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RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report Vol. 3, No. 41, 30 October 2001

A Survey of Developments in Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine by the Regional Specialists of RFE/RL's Newsline Team

On Polish foreign policy:

"The tragic events of 11 September have in a drastic way reminded everyone of the old truth that individual and general security are not granted once and for all. They also recalled that a secure state is for the basic good of all citizens, and its assurance a fundamental task for the government. In this respect, our membership of the North Atlantic alliance has a fundamental significance. We feel that NATO should retain its original function as a defense alliance, but at the same time extend its commitment in the stabilization of security and the overcoming of crises in the entire Euro-Atlantic zone, and also effectively undertake new challenges, to which today there belongs above all the overcoming of international terrorism.

"In this context, the lasting presence and commitment of the United States to the security of our continent remains a key issue. My government will tighten bilateral relations with the United States and also allied cooperation with America in the framework of NATO. The alliance has many times declared an open-door policy. In my deep conviction, the continuation of this policy, which should find expression in specific decisions at the NATO summit in Prague in 2002, constitutes the proper reading of the most relevant signs of the times....

"We are pleased at the new climate and the new language and new initiatives that favor the activation of Poland's relations with Russia.

"Enterprising people and business people are ever more dominant in the relations of Poland with Russia. By the nature of things, they introduce into these relations a pragmatic language and effective activity.

"We will also consistently act for the deepening of dialogue at the deepest level. A significant impulse going in this direction should be the meeting between the presidents of Poland and Russia in Warsaw in January 2002.

"Our relations with Ukraine are characterized by stability in the strengthening of strategic partnership. We support the ambitious Ukrainian policy that is oriented in different directions, although for understandable reasons we are concerned with Ukrainian activity that is directed toward its western neighbors and partners, and Poland especially. On our part, we will do everything for PolishUkrainian relations to profile ever more the European identity of Ukraine and tie it more closely with the institutions to which Poland already belongs or will belong.

"It is impossible not to harbor a feeling of not being sated when we look at today's state of Poland's relations with Belarus. We will be seeking avenues and methods of dialogue, and as far as it is possible, a convergence of standpoints. In this context, we are particularly concerned with developing contacts between individuals."

UKRAINE

COMMUNISTS RAGE OVER LAND CODE. Last week the Ukrainian legislature plunged into turmoil over the debate about the country's new Land Code, which includes a controversial clause allowing the sale of farmland.

Communist lawmakers on 25 October blocked the parliamentary rostrum in a bid to disrupt the planned debate of the Land Code and its adoption in the second reading. The Communists said the ballot passing the Land Code in the first reading in July was rigged. The protesters displayed slogans: "Selling Land [Means] Selling Fatherland" and "We Will Save the People's Shrine -- Native Soil." Deputy speaker Viktor Medvedchuk had to adjourn the debate. "If I am prevented from proposing a vote on the Land Code from my seat in the [parliamentary] presidium, I will do this from some other place, even from the third floor [of the parliamentary building]," he declared.

Medvedchuk was forced to take such emergency measures the following day, when Communist deputies blocked the tribune in a bid to prevent Agricultural Committee Chairwoman Kateryna Vashchuk from presenting the bill. When Vashchuk somehow managed to present the bill and it came to a vote, Communists yanked out wires to disable the parliament's electronic voting system. The parliamentary leadership ordered a manual vote outside the session hall, but some 15 Communist lawmakers broke the ballot box and destroyed most of the ballots. Another manual ballot proved to be successful, and the Land Code was passed by a slim majority of 232 votes (226 votes were necessary to pass it). Some 160 Communist and socialist deputies refused to vote.

On 26 October, Communist deputies walked out of the parliament in protest against the Land Code. Later in the day they returned to the session and blocked the aisles, trying to seize the tribune. Parliamentary proceedings ground to a halt. The Communists once again accused the centrist and rightist caucuses of falsifying the vote and announced that they will appeal to the Constitutional Court to rule on the 25 October voting.

The Land Code allows the sale and purchase of land not earlier than 2005. Moreover, the sale of land will become legal only after the parliament passes laws regulating the property market. In 2005- 2010, the sale of land will be limited to plots not exceeding 100 hectares for one individual.

In Ukraine, as anywhere in the post-Soviet area, private land ownership is a highly emotional issue. The authorities consider the possibility of private land ownership a key element in their land reform, which is intended to transform the state-run collective farm system into a more efficient system embracing different forms of farming. The authorities also believe that the new Land Code will help attract foreign investment.

Ukrainian leftists, as well as many ordinary Ukrainians, fear liberalization of the land market. They argue that Ukraine's pauperized farmers -- who have been given land ownership certificates only recently -- will become victims of foreign businessmen and Ukraine's wealthy classes.

"There are no real prices for land in today's Ukraine. The Committee for Land Resources estimates that one hectare of land costs 7,000-8,000 hryvni. It means $1,500 for one hectare of Ukrainian chernozem, doesn't it? In Montreal, one hectare of land costs $15 million," Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko argued in a recent interview.

"Kuchma and the IMF Killed 4 Million Ukrainians." -- a slogan displayed by some 300 elderly protesters in Kyiv on 25 October, who demanded that the parliament increase pensions for war and labor veterans and write off utility payment debts for poor families; reported by Interfax.

"Instead of $1,300 paid by the UN, I got $800 [monthly]. In July 1992 Ukraine had to pay its membership fee debt to UN, and that debt was repaid with money for our battalion." -- Sergeant Andriy Kuzmenko, who served in 1992-93 in a Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion in Sarajevo; quoted by Interfax.

RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report is prepared by Jan Maksymiuk on the basis of a variety of sources including reporting by "RFE/RL Newsline" and RFE/RL's broadcast services. It is distributed every Tuesday.

END NOTE: RUSSIA CONTINUES TO HOLD UP BORDER DEMARCATION WITH UKRAINE

RUSSIA CONTINUES TO HOLD UP BORDER DEMARCATION WITH UKRAINE

Four and a half years after Ukraine and Russia signed a treaty in Kyiv and 2 1/2 years after both houses of the Russian parliament ratified that treaty, the border question continues to bedevil both countries. While Russia agrees to the delimitation on maps of the former Soviet internal administrative frontier between itself and Ukraine, 97 percent of which is done, it continues its decade-long opposition to its demarcation.

Ukraine and Russia continue to hold opposing views as to how the border should be defined. The Ukrainian side believes that the border should be the same as any other international border where delimitation on maps is followed by physical demarcation by natural objects or signs arranged at regular intervals. Such an arrangement would be very different to that which continues to exist on Ukraine's Western border, where Kyiv inherited Soviet-style watchtowers and barbed wire.

Russia, in contrast, continues to insist that borders within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) should be divided into "internal" and "external" ones. CIS "internal" frontiers are in effect the same as those that existed in the USSR, except that they may be now delimited on maps for greater clarity. "External" frontiers represent former Soviet external borders.

These opposing views on borders reflect different understandings of nation-building and identity within Russia and Ukraine. Since the Declaration of Sovereignty in July 1990, nation-building in Ukraine has always been understood to consider borders -- wherever they might be -- as integral to a country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and as a national symbol. Ukraine has therefore not signed the majority of border agreements adopted by CIS structures.

Russia has always remained confused as to whether it is building a nation-state, which would lead to Moscow having similar views on borders to Ukraine, or whether it understands the CIS to be the successor to the USSR so that the CIS, like the USSR, would have no need for demarcated borders between "fraternal" republics. Such a view is accepted by Russophile states within the CIS, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. This view of borders within the CIS follows from Russia's view of the CIS as a "Near Abroad," whose members enjoy greater sovereignty than they did as soviet socialist republics, but less independence than the states of the "Far Abroad."

The Ukrainian position became confused itself on July 17 when Oleksandr Kupchyshyn, the director of the Treaty and Legal Department of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, stated that demarcation would not be necessary because this would violate the "historic traditions of living together and coexistence of our countries and nations." This sounded suspiciously similar to that of the Russian Foreign Ministry position outlined exactly a month later that rejected demarcation because the Russian-Ukrainian border "should be one of friendship, accord, and communication, uniting rather than separating our two nations."

The Ukrainian media reported that Kupchyshyn was officially reprimanded for his statement. Support for demarcation into a fully fledged international border with Russia was again restated as the official view by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and State Secretary Yuriy Serheyev. Serheyev, the president's representative in the Foreign Ministry, confirmed that Ukraine's approach to borders remains delimitation through protocols and separate agreements on maps, followed by demarcation with special signs or boundary posts, and finally, agreeing to a border regime. Explaining this position to Russia, Serheyev said it "coincides with our constitution," conforms to the "national will," and "fully corresponds to the standards of international law."

In a recent opinion poll among foreign policy elites by the Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (CPCFPU), a Kyivbased think tank with close links to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, 87.5 percent supported a demarcated border with Russia, and 53.1 percent believed the lack of demarcation prevents Ukraine from integration into Europe. Meanwhile, 59.4 percent felt the lack of demarcation forced Ukraine's Western neighbors to introduce visas on Ukrainians, and another 56.3 percent thought it contributes to illegal migration, organized crime, and contraband.

Ukraine placed border troops on its 2,292-kilometer Russian border in January 1993, and eight years on its status still continues to differ from that on Ukraine's Western (former Soviet) borders. Although delimitation on land will be completed this year, Russia's position on the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait, and the Black Sea are again influenced by national identity considerations. Non-Russian former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, view the Sea of Azov, Kerch Strait, and Caspian Sea as international waterways that should be delimited into country sectors with exclusive economic zones. Russia (backed by Iran in the Caspian) disagrees, with the Soviet legacy continuing to influence its attitude that they should remain "internal seas" as in the USSR.

Besides national identity, the CPCFPU points to three strategic motives for Russia's rejection of border demarcation. Firstly, the continuation of Soviet internal administrative frontiers in the form of "internal" CIS borders would allow Russia to continue to exert influence and apply pressure on other CIS states. Secondly, a nondemarcated border would prolong the confusion surrounding energy deliveries to Ukraine as until now Russia has refused Ukrainian requests to sell gas at the border where meters would be installed so it would be clear as to exactly how much Ukraine imports. Thirdly, Russia has always had irrational fears that Ukraine will slip away from its sphere of influence by integrating with the EU and NATO (it was not a coincidence that the May 1997 treaty was signed only two months prior to the Madrid NATO summit). Unresolved borders would prevent Ukraine's integration westward as the resolution of border questions is a prerequisite for membership in the EU and NATO. The CPCFPU therefore argues that accepting Russia's position (as Kupchyshyn briefly did) would, "cast doubts on the realization of Ukraine's European choice."

The Russian-Ukrainian border has even more importance for European security in the wake of the international concern over terrorism following the 11 September terrorist acts on the United States. Ninety percent of illegal migrants and two-thirds of contraband, including narcotics and weapons, enter Ukraine from Russia. A demarcated border with Russia has therefore importance not only for Ukraine, but for a soon-to-be expanded EU. Support for the demarcation of Ukraine's eastern border and improving security on it came during a June meeting between Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh and the EU's Security Chief, Xavier Solana, who has promised EU funds for improving security on the RussianUkrainian border. Obviously though, funds can only be provided if the border is demarcated, and to date Russia shows no sign of softening its opposition to doing so.

END NOTE: RUSSIA CONTINUES TO HOLD UP BORDER DEMARCATION WITH UKRAINE

UKRAINIAN PREMIER PLEDGES TO HELP FIGHT TERRORISM. Anatoliy Kinakh said on 29 October that Ukraine is ready to assist foreign states, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in fighting terrorism, Inter television reported. Kinakh made this statement at the JFK airport in New York upon his arrival for a three-day visit to the United States. Kinakh noted that he plans to discuss limitations in bilateral trade with U.S. officials. Kinakh spent the first day of his visit in New York meeting with New York City and New York state officials, U.S. businessmen, and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In addition, he visited the World Trade Center site and attended a service in a Ukrainian church. JM

UKRAINIAN STOCK MARKET OFFICIAL STABBED, SHOT TO DEATH. Oleksiy Romashko, a member of the State Commission for Securities and the Stock Market, was stabbed to death on 29 October as he left his house in Kyiv, Interfax reported. Deputy Prosecutor-General Yuriy Haysynskyy confirmed that Romashko was stabbed twice with a knife and added that he was also shot in the head after the stabbing. JM

UKRAINIAN TELEVISION QUESTIONS OFFICIAL VERSION OF JOURNALIST'S DEATH. Ukrainian Television on 28 October broadcast a 25-minute film questioning the official version of the death of journalist Ihor Aleksandrov in Slavyansk, Luhansk Oblast, in July (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 31 August 2001). Prosecutor-General Mykhaylo Potebenko has announced that Aleksandrov was mistakenly killed by a homeless man who intended to kill Aleksandrov's lawyer. Two former police officers said in the film that Aleksandrov was killed by a group responsible for a number of contract killings in the Luhansk region in recent years. JM

RUSSIAN, UKRAINIAN INMATES STRIKE IN CZECH REPUBLIC. A hunger strike declared by imprisoned Russians and Ukrainians on 26 October continues, although some strikers have since ended their protest, CTK reported on 29 October. Prison Authority spokeswoman Jana Trtikova said 111 inmates remain on strike in protest against alleged breaches of their rights and harsh conditions in Czech prisons. MS

RUSSIA CONTINUES TO HOLD UP BORDER DEMARCATION WITH UKRAINE

LUKOIL BUYS 85 PERCENT OF NORSI-OIL REFINERY (19 October) Russia's top oil producer, LUKoil, bought an 85 percent stake in the Norsi-Oil refinery in a state privatization auction, Reuters reported. The starting price for the two stakes, one of 45.36 percent and another of 40 percent, was fixed at $11.6 million and $10.6 million, respectively. LUKoil bought the stakes for $13.6 million and $12.1 million, beating out six other bidders including Russia's sixth-largest oil company, Sibneft. LUKoil, which produced 78 million tons of oil in 2000, will now have four refineries in Russia, one in Ukraine, one in Bulgaria, and one in Romania. The company has repeatedly said it needs to boost refining capacities as its oil production was growing due to new acquisitions. Norsi-Oil processed some 4.5 million tons of oil in 2000 and 5 million tons in the first nine months of 2001. Most of the crude was shipped by LUKoil. (TSK)