[LITOPYS UPA: Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army]
SERIES 1
VOLUME 6 - ABSTRACTS OF THE DOCUMENTS


1

Document No. 1, titled "A Memorandum Concerning the Aim of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement Issued by the Leadership of the OUN" and dated April 14, 1941, addresses the German government on the creation of a Ukrainian state. The memorandum states that the goal of the Ukrainian nationalists is to establish a Ukrainian state extending from the Carpathian Mountains to the Caspian Sea. It postulates that the creation of this state would be a culmination of the political and cultural development of the Ukrainian nation; it would remove the danger of Russian imperialism and it would play an important role in the political, economic and cultural life of Europe. The memorandum delineates the specific boundaries of the country, and it goes on to explain, on the basis of strategic and economic concerns, the reasons why the regions of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, with their mixed or ethnically non-Ukrainian population, should also be part of it. The memorandum proceeds to examine the reasons for the secession of Ukraine from the USSR, citing, among others, such factors as racial and national differences, distinct cultural traditions as well as different historical traditions and economic interests. It points out that the Ukrainians are determined in establishing cultural and economic relations with the West, and notes that they are strongly opposed to Russian autarchy.

2

Document No. 2, prepared at the end of May, 1941 and titled "Resolutions of the Second Congress of the OUN," is a translation of the resolutions passed by the Second Congress of the OUN which was held in Cracow. The congress repudiated Colonel Andrij Melnyk as leader of the OUN, and did not recognize the resolutions passed by the Second Grand Assembly of the OUN previously held in Rome. The report notes that the Second Congress has elected a new leadership of the OUN, with Stepan Bandera as its head and that it has passed resolutions regarding the political and military programs of the organization which are to serve as directives for the future. These resolutions stress in a more radical manner the revolutionary forms of struggle, incorporate a broader social-political program and discuss in greater detail military tactics for the upcoming revolution. The Second Congress of the OUN in Cracow finalized the split of the OUN into two organizations: the OUN under the leadership of A. Melnyk (OUNm), and the OUN under the leadership of S. Bandera, known as the OUN Samostiinykiv Derzhavnykiv - OUNSD ("OUN Advocates of Independent Statehood.")

3-14

Documents Nos. 3-14 are a compilation of "Communiqués from the Occupied Eastern Regions" by Chief of the SP and the SD, in Berlin. The documents provide information on the activities of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The reports, which are listed under the heading of either "The Opposition Movement in Ukraine" or "The Ukrainian Opposition Movement," were written between May 12 and September 20, 1942. The last report is dated March 19, 1943. These documents give information on the degree of opposition among the population as well as on the operations of political underground organizations and armed groups. In the reports one can detect an ever-growing concern brought on by the discontent of the populace at large, anti-German attitudes on the part of political groupings and a general growth in radicalism. The last report already brings up the armed struggle of the UPA in Volyn' (Volhynia) and points out that armed units of the German administration which were made up of Ukrainians have gone over to the UPA. In addition, these reports give information on German occupation policy as well as on the activities of the German police, specifically, data on arrests, executions, etc.

The greatest part of all the reports focuses on the activities of the OUNSD which is referred to as the largest anti-German political force, one which has massive popular support in the western regions of Ukraine and is active in all parts of the country. Also, there is frequent mention made of the activities of the OUNm.

Two of the reports provide information on the "Polis'ka Sich" and its leader - Taras Borovets'("Bulba"). Specific mention is made of the following local underground units: "The Revolutionary Ukrainian Nationalist Organization" of Kiev, headed by Oleksander Pohorilyi: "The Ukrainian Revolutionary Front" of Kremyanets', and "The Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine" of Lviv. The reports also mention the activities of some non underground organizations.

15, 16

Documents Nos. 15-16 contain the correspondence between Dr. Pütz, the Chief of the SD in Volyn'nd Podillia, and Otaman T. Borovets'. In a letter dated April 24, 1943, Dr. Pütz blames the Ukrainian insurgents for the "disorders" in Polissia. He proposes that Borovets' and his men give up the underground struggle, assuring them of "life and freedom." In a letter dated May 19, 1943, Borovets' answers that armed resistance is a response to the ruthless terrorizing of the Ukrainian civilian population by the German police. Borovets' insists that terror must stop before there can be any discussion concerning cooperation.

17

"General Report on the Activities of the Bands in 'the Region of Horodets', "dated May 19, 1943, informs about the operations of the UPA in the vicinity of Horodets' in the Polissia region. UPA units are to be found in the "Treshchava" forest near Horodets' and in the woods near Krychils'k in the Kostopil district. Among the UPA leaders mentioned by name are A. Woles, the former Schutzmann-commander in Volodymyrets', in command of an UPA unit from December 1942, and B. Babenko, who worked as a translator in Sarny. The report was prepared by the Commander of the SP and the SD of Volyn' and Podillia in Sarny.

18

This report by the Abwehr's FHO unit, dated May 19, 1943, gives the biography of T. Borovets' and the history of the development of the insurgent units under his command. The report estimates the strength of Borovets' units, which operate north of the Rivne-Zvyahel line (Novhorod Volyns'kyi), at about 20,000 men. The second part of the report, titled "Bandera," discusses the activities of the insurgents of the Kremyanets' region who are under the influence of the OUNSD. Both groups are strongly anti-German; both are fighting for an independent Ukrainian state.

19

The report by the Chief of the SP and the SD in Berlin, titled "The Origins and the Growth of the Ukrainian Band led by Borovets', alias 'Taras Bulba'," dated May 21, 1943, gives the biography of Borovets', along with information on his activities. The report points out that the "Polis'ka Sich" cooperated with the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) in fighting Bolshevik partisans. It goes on to say that Borovets went underground because of the brutality of the German administration in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Borovets' is still interested in working with the Germans, especially the Wehrmacht, in a common struggle against the Soviet Union on condition that there be an improvement in the German attitude towards Ukrainians. The report concludes with an estimate of the military strength of the units commanded by Borovets', together with an analysis of his activities.

20, 21

The report issues by the Abwehr's FHO unit, titled "Meeting between Walli-Section and Taras Bulba," dated June 3, 1943, says that Bulba is ready to cooperate militarily with the Wehrmacht in the struggle against Soviet partisans, but that he does not want to have any dealings with the German police. The report also offers information on the number of troops and the military strength of the units under Borovets' command.

Document No. 21 of the Abwehr - "Concerning the 'Taras Bulba' Movement" (June 11, 1943) analyzes in even greater detail the question of possible cooperation, listing the positive and negative aspects of such a prospect.

22

This document is part of a letter written by Erich Koch, Reichskommissar for Ukraine, to Alfred Rosenberg, Reichsminister; the letter is dated June 25, 1943. It deals with the activities of the partisan forces in Ukraine. Koch gives information on the regions which have fallen under the control of both the nationalist and the Bolshevik partisan units. He assesses their influence, strength and military capability and draws attention to the inability of the Germans to gain control of the situation. The letter also provides data on the general situation, the state of German forces, security measures as well as some figures on the casualties suffered (specifically, the losses sustained in Lutzke district during one week in June, 1943).

23

This document by the Abwehr's Walli III unit, titled "Bands and other Insurgency Movements in Northwestern Ukraine" and dated July 13, 1943, is a succint report on various military formations. The report is divided into the following sub-headings: a) Soviet partisans, b) Bulba's movement, c) Bandera's movement and d) other insurgency movements. The last section reports on the activities of a detachment under the command of P. Onyshchenko in the region of Fastiv, south-west of Kiev. Other leaders of the detachment are: A. Kravets', A. Ustymiv, V. Polishchuk and P. Bilovus. The information for each sub-heading provides the following: the areas of concentration of each movement, a profile on its membership, the number of men, weapons, fighting capability, type of operations as well as other data.

24

This document provides two reports dated June 7 and June 30, 1943, titled "Ukrainian National Bands" and "The Ukrainian National Insurgency Movement" respectively. It includes an extensive report by the Commanding Officer of the SS and the Police for "South Russia." The reports deal with the expansion of the movement led by Taras Borovets', whom the author Considers to be a supporter of the OUNSD. It is noted that the movement started its activities in the Sarny region in September, 1942. From the beginning of 1943, the movement began to spread further. The document also contains monthly reports on: the expansion of the insurgency movement in various areas, the eradication of German administrative and police posts, skirmishes and battles with the Germans, raids on Polish settlements, etc. A separate section is devoted to the propaganda activities of the insurgents, which was noticeably intensified in the spring. The propaganda exposes the barbaric deeds committed by the German civilian administration and attempts to neutralize the soldiers of the Wehrmacht. The section titled "Leadership" lists the commanding officers of insurgency detachments in Western Volyn' and in the regions of Zhytomyr and Kiev. The report names Borovets' as their commander, and the OUNSD - as their political leadership. Sections devoted to organizational matters give a detailed report on the organization of the underground and of the self-defense units as well as the tasks of the various formations. It is noted that the struggle is directed primarily against the German civilian administration and police, and not against the Wehrmacht. The report states that prisoners are well-treated by the insurgents, that the wounded are given first aid, and that others are disarmed and then set free. The report points to instances of rapprochement between the insurgents and Soviet partisans. The document includes a map.

25

This document, dated August 31, 1943, is a translation of an order issued by "Klym Savur" (Dmytro Kliachkivs'kyi), Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, on the occassion of the 24th anniversary of the victory of the united Ukrainian armies in driving the enemy out of Kiev in 1919. The communiqué, intercepted by the Germans, is addressed to the soldiers and officers of the UPA. It gives a brief analysis of the international situation and goes on to delineate the political and military tasks of the UPA, with particular emphasis on the need to form a united front to fight for the liberation of all captive nations. This order directs the insurgents to attain military proficiency and to fight courageously for the creation of a free Ukrainian state.

26

This report from the Abwehrstelle Ukraine (Abwehr's "Ukraine" unit), titled "The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement" and dated September 15, 1943, gives information on the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUNSD, held on August 21-25, 1943. (The report incorrectly refers to the congress as "The Third Conference of the OUN"), It states that among those who were participating, there were representatives of the OUNm and supporters of the post-WWI Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The participants of the congress democratized the political program of the OUNSD by striking from it "influences of fascism." The greater part of the report is given over to military matters. It states that the central leadership of the UPA is the UPA Supreme Command. It says further that the UPA is growing and is expanding its base, becoming a supra-political military organization composed of a cross-section of the population. This is evident in the composition of its officer corps which is made up of men of various political affiliations. The report gives information on: the reorganization of the UPA and the training camps for its officers, the non-Ukrainian units within the UPA as well as the military operations carried out by the UPA. The report also informs that the Soviet propaganda machine is waging an all-out propaganda war against the UPA.

27

The report of the Abwehr's FHO unit, titled "The National Ukrainian Insurgency Movement" and dated November 11, 1943, gives a brief account of the organization and the military strength of the UPA. It identifies "Klym Savur" (Dmytro Kliachkivs'kyi) as the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA and "Honcharenko" (Leonid Stupnyts'kyi) as its Chief-of-Staff. The number of soldiers in the UPA is estimated at 20,000, and when other formations are taken into account - at some 35,000-40,000 men. The units under the command of T. Borovets' are estimated to number 5,000-6,000 men.

28

This report by the Abwehr, titled "Taras Bulba - Leader of the Ukrainian Partisans" and dated November 22, 1943 provides information on meetings held with T. Borovets', which later would lead to his imprisonment. Following the retreat of German troops, Special Staff Section "R" was created within the Abwehr's FHO unit for the purpose of establishing contact with the insurgents in order to fight together against the Soviets. The report notes that this special unit was autonomous, acting independently of the German civilian administration. Borovets' held preliminary talks with members of this unit on November 19, 1943 in Rivne from where he was taken on November 22 (the day the report was issued) to Warsaw for further deliberations, This document includes a map.

29

"The Abwehr's Report on the Ukrainian National Army," issued by its FHO unit on December 23, 1943, contains information on the organizational structure of the UPA, on the composition of its Supreme Command and its military district commands (named as divisions in the report), along with an assessment of their strength and military capability. In spite of the frequent misspelling of names and other inaccuracies, the report generally contains a substantial amount of correct information. The inaccuracies have been corrected in the footnotes.

An enclosure to this document, titled "Report on the Growth of Armed Resistance and the Political Climate in Western Ukraine" provides information on the history of the development of the insurgent units led by T. Borovets' and on those organized by the OUNSD, naming Mykola Lebed and Roman Shukhevych as their leaders. The report states that units organized by the OUNSD have experienced rapid growth and have come to control vast territories. The report contains data on their organization, tactics, political orientation, etc. The final section of the report deals with refugees and the general situation brought about by the retreat of the German Army. This document includes a map.

30

Document No. 30, dated December 28, 1943, presents "The Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN, held on August 3, 1943," translated into German by the Abwehr unit of the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ukraine (Commander of Wehrmacht "Ukraine.") (The actual date of the congress was in fact August 21-25, 1943).

31

The intelligence report issued on January 21, 1944 by the XIIIth Army Corps, titled "The Activities of the Insurgent Bands within the Territory of the Corps," gives information on the, battles of the UPA with Soviet and Polish partisans north of Rivne as well as the general attitude towards the Germans. The report notes that the UPA is avoiding conflicts with the Wehrmacht, but that it continues to oppose the German occupation administration. The report also assesses the strength of the Polish partisan units and their attitute towards Ukrainians, Germans and Soviet partisans.

32

This is a brief report issued on January 25, 1944 by the Abwehr's FHO unit. It describes and analyzes the activities of the UPA in Volyn', specifically in the area extending from the Buh River to Korosten' near Kiev.

33

This document, titled "How to Deal with the UPA" and dated January 29, 1944, contains instructions for the XIIIth Army Corps. It notes that even though the UPA tends to cooperate with the Wehrmacht in the struggle against the Soviets, it is fighting, nevertheless, for an independent Ukraine and that, therefore, both the Germans and Soviets are enemies of the UPA. The document gives instructions on how to contact UPA units and how to cooperate in the struggle against the Soviet Army and its partisan units.

34

This report, titled "On the Resistance Movement in the Areas Formerly held by Poland" was issued on February 9, 1944 by the Abwehr unit of the Oberkommando des Heeres - OKH (Supreme Command of the German Army.) It gives a brief account of the activities of the UPA in Halychyna (Galicia).

35

The report of the XIIIth Army Corps, titled "Prützmann's Armed Group" and dated February 12, 1944, gives information on the fighting between the UPA and Soviet partisan units in Volyn'. The report also contains information on various Soviet partisan formations.

36, 38, 40

Document No. 36, titled "Attitude towards the UPA Units" was issued on February 15, 1944 by the XIIIth Army Corps Commander. It states that an agreement has been reached with the UPA to cooperate in the Kremyanets' region. Nevertheless, UPA units continue to intercept transports with supplies intended for the Wehrmacht.

Document No. 38, titled "Ukrainian National Bands" and dated February 28, 1944, reports that UPA units have not been engaging in skirmishes with the Germans, only with Soviet partisans, The report gives a description of some of the fighting.

Document No. 40, titled "Activities of the UPA within the Region of the Army Corps" and dated March 8, 1944, is similar in content. It also includes descriptions of the fighting between the UPA and NKVD forces behind the front.

37

The Abwehr's FHO unit report, titled "The Attitude of the Hungarians towards the UPA" and dated February 16, 1944, assumes that a truce has been concluded between the UPA and the Hungarian Army. In the village of Zholobky near Kremyanets', the Hungarians encamped together with a company-sized unit of the UPA. The report notes that the UPA is using Hungarian-made weapons. In addition it states, that the Soviets have also issued instructions to all their units to avoid unnecessary confrontations with the Hungarians.

39

The Aebwehr's report "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)," dated March 3, 1944, provides information on the UPA by Captain Andreas Herz, who was held prisoner by the UPA near the village of Kolodne (Ternopil oblast). Herz estimates that the UPA unit numbered some 60-70 soldiers and he related his conversations with the unit's commander. He notes that the latter did not express any hostility towards the Wehrmacht, but was deeply disturbed over the brutality of the German administration toward the Ukrainian population.

41, 42

Document No. 41, titled "Report of Abwehr Unit 104" is an intelligence report issued on March 22, 1944 by the XIIIth Army Corps. It describes the general situation and combat actions of the UPA against both the Soviet partisan and regular Red Army units in the area of Kremyanets'-Brody. The report includes information on the activities of some 2,000 insurgents and on large Soviet partisan units which were operating in this region.

Document No. 42, "Ukrainian National Bands," dated March 28, 1944, provides additional information on the situation in this region. The report also contains information on the proclamation issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, signed by M. Hrechukha, which was addressed to the UPA.

43

Document No. 43, titled "Activities of the UPA in the Rear of the Red Army Line," dated April 1, 1944, is a report prepared by the intelligence section of the Oberkommando der 4. Panzerarmee (Command of the 4th Armored Division.) It notes that whereas there has been an easing of tensions between the UPA and German forces, insurgent activity has been stepped up in the Red Army Rear Area. The fact that the Soviet government perceives UPA-activity as a grave threat is substantiated by the proclamation which was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR concerning the UPA.

44

This document, issued by the Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Nord-ukraine (Army Command "North Ukraine") on April 18, 1944, includes the translation of a letter from "Okhrim," the commander of an unidentified UPA unit, addressed "To the Supreme Command of the German Army in Halychyna" on April 2, 1944. The letter begins by informing that two German agents had fallen into the hands of the UPA and that upon having mistaken the UPA for the NKVD, they immediately divulged information about the Germans. The remainder of the letter deals with the cooperation between the UPA and the Wehrmacht. It notes that as far as the UPA is concerned, cooperation will be possible only if the Germans stop terrorizing the Ukrainian population and release political prisoners. The letter is quite specific in delineating the areas of possible cooperation as well as in listing the type of arms and materials needed by the UPA. The identity of both the author of the letter - "Okhrim," and that of his Chief-of-Staff - "Taras," has not been established.

45

This communiqué, titled "Contacts between the UPA and Serbian Nationalist Partisans" which was issued by the Abwehr on April 21, 1944, informs that the two groups have been cooperating since March in fighting both Germans and Soviets. Discussions were held concerning the goals of both movements and regarding their actions in the event of a collapse of both Germany and the Soviet Union. The report notes that the UPA has agreed to refrain from any facilitation of contacts between Tito and the Soviets across areas held by the UPA.

46

This report by the Abwehr, titled "The Nationalist Movement in Halychyna" and dated April 22, 1944, gives extensive information on the general situation as well as the growth of armed resistance in Halychyna. It notes that part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, although critical of German policy in Ukraine, has come out in favor of cooperating with the Germans, especially in forming Ukrainian army units within the German Army. The report goes on to say that the majority of the population and 90% of the youth are supporters of the UPA. The report analyzes the reasons for and reviews the development of the Ukrainian armed struggle from its beginnings in Volyn', with subsequent expansion into Halychyna. It notes that the struggle is being waged against all enemies of an independent Ukraine - i.e., against the Germans, Soviet and Polish partisan forces. The UPA considers the Soviet Union to be its principal and most important adversary. The report assesses the military strength of the UPA, provides information on its organizational structure and evaluates the prospects for the future. The lack of trained and experienced officers constitutes a serious drawback for the UPA. The report identifies Roman Shukhevych as the military commander of the UPA and Mykola Lebed as its political leader.

47

Document No. 47 is a translation of a propaganda leaflet put out in April, 1944 by Ukrainian insurgents and is addressed "To the Soldiers and Officers of the Red Army." The leaflet compares Stalin to Hitler, noting that both are equally brutal tyrants who are bent on destroying all the nations of the USSR. It was Stalin who introduced the police system into the USSR, exploited the population ruthlessly and had long been preparing for an imperialist war. During the war, both empires exploited the Ukrainian people even more ruthlessly and plundered the wealth of the country. The leaflet also comes out against the Soviet partisans-paratroopers, appending a long list of Ukrainian villages that they have plundered and burned, as well as listing the number of peasants murdered during 1943 and 1944.

48

This document, issued on May 12, 1944 by the Abwehr, contains a translation of the proclamation by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, addressed "To the Members of the so-called UPA and UNRA." In the Abwehr's commentary to the document emphasis is placed on the fact that such a statement was issued and signed by both the president - M. Hrechukha, and the head of the government - M. Khrushchov, thus attesting to the government's perception that the activities of the insurgents pose a serious threat to the state. The statement blames the insurgents for undermining the friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian nations, for instigating civil war and for disrupting the Ukrainian economy. It accuses the insurgents of collaborating with the Germans. As proof, it cites the case of battalion commander Antoniuk in the Volodymyr area of Volyn'. The appeal calls on the rank and file to kill off their officers and to go over to the Soviet side; there is assurance that their "tresspasses" will be forgiven.

49

Document No. 49, bearing the Abwehr's date of May 14, 1944, is a translation of an intercepted Red Army order sent on January 14, 1944 by the Chief-of-Staff of the 258th Khabarovsk Rifle Regiment. The cornmuniqué deals with certain security measures to be taken on the territory where Ukrainian insurgents are operating. The following orders are given: not to venture out alone and unarmed, increase security, evict civilians from buildings occupied by military headquarters, monitor the activities of Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army, etc.

50

Document No. 50, titled "The UPA in Halychyna," was issued by Der Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer im Generalgouvernement (Chief of the SS and the Police in the GG) on May 17, 1944. It gives a detailed account of the activities of the UPA in Halychyna. The activity of the insurgents was stepped-up in April as were the number of armed skirmishes and acts of railroad sabotage. The report indicates that areas of concentration of UPA units are to be found in the Carpathian Mountains, near Rohatyn, and in the vicinity of Sokal. The report assesses the number of men and the military strength of the UPA. It gives an estimate of strength, combat effectiveness, personnel staffing as well as information on the organization, recruitment, logistics, and it also names areas of troop concentration. In addition the report provides information on the fighting between the UPA and units of Soviet and Polish partisans and supplies some data on these partisan forces.

51

This report, issued on May 23, 1944 by an official representative of Army Command "North Ukraine" discusses the general state of affairs for April, 1944. It notes the population's support for the OUN program and its struggle for an independent Ukraine. The report indicates that the UPA is the military arm of the OUN. The position of the UPA regarding the Germans has been non-commital, one of marking time until Germany makes clear its stand vis-a-vis the idea of creating an independent Ukraine. The report assesses the strength of UPA forces in the area of Rohatyn at approximately 3,000-5,000 men, some of whom are scattered among the villagers. The report also draws attention to the hostility towards the local Polish population and the matter of securing food supplies for the insurgents. The section of the report dealing with Soviet partisans gives information on their activities, skirmishes, acts of sabotage as well as intelligence operations, radio communications with Moscow, etc. It concludes with a review of both Soviet and German propaganda activities (leaflets) directed at the general population.

52

This is an excerpt from a monthly report issued by the Oberfeldkommandantur 365 (Field Command Section No. 365) on May 19, 1944. It contains some information on the activities of the UPA in the areas of Khodoriv, Bibrka and Stanislaviv in Halychyna.

53

This is an excerpt from a report by an intelligence section of the Command of the 4th Armored Division. It covers the period of May, 1944, and gives an overview of the activities of the UPA as well as that of Soviet and Polish partisan forces operating on Ukrainian territory. The report refers to the UPA as a mass movement. It states that the UPA has disarmed and set free soldiers of the Wehrmacht who had been taken prisoner.

54, 54a, 54b, 55

Document No. 54, a report by the Abwehr's FHO unit, titled "Ukrainian National Partisan Movement" and dated June 1, 1944, reviews the history of Ukrainian armed resistance. The section titled "Aims" explains that the Ukrainians are fighting for their own sovereign statehood, incorporating in this state all territories settled by Ukrainians. The report lists all Ukrainian territories. The section titled "Membership" gives a profile on: "The Taras Bulba (Borovets') Movement," "The Ukrainian National Group (the movement headed by Meinyk)," "OUN (the movement headed by Stepan Bandera)" and the underground activities of Ukrainians in Germany. The report notes that the OUN initiated the all-out struggle waged by the UPA. Other sections of the report are devoted to the activities of the UPA in areas now under the Soviet regime, in the woodlands of the right-bank regions of Ukraine north of the Chernivtsi--Vinnytsia--Kiev line. Entire divisions of the NKVD were deployed against these UPA units. There are two sections providing information on the organization of the underground administration and units of the UPA. Several leaders are mentioned by name. There is additional information on the number of troops, the military strength of UPA units in the various regions, etc. There are separate sections on the general situation and related armed resistance in areas of Transcarpathia and in Halychyna.

Two documents have been appended to this report by the compiler. "The Basis for Negotiations," Documents Nos. 54a and 54b, give information on talks held between the Wehrmacht and representatives of the UPA and the OUN. It was agreed that the talks would not deal with areas of political or military cooperation, but since both sides are engaged in battle against the Soviet Union, it seems possible to reach an understanding concerning the establishment of less-strained relations, mutual tolerance and aid. Accordingly, the Wehrmacht would not attack UPA units, it would exert its influence on the civilian administration to stop terrorizing the Ukrainian civilian population and would take action to aid in the release of political prisoners; it would allow UPA units to cross the front-line and it would give the UPA technical assistance. On its part, according to the documents, the UPA would not attack German units stationed at the front, disrupt lines of communication, stop field couriers and transport; it might provide intelligence information. The documents do not specify between whom and on what date these tentative proposals had been reached.

Document No. 55, dated June 5, 1944, is a report by Abwehrkommando 105 (Abwehr section 105) about a meeting between Dr. Stark, a representative of the Abwehr, and an unidentified representative of the UPA Command which was held in Lviv on June, 1944. It states, that the Germans were interested in obtaining information about the activities of the Soviet forces behind the front line; the concerns of the UPA were to bring an end to the terrorizing of the Ukrainian population by the Germans and to secure the release of political prisoners. The Germans also suggested delivery of arms, munitions and medical supplies. The report lists the concerns of both sides and information on the general state of affairs.

56

Document No. 56, issued on June 5, 1944 by the XXIVth Armored Division, contains a translation of the "Report on the Propaganda Effort" for the month of April by the director of propaganda for the underground operating in the southern portion of Ternopil oblast. The report contains a wealth of information not only on the personnel and the activities of this propaganda section, but also on the general state of affairs and current activities in this area, which is within the combat zone. The document gives extensive information on the attitudes and conduct of the population, the German and Soviet units stationed at the front, administration, etc.

57

This document, dated June 12, 1944, is a translation of an order issued on January 8, 1944 by the Commander of the SMERSH-unit attached to the 226th Division of the Red Army, addressed to the Commander of the 985th Regiment. The order, which was intercepted by the Abwehr, deals with those measures to be taken which would counteract the influence of the UPA in the regiment. The soldiers from the raions of Malyn, Potiivka and Chopovychi (Zhytomyr oblast), an area where the UPA is active, are to be kept under surveillance so as to ascertain whether they belong to or have contact with either the OUN or the UPA.

58

This document contains an excerpt from a monthly report issued on the activities of the UPA by Field Command Section No. 365, covering the period from May 16 to June 15, 1944. The report provides information on the areas of concentration of large UPA forces, their military strength as well as their activity, German military operations against the UPA, etc. The report concludes with statistical data on action taken against the Germans by the UPA, indicating casualties suffered by both sides.

59

This is an excerpt from a 6-month report prepared for the IIIrd Armored Division, dealing with the attitute of the Ukrainian population and the UPA toward the Germans. The report notes that the general population is under the influence of the UPA, yet it does not have a hostile attitude toward the German soldiers. There is no substantive information on the relations between the UPA and the Wehrmacht. The report casts doubt on any military cooperation between the UPA and the Wehrmacht in fighting the enemy.

60

Document No. 60, "Memorandum on Ways to Deal with the UPA," is an address to the Army Command "North Ukraine." It provides an explanation of the goals and type of operations conducted by the UPA as well as its attitude toward the Soviet Union and Germany. It notes that there has been some cooperation with the UPA, and recommends seeking contacts for the common struggle against the Soviets.

61

This report, issued on July 2, 1944 by the 4th Armored Division to the Army Command "North Ukraine" informs that large Polish and Soviet partisan units have left the war-front zone east of the Buh River (Volyn'). The UPA, on the contrary, has concentrated its efforts to maximize control and to expand its field of operation behind the Red Army lines. The report also informs that "The White Eagle," a Polish partisan unit, is still in the formative stage, and that the other smaller Polish groups are generally under the influence of Moscow.

62

This report, issued on July 5, 1944 by Leitstelle III Ost (Abwehr Section III-East) states that the planned meeting with the representatives of the local command of the UPA for the Kalush raion did not take place on orders issued by the UPA Command, forbidding lower-echelon staff to engage in talks with the Germans.

63, 64

These documents contain translations made by the Abwehr, which chronicle events in Ukraine, compiled on the basis of information which appeared in two UPA-newspapers from Volyn' -- "Vil'na Ukraina" (issue No. 8, September 1943), and "Strilets'ki Visti" (issue No. 23 of July 14, 1944). "Vil'na Ukraina" reports on the terrorizing of the Ukrainian population by the Germans, on arrests and executions, on the forced deportation of laborers from the regions of Kiev, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovs'ke, Kamyanets'-Podils'kyi and the Crimea -- to work in Germany, and on the fighting between the UPA and the Germans in various districts of Volyn'.

"Strilets'ki Visti" provides information on the numerous battles waged by the UPA against NKVD forces as well as against Red Army units which were deployed against the UPA.

65

This is an excerpt from a weekly report issued on July 15, 1944 by Dr. Pütz, Chief of Police and the SS for the District of Lublin. It provides information on the activities of the UPA, especially in the district of Hrubeshiv. The report notes that although the UPA is engaged in fighting local Polish partisans, there have been numerous instances of attacks on the German administration.

66

"An Appraisal of Strength of the Enemy Forces" was issued by the intelligence section of the OKH on July 18, 1944. It provides information on the attacks launched by the UPA on garrisons and administrative posts in various parts of Soviet-occupied Ukraine. The report notes that Soviet radio and press do not comment on military operations involving the UPA. Travel to Ukraine has been restricted in order to keep the population ignorant of insurgent activity. Nevertheless, according to the report, the prevalent conviction holds that, for the most part, the Ukrainian insurgency movement is a local phenomenon, too fragmented to pose a real threat to the Soviet Union.

67

This report, issued on July 21, 1944 by the Frontaufklärungskommando 202 (Front-line reconnaissance unit No. 202) of the Army Command "North Ukraine," provides information on the situation on the front. It notes that since Soviet troops have now advanced into Halychyna, the Supreme Command of the UPA, the Command of UPA-West and the leadership of the OUN are all presently situated behind the front line. The UPA is planning to set up positions in the Carpathian forests, from where it could maintain contact with Hungary, Slovakia as well as the Wehrmacht. The report notes that the UPA has requested some military assistance and medical supplies. It also informs that there exists a liason section whose task is to maintain contact with the Wehrmacht. It also notes that representatives of this section wish to meet with Stepan Bandera and other imprisoned activists.

68

This report on the UPA, issued by the Abwehr on July 22, 1944, provides information on two groups of UPA units from Volyn' which are operating on the German side of the front; specifically, in the vicinity of Volodymyr--Hrubeshiv and near Volodava. The number of soldiers is estimated at 1,000-1,200 men. These two groups are in contact with UPA forces on the other side of the front and have even been able to get supplies through to them. The report notes that UPA units operating in the region of Hrabovets--Hrubeshiv are involved in skirmishes with Polish and Soviet partisans from the area of Zamostia. It concludes with an unofficial proposal for cooperation with the UPA. In exchange for UPA intelligence reports on the activities of the Red Army, the Germans would supply the UPA with arms, radios, medical and other supplies.

69

This document, prepared for the Headquarters of the Eastern Front, provides an estimate of the strength of the anti-German partisan forces as of July 25, 1944. This is a chart providing detailed information on the organization of Soviet partisan forces on both sides of the front as well as an estimate of the number of Soviet and Polish partisans and of the UPA. The UPA was estimated to include some 40,000 soldiers.

70

This report, issued on July 31, 1944 by the OKH includes "An Excerpt from the Monthly Report of the Army Command 'North Ukraine'," dealing with the prevailing attitude among the general population. The report says that the people are disturbed by the imminent invasion of the Red Army. It notes that fighting continues between the Polish and Ukrainian underground armies. Finally, it notes that UPA's numerical strength could be put to good use in fighting the Soviets.



VOLUME 6



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