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OPPOSITION AZERBAIJANI POLITICIAN'S BODYGUARDS CHARGED. Criminal proceedings have been launched against two of Azerbaijan Popular Front Party first deputy chairman Ali Kerimov's bodyguards on charges of hooliganism, Turan reported on 23 October. The two men are accused of having beaten the chairman of the Gyaanja branch of the association of Chernobyl invalids while Kerimov was addressing a meeting in that town the previous day. A spokesman for Kerimov said the man had tried to disrupt the meeting by addressing abusive remarks at Kerimov. Another of Kerimov's bodyguards was injured when someone threw a knife at Kerimov in the town of Masally, according to the independent newspaper "Azadlyg" on 21 October. LF

Russia's Gazprom, Germany's Ruhrgas and Wintershall, Italy's SNAM, and Gaz de France signed a memorandum of understanding in Moscow on 18 October to study and develop a new section of the planned Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. The project calls for the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline--currently under construction-- to be linked to Slovakia, where it would connect with a network of gas pipelines to Germany, Italy, and France. Such a link, while traversing Polish territory, would bypass Ukraine.

It remains to be seen if the project is feasible. In the meantime, all gas experts agree that the main goal of the agreement--regardless of whether it can be implemented--is to intimidate Ukraine into ceasing to siphon off Russian gas transiting Ukrainian territory and into paying for Russian gas more efficiently. According to some Russian estimates, Ukraine's debt for Russian gas stands at $2.5 billion (Kyiv admits to owing some $1.4 billion). Gazprom, however, says Ukraine stole 15 billion cubic meters of transit gas in 1999- 2000 (worth some $900 million).

Gazprom's chief Rem Vyakhirev commented that the bypass pipeline scheme will make it possible to increase Russian gas supplies to the EU. But it remains a mystery how this can be done by simply constructing a pipeline to Slovakia through Poland without completing the entire Yamal-Europe pipeline. Most likely, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was aware of this when on 19 October he shrugged off the deal by saying that "it takes a lot of time [to proceed] from the project to its practical implementation." At the same time, Kuchma stressed that the capacity of Ukraine's existing gas pipeline network can be increased by 30 percent.

The estimated cost of that part of the Yamal-Europe pipeline that would be built to avoid Ukraine is $1 billion. It is not unfeasible that Gazprom and its Western partners could invest such a sum immediately after the project's feasibility study is completed in favor of the Slovak connection. For Russia, the implementation of the project would mean obtaining great political leverage in Ukraine. Without Russian gas supplies in payment for transit, Ukraine would become a country as politically and economically dependent on the Kremlin as Belarus.

Warsaw is well aware of all the consequences connected with the bypass pipeline project. That's why a number of Polish top officials hastened to assure Kyiv earlier this year--when the bypass pipeline project became known to the public--that Poland would not support any gas supply scheme that would be to the detriment of Ukraine, Poland's "strategic partner."

Many Polish politicians believe that the survival of sovereign and independent Ukraine is a guarantee that Poland itself will not return to "the Russian sphere of influence" and that the political changes that took place in Eastern and Central Europe a decade ago are irreversible. Given Poland's complicated and tragic fate in the 20th century, one should not dismiss such fears among Poles as trivial or groundless.

Europe wants more Russian gas in order to become more independent from OPEC countries in terms of energy consumption, while Poland wants to be in Europe, that is, in the EU as soon as possible. Moscow has calculated that these two aspirations can be utilized to exert pressure on Ukraine. According to this line of reasoning, Poland will not oppose the bypass pipeline project too strongly if Berlin or Paris (both of which have a powerful voice in Brussels)--ask Warsaw to come to its senses and agree. For this reason, Gazprom signed a deal with its Western partners on building the pipeline even without securing the permission of the country across which the pipeline is supposed to run. Moscow bypassed Poland in its political maneuvering, just as it wants to bypass Ukraine in gas transit.

From an economic point of view, Gazprom's project offers Poland more revenues for Russian gas transit. Some Ukrainian commentators say it is only a matter of time until Poland, pressed by its Western allies, will say "yes" to Gazprom's offer. For the time being, Poland has called for an international conference of all countries interested in the construction of a gas pipeline linking Russia's Yamal peninsula with Western Europe.

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin put Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko in charge of negotiations with Poland on building a gas pipeline stretch to bypass Ukraine. Can Ukraine prevent the bypass pipeline scenario from being implemented? In an attempt to do so, Kyiv has proposed to Moscow that the latter jointly manage Ukraine's gas transport network. Putin reportedly showed interest in the proposal during his recent meeting with Kuchma in Sochi. But Khristenko has noted that "currently our position is that joint management is only possible if 51 percent of a consortium controlling Ukraine's gas transport system is in the hands of Gazprom." It seems that Kyiv is not yet ready to accept this technical parameter as the starting point for talks with Moscow on Russian gas supplies.

UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT THREATENS PARLIAMENT, CABINET OVER 2001 BUDGET. Leonid Kuchma said on 23 October that either the parliament or the government must resign if one or the other proves "incapable" of performing its tasks, the "Eastern Economist Daily" reported. Kuchma was commenting on the 2001 budget draft that is now under debate in the Supreme Council. Kuchma said budget revenues should be "balanced and sound," adding that officials who provide "unrealistic" budget indicators may be considered guilty of abuse of power. He also disapproved of the way the budgetary debate is being conducted. "If politics interfere with the economy, consequences can be negative," ITAR-TASS quoted him as saying. The parliament is expected to vote on the 2001 budget next week. JM

UKRAINE SECURED GAS SUPPLIES FOR 2001? Vadym Kopylov, head of Naftohaz Ukrayiny, has announced that Ukraine has resolved all issues connected with gas supplies in 2001, the Internet newsletter "Ukrayinska pravda" reported on 24 October, citing the UNIAN agency. According to Kopylov, next year Ukraine will buy 30 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan, receive another 30 billion cubic meters as payment for the transit of Russian gas to Europe, and extract 18 billion cubic meters from domestic deposits. Kopylov said Naftohaz Ukrayiny is currently working on two agreements, one on the supply of Russian gas and the other on the transit of Turkmen gas to Ukraine via Kazakhstan and Russia. Last week, Fuel and Energy Minister Serhiy Yermilov said Ukraine has not yet concluded the agreements, which could cover all its gas needs in 2001. JM

Russia's Gazprom, Germany's Ruhrgas and Wintershall, Italy's SNAM, and Gaz de France signed a memorandum of understanding in Moscow on 18 October to study and develop a new section of the planned Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. The project calls for the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline--currently under construction-- to be linked to Slovakia, where it would connect with a network of gas pipelines to Germany, Italy, and France. Such a link, while traversing Polish territory, would bypass Ukraine.

It remains to be seen if the project is feasible. In the meantime, all gas experts agree that the main goal of the agreement--regardless of whether it can be implemented--is to intimidate Ukraine into ceasing to siphon off Russian gas transiting Ukrainian territory and into paying for Russian gas more efficiently. According to some Russian estimates, Ukraine's debt for Russian gas stands at $2.5 billion (Kyiv admits to owing some $1.4 billion). Gazprom, however, says Ukraine stole 15 billion cubic meters of transit gas in 1999- 2000 (worth some $900 million).

Gazprom's chief Rem Vyakhirev commented that the bypass pipeline scheme will make it possible to increase Russian gas supplies to the EU. But it remains a mystery how this can be done by simply constructing a pipeline to Slovakia through Poland without completing the entire Yamal-Europe pipeline. Most likely, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was aware of this when on 19 October he shrugged off the deal by saying that "it takes a lot of time [to proceed] from the project to its practical implementation." At the same time, Kuchma stressed that the capacity of Ukraine's existing gas pipeline network can be increased by 30 percent.

The estimated cost of that part of the Yamal-Europe pipeline that would be built to avoid Ukraine is $1 billion. It is not unfeasible that Gazprom and its Western partners could invest such a sum immediately after the project's feasibility study is completed in favor of the Slovak connection. For Russia, the implementation of the project would mean obtaining great political leverage in Ukraine. Without Russian gas supplies in payment for transit, Ukraine would become a country as politically and economically dependent on the Kremlin as Belarus.

Warsaw is well aware of all the consequences connected with the bypass pipeline project. That's why a number of Polish top officials hastened to assure Kyiv earlier this year--when the bypass pipeline project became known to the public--that Poland would not support any gas supply scheme that would be to the detriment of Ukraine, Poland's "strategic partner."

Many Polish politicians believe that the survival of sovereign and independent Ukraine is a guarantee that Poland itself will not return to "the Russian sphere of influence" and that the political changes that took place in Eastern and Central Europe a decade ago are irreversible. Given Poland's complicated and tragic fate in the 20th century, one should not dismiss such fears among Poles as trivial or groundless.

Europe wants more Russian gas in order to become more independent from OPEC countries in terms of energy consumption, while Poland wants to be in Europe, that is, in the EU as soon as possible. Moscow has calculated that these two aspirations can be utilized to exert pressure on Ukraine. According to this line of reasoning, Poland will not oppose the bypass pipeline project too strongly if Berlin or Paris (both of which have a powerful voice in Brussels)--ask Warsaw to come to its senses and agree. For this reason, Gazprom signed a deal with its Western partners on building the pipeline even without securing the permission of the country across which the pipeline is supposed to run. Moscow bypassed Poland in its political maneuvering, just as it wants to bypass Ukraine in gas transit.

From an economic point of view, Gazprom's project offers Poland more revenues for Russian gas transit. Some Ukrainian commentators say it is only a matter of time until Poland, pressed by its Western allies, will say "yes" to Gazprom's offer. For the time being, Poland has called for an international conference of all countries interested in the construction of a gas pipeline linking Russia's Yamal peninsula with Western Europe.

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin put Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko in charge of negotiations with Poland on building a gas pipeline stretch to bypass Ukraine. Can Ukraine prevent the bypass pipeline scenario from being implemented? In an attempt to do so, Kyiv has proposed to Moscow that the latter jointly manage Ukraine's gas transport network. Putin reportedly showed interest in the proposal during his recent meeting with Kuchma in Sochi. But Khristenko has noted that "currently our position is that joint management is only possible if 51 percent of a consortium controlling Ukraine's gas transport system is in the hands of Gazprom." It seems that Kyiv is not yet ready to accept this technical parameter as the starting point for talks with Moscow on Russian gas supplies.

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC


RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report Vol. 2, No. 39, 24 October 2000

A Survey of Developments in Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine by the Regional Specialists of RFE/RL's Newsline Team

UKRAINE

RUSSIA'S DOUBLE BYPASS. Russia's Gazprom, Germany's Ruhrgas and Wintershall, Italy's SNAM, and Gaz de France signed a memorandum of understanding in Moscow on 18 October to study and develop a new section of the planned Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. The project calls for the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline--currently under construction--to be linked to Slovakia, where it would connect with a network of gas pipelines to Germany, Italy, and France. Such a link, while traversing Polish territory, would bypass Ukraine.

It remains to be seen if the project is feasible. In the meantime, all gas experts agree that the main goal of the agreement--regardless of whether it can be implemented--is to intimidate Ukraine into ceasing to siphon off Russian gas transiting Ukrainian territory and into paying for Russian gas more efficiently. According to some Russian estimates, Ukraine's debt for Russian gas stands at $2.5 billion (Kyiv admits to owing some $1.4 billion). Gazprom, however, says Ukraine stole 15 billion cubic meters of transit gas in 1999- 2000 (worth some $900 million).

Gazprom chief Rem Vyakhirev commented that the bypass pipeline scheme will enable it to increase Russian gas supplies to the EU. But it remains a mystery how this can be done by simply constructing a pipeline to Slovakia through Poland without completing the entire Yamal-Europe pipeline. Most likely, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was aware of this when on 19 October he shrugged off the deal by saying that "it takes a lot of time [to proceed] from the project to its practical implementation." At the same time, Kuchma stressed that the capacity of Ukraine's existing gas pipeline network can be increased by 30 percent.

The estimated cost of the part of the Yamal-Europe pipeline that would be built to avoid Ukraine is $1 billion. It is not unfeasible that Gazprom and its Western partners could invest such a sum immediately after the project's feasibility study is completed in favor of the Slovak connection. For Russia, the implementation of the project would mean obtaining great political leverage in Ukraine. Without Russian gas supplies in payment for transit, Ukraine would become a country as politically and economically dependent on the Kremlin as Belarus.

Warsaw is well aware of all the consequences connected with the bypass pipeline project. That's why a number of top Polish officials hastened to assure Kyiv earlier this year-- when the bypass pipeline project became known to the public-- that Poland would not support any gas supply scheme that would be to the detriment of Ukraine, Poland's "strategic partner."

Many Polish politicians believe that the survival of sovereign and independent Ukraine is a guarantee that Poland itself will not return to "the Russian sphere of influence" and that the political changes that took place in Eastern and Central Europe a decade ago are irreversible. Given Poland's complicated and tragic fate in the 20th century, one should not dismiss such fears among Poles as trivial or groundless.

Europe wants more Russian gas in order to become more independent in terms of energy consumption from OPEC countries, while Poland wants to be in Europe, that is, in the EU, as soon as possible. Moscow has calculated that these two strivings can be utilized to exert pressure on Ukraine. According to this line of reasoning, Poland will not oppose the bypass pipeline project too strongly if Berlin or Paris (both of which have a powerful voice in Brussels)--ask Warsaw to come to its senses and agree. For this reason, Gazprom signed a deal with its Western partners on building the pipeline even without securing the permission of the country across which the pipeline is supposed to run. Moscow bypassed Poland in its political maneuvering, just as it wants to bypass Ukraine in gas transit.

From an economic point of view, Gazprom's project offers Poland more revenues for Russian gas transit. Some Ukrainian commentators say it is only a matter of time until Poland, pressed by its Western allies, will say "yes" to Gazprom's offer. For the time being, Poland has called for an international conference of all countries interested in the construction of a gas pipeline linking Russia's Yamal peninsula with Western Europe.
Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin put Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko in charge of negotiations with Poland on building a gas pipeline stretch to bypass Ukraine. Can Ukraine prevent the bypass pipeline scenario from being implemented? In an attempt to do so, Kyiv has proposed to Moscow that the latter jointly manage Ukraine's gas transport network. Putin reportedly showed interest in the proposal during his recent meeting with Kuchma in Sochi. But Khristenko has noted that "currently our position is that joint management is only possible if 51 percent of a consortium controlling Ukraine's gas transport system is in the hands of Gazprom." It seems that Kyiv is not yet ready to accept this technical parameter as the starting point for talks with Moscow on Russian gas supplies.

"RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report" is prepared by Jan Maksymiuk on the basis of a variety of sources including reporting by "RFE/RL Newsline" and RFE/RL's broadcast services. It is distributed every Tuesday.