Related Materials

Preliminary draft.
Not to be quoted without premission.

Prepared for the Conference on "Glasnost', Perestroika and Ukraine at the University of Illinois, Urbana - Champaign, June 19-22 1989

1989

I. A Brave new Beginning?

In eight numbers of Radians'ka Ukraina (November and December, 1988) 1, the official organ of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the readers were treated to a lengthy exposition about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was active from approximately 1942 to 1953.

V. Davydenko, who has been specializing in the field of Ukrainian nationalism for a number of years, and whose pamphlets have appeared in large runs, both in Ukrainian and in various foreign languages, is trying once again to place this highly emotional and controversial subject back into a framework of an acceptable ideological interpretation.

His conclusions do not deviate from standard practice. To him, members of the UPA are simply traitors, bandits, cutthroats, hitlerites, whose major task, despite the slogans to the contrary, was to fight for the Nazi Germany. The footnotes to this paper clearly shows how closely the author follows the established line.

V. Davydenko, in his article "Ne stanut' ahntsiamy vovky: UPA z pohliadu siohodennia", prepares the reader well for the complexity of the topic that he is about to raise. The question to be discussed, he says, is a "complex, multilayered, dramatic one". 2 The problem, he says, cannot be dealt with in one or even several newspaper articles, and required the attention of the social scientists. After all, there exists "a heightened interest of the Soviet people..." in this matter, and this interest in "legitimate". In the period of glasnost and openness this interest is connected with the "renewal of historical truth and the new approach to out past". 3 He laments the fact that during the "stagnation period" in the works of "some of our historians and literati" there was a clear tendency to "bypass the question of uncompromising class struggle in the western regions of Ukrainian SSR", and of the "intensity of military duel with the bands". 4 Most importantly, ignored were such questions as the "leadership of this struggle by the Communist Party, participation in the liquidation of bands of separate units of the Soviet Army, of border and internal troops, the interconnection of this struggle with the banderites with the collectivization of agriculture, the exile of the families of bandits and their helpers etc." 5 Because of this , there "exist the bases for various misrepresentations and falsifications by our ideological adversaries". 6 A reader is left with a distinct impression that these questions were neither ignored, nor misinterpreted before the "stagnation period" set in.

No less important requirement for the "period of perestroika and democratization" in to provide an "all-sided analysis and unprejudiced elucidation of a complex and in many aspects of a contradictory struggle for the establishment and strengthening of the Soviet power in western Ukrainian lands, - and objective approach to the assessment of the 'positive' and the 'negative' aspects of this struggle". 7 Moreover such and objective approach is dictated by the XIX All-Union Conference of CPSU and its resolution "On the Internationality Relations", which requires a "creative development of Leninst norms and principles of the nationality policy" and the need for "their decisive cleansing form artificial layers and deformations". 8

Thus, the author clearly signals to the reader that he is not only in tune with the prevailing Party line on the subject, but that he will attempt a novel and a thoroughly objective approach to the problem.

However, due to the tremendous complexities of the matter the author promises to limit himself to only two aspects of the problem, namely:

1. What were the factors that led to the organization of "UPA bands" ?;
2. Who organized and led them ?

Davudenko, however, does not restrict himself to these two questions and already in the introductory portion of his article, goes out of his way to tar the activities of Ukrainian nationalists with a heavy nazi-fascist brush. Because, as he puts it, even thought, M. D. Stepaniak in his "Ideolihiia OUN", and the OUN leadership in general, may have been speaking about relying on "own forces of the people" and about the "great Ukrainian national revolution", in practice, "they tied their entire policy to the military goals of fascism", and fully depended on fascist help. 9 As a result, in gratitude to their fascist bosses, the OUN leadership organized the "Pokhidni grupy", as well as the battalions "Nachtigal" and "Rolland", the Ukrainian Police, various guard, and extermination units for concentration camps and aided the Nazis in killing the innocent people, in establishing the occupational administration, in sending Ukrainian youth to forced labor in Germany, in plundering the population, in requisitioning cultural treasures of the country, etc. 10

The "OUN-UPA bands, organized, trained and equipped by the hitlerites", in view of the author, are simply one link in the long chain of OUN efforts in support of German goals. 11 After all, how can one argue, asks the author, (as some in the USSR obviously do), "that they [UPA units-PJP] were being formed for the 'struggle against Stalinism' 12, or for 'defense of national interests', when the Soviet-German from was some 1200-1500 kilometers away from Western Ukraine in November 1942 ? Was the UPA being organized to fight the Germans? 13

Davudenko provides a standard answer. The military situation in Ukraine was quit troublesome for the Germans. Their supply lines became quite extended and were being threatened by the growing "partisan war" led by the "Communist party". In order to fight the partisans and to protect their rear the Germans needed help and found in once again in the ranks of the OUN leadership. At the beginning of 1943 the newly organized "OUN bands" on instructions from the Nazis were joined by the "Ukrainian" police and the "banderites" from "Nachtigal" and "Rolland" who by then have completed a "special anti-partisan training. They [these units-PJP] became the skeleton for the bands". 14

The hunger for power and the class origin of the OUN leadership provided the impetus for collaboration with the Germans.

The "class character" of the nationalist "bands" can be seen from the "leadership cadres of the OUN", various "banderite groupings" and the "banderite security service (SB)". 15

The top leaders of the OUN, D. Kliachkivs'kyi, R. Shukhevych, M. Lebed', Ia. Busel, O. Luts'kyi, D. Hrytsai, D. Maievs'kyi (sic), S. Arsenych-Berezivs'kyi, came from rich, kulak families. While S. Bandera, Ia. Stets'ko, S. Lenkavs'kyi, P. Kravchuk. I. Hryniokh were children of the Uniate clergy. 16

However, says Davydenko, it would be wrong to assume, "as was fashionable until very recently"(sic), that the "bands generally were being recruited only from among the 'class-enemy elements', 'criminal offenders' etc.". 17 "In the 'UPA' formations, as well as among those who were helping the bands, especially in the initial period, there were many peasants who were either deceived by the nationalist demagoguery, or intimidated by the banderites", but also "POWs", "escapees from concentration camps", "local youth" who refused to serve as German laborers, but also "those who were offended by the Soviet authorities in connection with the violation of socialist legality in the localities, groundless arrests or exile of family members or relatives, or nationalization of land the property and of the means of production, of the rich and the clergy". 18

Quite often "there were honest people among the bandits who had swallowed the bait of the OUN agents provocateur and believed that, after they had joined the UPA, they would fight the Nazi invaders. Actually, that was the only reason why hey found themselves among the thugs at that period". 19

Finally, "there were those who had joined the UPA out of fear; otherwise, they had been warned by the recruiters, that they and their families would by killed, (Incidentally, many had refused nevertheless and had been slaughtered for that)." 20

It was largely these people who "contrary to the orders of the OUN-UPA leadership" and, in fact, because of these orders, at a considerable personal risk, "attacked the small living enclaves of he occupiers, and individual hitlerites", and then at the earliest opportunity deserted and joined the Soviet partisans. 21

But even such individual, spontaneous instances of anti-German opposition were not to the taste of the OUN leadership and in a "directive from the SB of 27 October 1943", special measures were recommended to stop such activity, and the punishment for disregarding such orders could by "execution". 22

Here end the task that the author placed before himself at the outset of his work. And the answer that he gives to the two questions that he posed at the beginning of his article is a rather traditional one. he UPA came into being thanks to the Nazis and was largely led by the fascist elements, and the experienced agents of the Abwehr. 23

Even though the author stated at the very beginning that the newspaper article in not the place to disentangle this very complex issue of the UPA and of the Ukrainian underground, he is not embarrassed in any way to actually attempt this very difficult task. Some portions of his article contain a few new elements of emphasis and interpretations and there fore, should be noted at he very beginning.

Thus in most of the Soviet literature, the UPA has been represented as a conglomerate of rather small, highly divided, unorganized gangs, which lacked proper military training and centralized direction, and were thoroughly despised by the people. This approach, as the author readily admits, was purely political in motivation and was imposed by the authorities who wee concerned with not exaggerating "the political importance of the enemy", and , therefore, it constitutes one of the historical "blank spots" that needs to be cleared up. 24

In actual fact, Davudenko says, the UPA was a "sufficiently mobile and a [well] prepared formation" especially in its first phase of existence, namely during 1943-1945. It had a well developed command structure, military ranks, the Security System (SB), and even Political Officers, and "in the fall of 1945 it numbered nearly 90,000 men". 25 The contribution in the struggle against the UPA of the "border and internal troops" was especially great. Yet due to a tendency of minimizing sharp problems, this important contribution was not properly acknowledged and thus "still another 'blank spot' was created in the history of the struggle with nationalist gangsterism". 26

In this struggle it was necessary to deny the underground its social base and, therefore, the author feels that repression against those elements of the population that were supporting the UPA was fully justified and should not be denied or hidden from the public eye. He puts it this way:

"Without in any way justifying groundless punitive measures, we cannot fail to see that in the conditions of a sharp class struggle and banderite terror the exile beyond the borders of the republic of those, who in neglecting the Soviet laws consciously supported and concealed the bands, provided them with all the necessities, and , therefore, helped the ounites in their crimes, was a painful necessity". 27

Yet these measures, "during the cult of personality and the period of decay" were being "stubbornly kept quiet" and this led to another, a rather "peculiar blank spot" in the post-war history of the republic, which was created by the nationalists who live abroad, and who, according to Davydenko, naturally, tend to exaggerate the extent of these reparations". 28 Thus, for example, from 1944 to 1951 from western regions of Ukraine the Soviets exiled only 65,906 families or 203,662 individuals and not as the nationalists claim 2 million or more persons. 29 The author also admits that the "socialist legality" (which at that time was referred to by N. S. Khrushchev as the 'revolutionary legality'-PJP) was quite often violated by the "individual party, Soviet and administrative workers", and , in fact, necessitated intervention of the CC CP(b)U, and Khrushchev personally. 30

The rest of the story is cast very much in a traditional mould and does not deviate in any significant way from the Party line that has been established in the early 1940s.

II. Collaboration.

A large portion of the article is taken up with the issue of collaboration with the Germans. Here, not unlike in most of the Soviet writings on the subject, several themes are interwoven together and the evidence to support these themes is carefully arranged. First, several categories of collaborationists, and them their motivations and activities are presented.

I. The first category of collaborationists is the broadest. These are the "class enemy" who are implacably opposed to the Soviet system/ Because the Ukrainian society was not greatly differentiated and mostly rural, the "class enemy" by definition were the richer peasants and the church leadership and its clergy. Although the Ukrainian Catholic clergy (Uniate clergy in Soviet sources) is especially strongly attacked, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is certainly not spared, and its hierarchy and clergy come in for a great deal of vilification and abuse. he leadership of the Ukrainian underground is presented as having been recruited primarily from this group of people. 31

II. The second category were those among the leadership who went through a special preparation in the German special services, such as the Abwehr and Sicherheits Diest(SD), auxiliary police, or he SS. This was especially true of the Sluzhba Bezpeky (SB or the OUN Security Service). 32

III. A third category were all kinds of hangers on, most of them uneducated, simple fellows, who were either unsophisticated or simply unable to distinguish between friends and enemies. Here also belong those who were forced to join for various reasons, some of them because they genuinely wanted to fight the Germans. 33

It was, therefore, not at all surprising that the leaders were willing to collaborate with the German Nazis.

How was this collaboration consummated?

1. First of all, the fascist ideology was embraced by the collaborators. 34
2. Most were trained in German special services. 35
3. Germans went out of their way to help them in organizing. 36
4. Germans supplied them with weapons and equipment. 37

Davydenko, without stating precisely what period of time he has in mind, claims that the Germans gave the UPA, 700 mortars, 10,000 machine guns, 26,000 automatic rifles, 22,000 pistols, 100,000 hand grenade, 80,000 mortar shells, several millions pieces of ammunition, and that at the Department I-C of the Staff Army Group South, a special Division was created, with Major Helwich in charge, to aid the UPA. 38 Thus the Germans left some 40 bases in Volyn alone full of weapons for the UPA. 39

5. Germans kept control over the operation both on the political and on the military level. 40

6. Germans provided substantial financial support. 41

What did the Ukrainian nationalist do in return?

1. They organized anti-Soviet units (Pokhidni Grupy, Nachtigal, Rolland, 42 SS Division Galizien 43 Schutzmanschaften 44 Ukrainian police 45, and finally the UPA 46.
2. They assisted the Germans in their occupation policies and repressions against the Ukrainian people. 47 Helped round up young people or slave work in Germany. 48 And acted as German helpers in arresting, guarding and executing Jews. 49
3. They fought the Soviet partisans and protected the German rear. 50
4. They cooperated with the Germans in search ad destroy operations against successful Soviet agents, or leading Soviet officials. 51

Anything that is contrary to this line is presented as a nationalist lie. Thus, for example, a declaration of Ukrainian Independence of June 30, 1941 is viewed simply as a costly temporary mistake of the ambitious OUN leaders which , contrary to appearances, did not lead to the break with Nazis. 52

Any or all negotiations with the Germans, or the Hungarian and Romanian armies of occupation are held up as a clear indication that the UPA was a tool in German hands. 53 As mentioned earlier, D. Kliachkivs'kyi was accused of negotiating successfully for additional weapons in August 1944, although at that time he was no longer alive, a fact, that the author chose completely to ignore. 54

But the villain of these pertractation is clearly Rev. Dr. Ivan Hryniokh (Herasymovs'kyi). Davydenko accuses him of carrying on talks with the Hauptsturmfuhere Pappe, the kriminalkommissar, in the strictest conspiracy from the UPA rank and file. 55

The conversations began on March 1, 1944 in Ternopol. 56 They continued in Lviv on march 23, March 27 March 28 (with Dr. Witska), May 3, 1944 and June 7, 1944. 57

Hryniokh's negotiations led to exchange of information between UPA and the Germans but even more importantly, they resulted in the so called Helwich's operation. Some 40 bases in Volyn alone were left full of weapons for the UPA. 58

In the fall of 1944 in order to check on the efficiency of the UPA operations a special group of Witzel-Kern (sic) (Kirn) was dropped behind the Soviet lines where it operated for four weeks. For this operation Witzel-Kern was decorated by Hitler with the Ritterkreuz. 59

The collaboration with the Germans and especially substantial German support for the UPA, allowed it to exist until 1951, when even individual "banderites" finally decided to give up the fight. 60

But true to their habits, just before the final collapse came, the collaborators began to search for new supporters abroad, namely the British and American intelligence services. And as the press conference of 14 September 1988 well shows, the banderites try to this day, without much success, to create a nationalist underground in Ukraine. 61

Such activities, of course, are totally unacceptable, because as one of the propagandists wrote in an earlier period, "by all its achievements the Ukrainian people is obligated to the Communist Party, to its great leaders and teachers of toilers V. I. Lenin and I. V. Stalin, to constant help and support of all Soviet people but first of all to its elder brother the Russian people". 62

III. Church and the UPA.

The close ties between the Ukrainian underground and the church has been for years a very strong staple in Soviet propaganda. V. Davydenko follow very closely into the footsteps of his predecessors.

The clergy of the Ukrainian churches (Catholic and Orthodox) and their offspring were and are considered by the Soviet propagandists as the main and the most dangerous "class enemy". They are viewed as the chief defenders of the ideology of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, which they manipulate people for their nefarious goals. It is from their ranks, and especially from among the children of the Ukrainian Catholic clergy, that the top leadership of the OUN and the UPA was recruited. 63. They are also accused of a number of other crimes.

The "uniate priest" Hryniokh held discussions with the Nazis about collaboration and gave the name of the fallen hero M. Kyznetsov and his documents to the Germans. 65

It was Rev. Hrynoikh who negotiated transferal of weapons from the Germans o the UPa. 66

This close collaboration between the church and the underground did not prevent "banderites" from killing also the Catholic priests, especially those, who happened to be non-Ukrainians. 67

According to Davydenko, the "uniate-nationalist traitors" also killed writer Ia. Halan. 68

The uniate clergy widely supported "the bands", and Metropolian "Barron" Sheptyts'kyi sent into UPA a number of so called "forest chaplains". 69

These uniate chaplains carried out not priestly but "murderous functions" in the UPA, and they used German automatic "Schmeissers" better than the world of god. 70

Although a part of uniate clergy was opposed to the UPA, most, nevertheless, gave them support ad hiding places in UPA churches and monasteries. 71

The uniate hierarchy, and especially Sheptytskyi, gave the OUN leaders moral and material aid. M. Stepaniak, Ia. Blusel, I. Hryniokh regularly informed him about underground activities on the anti-Soviet from. And in the summer of 1944 the Metropolitan in a conversation with R. Shukhevych not only failed to advise him to stop the war against the Soviets, but actually urged him to continue the fight, as the expert, S. T. Danylenko (KGB Colonel at that time - PJP) claims in his book. Had he taken such a step situation would have been much better and the conflict would have come to a speedy end. 72 Nudged in such a manner, the "bandits" went on to kill even those of the priests who decided to leave the uniate church. During 1946-48 some 50 priests were killed, including Rev. H. Kostel'nyk, Mykola Bobeliak, Ievhen Korol etc. 73

Thus, even though the war was over the "bandits" continued their activities primarily because they received support from the kulaks and the reactionary priesthood. 74

IV. Banderite terror.

the author does not differ at all from Soviet propagandists of earlier times in describing all nationalist formations as terrorist organizations. To him, Pokhidni Grupy OUN, the legions - Nachtigal and Rolland. Ukrainian Auxiliary Police organized by the Germans, as well as the various guard units, the SS Division Galizien, the UPA, all were creatures of the nationalists and all used terror against the population. 75. There is no attempt at all to differentiate among these formations, and all of them are presented as willing collaborators of the Germans in theirs policy of pillage and murder.

At the beginning of war, in 1941, in Lviv alone, the nationalists are accused of having killed over 5,000 inhabitants. 76 While later the police and the "ounites" killed 136,000 Jews. 77 The impression is thus created, that Ukrainian underground was totally fascinated by killing the innocent people and its raison d'être was killing and torture not only during he war but also long after it was over.

All claims by the underground that they carried the fight also to the Germans are dismissed simply as lies. It is emphasized instead that all, or any attempts, to fight the Germans, were severely punished by the leadership, even those which had a spontaneous character. 78 Thus, he UPA is accused of killing the peaceful inhabitants. Poles, anti-German partisans, or individual heroes such as Kuznetsov. 79 It fought the Soviet army and killed Gen. Vatutin, Polish Gen. Szierszewski and other prominent communists. 80

The Ukrainian underground attached and burned those villages that supported the soviet partisans, and in their terror against the population used the crudest methods of execution such as "krenpultsy", drowning, electrocution, torture etc. 81

Inspired by the Germans, the action against the Polish population was especially brutal. the nationalists killed Poles in Volyn, in Khom, in Liubachiv and in other area. 82

When the Germans were finally chased out and the front moved west the "banderites" tried to take control over the villages, cities and towns in Soviet rear. 83 In their zoological hatred of everything Soviet they tried to drown in blood the "Socialist transformations" that were taking place in the country. 84 By the use of terror they tried to stop collectivization. 85 With this purpose in mind, in the summer of 1945 individual nationalist leaders such as "Krylatyi" demanded that the UPA terrorize the population, and liquidate all who support the communists. 86

Davydenko claims that factual materials about this activity can be found in the Central State Archives of the October Resolution, Socialist construction and Management of he Ukrainian SSR in Kiev, which contains various reports by the "bandit leaders". 87 he also mentions confessions of captured underground leaders such as V. Halasa ("Orlan"), which state that these repressions against the population were psychologically bothersome to him. 88 The author, however, does not cite any of the documents.

In a rare display of statistics, Davydenko claims, that even an incomplete data of 'banderite" terror clearly shows, that in the regions of their operations, hey have liquidated: 1454 chairmen of village councils, 300 chairmen of collective farms, 30 first secretaries and secretaries of raikom, 32 chairmen and vice-chairmen of raiispolkoms, 37 obkom secretaries, many secretaries of komsomol raikoms, and hundreds of Soviet deputies. 89

In short, anyone who disagree with the nationalists had to be punished by death, including the priests, especially those, who converted to Russian orthodoxy. According to the author, more than 50 former uniate priests lost their life in this fashion. 90 One of he more prominent victims among them, was Arch priest H. Kostel'nuk, writer Halan and numerous others. 91

The author concludes that as far as the nationalists are concerned nothing has really changed and given the opportunity they are apt to repeat these crimes all over again. 92

V. The "People's war" against the underground.

The author acknowledges that the struggle against the underground was quite difficult and that variety of measures, military, police and political, were used to combat it. This activity against the underground is presented primarily as the people's war, which was, nevertheless, under very close control of the Party and the government. The process is viewed as being almost entirely voluntary, as being enthusiastically supported by the people, and one which had its beginning already under the German occupation.

At the call of the Party, there grew a network of underground Party and Komsomol organizations, and of the units of 'people's avengers', who fought both the Germans and the Ukrainian nationalists. 93

In the summer of 1944 when the Red Army returned to the region, the people welcomed its coming enthusiastically. 94 This enthusiasm, however, was not shared by the nationalists. The "banderite killers" and their "uniate-nationalist" supporters especially strongly hated the young "Patriots-internationalists" who were willing to help the party and the "organs of Soviet government" in the struggle against the bands. 95

Slowly the tide was turned. Cultural changes and greater political consciousness in the village began to work against the nationalists. 96 This was possibly primarily because of the wise policy of the Party which called the attention of all Party workers to the fact that the underground was composed of various class elements and required, therefore, a differentiated approach to its liquidation. 97

In response to the call of the Party and in the face of mounting crimes perpetrated by nationalists more and more people joined the Extermination Battalions (Istrebitel'nye bataliony) and the village "Self-defense" units. By June 1945 some 300 Extermination Battalions were in operation with 28,000 members, which were supported by additional 2,666 village Self-defense units with some 29,000 members. 98

The author laments the fact that to this day, the activities of these brave "patriots - internationalists" have not been given proper recognition. he feels very strongly, that for their contribution to the construction of "peace and socialism" the veterans of these "people's formations" should be reworded with well-deserved special pensions. Or at least, they should be allowed to form their own organization, allowed to meet, and to express all that pain that has accumulated in their hearts over these long years of neglect and oblivion. After all, asks the author, should not these people at least be able to react in an organized fashion to by some misguided members of society who have the temerity to suggest that monuments should be erected in honor of the UPA? 99

The most active supporters of the Party in this struggle were, of course, the Komsomol members. In Rovno, Volyn and Ternopil regions alone, in the post-war years, some 10,000 Komsomol members served with the Extermination Battalions. 100

Women no less than men full supported the party in this struggle. 101

The people in turn were helped by the state. An uncompromising struggle in this conflict was carried on by the border and internal troops who rushed to the aid of the village activists and of the people's formations. 102 These special military units were used not because it was absolutely necessary - the people alone would have succeeded very nicely - but in order to liquidate the underground as fast as possible. In this effort the Party was animated first of all by "humanitarian considerations". moreover, quite often this struggle was carried on in joint operations with the Polish and the Czechoslovak army. 103

This policy provided tremendously successful and despite he "banderite terror", the people rushed into collective farms with a great deal of enthusiasm. 104 But most importantly, the hatred of the workers for nationalists, combined with the active efforts of various state organs, the cleavages and internal fighting within the bands, their total demoralization, led finally to their complete destruction. 105 thus, in 1949-50, when new attempts to penetrate the Soviet Union from abroad were made, this time by the spies sent by the Anglo-American intelligence services, they were easily discovered and apprehended with the help of the people. 106

VI. Government pacification measures.

The Party's role in combating the Germans and the Ukrainian underground is also presented in a standard fashion. Having found itself in a war with Germany, the leadership of the Party called on the people to resist the invaders. At the call of the leaders, the people began to organize the anti-German, partisan units and to attack the Germans. 107 In addition, the Party organized and sent large partisan units under the command of S. A. Kovpak, M. I. Naumv, B. G. Shanhin and others to create havoc and to spread demoralization behind the enemy lines. 108

The Ukrainian nationalist underground which entered the struggle on the side of the Germans began to combat the Soviet partisans. It continued this anti-Soviet activity even after the front moved west and the Germans were pushed out of Ukraine. In the situation of extreme danger the Soviet command was forced to remove some badly needed units from the front to combat the UPA. 109

Later on, responding to the Party's call a number of Extermination Battalions and village "Self-defense" units were created who became very effective tools in combating the underground. 110 The author grudgingly admits that these "people's formations" were not enough to defeat the nationalists and that border, internal troops, and even the regular military units had to be used, the latter primarily for mopping up operations. 111

In this struggle, ordinary Soviet soldiers, members of state security, officials of the MVD and militia men, all have shown themselves as the true heroes, fully devoted to the Communist Party and dedicated to its ideals and principles of socialist internationalism. 112

The leaders in the anti-UPA struggle, however, were the Party organizations. The Central Committee of the CP(b)U always emphasized the need to approach this question in a rational and differentiated manner. Members of the Politburo of the CP(b)U, N. S. Khrushchev, M. S. Hrechukha, D. S. Korotchenko, D. Z. Manuil'skyi, were intimately involved in this work. 113 With the goal in mind to bring the conflict to a speedy end, the Party issued several appeals directed at the people at large and specifically, at the underground.

Proclamations of 12 February and 27 November 1944 to the population of Western Ukraine promised forgiveness to all members of the underground who stopped fighting and gave themselves up to the Soviet authorities. 114

An attempt was even made to negotiate with the UPA in February of 1945. This Soviet initiative was communicated to the underground and the UPA leadership under pressure from its rank and file, according to the author, had no choice but actually to agree to such conversations with the representatives of the Soviet authorities. On 28 February 1945, at night, at the 93d km. marked on the road between Lviv and Ternopil, two Soviet delegates (Colonel of State Security, Serhii Tarasovych Karyn (S. T. Danylenko) and Major of State Security, Oleksander Oleksiiovych Khoroshun, met with Dmytro Maivs'kyi, ("Nachal'nyk holovnoho shtaby UPA"), and Iakiv Busel, ("Politreferent UPA"), in a hamlet near the village Koniukhy. The conversations went on for over 5 hours. In the end, however, he UPA delegates, refused to accept the "humane" proposals of the Soviet government. It was clear, the author says, that they never intended to take these talks seriously, and only carried on these conversations in order to pacify those among them who insisted that such talks should take place. 115 In this manner the blame for the breakdown of negotiations is once again shifted to the underground leadership.

Still another Proclamation to the population was issued on 19 May 1945, giving the "bandits" the last opportunity to give themselves up. Some took this chance and by June 1, 1945, some 40,385 underground fighters came out of hiding. 116

Other measures to win the population over and to raise its political consciousness were also undertaken. The Party and the Komsomol tried to develop educational programs and facilities, and great efforts were made to liquidate illiteracy among the population, etc. 117

The press and other information media played a very important role in this process. 118

The Party also tried very hard to create the loyal group of lical activists. The Decree of CC CP(b)U of 10 July 1945, "pro dobir i vykhovannia kadriv z aktyvu mistsevoho naselennia zakhidnykh oblastei URSR", was especially important in this respect. Korotchenko in his report of the Orgbiuro of the CC All-Union CP(b) of July 1946, stated that the C CP(b)U paid special attention to this problem of cadres and that out of 60,000 Soviet, economic and trade union workers, 33,956 (of these 10,396 women) were of local origin and that more than 30 persons among them, became deputies either to the USSR or to Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. 119

However, as the author clearly admits, the recruitment of the locals into important positions was very limited and restricted, and the Party committees in several obkoms did not proceed in this matter with necessary dispatch. Thus out of 15,120 nomeklatura workers in July 1946, only 1,839 were of lical origin, which constituted only 21.1 per cent (sic) of all nomenklatura positions in Western Ukraine. 120 In some obkoms the number of local cadres was even less. In Stanyslaviv obkom, only 89 workers or 7 per cent were of lical origin. Moreover, these positions as a rule were limited to the raion or village level only. Such shortcomings in the selection and promotion of cadres, according to the author, created an atmosphere of suspicion, put the break in the process of "socialist reconstructions", and gave the "trump-cards to nationalists" in their fight against the Soviet order. 121

Composed as they were of individuals not familiar with lical conditions, the Party committees did not always take into account he fact that the native population for decades was educated in the spirit of "bourgeois ideology". The past contributions to the cause of Communism and the glorious deeds of Western Ukrainian Communists (KPZU) were either unknown to the Party workers, or willfully disregarded, which resulted in a heightened feeling of bitterness and passivity among the lical Communists. The theory of the "sharpening class struggle in the socialist construction", also had a largely negative effect, as did the substitute of he military and security measures ("pravozakhysnykh organiv") for political work among the masses, in combating the nationalist ideology. 122

There were other exaggerations, for example, in the field of agricultural policy. When the collectivization of agriculture was introduced, the people joined the collective farms with great deal of enthusiasm. 123 However, in many villages the principle of voluntary association was violated, ad many middle peasants were wrongly regarded as kulaks. 124 Socialist legality was also violated and Stalin was largely to blame for these harmful exaggerations. In any case these "derangements and deviations" in their overall effect should be considered as of marginal nature, and not capable, in a fundamental way, of seriously undermining the strength of socialism in the countryside. The nationalists abroad always stress the negative side and, therefore, their position on this issue is very weak and not to be taken seriously. 125

Finally, probably for a first time ever in the Soviet Ukrainian press, the author admits that large scale repressions against the population did take place. One such measure which was widely practiced was the forcible exile of those who were considered "supporters" (by author's own admission a rather flexible and easily expanded category - PJP) of the UPA. In his view such punishment against the recalcitrant elements of the population was fully justified, especially as only 65,906 families or some 203,662 persons were moved in this manner beyond the borders of Ukraine, mostly to Siberia. Nationalists, therefore, lie when they claim that it was a couple of million people that were subject to forcible exile. 126 The author admits that some violations of "socialist legality" did take place here as well, but as the speech of N. S. Khrushchev at the August 1946 CC CP(b)U clearly shows, the Party came out strongly against such excesses.

After the liquidation of the underground and in line with the humanitarian concerns of the Party, all those who were exiled, were allowed to return to their places of origin. Some did, others decided to continue living in the "eastern regions of the country", while still others could not return because the local people did not want them back. 127

It is too bad, Davydenko feels, that today in the USSR some would like to refurbish, to humanize the horrible history of the UPA, to characterize it as a notional-liberation movement and its deeds as a national-liberation struggle. 128

VII. Conclusions.

The conclusions are rather simple. The process of glasnost' and perestroika has not as yet touched the area of historical analysis that pertains to Ukrainian national Movement of modern times. The writings in this field suffer from old propaganda habits, approaches and interpretations, which are worthy of a Stalin Prize. Argumentation is not based on documentary evidence, and where facts tent to interfere, they are disregarded or twisted to fit the established Party line. Such an approach, can only slow down the forces of change and reconstruction. In fact, this may be its intention. it was probably with this in mind, that I. F. Drach responded rather negatively to Davydenko's article, fearing, no doubt, that it was one more attempt, with the help of a "scythe", to keep things in Ukraine under control. 129

It is reasonable to assume, that the series of articles in Radians'ka Ukraina and in other newspapers, were inspired by the security organs in order to delimit the extent and contents of the discussion about the Ukrainian national demands which are permitted at this time. Davydenko's article does not, therefore, offer much that is new. Here and there, in his article, some new facts are presented, but they are not fully explored. For example, regime repressions against the population are finally admitted but the extent of these repressions is considerably minimized. 130 no doubt, a full disclosure, of these activities, like the mass killings in Bukovnia, in Vinnytsia, and during the retreat of the Soviets in 1941, as publicized by Rostyslav Bratun', would not bring much credit to the Party's nationality policy in Ukraine. And it is highly unlikely that it is possible to whitewash the crimes of the security apparatus against the people by presenting them as "the knights of the revolution" and as "victims of Stalinism". 131

On the other hand, the issues of national consciousness, the struggle for national equality, national rights, national self-determination can no longer be dismissed as the meddling of foreign intelligence agencies in the internal affairs of the USSR. Mr. Drach, therefore, is probably exaggerating somewhat when he says that Davydenko's piece was simple a response to the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, which was taking place in Toronto, Canada late last Fall. 132 No doubt, the activities of the Ukrainian diaspora are followed by the Soviet government with a great deal of interest. but it is more likely, that the home-grown demands for a visible uskorenie, improvement in the field of nationality relations, and removal of the black spots in the history of Ukraine, were the root cause of Davydenko's concern, and of people like him.

This lasting preoccupation with the Ukrainian national demands on the part of Soviet leaders in clearly seen in the literature collected in the footnotes and bibliography to this paper. This literature also shows how very narrow are the channels within which the Soviet Ukrainian propagandists have to function, (at least until recently), and how strikingly primitive are its contents. The "Party Line", which was worked out in 1943-44, continues to be the operative principle of these elaborations, most of them highly repetitious, and strongly touched by crudeness, premediations and plagiarism.

The Soviet propaganda continues to count on the public that is ignorant of the most basic facts about the Ukrainian National Movement, and has no access to the rich archival sources which are available to all in western countries. 133 We can only hope that the State Archives of the Ukrainian SSR will soon be open to researchers in all fields, including the "nationalist activities", and that in the foreseeable future, the task of clearing the "black spots" and filling the "blank spots" in the history of Ukraine will rest in the hands of reputable historians and not security men it is only when this comes to pass that we can say with some certainty that a genuine "glasnost" has finally reached Ukraine.

FOOTNOTES

• The author wishes to express his gratitude to Messrs. P. I. Kravchuk, M. Kulyk, V. Makar, K. Mykytczuk and T. Zakydalsky for help with the Soviet materials.
  1. A shorter, even harsher version of this artilce appeared in Sotsialisticheskaia industria, 5. XI. 1989.
  2. V. Davydenko, Radians'ka Ukraina, 27. IX, 1988, p. 3, henceforth RU; See also: I. F. Drach, "suchasni problemy i tryvohy", Literaturna Ukraina, No. 51, 1988.
  3. V. Davydenko, Ibid.
  4. Idem.
  5. Idem.
  6. Idem.
  7. Idem.
  8. Idem.
  9. Idem.
  10. Idem.; See also: E. Kotliarchuk, "Fal'shyvi madaty", in V. M. Chudovs'kyi, Bezchestia, Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1983, p.11.
  11. V. Davydenko, Ibid.
  12. Evidenttly the proposition that UPA as an anti-Stalinist force should be regabilitated was raised publically by Mr. Makar at a Lviv rally. Since then this cry or justice and historical truth has been reported from various areas in the republic and vehemently attacked in the press. See: V. V. Tetervak, "Oblyshte bavytysia v patriotiv", Vil'na Ukraina, 2. II. 1989; V. Honcharenko et al (six signatures), "Iasno kto zakazyvaet etu 'muziku", Pravda Ukrainy, 26. II. 1989, p. 3; "Dva lysty na odnu temy: Baderivshchyna proty stalincchchyny", Sil's'ki visti, 18. III. 1989; M. Mashtaler, "Na zakhyst choho ratoborstvuie R. Hormiak?", RU, 19. III. 1989 and similar letters to various Soviet newspapers.
  13. The pamphlet by B. Vasylevych, based on the information supplied by Luka Pavlyshyn - "Vovk", however, describes the meeting of top OUN-B leadership in Lviv (Horodets'ka Street 47, second floor, in December 1942), where according to him a decision was taken to organize the UPA in Volyn, and how "with the coming of the Red Army to continue the struggle against the Soviet government". B. Vasylevych, Lzhemesii. Lviv, Kameniar, 1973, p. 87. Present at the meeting were Mykola Lebid (sic), Hrytsai, Lehenda, "Vovk" - Luka Pavlyshyn, Vasyl Ivakhiv, Mykhailo Medvid', In the discussion allegedly the following points were made: Volyn population is being severely oppressed by the Germans and is not willing to submit like the cautious Galicians; Only the red partizans are defending it; In order not to lose influence the OUN must organize military units and pretend to defend the volynians. If necessary, in order to convince the population, separate clashes with the Germans nay be allowed, never forgetting, however, that the main enemy is bolshevizm - Moscow; Initially the UPA should be organized on the basis of anti-German attitudes but subsequently to come out against the bolsheviks (Ivakhiv). Ibid., p. 91.
  14. V. Davydenko, Ibid.; the Party line on the Ukrainian underground has been worked out already in the early 1940s. V. Cherednychenko in his pamphlet Anatomiia zrady: Ukrains'kyi burzhuaznyi nationalizm - znariaddia antyradians'koi polityky imperializmu. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1978, p. 151, quotes externcively from the "Proclamation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the council of Ministers of IUkrainian SSR to Members of UPA and UNRA", (PA IIP at the CC Communist Party of Ukraine, f. 56, op. 1, spr. 1089), which states that "under the slogan of liberating Ukraine from the enemies of the Ukrainian people [UPA/UNRA - PJP] create their armed units ... and direct their attacks not against the bloody hitlerite hangmen, who plunder our country, and destroy out people, but agaisnt the heroic sons and daugters of out people, against the Soviet partizans..."; "In July 1942 ounist leadership gave an order, in whihc it demanded that ... 'an active struggle be waged only against Moscow. As to Germany, a tactic should be, to wait , economize strength, and no unnecessary stupid actions'". Tsentral'nyidewrxhavnyi arkhiv Zhovtevoi revoliutsii URSR, f. 4328, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 108 quoted in D. D. Podovzhnii, Liuds'koi krovi ne zmyty. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1970, p. 49; This line is further developed in the speech by N. S. Khrushchev at the Sixth Session of the SupremeSoviet of the Ukrainian SSR on March 1, 1944. See: M. S. Khrushchov, Shost Sessia Verkhovnoii Rady URSR, Stenohrafichnyi zvit. Kiev, Ukrderzhvydav, 1944, pp. 20-21 quoted in ol. poltorats'kyi, Ukrains'ki burchuazni nationalisty-nailiutshi vorohy ukrains'koho narodu. Kiev, politvydav Ukrainy, 1953, pp. 52-53; Similar accusations are repeated in a talk by D.
  15. Manuilskii, then the Minister of foreign Affairs of Ukrainian SSR, delivered at the Coference of Teachers of Western Ukraine in Lviv on January 6, 1945 and reprinted in English in a pamphlet issued by the National Executive of the Ukrainian Canadian Association, Toronto, Ontario, November 1945 entitled The Truth About Ukrainian "Refugees" in Germany. Manuilskii said: For what purpose did the Germans, as well as the Ukrainian-German nationalists, have to resort to this comedy with the O. U. N. 'Underground'? They needed it in order to draw into these bands the militant farmers who hated theGermans, presumably to fight the Germans, but in reality to force them by terror to fight the Red Army. As you can see, this so-called 'underground' is something quite different in reality". p. 17; The Soviet explanation for the rise of the UPA is well exemplified by V. cherednychenko. The Red Army's victiries - especially in the abttles of Moscow and Stalingrad - dampened, to a considerable extent, the military potential and prestige of Nazi Germany and caused a general shift in the situation on the fronts, testifying, for all the world to see, to the inevitablilty of the Axis's defeat. Of special importance on this sense was the national-liberation struggle in the Nazi-occupied coutries as well as in Ukraine, where the underground patriotic forces and partizan exercis control and protect theor supply routes.

It was then that the nazis sounded the alarm and recruited all the available forces in an effort to win the losing war game. The Nazis agents - the Ukrainian nationalists - followed suit and annonced "total mobilization".

The Bandera faction responded to the alarm "by furnishing armed gangs and uniting them into what became known as the UPA Ukrainian Insurgent Army which the Nazis generoulsy provided with weapons and other military supplies". See: V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths About UPA. Lviv, Kameniar, 1981, p. 13; See also: V. Chednychenko, Collaborationists. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1975, pp. 78-79.

The UPA was devised as a trap for the population which was burning with hatred for the aggressor and thus even the name of the Army would satisfy the credulous that is served the Ukrainian and not the German cause. V. Cheredychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 13; Actually the Nazis assigned UPA concrete and far-reaching missions as follows:

1. to check the struggle of the working masses against the inbaders in the Western Ukraine;
2. to accumulate more Ukraiian genuinely stribing to fight the nazis in the UPA gangs, thus preventing the largest possible number of people from joining partisan detachments;
3. by using the motto about the 'liberation' of the Ukraine, to sick the UPA gangs on Polish and Soviet partisans, and on the non-Ukraiian population of the Western regions of the ukraine and of eastern poland;
4. to reinforce nazi punitive units by OUN gangs, thus releaving forces of the Wehrmacht so they can besent to the German-Soviet front;
5. to encircle Soviet partisans in the north of Volyn and Polissya, so they can no longer conduct hostilities alongside nazi communication lines - railroads and motorways - and to prevent the flames of partisan warfare from spreading to other Wester regions of the Ukraine;
6. to extent espionage and subversive efforts on the territores liberated by Soviet troops. "Proclamation..." PA IIP at the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine, in V. cherednychenko, Anatomiia zrady, p. 152; V. cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, pp. 17-18; The Appeal of the Volyn obkom KP(b)U reitrated this line. It said: "The hitlerite agents - banderites desire to stop partizan struggle in enemy's rear, and in this manner to free Geman garrisons in Ukraine and allow German command with the help of these garrisons to reinforce the thinned out ranks of these garrisons to reinforce the thinned out ranks of the hitlerite army on the Soviet-German fromt. PA IIP at the CC Communist Party Ukraine, f. 56, op. 1, spr. 1281, in V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia zrady. p. 152; The explanation why the UPA was organized in Volyn and Polissya forst is also rather traditional. "Volyn and Polissya were then one boiling hell for the occupiers. The latter constanstly sought to extinguish the fire of partisan warfare there of, at least, to somehow neutralize it by laying siege to partisan units in swamps in Polissya. However, the Nazis obviously lacked strength for such a maneuver and so they increadingly relied on the Ukrainian Undurgent Army (UPA), the German-Ukrainian police and auxiliary combat units furnished from aong the nationalists". V. Cherednychenko. Truth and Myths, p. 28; See also:
7. O. Zamlyns'kyi, OUN: Istoriia zaprodanstva. Kiev, ukraina, 1978, p. 18.' See also: V. O. Zamlyns'kyi, "Na sluzhbi u abveru i gestapo" in D. D. Podovzhnii, ed., Liuds'koi krovi ne zmyty, pp. 49-50 and Ivan Petriv, "V nadii na chuzhi bahnety", Kiev, 1967, pp. 22-23 reprinted in D. D. Podovzhnii, Ibid., p. 59; Ia. Halan states that "from the fall of 1941 the OUN-B gradually goes 'underground', which was masterfully prepared by the Gestapo". He also claims that anti-German leaflets were being perpared with German help, and that underground was being armed by the Germans. Ia. Halan, "Chomu ne maie imennia", Lviv, April, 1945, in D.D. Podovzhnii, Ibid., p. 98;

"Late in the summer 1944 ... Soviet partisan units plunged into active combat operations in a number of localities in Polissya and volyn. It was then the Ukrainian nationalsits hastned to the rescue of the Nazis, shaping up a rough Galician version of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which became known as the Ukrainian People's Self-Defense Force (UNS)." V. cherednychenko, Truth and Muths, p. 28.

"Five UNS armed gangs were formed formed to carry out punitive missions [allegedly against those who supported Soviet partizns]. One known as the Black Devilis...(Yaremcha District); the second one. Trembita, (in dolyna District); the thierd one, Siromantsi, (In Bolekhiv District); the rest in Drhobych District and near Staryi Sambir." Ibid, p. 33; See also: V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationsits, pp. 82-83; See also: V Tanitivs'kyi, Triasonvyna: Zapysky chekista. Lviv, Kameniar, 1976, pp. 59, 65;

"Facts show that the UPA-UNS gangs, their very formation and ammunition, were aimed against the anti-Nazi resistance movement. This was another openly reactionary move the nationalist leaders made in response to teh Nazi call for help in distress." V. cherednychenko. Truth and Myths, p. 29;

"and so the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalsits and their creation - the Ukrainian unsurgent Army (UPA) - never even dreaned of revolting against the Nazis, the worst enemy of the Ukrainian people. On the contrary, they did their best to curry favors with the aggressors, while turining the weapons they had received from the Nazis against the people's avengeers - the partisans." Ibid., p. 35;

cherednychenko then asserts that it is a lie that Gen. Lutze (He spells it as Ljutze) was killed or wounded by the UPA and that he actually died in a car accident - he had a weaknessfor fast cars. V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 36; Probably to confuse the matter even further V. cherednychenko intorduces into picture still another Lutze. This person was allegedly responsible for ofganizing the Ukrainian Naitonal Selfdefence (UNS) in Galicia. He was captured by the Soviets and tried in 1945. See. V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, pp. 82-83.

15. V. Davydenko, RU, 29. XI. 1988, p. 3.

16. Idem.

17. Idem.

18. Idem.; Here as well as in other places, the author does not clearly explain the period of which he speaks. Does he speak of 1939-1941 period or later?; Actually the line that the UPA was composed predominantly of two social strata is well established in Soviet propaganda. Cherednychenko puts it this way: "The constituent gangs were led by sons of kulaks, clergymen, petty bourgeoisie, declasse and criminal elements, by and large well-trained Abwehr, Gestapo and SD agents. There were also plain ordinary village fellows there, throughly brainwashed and bullied into obedience by the Nazis." V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myth, p. 20; See also: V. Cherednychenko , Nationalizm proty natsii. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1970, p. 78, in Stepan Boiko Narod ne proshchaie. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1976, p. 45; V. Cherednychenko. Collaborationists, pp. 78-79; Cherednychenko also states that it was Gestapo that it was Gestapo that organized the UPA and instructed the OUN leadership to use the alleged 'arrests' of Bandera and Stets'ko for the purpose of sending the masses of the banderite OUN into the unerground. V. Cherednychenko, in S. Boiko, Narod ne proshchaie, p. 46; When Shukhevych conpleted his task, Gestapo released Bandera and his followers from 'jail' (in the beginning of October 1944 - PJP). S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by i zrady. Kiev, 1970, p. 241. In the second edition of Danylenko's pamphlet this is presented somewhat differently: "At the beginning of Octiber of this year (1944-PJP) S. Bandera was freed from jail. Together with him were released 300 OUN member. S. Bandera transmitted to the representative of UHVR abroad a warm greeting from the UPA". S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by i zrady. Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1972, p. 241.

19. V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 20.

20. Idem.

21. V. Davydenko, Ibid.

22. Idem.; According to Cherednychenko, "the OUN officers explained to the credulous UPA soldiers who were ready to fight the occupiers that their detachments were still 'raw and incomplete in strength," (Ideia i chyn, 1943, No. 5), whereas the Nazis had 'big forces' (Appeal of the OUN Leadership, January 1, 1944). V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 20; Or that: "Germany who is facing catastrophy, which is losing...is not worth the bones of even one Ukrainian nationalist. The military struggle with the Germans in this condition is inexpedient". V. Cherednychenko, Nationalizm proty natsii, p. 138, in S. Boiko, Narod ne proshchaie, p. 46; See also: "The nationalist terror was mainly aimed at supressing anti-Nazi sentiment or nipping in the bud any sign of disturbances among the population and rank and file Benderites in UPA. The nationalist "security service" liquidated even those who just expressed in some form or other the idea of an armed resistance to the Nazis. 'Special attention must be paid to spontaneous protests of UPa men against the Germans. In such cases reprisals are obligatory and capital punichment is not excluded', read the instructions issued by the nationalsit 'security service' on October 27, 1943. V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, p. 85;

"It was difficult for the nationalists to tame people enmeshed in UPA, through terror, torture and deceit, to supress hostile sentiments towards the Germans.... Despite the prohibition and the element of danger their actions involved, these people began to liquidate nazis whenever the chance arose. These sporadic and singular acts were not strong enough to really give the Nazis trouble. But the nationalist leaders used these incidents for their own ends trying to present them as an anti-nazi struggle enspirited by them. They had no option but to do so." Ibid., p. 86.

23. This line is repeated in other publications bevoted to the subject-matterof the Ukrainian underground. In a recent book editied by V. Evintov and others it is said: "As was mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was organized in 1943. The nucleus of the UIA personnel were the butchers from the battalions Nachtigall and Rolland, police and other riffraff. The composition of the command was the same. The Commander-in-Chief of the UIA was Roman Shuhevich (sic!), a professional Abwehr saboteur, one of the commanders of Nachtigall. Officers of 'Halychyna' or the Wehrmacht, Kuzminisky, Karachevsky and Sidor, were members of the UIA military brass coordinating the activity of the UIA bands. Kozak, who in 1941-1942 was a top ranking official of the Vinnitsya Gestapo, was appoined the leader of the Ost (sic!) intelligence group of the UIA." V. Evintov, V. Leonenko, A. shishko, No Statute of Limitations For War Criminals. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1986, p. 56.

24. V. Davydenko, Ibid.; V. Cherednychenko represents well the accepted line on this issue. He states: "Talking about UPA, one must bear in mind the fact that it was neither 'Insurgent' nor 'Ukrainian', let alone being regerred to as 'Army'. It was sired by the Nazis, to begin with , who supplied it with arms and other equipment and it basically protected their interests. Scondly, even if this 'Army' were 'Insurgent', it revolted against the Ukrainian people. Until the debacle of the Third Reich, UPA remained and obedient servant of the invaders. Thierdly, it was in reality a handful of bands secializing in hunting down and bushwacking Soviet partiots, reporting on them to the Nazis and staging various provacations. Narturally, not one of these activities can justify UPA's name as an 'Army'. V. cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, pp. 57-58.

cherednychenko concludes: "The Ukrainian nationalist traitors were part and parcel of the Nazi espionage network and were directly involved in anti-Soviet subversive missions, for the most part in the Western Ukraine, designed to undermine the Soviet rear. During WWII, UPA's efforts were supported and directd by Germany's secret services. After the war, control over UPA was tried to be taken over by the intalligence departments of the United States, Great Britain and other capitalist countries." Ibid., p. 58.

25. V. Davydenko, RU, 29, XI, 89.

26. V. Davydenko, RU, 7. XII. 1988, p. 3.

27. V. Davydenko , RU, 8. XII. 1988, p. 3.

28. Idem.

29 Idem.; This represents first such Soviet admission on record.

30. Idem.

31. V. Davudenko, RU, 29. XI. 88, p. 3; "By and large, the Army was composed of the sons of kulaks and recidivists, and the people boycotted this bandit organization". K. Dmytruk, In Holy Robes, Kiev, Ukraina, 1978, pp. 48-49; K. Dmytruk, Pid chornymy sutanamy: Pravda pro zviazky ierarkhii uniats'koi tserkvy z fachysts'kymy zaharbnykamy. Kiev, Ukraina, 1975, p. 27.; The UPA, according to Soviet propagandists, was composed predominantly of two social strata.

"The consittuent gangs were led by sons of kulaks, clergymen, petty bourgeoisie, declasse and criminal elements, by and large well-trained Abwehr, Gestapo and SD agents. there were also plain ordinary village feoolows there, throughly brainwashed and bullied into ibedience by the Nazis." V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 20.

32. V. Davydenko, RU, 29. XI. 88; See also: V. Evintov, et al., No Statute of Limitations For War Criminals. p. 56; See also: I. S. Skruten', Bez prava na maibutne. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1984, p. 56 from "Nezhrabna UPAkovka"; See also: V. O. Zamlyns'kyi, "Na sluzhbi u abveru i hestapo" in D. D. Podovzhinii, et al., Liuds'koi krovi ne zmyty: Knyha faktiv, pp. 49-50; Ivan Petriv,"V nadii na chuzhi bahnety", in D. D. Podovzhnii, Ibid., p. 59; Many nationalists escaped togetherwith the hitlerites. But one part of them on the orders of the German command were left behind in order to contimue from the underground the struggle against the Soviet people, to terrorize the population, and sabotage attempts to renew the Soviet power. V. Ivanenko, Na zadvirakh istorii: Pro antynarodnu, antyradians'ku diial'nist' zakordonnykh orhanizatsii ukrains'kykh burzhuaznykh nationalistiv. Kiev, Politvydav Ukrainy, 1969, p. 30.

33. "Quite ogten there were honest people among the bandits who had swallowed the bait of the OUN agents provocateur and believed that, after they had joined UPA, they would foght the Nazi invaders. Actually, that was the only reason why they were among the thugs at that period." V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 20; See also: D. Z. Manuilskii in The Truth About Ukrainian "Refugees" in Germany, p. 17; V. O. Zamlyns'kyi, OUN: Istoriia zaprodanstva. Kiev, Ukraina, pp. 19-21, 25; See also: cofessions of Iurii Stefiuk, Nazar Smishan, Tereshko Dilets'kyi, Ierofei Deinenko, Pavlo Koval'chuk, Prokhor Kozlovs'kyi etc.; finally, there were those who had joined UPA out of h\fear. V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 20; UPA men were enlisted through blackimail, fear of repression of relations and family, through sheer deceit and demagogery. Such stayed within UPA while the Nazis dominioned over Wester Ukrane and deserted as son as the liberation came. V Cherednychenko, Collaborationists. Kiev, Ppolitvydav Ukrainy, 1975, pp. 78-79; D. D, Podvzhii, et al., Liudskoi krovi, p. 49.

34. I. S. Skruten even misquotes Ukrains'kyi Samostiinyk in order to prove that a "banderite OUN was a typical facist organization", while "the UPa was not a krainian miltary formation but not unlike the 'Waffen SS', organized on hitlerite mobel and (had) a nazi mentality", Op.cit., p. 58; As to the anti-Nazi stand of the UPA, V. Cherednychenko quotes out of context two items: 1. An instruction (source is not given) of the UPA's Security Service which stted that "at this time of the German-Bolshevic conflict, it wouldn't serve our interests (i.e. those of the OUN - V. Ch.) to be in active opposition to Germany". V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 20. On its own merits this instruction can be interpreted in a variety of ways; 2. An article in the Ideia i Chyn, No. 6, 1944, to the effect that, "It is not struggling against the Germans"..."that serves out goals, but quite the opposite - destroying as many Bolsheviks as possible with German hands", and that ..."Under the circumstances, an armed struggle against the Germans is not expedient". V. Cherednychenko, Idem.; The Germans went so far that they actually fabricated important documents at the UHVR. "There are two other OUN documents which are respectfully and with the pompousness intrinsic to the nationalists - entitled the 'Platform' and the 'Universal' of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation council. These documents give rise to as much scheming and lying as the Act of June 30. Officially, the 'Platform' and the 'Universal' were released by the nationalist publichers in June of 1944. However, the German text of both was recently discover among the captured documents of a Nazi administrative body whose bureaucratic interests were quite remote from those of general history but were very close to those of organizing and continuing espionage work. Both documents are dated June 1944." Olexander asylenko, "Friends and Foes of Ya. Stesko and Co.", In Petro Havrylenko, comp., Their True Face, Part V, Kiev, Ukraina, 1982, pp. 278-29. (Actually these documents have been published in the documentary series Litopys UPA and can be easily inspected).

"Perhaps, numerous OUN 'scholars' from UGVR (sic!), or even Lebed himself, could tell those taking an interst in the history of their activity exactly why these documents, which belong to the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, allegedly set up by the nationalists themselves, were written in German one month begore they were translatedinto Ukrainian to be understood by the entire community?... This is a rather serious question, for it brings forth another one which is no less interestin: Could it be that this UGVR was founded by the Abwehr or the SD in order to further use OUN in the interests of German Nazism, but without Hitler? We will probably use some in the intersts of German Nazism, but without Hitler? We will probably use some other opportunity to discuss at length whether or not the question of what really lay behind the very appearance of USVR is rational. Here and now let us try to shed light on the activity of Roman Shukhevych, this 'creator' of the Ukrainian Insurgen Army (UPA) and, in the words of Yaroslav Stets'ko, 'the layerof the foundation of the double-front war of the OUNites against Germany and Russia". O. Vasylenko, Ibid., p. 30.

35. V. Evintov, et al, No Statute of Limitations, p. 56; To emphasize this point a virulent attack on M. Lebed is borrowed from march 1986 issue of Village Voice to wit: "At far back as the 1930s he participated in the plot to murder Bronislav Peratsky (Sic!), the Polish Minister of Home Affairs. Being a 'Ukrainian commandant' of an intelligence school set up by the OUN authorities ad assisted by the German Security Service, he 'practised' sadistic tortures adn killings. Later, Lebid was elevated to the post of the head of OUN Security Service, spearheaded first of all agaist civilian population of the territories occupied by fascists, adn patriots who rose to fight just battles. Lebid is guilty of not only murders he personalyy committed but of mass extermination of civilian population in Ukraine, carried out on his orders by terroristic bands of OUN-UIA, left by the Hitlerites in the rear of the Soviet troops. Professional killer and terrorist, he for quite a time ranked thierd in the OUN hierarchy...Evintov, Ibid., p. 87; See also: D. D. podovzhnii etal., Ibid., pp. 49-50.

36. S. T. Danylenko goes so far as to say that "on the basis of dicuments", which he does not show or even quote, the creation of the UPa is simply a "gestapo provocation". An that Bandera simply pretended to have broken with the Germans by publishing anti-German leaflets, agreed to create the underground in order to liquidate those who were genuinely anti-German, (such as "Dmytro-Myron", p. 218), and camouflaged his activities by accusing the melnikites of collaboration with the Germans. S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by i zrady, p. 216-217. S. Bandera is even accused of betraying his own brither Basyl who was killed by the Germans. Ibid., p. 220; The release from jail of S. Bandera and 300 of his supporters in octiver 1944 by the Germans is presented as a clear proof of collagoration. I. Petric, in D. D. Podovzhnii et al., Liuds'koi krovi..., p. 59; Still another author claims that: "Indusputable is the fat the the UIA (UPA-PJP) was organized upon orders and with direct support of the German military intellignce. This, in particular, is testified to by one of the Abwehr officials Erwin Schtolze, who was in cherge of the Ukrainian nationalists:'During the retreat of the German troops from Ukraine, Canaris gave orders on the organization of an undergroundfor continuing the struggle against Soviet powers in Ukraine, for conducting terror, sabotage and espionage... Orders were given to set up stocks of weapons, food, and so on'". V. Evintov etal., No Statute of Limitations, pp. 56-57; "We spent milions and made tremendous efforts to place Bandera next to Melnyk, said the SD cheif of Rovno Muller. We will stop at nothing to creat another ten Banderas.V. Cherednychenko, Nationalizm proty natsii, Kiev, 1978, p. 78 in S. Boiko, Narod ne proshchaie. Uzhorod, Karpaty, 1976, p. 45.

37. The Hitlerites gave the UIA a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. With the aim of concealing from the population the true essence of the raltions between the UIA and the fascist army, demonstrative attacks were organized on Wehrmacht warehouses by the OUNites which the Hitlerites gave up without the smallerst resistance, safe and sound, and even hung out the 'UIA flag' on the warehouse building. V. Evintov et al., No Statute of Limitations, p. 57.

38. V. Davydenko, RU, 29. XI. 88; This had come about primarily as a result of the negotiations that I. Hryniokh had with Pappe.

39. V. Davydenko, RU, 30. XI. 88; D Kliachkivs'kyi, Commander-in-Cief of the UpA is accused of asking Germans for additional arms in August 1944 (Idem.), when he was no longer alive - (he fell in battle on 12 February 1944); General-Colonel K. V. Krainiukov, member of Military Council of the First Ukrainian Front wrote that in 1944 at night over forests German airplanes were flying and suppluing the UPA. V. Davydenko, RU, 1. XII. 88; Yu. Stefyuk, an UPA Participant stated: "On orders from OUN leaders, we avoided the Germans and the German command, by an agreement with the OUN chiefs, ordered its troops to leave our armed units alone, although quite often we and Germans found ourselves stationed in the same village."

"I am a living witness to how the Germans armed our detachments and left them to fight the Soviet underground. I saw with my own eyes how in the fall of 1944 Germans brought 20 wagons of weapons - submachine guns, oviet rifles and cartridges for them, several heavy machine guns and other military equipment and clothes, even two antitank guns with ammunition - and ganded all this over to Ren's unit. Whoever was in the Bukove Berdo Forest near the village of Stuposiany in the province of Syanots sic. at that period ould see and testify to this open cooperation with German combat units. Such is the truth about the so called 'struggle' of OUN and UPA against Germans". V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 23. This is taken from: M. Yaremko, I. Zhylavyi, Yu. Stefyul, Toward the Bright Road, (in Ukr.). Kiev, 1962, pp. 29-30; V. Tanitovs'kyi, Triasovyna: Zapysky chekista, p. 59, 65; "The Nazis took special pains with equipping the nationalist gangs when they had to beat a hasty retreat from the Soviet Union." Cherednychenko cites testimony of captured Col. E. Schtolze, deputy head of the Abwehr's Dept. II who stated that "Canaris personally instructed the relevant Abwehr divisions to set up an underground resistance network to fight Soviet rule in the Ukraine, including acts of terrorism, subversion and espionage. Official workers of the Abwehr - officers and agents - were left behined specially to exercise control over the nationalist movement. Orders were also issued to st up caches of weapons, canned rations and the like. contact agents were sent across the front line. The nationalist gangs were supplied with munition". Truth and Myths, p. 24; And Yo. Lazarek, CO, Dept II, Occupation HQ, Ukraine, who claimed that on April 15, 1944, nationalist gangs came in possession of stores of food and ammunition in the town of Kamin-Kashyrskyi. Idem.; That material was supplied in the towns of Ratne and Lyubeshiv. Idem.; That conversation of I. Hryniokh and Gestapo officer Pappe in March 1944 show that Hryniokh requested the Nazis, on behalf of the OUN-UPA leadership, that they "secretly supply it struggle" and that this be done in secret "lest the Bolsheviks should have proof that the Ukrainian nationalists remaining behind the Soviet from lines are German allies or German agents". Ibid., p. 25; that Sturmbahnfuerer Witiska, chief of the SD in Lviv, the Bolshevik administration. Idem.; V. Cherednychenko concludes: "And so it is fact hat the Nazis supplied the Ukrainian nationalists with munition, medicaments and all". Ibid., pp. 24-25.

40. Official representatives, officers and agents of the Abwehr were especially left behind to coordinate movments of the nationalists... The active partiipation of German-facsist agents in UIA operations is testified to by the fact that during clashes of Soviet Army units and national armed formations with the UIA bandits in the autumn of 1944, 320 Germans were destroyed, the absolute majority of whom were Wehrmacht, Abwehr and Gestapo officers. E. V. Evintov, No Statute of Limitations, p. 57.

41. Cherednychenko in order to give support to thses allegations quotes M. Matvijeiko's brochure (P. 9), Do chleniv i sympatykiv OUN to do vsikh ukraintsiv, iaki zhyvut' poza mezhamy ridnoi zemli. Kiev, 1960, as having admitted, aong other things, that the "Nazi intelligence had supplied UPA commanding officers with fifty million rubles during the war". Truth and Myths, p. 22. However, in the Matviieiko's brochure just cited, either on p. 9 or any other page, nothing is said about fifty million rubles. Nothing is said about it also in the reprint of the above-mentioned Matviieiko's brochure in his Chorni spravy ZChOUN. Kiev, 1962. However, in the last publication, in the chapter, Pro tak zvanyi "vyzvol'nyi fond" abo pro syte koryto Bandery, Stets'ka i Ko., there is a mention of 50 million rubles. Of this sum, five million were given to I. Hryniokh and M. Lebed who were already in Germany and not in Ukraine as is claimed by Cherednychenko in his brochure on page 22; See also: M. Matvijeiko, A Word to the Younger Gemeration. Lviv, Kameniar, 1981, p. 24, where this money is mentioned once more; However in another publication and based on eyewitness accounts of Sigfried Muller of 19 September 1946, the amount of money that Lopatynskyi allegedly with him for transmission to UPA was 1 million rubles. Arkhiv Instytutu istorii partii TsK KPU, f. 57, op. 4, spr. 338, ark, 268-279 cited in D. D. Podovzhnii et al, Liuds'koi krovi, pp. 97-98.

42. V. Davydenko, RU, 27. XI. 88. p. 3.

43. V. Davydenko, RU, 29. XI. 88.

44. V. Davydenko, RU, 27. XI. 88.

45. Idem.

46. Idem.

47. Idem. See also: Zvernennia Prazidii Verkhovnoi Rady i Rady Narodnikh Komisariv URSR do uchasnykiv UPA to UNRA and Zvernennia Volyns'koho pidpil'noho obkomu KP(b)U, in V. Cherednychenko, Anatomia zrady, pp. 151-152.

48. V. Davydenko, RU, 27. XI. 88; G. V. kartunov, "Na posluhakh imperialistychnoi voiachchyny" in V. S. Trubenko, N. S. Shafeta, Pro spravzhnie oblychchia ukrains'koho burzhuaznogo natsionalizmu. Kiev, naukova Dumka, 1974, p. 202.

49. V. Davydenko, RU, 27. XI. 88.

50. Idem.; Zvernennia Prezidii...op. cit., p. 152.

51. In the beginning of 1943 they carried out in Volyn and Subcarpathia a mopping out operation aimed at communists and their sympathisers. Also they organized attacks on Polish population in volyn in 1943 and together with the SS Division Galizien on Huta Peniacka in Brody region. Special instructions to that effect are mentioned by Iulia Luts'ka who in 1943-44 was a member of 'boyivka' UPA in volyn. V. Davydenko, RU, 30. XI. 88; V. Cherednychenko, Anatomia zrady, p. 171; "Thirty of the most prominent intellectuals of Lviv were executed by the occupants...not without help from the former Captain Roman Shukhevych, who appropriated for himself a 'rank' of UPA General under the pseudonim of Taras Chuprybka." Iu. I. Rymarenko, Na sluzhbi u svitovoi reaktsii: Pro antynarodnu sut' ukrains'koho burzhuaznoho nationalizmu. Kiev, Znannia, Seriia I, No. 10, pp. 35-36. The UPA leadership helped in killing of Mykola Kuznetsov and Jan Kaminski who executed vice-gouvernor Bauer on 9 March 1944 in Lviv. The underground Volhynian Communist Party oblom in its leaflet classified this activity of the Ukrainian nationalists as an attempt to help the weakening German armies in their fight against the USSR. V. Davydenko, RU, 29. XI. 88; V. Cherednychenko, Anatomia Zrady;, p. 178; In April 1944 nationalist killed Commanding General of the First Ukraiian Front M. F. Vatutin, V. Davydenko, RU, 30. XI. 88; See also: V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia zrady, p. 178.

52. S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by i zrady;, pp. 216-217; To give support to these allegations V. cherednychenko quotes several former OUN-UPA leaders who found themselves in Soviet hands, such as V. Kuk ("Koval"), commander in Chief of the UPA after the death of "Chuprynka" who in his The Open letter of V. Kuk said that "OUN's active collaboration with the German Nazis prior and during the Great Patriotic War had a great devastating effect on our country"..."it inflicted tremendous losses on the Ukrainian people which it will never be able to forget. Its nationalist anti-Soviet orientation was supported by the Nazis who encouraged Melnyk, Bandera and lower OUNfunktionaries to carry on the anti-Soviet struggle" (P. 7 of the letter). Truth and Myths, p. 22; One of the UIA rank and file members nazar Smishan, having acknowledged his tragic mistake and broken off ties with the bandits recalls: 'We called ourselves Ukrainian insurgents, but in reality we were sold lock, stock and barrel to the fascist command, and we were actually its agents and henchmen in the perfront zone'. V. Evintov, No Statute of Limitations, p. 57.

53. See: V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, p. 96.

54. V. Davydenko, RU, 30. XI. 88.

55. Ibid.; Much more attention is given to this matter in other Soivet publications. See for example: S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by i zrady, 1972, pp. 231-238; It was S.T. Danylenko (Karyn) who was negotiating with the UPA in February 1945 on behalf of the Soviet government. Ibid., p. 261.

56. Ibid., p. 231; Some authors claim that it took place on March 6, 1944. See: V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, p. 88.

57. S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu, pp. 232-234; V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, pp. 92-93; The Excerpts from the "Agreement" are found in "Z dovidky pro spil'nu diial'nist' OUN, UPA z okhoronnoiu politsiieiuto SD", L'vivshchyna u Velykii Vitchyznianii viini 1941-1945rr: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv. Lviv, Kameniar, 1968, pp. 203-206, reprinted in D. D. Podovzhnii et al., Liuds'koi krovi ne zmyty, pp. 99-102.

58 V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI.88.

59. Ibid.; "Pokazannia Zigfrida Miullera" in D. D. Podovzhnii et al., Liuds'koi krovi ne zmyty, pp. 92-99; V. Cherednychenko talks about Csptain of Abwehr Witzel. See: V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia zrady, p. 181. It seems that the talk is about Captain Kirn and his group that parachuted on 6.X.1944. See: Litopys UPA, VII.

60. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88; By that time the nationalist underground was completely demoralized, given to mass murder, and to sexual orgies. Not only rank and file but Gen. Chuprynka himself suffered from a venerial disease. V. Zamylns'kyi, OUN: Istoriia zaprodanstva. Kiev, Ukraina, 1978, pp. 26-27.

61. Idem.

62. O. L. Poltorats'kyi, Ukrains'ki burzhuazni nationalisty - nailiutishi vorohy ukrains'koho narodu. Kiev, Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1953, p. 68.

63. V. Davydenko, RU, 29.XI. 88; Historically, always in the serice of foreign power the churches and their leaders became the natural allies of the German occupiers. See: V. Iu. Malanchuk, et al., eds., Pravda pro uniiu: dokumenty i materialy. 2d Ed., Lviv, Kameniar, 1968. for charges of collaboration against the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy of March 1, 1946, see: Ibid., pp. 363-364, and the accusations by procurator R. A. Rudenko of October 16, 1951, Ibid., pp. 366-371; S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by i zrady, 2d Ed., 1972, pp. 216-226; Iu. M. Hryhor'iev, Buzuviry. Lviv, Kameniar, 1974; V. I. Maslovs'kyi, Zhovto-blakytna mafiia. Lviv, Kameniar, 1975, pp. 42-43, 48-49; On Sheptyts'kyi and the Orthodox hierachs see: S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu, pp. 248-256; In a publication sponsored by the Institute of the Party, Institute of Marzism-Leninism, Institute of History AN Ukr SSR, and Main Administration of Archives UkrSSR, it is stated quite openly that "Numerous documents show evidence of the dirty complicity with the Hitlerite incaders of the leaders of the Greek Catholic Uniate Church, these vehement enemies of the Ukrainian people". Yu. Yu. Kondufor, et al., Eds., History Teaches a Lesson. Kiev, Politydav Ukrainy, 1986, p. 7. But the best indication of Soviet falsification can be seen in the reproduced exerpts from the letter of Dr. Frederic, a German agent who reported on his conversation with Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi. Kondufor did not publish those portions of the letter which contained very strong condemnation by Sheptyts'kyi of German policy in Ukraine, thus willfully creating an impression that Sheptyts'kyi was totally pro-German, p. 236. Orthodox bishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk is also attacked on pp. 223-224; "It is a proven fact that the Uniate clergy collaborated with the nazi invaders. In his pastoral [letter-PJP] of July 5, 1941 Metropolitan Andriy Sheptitskyi urged 'to greet with joy and gratitude the victorious German army which has occupied almost the whole of our land' and conduct divine service everywhere in their honor". And when the Nazis seized Kiev, "he...sent Hitler a telegram, congratulating him cordially on the occupation" of the city. M. Zhulyns'kyi, Yaroslav Halan: Lest People Forget. Diev, Dnipro, 1986, p. 9; Pastoral letters of Metropoitan Sheptyts'kyi and of the head of Ukrainian Autocephalic Church polikarp is mentioned also by Cherednychenko. See: V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia zrady. p. 125; "It wasn't the Ukrainian people but the bourgeois nationalists and their shepherds - Uniate and autocephalous clericals - who fawned upon the Nazi aggressors and met them with the bread - and - salt traditional sign of Slavic hospitality". V. Cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, p. 27; V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, pp. 38-39, 70, 72; iosyp Tsiokh in P. Iashchuk, Prokliati narodom. Lviv, Knyzhlovo - Zurnal'ne Vydavnytstvo, 1954, pp. 10-11; O. Poltorats'kyi, Ukrains'ki burzhuazni natsionalisty, pp. 44-48; V. Zamlyns'kyi, OUN: Istoriia zaprodanstva, p. 16; O. Mstyslavets'. Pid chuzhymy praporamy. New York, Liga Amerykans'kykh Ukraintsiv, 1946, pp. 98-100; A special attack on Metropolitan Skrupnyk is found in M. Rayevsky, "In the Name of the Father, the Son and ..", V. Chudovsky, Comp., Their True Face. Kiev. Ukraina, 1974, pp. 29-36; See also: O. Nosenko, "Vovkulaky", in M. Dubyna, comp., Kryvavykh kainiv pechat' : Zbirnyk tvoric, spriamovanykh proty ukrains'kykh burzhuaznykh natsionalistiv. Kiev, Radians'kyi pys'mennyk, 1980, pp. 162-171. Herein are found works of many contemporary Ukrainian writers who were aked to contribute their part in the struggle against the nationalists; About accusations against Sheptyts'kyi and Ohienko-Ilarion soo: Marko Terlytsia, Here is the Evidence. Toronto, Kobzar, 1984, pp. 26-29, or the Ukrainian version of his brochure, Napysanoho solyroiu ne vyrubaiesh: Fakty pro sluzhinnia ukrains'kykh burzhuaznykh natsionalistiv hitlerivtsiam pid chas druboi svitovoi viiny. n.d.., pp. 16-18; Metropolitans Ohienko and Skrypnyk are also mentioned in P. Kovalchuk, Criminal Hirelings. Kiev, Ukraina, 1975, pp. 15-21; O. L. Vovk, Mistse i rol' natsionalistychnykh klerykaliv v planakh reaktsii. Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1984, especially pp. 59-70; V. M. Dachyns'kyi, Prysluzhnyky natsionalistychnoho okhvistia: Relihiia-sluzhnytsia vorohiv ukrains'koho narodu. Kiev, Znannia, Seria II, No. 8, 1963; Taras Myhal', ABN - Asambleia Blazniv Natsionalistychnykh. Kiev, Tovarystvo kulturnykh zviazkiv, 1967, p. 7, or the English edition (Kiev, 1968), p. 9; I Petriv, V nadii na chuzhi bahnety. Kiev, Tovarystvo, 1967; Bohdan Vasylevych, Lzhemesii. Lviv, Kameniar, 1973, pp. 43-44, 72-73, 80-82; Yevhen Kaminsky, 20th Century Crusaders: Who Backs Them Up?. Lviv, karmeniar, 1983, p. 19; V. I. Maslovs'kyi, Zhovto-blakytna mafiia;, pp. 68-72, 110-111. For a recent attack on Bishop P. Ia. Vasylyk see: I. Vesniak, "Do iakoho khramu vede 'UKTs'," Peremoha, (Buchach), No. 91-92, 6 August, 1988, p. 1.

64. V. Davydenko, RU, 29.XI.88; About Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi it is said: "...He gave lavish financial aid and assistance to the leaders of the profascist murderous terrorist organization of Ukrainian nationalist, encouraging their close collaboration with the Hitlerite intelligence and punitice bodies. Furing the German-fascist occupation he actively supported the Nazi 'new order', was one of the organizers of the 14th SS infantry Division Galizien raised by the Hitlerites from among Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists". Yu. Yu. Kondufor, et al., eds., History Teaches, p. 217; S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by, pp. 212-216; "In the spring and summer of 1943, the Nazi command, jointly with the OUN - Melnyk elite and the upperechelons of the reactionary Uniate clergy, formed the 14th Infantry Waffen SS Divison Galizien, also known as the Halychyna Division..." V. Cherednychenko, Truth and myths, pp. 12-13; V. Styrkul, The SS Werewolves. Lviv, Kameniar,1982, pp. 20-22, 41-42; "Among those that enlisted in its ranks (Division Galizien-PJP) were sons of Greek Catholic priests, local Ukrainian bourgeoisie, criminal and declasse elements, plus separate young Ukrainians blindfolded by Nazi ideoulogy". Ukrainian People Accuse, Lviv, Kameniar, 1987, p. 10; O. Butsko, This Can't Be Forgiven. Kiev, Ukraine, 1988, pp. 54-55; K. Dmytruk, Svastyka na sutanakh, especially pp. 286-326, and his Pid chornymy sutaanamy: Pravda pro z'viazky ierarkhii uniats'koi tserkvy z fashysts'kymy zaharbnykamy. Kiev, 1975, and In Holy Robes. Kiev, 1978; S. Boiko, Narod ne proshchaie, pp. 21-36; Iu. Rymarenko, Na sluzhbi u svitovoi reaktsii, p. 35; V. M. Chudovs'kyi, comp., Bezchestia. kiev, 1983; I. Mihovich, The Truth about the Uniate Church. Kiev, 1988; O. Kartunov, Yellow - Blue Anti - Semitism. Odess, Maiak, 1981. pp. 33-35.

65. V. Davydenko, RU, 29.II.88; O. Mstyslavets', Pid chuzhymy praporamy, pp. 102-103; S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by, pp. 231-243; S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu Han'by, pp. 231-243; V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia zrady, pp. 174-176; V. cherednychenko, Truth and Myths, pp. 16-17, 25, 48; "I am witness to the collaboration of ...Ivan Hrynoikh...with Nazi intelligence", ..."With Abwehr and the Hungarian secret service of Horthy", ...Chetniks under Mikhailovich...Britich and American intelligence. M. Matvijeiko, A Word, pp. 10,24,33-37; The nationalists also estabished contacts with the Hungarians, Serbian Drazha Mikhailivich, Polish AK, tried to get in touch with Anglo-American intelligence service services. V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia, pp. 185-187; V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, pp. 87-94; V. Zamylyns'kyi, OUN, pp. 185-187; V. Maslovs'kyi, Zhovto-blakytna mafiia, pp. 57-58; he OUN ..."has been involved with the bourgeois Polish secret police, the Nazi Abwehr or SD, Horthy's intelligence service in Hungary, Rumanian secret intelligence, the Secret Intelligence Service of Gerat Britain and the American CIA". M. Matvijeiko, A Word, p. 48; M. Matviieiki, Do chleniv i sympatykiv OUN to do vsikh ukraintsiv, iaki zhyvut' poza mezhamy ridnoi zemli, p. 9, and his Chorni spravy ZCh OUN, p. 10; Olexander Butsko, This Can't be Forgiven...Kiev, Ukraine, 1988, p. 16; B. Vasylevych, Lzhemesii, pp.-106, 116-118, 136-152.

66. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI.88.

67. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI.88; See especially: O. Mstyslavets', Pid chuzhymy praporamy, about the killing of Metropolitan Hromads'kyi, pp. 98-100.

68. V. Davydenko, RU, 2.XII.88; Ilariy Lukashevich ws the son of an Uniate priest...explaining the motive of the murder, Ilariy said that he was told by Roman Shchepansky and by other OUN chieftains that "Halan had to be killed because he went against the Vatican, and as a Soviet press correspondent at the Nuremberg Trials, he had demanded the extradition and trials of Stepan Bandera". An finally, "the murderer Mikhailo Stakhur, who had the death of many civilians on his conscience, said in court: 'We recieved irders to kill Halan because he was feared by the Vatican'". M. Zhulyns'kyi, comp., Yaroslav Halan, p. 11; O. Iakovlev, Pravda karaie kativ. Lviv, Kameniar, 1976.

69. V. Davydenko, RU, 2.XII.88; See also: V. Beliaev, Formula iada. Moscow, Sovetskii Pisatel', 1976,pp. 42-52, 74-76.

70. V. Davydenko, RU, 2.XII.88.

71. Idem.

72. Idem.

73. Idem.

74. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.1988.

75. V. Davydenko, RU, 27.XI.88; See also: M. Terlytsia, Napysanoho, p. 68 and his Here is the Evidence, pp. 102-103; V. Cherednychenko, Truth, pp. 9, 12-14; V. Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, pp. 43-44; Petro Illich Kravchuk, Natsionalistychnym naklepam - zas'! Kiev, Ukraina, 1971, pp. 18-19; M. Zhulyns'kyi, Yaroslav Halan, p. 9; M. Dubyna, Kryvavykh kainiv pechat. Kiev, 1980; A. D. Skaba, "vstup", in v. S. Trubenko et al., eds., Pro spravzhnie oblychchia ukrains'koho burzhuaznoho natsionalizmu, p. 5; Oles' Honchar, "Zmeteni vitrom istorii", in D. D. Podovzhnii, Liudskoi krovi ne zmyty, pp. 3-5; V. Tanitovs'kyi,Triasovyna: Zapysky chekista. Lviv, Kameniar, 1976; P. Iashchuk, ed., Prokliati narodom. Lviv, 1954.

76. V. Davydenko, RU, 27.XI.88; Other accusations are that the nationalists also killed many prominent scholars: I. Petriv, V nadii, pp. 22-23; T. Myhal', ABN, p. 6; M. Zhulyns'kyi, Yaroslav Halan, p. 25; S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu, p. 190.

77. V. Davydenko, RU, 27.XI.88; "In Lviv Region alone, some 700,000 Soviet citizens and foreign subjects (e.g., citizens of Great Britain, Holland, Rance, etc.) were exterminated by Nazis and their Ukrainian nationalist henchmen". Ukrainian People Accuse...Lviv, Kameniar, 1987, p. 5; "In Rovno and the outskirts, the Nazis, assited by Ukrainian nationalists, massacred 102,000 Soviet citizens". Ibid., p. 5; "In Lviv Region alone, from the summer of 1944 till May of 1946, the nationalists tortured to death a total of 5,088 Soviet citizens, among them 497 children. After the Nazis had been chased out of Ternopil Region, as many as 3,556 licalresidents died at the hands of the OUNites". V. Cherednychenko, Truth, p. 52; From February 1944 to 1 january 1945 Especially large human losses occurred during August-November 1944 in Volyn, where bandits killed 520 Soviet citizens. During October-December 1944 in Ternopil oblast' 7-6 individuals were killed. After libeeration to the end of 1944 in Stanyslaviv oblast' 2, 786 were killed. In Lviv oblast' from summer 1944 to May 1946 - 5,088 individuals were killed. During 1946 in Wester Ukraine 2,000 citizens died". V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia, p. 196; During January-February 1947 the "OUN janissaries" killed almost 2,000of Soviet citizens, mostly the "village activists". V. I. Maslovs'kyi, Zhovto-blakytna, p. 102.

78. V. Davydenko, RU, 29.XI.88.

79. Idem.; V. Cherednychenko, Truth, pp. 27-28, 30-32, 43,48, and his Collaborationists, pp. 82-85; M. Zhulyns'kyi, Yaroslav Halan, p. 59.

80. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI.88.

81. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI.88; See also: V. I. Maslivs'kyi, Zhovto-blakitna, pp. 64-66, 72-78, 101-105; V. Chudovsky, comp., Day of Reckoning, Kiev, 1972.

82. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI. 88; B. Vasylevych, Lzhemesii, pp. 95-96; O. Mstyslavets', Pid chuzhymy praporamy, 106-107; The Truth About Ukrainian 'Refugees' in Germany, pp. 15-16; Kortelisy, Huta Peniats'ka, Trudovach, Adamy, Nyzy i Porochyshche show the use of terror by the banderites. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88; Rostyslav Bratun', Slovo hnivu. Lviv Kameniar, 1975, pp. 42-49; O. Butsko, This Can't Be Forgiven pp. 36-37; M. Toropovs'kyi, "Rekviem ubytoho sela", Post imeni Iaroslava Halana. Kn. 8., kameniar, 1981, pp. 89-99.

83. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI.88.

84. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XII.88; V. I. Maslovs'kyi, Zhovto-blakitna, p. 109-112.

85. v. Davydenko, RU, 8. XII.88.

86. V. Davydenko, RU, 1.XII.88; O. Mstyslavets'. Pid chuzhymy praporamy, pp.104-105; The nationalists terrorized former Red Army men, komsomol members state employees and their families when even women and small children quite often were killed in the most bestial fashoin. V. Davydenko, RU, 1.XII.88; Thus, from July 1944 to may 1946 in Lviv region alone the "bands" killed 5000men among them 497 children. Idem.; From February 1944 to December 1945 in volyn they murdered 1696 peaceful ingabitants among them 615 women and 313 children. Idem.; "In the period between February 1944 and October 1945 alone, the nationalists murdered a total of 313 childern,615 women, and 365 elders in Volyn". See: Ukrainian people accuse..., p. 21; Also: V. M. Bachyns'kyi, Prysluzhnyky, p. 24.

87. V. Davydenko, RU, 1.XII.88.

88. Idem.; See also: V. halasa, ivan Bysaha, Za velinniam sovisti, pp. 17-19.

89. V. Davydenko, RU, 1.XII.88.

90. V. Davydenko, RU, 2.XII.88.

91. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88; See also: V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia, p. 203; M. Zhulyns'kyi, Yaroslav Halan, pp. 8, 11; S. T. Danylenko, dorohoiu, pp. 310-311, 313-317; V. I. Maslovs'kyi, Zhovto-blakytna, p. 130.

92. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88.

93. V. Davydenko, RU, 27.XI.88.

94. V. Davydenko, RU, 30.XI.88.

95. V. Davydenko, RU, 1.XII.88.

96. V. Davydenko, RU, 1.XII.88.

97. V. Davydenko, RU, 2.XII.88; V. Cherednychenko even quotes marx and Engels on this question and emphasizes the fact the the Soviet propaganda effort in combatting the underground and in bringing the poopulation to its side was indeed massive. At the beginning of 1945 only in Drohobych, Rovno, and Chernivtsi oblast's there took place some 2,000 village meetings with 244,000 participants. Special meetings of the village youth were also held. In Rovno and Chernivtsi oblast's 550 such meetings were held in which 48,000 persons participated. In May 1945, in Wester Ukraine, were active over 3,500 agitation groups which encompassed some 38,000 propaganda workers. See his: Anatimiia zrady, p. 200.

98. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88; "Already in November 1944 in Western Ukrainian region there were active 203 Extermination Battalions with 22, 796 soldiers, and 2, 997 groups helping in the struggle against nationalists with 27,383 soldiers". V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia zrady, p. 204. Thus during 1944-1945 alone, these units have "liquidated 1,273 bandits of [Lviv-PJP} oblast", p. 204; See also: V. I. Maslovs'kyi, Zhovto-blakitna mafiia, pp. 86-87, who provides similar information about the "village Self-defence groups". In January 1945 these "people's formations of Ternopil' oblast' carried out 82 military actions and liquidated 480 bandits", p. 88.

99. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88.

100. Idem.; See also: Post imeni Iaroslava Halana. Lviv, Kameniar, 1979, pp. 20-39.

101. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88.

102. Idem.; V. Cherednychenko, Anatomiia, p. 204.

103. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88.

104. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88.

105. Idem.

106. Idem.

107. V. Davydenko, RU, 27 XU.88; K. Dmytruk, In Holy Robes, pp. 48-50; Boiko, Narod ne proshchaie, p. 58; P. Iashchuk, ed., Prokliati narodom, p. 115.

108. V. Davydenko, RU, 29.XI.88; V. S. Koval', "shcho take OUN i khto taki banderivtsi", Zakhidna Ukraina: Pershe desiatyrichchia pislia viiny. Kiev, Instytut Istorii, AN URSR, 1988, Preprint No. 3, pp. 19-20.

109. V. Davydenko, RU, 1. XII. 88; V. S. Koval', "Shcho take OUN...", p. 21; About the alleged nationalist crimes see also: M. Dubyna, "I khodiat' iak heroi", RU, 7.I.89; A. Babukh, "Ne zabudu", RU, 7.I.89; D. Bohush, "Ia buv ubytyi", RU, 7.I.89.

110. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88; V. I. Maslov'skyi, Zhovto-blakitna, pp. 83-88; V. S. Koval' states that in 1945 there were 300 Extermination Battalions, and 2,400 Self-defence groups with 50,000 men. Ibid., p. 21. he further claims that in 1944-45 the UPA alone had some 100,000 men of which 48,300 were amnestied, 56,600 killed and 108,5000 taken prisoner. Ibid., p. 22.

111. V. S. Koval claims, however, that in 1949 ocal Self-defence units were able to resist successfully 66 per cent of attacks by the underground on collective farms, and in 1950, 97 oer cent. Ibid., p. 22.

112. V. Davydenko, RU, 7. XII.88; B. Vasylevych, Lzhemesii, pp. 123-135; V. Tanitovs'kyi, Triasovyna: Zapysky chekista.

113. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88; V. Cherdnychenko even quotes Marx and Engels to prove hw wise was the Party leadership. See his: "Chirna sotnia gestapo i abveru", Post imeni Iaroslava Halana, Book IX, p. 38.

114. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XI.88; V. Cherdnychenko, Anatomiia zrady, p. 197-199.

115. V. Davydenko, RU, 2.XII.88; S. T. Danylenko, Dorohoiu han'by i zrady, pp. 261-262.

116. V. Davydenko, RU, 2.XII.88; V. S. Koval's talks about 48,300. Ibid., p. 22.

117. V. Davydenko, RU, 1.XII.88.

118. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88.

119. Idem.

120. Idem.; Actually this number comes to only 12.1 per cent-PJP.

121. Idem.; See also: O. V. Haran', "Industrializatsiia i kul'turna revoliutsiia v zakhidnykh oblastiach URSR: Problemy formuvannia kadriv", in Zakhidna Ukraina, pp. 28-29. He states that in 1946 out of 16,129 obkom nomenklatura workers, only 2,097 or 13.9 per cent were locals. In Chernivtsi - 3 per cent. In Stanislaviv - 7.6 per cent. In agricultural and procurement organs - 12.1 per cent. In planning and trade organs 31 per cent.

122. V. Davydenko, RU, 7.XII.88; See also: O. V. Haran', Ibid., pp. 31-32.

123. v. Davydenko, RU, 8. XII.88.

124. A rather intersting two letters and an editorial comment were published on this theme in "Banderivshchyna proty stalinshchyny?", Sil'ski Visti, 18.III. 1989, which abmit involuntary nature of the collectivization drive.

125. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88.

126. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.89; in a recent speech at the meeting of the Ukrainian association "Memorial", Iu. Badzio said that some 3,000,000 western Ukrainians were exiled at that time. See: "Pobuduimo susip'stvo svobody" (5III89) in Novyi Shliakh, No. 18, May 6,1989, p. 4; As one recent letter indicates in Ternopil oblast one village, Antonivtsi, was raised to the ground and people forcibly removed elsewhere. See: M. Mashtaler, "Na zakhyst choho ratoborstvuie R. Hromiak?", RU, 19.III. 1989.

127. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88; Such tactics are used to this day. See: V. Honcharenko, et al., "Otnyne on nam zemliak", Pravda Ukrainy, 26.II.89, about V. Chormovil.

128. V. Davydenko, RU, 8.XII.88.

129. I. F. Drach, "Suchasni problemy i tryvohy molodykh", Literaturna Ukraina, No. 51, 1988.

130 See: Speech of Iu Badzio at the meeting of "Memorial" on 5 March, 1989, in Kiev, as reported in Ukrains'ki visti, 2. IV. 1989, p. 2, in which he claims that some 3 million Western Ukrainians were exiled after the war. About the Soviet counter-insurgency policy and tactics in Western Ukraine see: P.J. Potichnyj, "Pacification of Ukraine: Soviet Counter-insurgency 1944-1956", Paper for the conference on "Russian Experience with counter-insurgency", October 2-3, 1987, Univercity of New Brunswick and Luba Fajfer, "Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Documents", Problems of communism, September-October 1988, pp. 77-84.

131. See for example: V. Zamlyns'kyi, "Portret chekista", RU, 7.IV.89, who in his review of the book Shiliakhamy chekists'koi doli, mentions thatin Ukraine alone 1,199 leading chekists were liquidated. The book also contains an essay by Ivan Iakymenko and Vitalii Vynograds'kyi entitled "Stezhka do potaiemnoho bunkeru" in which the killing of the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, Gen. Roman Shukhevych-Chuprybko is apparently described in great detail.

132. I. f. Drach, "Suchasni...", Ibid.

133. To mention just a few publications in the field, see: Litopys UPA. Toronto, 1976-,vols. I-XVII; P.J. Potichnyj and Ye. Shtendera, eds., Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943-1951. Edmonton, 1986; M. Lebed, Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia, 2d ed., 1987; P.J. Potichnyj, "UPA and the German Authorities", Paper for the conference on the history of German-Ukrainian Relations", October 12017, 1986, Garmisch-Partenkirchen; P. J. Potichnyj, "The Lemkos in the Ukrainian National Movement During and After WWII", The Papaer for the 20th National Covention of AAASS, November 18-21, 1988, Honolulu; and many others.

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