkiv, the Crimean peninsula, and Lviv--the site of recent Ukrainian-Russian tensions caused by the tragic death of a Ukrainian composer (see "RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report," 6 and 13 June 2000). Van der Stoel has not commented on the results of his mission, pledging only "to carefully study" the information and documents he gathered. The same day he left for Russia to examine the situation of ethnic Ukrainians there. "I have absolutely no grounds to think that the needs of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine are being ignored," Interfax quoted Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Zhulinskyy as saying. JM
CHINESE PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER IN UKRAINE. Li Peng met with Ukrainian parliamentary speaker Ivan Plyushch, Premier Viktor Yushchenko, and President Leonid Kuchma in Kyiv on 26 June. He had arrived in Ukraine on 24 June and spent two days touring the Crimean region and meeting with officials there. Plyushch urged China to agree to joint aviation projects with Ukraine, in particular involving the Ukrainian An-70 aircraft. "This is a question of business," Li Peng said, adding that much of the Asian market is already occupied by U.S. and European companies, according to AP. JM
BELGRADE RESENTS EXCLUSION FROM UN DEBATE. Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Nebojsa Vujovic said in Belgrade on 26 June that the UN Security Council should have invited his government's representatives to take part in its discussions on the Balkans three days earlier, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. He said that the decision to exclude Serbian officials was "politically motivated and counterproductive." Vujovic stressed that Yugoslavia is a "factor of regional stability and cooperation." On 23 June in New York, Russian and Ukrainian delegates stressed that Serbian representatives should be present for any discussion on the Balkans. U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke argued that Milosevic's representatives have no right to participate in UN discussions, an RFE/RL correspondent reported. PM
NATO expansion and EU expansion, long assumed to be complementary processes, are having an increasingly contradictory impact on those countries seeking to join one or the other or both, on the current members of these two key Western institutions, and on those countries like Russia that are unlikely ever to get into either.
These unintended contradictions, British defense analyst James G. Sherr concludes in a recent paper released by the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst's Conflict Studies Research Centre, reflect less the different purposes of the two organizations--NATO is a security alliance and the EU is an economic one--than the specific mix of policies they have adopted over the last decade concerning potential new members.
Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, Sherr notes, NATO has done everything it can "to soften the distinction between members and non-members," thereby successfully avoiding the drawing of new lines in Europe while extending a penumbra of security to countries whose national sovereignty has been at risk.
NATO, Sherr points out, has been willing and able to tailor its relationships with all Partnership for Peace countries, developing close links with some countries like the Baltic states and Ukraine and maintaining somewhat looser ties with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. And because it is concerned with national defense, NATO has insisted that fundamental change inside these countries be a precondition for cooperation.
Indeed, Sherr implies, this willingness of the Western alliance to accept such diversity in the countries with which it is cooperating has become one of NATO's greatest strengths.
The EU has taken a very different approach. Sherr notes its main focus throughout this period has been the deepening of the integration of current members. And consequently, it demands that those countries that want to become members transform themselves at home and be willing to impose tighter border controls vis-a-vis their neighbors who cannot or do not want to join.
In that way, the EU draws precisely the kind of lines in post-Cold War Europe that NATO has sought to avoid. Moreover, because the accession process takes so long, this EU approach has the potential to dramatically expand the size of the gray zone of political and economic uncertainty between East and West. That, in turn, undercuts NATO's approach.
Not surprisingly, these differences between NATO and the EU have had a serious impact on countries interested in joining one or the other or both. Many of those countries' leaders view NATO as the primary source of military security but are increasingly concerned by NATO's efforts to work out a cooperative relationship with Moscow, whose policies are the primary reason these countries seek a relationship with the Western alliance.
At the same time, many aspirant countries see EU membership as the primary source of economic well-being. But they are nervous both about the impact of the demands of membership on their own societies and the tariff and visa walls the EU requires its members erect. Such tight borders will often cut these countries off from traditional partners, even after certain special transitional arrangements are approved.
But because NATO and the EU have such different purposes, few in Eastern Europe accept the notion, often promoted in the West, that the expansion of one is the equivalent of the expansion of the other. Indeed, they are ever more sensitive to the distinctions than are current members or those who oppose both institutions.
These distinctions are having an impact on NATO and the EU as they exist today. The approach of each of these institutions often undercuts the approach of the other, thereby reducing the effectiveness of both NATO's approach and the common European security and defense policy and also exacerbating tensions between the two groups.
And this contradictory impact of the two approaches also has a major impact on countries like Russia, which are unlikely to join either. That impact is all the greater because the Russian government does not appear to fully understand the distinctions.
Focusing on NATO's military past, Russian officials have largely ignored the alliance's variegated approach and its efforts to avoid drawing lines. And consequently, they have been almost unanimous in opposing the eastward expansion of the alliance, even as the alliance seeks to cooperate with Moscow.
And focusing on the EU's economic role, these same Russian officials have largely ignored the tight borders EU membership requires and the impact such borders might have on the Russian economy. Not surprisingly, most of them have welcomed EU expansion as a substitute for NATO growth, even though EU expansion might be more damaging to some Russian interests.
As Sherr notes, neither NATO nor EU leaders appear to be fully aware of the impact of such contradictions. Unless they consider them in the near future, both organizations will be helping to create a world in Eastern Europe very different from the one they and the countries of that region say they want.