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Following Russia's more than twofold increase in gas prices and imposition of a sizable duty on crude oil supplies to Belarus in 2007, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears utterly confused and at a loss to decide what course he should take now.

Lukashenka has made a number of politically incoherent statements recently, thus reinforcing the general feeling that without Russia's political and economic support his autocratic regime is vulnerable and insecure. According to his own estimate, because of the new energy prices, Belarus will have to pay $3.5 billion more in 2007 than last year. Some Russian estimates say Russia's energy and trade subsidies and benefits for Belarus in 2006 amounted to as much as $7 billion. Belarus's gross domestic product is roughly equal to $35 billion.

In the January 25 issue of "Die Welt," Lukashenka pledged to open the Belarusian economy for Western investors and expressed his desire to cooperate with Europe. He also publicized his idea to "consolidate" energy-transit countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and the three Baltic states into a sort of formal alliance, presumably to counteract Russia's increasing assertiveness in using gas and oil deliveries as political weapons.

While firmly rejecting the adoption of the Russian ruble in Belarus, Lukashenka did not rule out that his country might join the euro zone in the future. He called in "Die Welt" on European leaders for an "open dialogue" and urged them to lift a travel ban on Belarusian officials, which he compared to "medieval savagery."

On the day following the publication of his interview in "Die Welt," Lukashenka said in a speech to recipients of doctoral diplomas and professorial chairs in Minsk that there will be no "radical change" in Belarus's foreign policy, adding that he will not "rush toward the United States or wherever."

This week Belarusian media reported that Lukashenka had sent an invitation to Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and that the invitation was promptly accepted.

His statements and moves regarding Russia have been no less disjointed. While paying lip service to his unwavering desire to build an "equal" Belarus-Russia Union State, which was conceived as a bureaucratic phantom by himself and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1996, Lukashenka simultaneously announced two steps that appear to be in stark contrast with his integration rhetoric.

Last week, Lukashenka instructed his government to consider charging Russia rent for the use of land under its gas and oil pipelines crossing Belarusian territory. And he announced that Russian oil companies will have to pay new, higher duties on oil transit across Belarus if they continue to demand prices "higher than those on world markets" for their oil deliveries to Belarusian refineries.

These steps, if actually taken, might escalate the current energy-price row between Belarus and Russia into a full-scale trade war and lead to the reestablishment of a full-fledged customs border between both countries. For many unreformed Belarusian industries this would probably mean the loss of the only market in which they can still be competitive and, as a result, their unavoidable collapse.

Therefore, Lukashenka's threats regarding Russia seem to be more of a propaganda exercise than a real intention.

But these threats, as well as Lukashenka's overtures to the West, demonstrate clearly that the Belarusian president has understood something: Not only his self-styled "market socialism" in Belarus but the very foundations of his regime may be eroded by the Russian termination of discount gas and oil supplies.

Most Russian political analysts openly admit that the Kremlin has finally become fed up with Lukashenka's lip service to integration with Russia and has decided to goad him into action. And the recent tone of the Russian media commenting on Belarus indicates that the Kremlin's new approach toward Lukashenka is a calculated and well-coordinated campaign.

"Izvestiya" wrote on January 18 that Russia needs "an ally, not an arrogant parasite" in Belarus. This assessment was obliquely echoed by President Putin during his meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel a few days later, when the Russian leader noted that in its relations with energy-transit countries, Moscow says "'yes' to cooperation and 'no' to parasitism."

Sergei Karaganov, head of the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy think tank, wrote last week that the Russian policy with regard to Lukashenka -- which he labeled with the well-known political aphorism, "He's a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch" -- has suffered a total failure.

According to Karaganov, Russia's unequivocal political and economic support for Lukashenka allowed him to consolidate his regime and reduce Russia's influence in Belarus almost to nothing. Karaganov said that by taking advantage of "gigantic preferences" provided by Moscow, Lukashenka has managed to form a political class that does not want any rapprochement with Russia.

Like other Russian analysts, Karaganov does not specify what the ultimate goal of such rapprochement could be. But it should be recalled that the only coherent and realistic scenario for Belarus's integration with Russia voiced by the Kremlin was President Putin's suggestion in August 2002 that Belarus give up its sovereignty and join the Russian Federation as a single federation subject or as six separate oblasts.

Stopping short of an outright call to oust Lukashenka, Karaganov urged the Kremlin not to stop "halfway" and "to swiftly finish the business" of increasing the energy prices for Belarus to European levels.

At the same time, Karaganov proposes that the Kremlin start developing a truly pro-Russian political elite in Belarus. He even went so far as to suggest that Moscow should "take notice" of the human rights situation in Belarus, something it has not done even once during Lukashenka's more than 12-year rule.

For a number of reasons, the West -- in particular Europe -- might decide to give a helping hand to Lukashenka if Moscow attempts to politically absorb Belarus.

First, the disappearance of Belarus -- an independent state and a UN member -- from the political map of the world would set a dangerous precedent for any other attempts at such "integration" in the future.

Second, Europe needs secure and uninterrupted gas and oil supplies from Russia. Belarus as a transit country is an essential link in this supply chain. And Lukashenka, in his attempts to oppose the political incorporation by Russia, may disrupt these supplies more than once.

Therefore, it might well be in Europe's interest to enter a dialogue with the erratic Belarusian leader and try to persuade him that Belarus could remain a sovereign country without playing the role of a highwayman.

It is doubtful that Lukashenka could accept Western rules of the game in politics. But he may listen to some economic arguments. He might be persuaded that the best way to counteract Russia's recent "integration" push is to launch market reforms and build his country's independence on a sound economy, which would not be as vulnerable to Russia's malevolence or benevolence to such a degree as now.

The political system built by Lukashenka in Belarus, unshakable as it appears at first glimpse, is very precarious. The machinery works solely due to the absolute loyalty of government officials to the "father of the nation." And this "father" has behaved so far as though he plans to rule Belarus forever.

The West might be able to convince the Belarusian president and his compatriots that there is life after Lukashenka and that "afterlife" may not be so costly to them -- and Belarus -- after all.

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RESIGNS. Borys Tarasyuk resigned on January 30, accusing Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych of usurping power and returning to authoritarian methods of governance, the "Ukrayinska pravda" website (http://www.pravda.com.ua) reported. "I refuse to make the Foreign Ministry a hostage to unlawful actions of the government. As a diplomat with 30 years of experience in diplomatic work, I cannot agree to outright abuses of the diplomatic service," Tarasyuk told journalists in Kyiv on January 30. Tarasyuk was dismissed from his post by the Verkhovna Rada on December 1, 2006, but President Viktor Yushchenko ordered Tarasyuk to keep his job, arguing that his dismissal should have been preceded by a presidential motion. Yanukovych banned Tarasyuk from attending cabinet meetings following the dismissal vote. Under the Ukrainian Constitution, the foreign and defense ministers are nominated by the president and approved by parliament. The constitution does not oblige lawmakers to seek the president's consent in dismissing these two ministers. JM

Following Russia's more than twofold increase in gas prices and imposition of a sizable duty on crude oil supplies to Belarus in 2007, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears utterly confused and at a loss to decide what course he should take now.

Lukashenka has made a number of politically incoherent statements recently, thus reinforcing the general feeling that without Russia's political and economic support his autocratic regime is vulnerable and insecure. According to his own estimate, because of the new energy prices, Belarus will have to pay $3.5 billion more in 2007 than last year. Some Russian estimates say Russia's energy and trade subsidies and benefits for Belarus in 2006 amounted to as much as $7 billion. Belarus's gross domestic product is roughly equal to $35 billion.

In the January 25 issue of "Die Welt," Lukashenka pledged to open the Belarusian economy for Western investors and expressed his desire to cooperate with Europe. He also publicized his idea to "consolidate" energy-transit countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and the three Baltic states into a sort of formal alliance, presumably to counteract Russia's increasing assertiveness in using gas and oil deliveries as political weapons.

While firmly rejecting the adoption of the Russian ruble in Belarus, Lukashenka did not rule out that his country might join the euro zone in the future. He called in "Die Welt" on European leaders for an "open dialogue" and urged them to lift a travel ban on Belarusian officials, which he compared to "medieval savagery."

On the day following the publication of his interview in "Die Welt," Lukashenka said in a speech to recipients of doctoral diplomas and professorial chairs in Minsk that there will be no "radical change" in Belarus's foreign policy, adding that he will not "rush toward the United States or wherever."

This week Belarusian media reported that Lukashenka had sent an invitation to Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and that the invitation was promptly accepted.

His statements and moves regarding Russia have been no less disjointed. While paying lip service to his unwavering desire to build an "equal" Belarus-Russia Union State, which was conceived as a bureaucratic phantom by himself and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1996, Lukashenka simultaneously announced two steps that appear to be in stark contrast with his integration rhetoric.

Last week, Lukashenka instructed his government to consider charging Russia rent for the use of land under its gas and oil pipelines crossing Belarusian territory. And he announced that Russian oil companies will have to pay new, higher duties on oil transit across Belarus if they continue to demand prices "higher than those on world markets" for their oil deliveries to Belarusian refineries.

These steps, if actually taken, might escalate the current energy-price row between Belarus and Russia into a full-scale trade war and lead to the reestablishment of a full-fledged customs border between both countries. For many unreformed Belarusian industries this would probably mean the loss of the only market in which they can still be competitive and, as a result, their unavoidable collapse.

Therefore, Lukashenka's threats regarding Russia seem to be more of a propaganda exercise than a real intention.

But these threats, as well as Lukashenka's overtures to the West, demonstrate clearly that the Belarusian president has understood something: Not only his self-styled "market socialism" in Belarus but the very foundations of his regime may be eroded by the Russian termination of discount gas and oil supplies.

Most Russian political analysts openly admit that the Kremlin has finally become fed up with Lukashenka's lip service to integration with Russia and has decided to goad him into action. And the recent tone of the Russian media commenting on Belarus indicates that the Kremlin's new approach toward Lukashenka is a calculated and well-coordinated campaign.

"Izvestiya" wrote on January 18 that Russia needs "an ally, not an arrogant parasite" in Belarus. This assessment was obliquely echoed by President Putin during his meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel a few days later, when the Russian leader noted that in its relations with energy-transit countries, Moscow says "'yes' to cooperation and 'no' to parasitism."

Sergei Karaganov, head of the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy think tank, wrote last week that the Russian policy with regard to Lukashenka -- which he labeled with the well-known political aphorism, "He's a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch" -- has suffered a total failure.

According to Karaganov, Russia's unequivocal political and economic support for Lukashenka allowed him to consolidate his regime and reduce Russia's influence in Belarus almost to nothing. Karaganov said that by taking advantage of "gigantic preferences" provided by Moscow, Lukashenka has managed to form a political class that does not want any rapprochement with Russia.

Like other Russian analysts, Karaganov does not specify what the ultimate goal of such rapprochement could be. But it should be recalled that the only coherent and realistic scenario for Belarus's integration with Russia voiced by the Kremlin was President Putin's suggestion in August 2002 that Belarus give up its sovereignty and join the Russian Federation as a single federation subject or as six separate oblasts.

Stopping short of an outright call to oust Lukashenka, Karaganov urged the Kremlin not to stop "halfway" and "to swiftly finish the business" of increasing the energy prices for Belarus to European levels.

At the same time, Karaganov proposes that the Kremlin start developing a truly pro-Russian political elite in Belarus. He even went so far as to suggest that Moscow should "take notice" of the human rights situation in Belarus, something it has not done even once during Lukashenka's more than 12-year rule.

For a number of reasons, the West -- in particular Europe -- might decide to give a helping hand to Lukashenka if Moscow attempts to politically absorb Belarus.

First, the disappearance of Belarus -- an independent state and a UN member -- from the political map of the world would set a dangerous precedent for any other attempts at such "integration" in the future.

Second, Europe needs secure and uninterrupted gas and oil supplies from Russia. Belarus as a transit country is an essential link in this supply chain. And Lukashenka, in his attempts to oppose the political incorporation by Russia, may disrupt these supplies more than once.

Therefore, it might well be in Europe's interest to enter a dialogue with the erratic Belarusian leader and try to persuade him that Belarus could remain a sovereign country without playing the role of a highwayman.

It is doubtful that Lukashenka could accept Western rules of the game in politics. But he may listen to some economic arguments. He might be persuaded that the best way to counteract Russia's recent "integration" push is to launch market reforms and build his country's independence on a sound economy, which would not be as vulnerable to Russia's malevolence or benevolence to such a degree as now.

The political system built by Lukashenka in Belarus, unshakable as it appears at first glimpse, is very precarious. The machinery works solely due to the absolute loyalty of government officials to the "father of the nation." And this "father" has behaved so far as though he plans to rule Belarus forever.

The West might be able to convince the Belarusian president and his compatriots that there is life after Lukashenka and that "afterlife" may not be so costly to them -- and Belarus -- after all.