RUSSIAN MILITARY DENIES DUMPING POISONS IN UKRAINE. The press service of Russia's strategic missile troops has rejected Ukrainian suggestions that Russian troops dumped nuclear fuel or its components in Ukraine's Mykolayiv Oblast, ITAR-TASS reported on 1 September (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 1 September 2000). PG
UKRAINE, TURKEY OFFER TO HELP COMBAT THREAT TO CENTRAL ASIA. Kyiv is ready to cooperate with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states in the struggle against "international terrorism and extremism," ITAR-TASS reported on 1 September, citing a Ukrainian Foreign Ministry statement. The statement expressed concern at the "escalation of tensions" in Central Asia and at "efforts by international terrorists aimed against the territorial integrity of regional states." Ankara has also offered Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan "financial and psychological assistance" in the battle with Islamic extremists, Caucasus Press reported on 2 September, quoting Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. LF
Moscow's decision to withdraw from the visa-free regime with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States may help the Russian government to protect itself against terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.
But it is also likely to affect Russia's relationship with other CIS countries, offending many and at the same time giving Moscow new political leverage over some. In addition, this move seems certain to affect the attitudes of the 11 non-Russian countries toward Russia and Russians and possibly even Moscow's ability to recruit low-income workers from abroad.
Consequently, Russia's use of this tool to defend some of its national interests may have the effect of undermining other important interests as well.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced on 30 August that Russia is withdrawing from the 1992 Bishkek accord, which established visa-free travel among all but three of the members of the CIS. (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine have remained outside.) He said that terrorism and organized crime mean that Moscow will withdraw from this regime after giving the 90-day notice required by the original agreement.
Some of his aides pointed out that the Bishkek arrangements themselves have already begun to break down, with several of the Central Asian countries already having imposed visa agreements on one another's nationals. But the Russian foreign minister himself went out of his way to stress that this decision was not intended to divide the CIS countries: Russia's withdrawal, he said, "does not mean that Russia intends to create artificial barriers and to fence itself off from Commonwealth partners." He added that Russian diplomats will now begin discussions with CIS governments about travel documentation requirements in the future.
Nonetheless, many people across the 12 countries currently part of the CIS are likely to view this Russian decision as the latest blow to the continued existence of an organization that has tried to maintain ties among the 12 Soviet republics since 1991. After all, despite numerous meetings, the CIS could point to few real achievements beyond the visa-free regime system, an arrangement that allowed some of the countries involved to survive as their workers abroad sent back part of their earnings to their homelands. Russia's decision to withdraw will not only lead others to do the same but call into question whether the CIS has any future.
But regardless of whether this Russian decision has the effect of ending the CIS, it clearly will have an impact on Moscow's relationship with the other members. On the one hand, it will reduce Russia's ability to present itself to them as the guarantor of CIS arrangements. On the other, it will almost certainly allow Moscow to step up its pressure on various countries, demanding concessions as the price for a more favorable visa regime.
In addition, this decision may prompt many in the non-Russian countries to revise their views of Russia and their treatment of ethnic Russians resident on their territory. They will certainly view this decision as a reflection of Russian, even ethnic Russian national interests, a perception that may lead some of them to become more nationalist in the defense of their own interests domestically and internationally.
Finally, this decision seems certain to affect Russia itself. Economically, it appears likely to have the effect of depriving certain Russian firms of low-paid guest workers from the former Soviet republics, who up to now have provided some of the muscle behind Russia's recent economic gains. Such enterprises will certainly seek special arrangements for "their" workers, thus adding a new element to Russian politics.
And politically, this decision could have the effect of increasing Russian hostility to non-Russians living in the Russian Federation, regardless of their citizenship. Not only is it likely to increase demands, like those already in place in some Russian cities, for the expulsion of "persons from the Caucasus," but it may be seen by some as giving a kind of official green light to Russian nationalist organizations of various stripes.
Moscow's move last week thus may have a very different impact on Russian national security than its authors intend.
ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSFER CHARGES TO HIT UKRAINE'S DEPUTY PREMIER? Deputy Prosecutor-General Mykola Obikhod told journalists on 1 September that in 1996-1997 Ukraine's Unified Energy Systems (UES) illegally channeled abroad more than $1.1 billion, including $100 million to accounts of former Premier Pavlo Lazarenko, Interfax reported. At the time of the alleged transfers, the UES was headed by Yuliya Tymoshenko, who is now deputy prime minister in charge of the energy sector. Tymoshenko's party, Fatherland [Batkivshchyna], said the same day that the charges against the UES leadership are "senseless, absurd, and ridiculous" and intended to discredit the current government. Last month, the Prosecutor-General's Office opened a criminal case on embezzlement charges against Tymoshenko's husband, Oleksandr, a member of the UES board of directors, and Valeriy Falkovych, the UES's deputy director (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 22 and 23 August 2000). JM
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT CRITICIZES RUSSIA FOR QUITTING CIS VISA-FREE TRAVEL ACCORD... Leonid Kuchma told journalists on 1 September that Russia's decision to back out of the 1992 Bishkek treaty on visa-free travel within the CIS will undermine prospects for creating a CIS free-trade zone, Interfax reported. According to Kuchma, such a zone means "free movement of capital, goods, and people." "If this is not the case, the idea of a free-trade zone is laid to rest. The question arises--who needs the CIS in such circumstances?" Kuchma commented. Russia's decision will not affect Kyiv directly, since Ukraine, like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, has a separate agreement with Russia allowing visa-free travel (see also "End Note" below). JM
...URGES SPORTSMEN TO REMAIN IN 10 TOP OLYMPIC TEAMS. Bidding farewell to Ukraine's Olympic team on 2 September, Kuchma said "it would be a serious disappointment [for Ukraine] not to join the club of 10 best teams again," AP reported. Ukraine has sent a 390-member delegation to Sydney, including 239 athletes. The Ukrainian government decided that the gold winners at this year's games will be given a prize of up to $50,000, silver winners up to $30,000, and bronze winners up to $20,000 each. JM
Moscow's decision to withdraw from the visa-free regime with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States may help the Russian government to protect itself against terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.
But it is also likely to affect Russia's relationship with other CIS countries, offending many and at the same time giving Moscow new political leverage over some. In addition, this move seems certain to affect the attitudes of the 11 non-Russian countries toward Russia and Russians and possibly even Moscow's ability to recruit low-income workers from abroad.
Consequently, Russia's use of this tool to defend some of its national interests may have the effect of undermining other important interests as well.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced on 30 August that Russia is withdrawing from the 1992 Bishkek accord, which established visa-free travel among all but three of the members of the CIS. (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine have remained outside.) He said that terrorism and organized crime mean that Moscow will withdraw from this regime after giving the 90-day notice required by the original agreement.
Some of his aides pointed out that the Bishkek arrangements themselves have already begun to break down, with several of the Central Asian countries already having imposed visa agreements on one another's nationals. But the Russian foreign minister himself went out of his way to stress that this decision was not intended to divide the CIS countries: Russia's withdrawal, he said, "does not mean that Russia intends to create artificial barriers and to fence itself off from Commonwealth partners." He added that Russian diplomats will now begin discussions with CIS governments about travel documentation requirements in the future.
Nonetheless, many people across the 12 countries currently part of the CIS are likely to view this Russian decision as the latest blow to the continued existence of an organization that has tried to maintain ties among the 12 Soviet republics since 1991. After all, despite numerous meetings, the CIS could point to few real achievements beyond the visa-free regime system, an arrangement that allowed some of the countries involved to survive as their workers abroad sent back part of their earnings to their homelands. Russia's decision to withdraw will not only lead others to do the same but call into question whether the CIS has any future.
But regardless of whether this Russian decision has the effect of ending the CIS, it clearly will have an impact on Moscow's relationship with the other members. On the one hand, it will reduce Russia's ability to present itself to them as the guarantor of CIS arrangements. On the other, it will almost certainly allow Moscow to step up its pressure on various countries, demanding concessions as the price for a more favorable visa regime.
In addition, this decision may prompt many in the non-Russian countries to revise their views of Russia and their treatment of ethnic Russians resident on their territory. They will certainly view this decision as a reflection of Russian, even ethnic Russian national interests, a perception that may lead some of them to become more nationalist in the defense of their own interests domestically and internationally.
Finally, this decision seems certain to affect Russia itself. Economically, it appears likely to have the effect of depriving certain Russian firms of low-paid guest workers from the former Soviet republics, who up to now have provided some of the muscle behind Russia's recent economic gains. Such enterprises will certainly seek special arrangements for "their" workers, thus adding a new element to Russian politics.
And politically, this decision could have the effect of increasing Russian hostility to non-Russians living in the Russian Federation, regardless of their citizenship. Not only is it likely to increase demands, like those already in place in some Russian cities, for the expulsion of "persons from the Caucasus," but it may be seen by some as giving a kind of official green light to Russian nationalist organizations of various stripes.
Moscow's move last week thus may have a very different impact on Russian national security than its authors intend.
RUSSIAN MILITARY DENIES DUMPING POISONS IN UKRAINE. The press service of Russia's strategic missile troops has rejected Ukrainian suggestions that Russian troops dumped nuclear fuel or its components in Ukraine's Mykolayiv Oblast, ITAR-TASS reported on 1 September (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 1 September 2000). PG
UKRAINE, TURKEY OFFER TO HELP COMBAT THREAT TO CENTRAL ASIA. Kyiv is ready to cooperate with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states in the struggle against "international terrorism and extremism," ITAR-TASS reported on 1 September, citing a Ukrainian Foreign Ministry statement. The statement expressed concern at the "escalation of tensions" in Central Asia and at "efforts by international terrorists aimed against the territorial integrity of regional states." Ankara has also offered Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan "financial and psychological assistance" in the battle with Islamic extremists, Caucasus Press reported on 2 September, quoting Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. LF
Moscow's decision to withdraw from the visa-free regime with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States may help the Russian government to protect itself against terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.
But it is also likely to affect Russia's relationship with other CIS countries, offending many and at the same time giving Moscow new political leverage over some. In addition, this move seems certain to affect the attitudes of the 11 non-Russian countries toward Russia and Russians and possibly even Moscow's ability to recruit low-income workers from abroad.
Consequently, Russia's use of this tool to defend some of its national interests may have the effect of undermining other important interests as well.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced on 30 August that Russia is withdrawing from the 1992 Bishkek accord, which established visa-free travel among all but three of the members of the CIS. (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine have remained outside.) He said that terrorism and organized crime mean that Moscow will withdraw from this regime after giving the 90-day notice required by the original agreement.
Some of his aides pointed out that the Bishkek arrangements themselves have already begun to break down, with several of the Central Asian countries already having imposed visa agreements on one another's nationals. But the Russian foreign minister himself went out of his way to stress that this decision was not intended to divide the CIS countries: Russia's withdrawal, he said, "does not mean that Russia intends to create artificial barriers and to fence itself off from Commonwealth partners." He added that Russian diplomats will now begin discussions with CIS governments about travel documentation requirements in the future.
Nonetheless, many people across the 12 countries currently part of the CIS are likely to view this Russian decision as the latest blow to the continued existence of an organization that has tried to maintain ties among the 12 Soviet republics since 1991. After all, despite numerous meetings, the CIS could point to few real achievements beyond the visa-free regime system, an arrangement that allowed some of the countries involved to survive as their workers abroad sent back part of their earnings to their homelands. Russia's decision to withdraw will not only lead others to do the same but call into question whether the CIS has any future.
But regardless of whether this Russian decision has the effect of ending the CIS, it clearly will have an impact on Moscow's relationship with the other members. On the one hand, it will reduce Russia's ability to present itself to them as the guarantor of CIS arrangements. On the other, it will almost certainly allow Moscow to step up its pressure on various countries, demanding concessions as the price for a more favorable visa regime.
In addition, this decision may prompt many in the non-Russian countries to revise their views of Russia and their treatment of ethnic Russians resident on their territory. They will certainly view this decision as a reflection of Russian, even ethnic Russian national interests, a perception that may lead some of them to become more nationalist in the defense of their own interests domestically and internationally.
Finally, this decision seems certain to affect Russia itself. Economically, it appears likely to have the effect of depriving certain Russian firms of low-paid guest workers from the former Soviet republics, who up to now have provided some of the muscle behind Russia's recent economic gains. Such enterprises will certainly seek special arrangements for "their" workers, thus adding a new element to Russian politics.
And politically, this decision could have the effect of increasing Russian hostility to non-Russians living in the Russian Federation, regardless of their citizenship. Not only is it likely to increase demands, like those already in place in some Russian cities, for the expulsion of "persons from the Caucasus," but it may be seen by some as giving a kind of official green light to Russian nationalist organizations of various stripes.
Moscow's move last week thus may have a very different impact on Russian national security than its authors intend.
VYAKHIREV WANTS TO CIRCUMVENT UKRAINE. Gazprom head Rem Vyakhirev has called for the creation of a consortium of the four largest European energy companies to build a pipeline through Belarus, Poland, and Slovakia, "Izvestiya" reported on 30 August. In making this proposal, Vyakhirev said that "the goal of his life is to build a pipeline circumventing Ukraine," a country which he said has been "stealing Russian gas."