With the kind permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, InfoUkes Inc. has been given rights to electronically re-print these articles on our web site. Visit the RFE/RL Ukrainian Service page for more information. Also visit the RFE/RL home page for news stories on other Eastern European and FSU countries.
Return to Main RFE News Page
InfoUkes Home Page
END NOTE: RUSSIAN NATIONALISM COMES UNDER ATTACK IN UKRAINE xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
RUSSIAN NATIONALISM COMES UNDER ATTACK IN UKRAINE
In the last week of January, an arson attack took place on the Kyiv headquarters of the Russian Bloc electoral union and editorial office of the "Russkii Mir" newspaper. The fire gutted one room and destroyed office furniture and a computer. The arson attack was preceded by earlier assaults across Ukraine against Russian nationalists, the most recent of which, on 13 January, was directed against the head of the Russian Bloc's Chernihiv branch. The previous month, members of the Russian Youth Movement were beaten up in Kyiv. On all three occasions, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued protest notes demanding that the culprits be brought to justice.
The Russian Bloc is a registered participant in Ukraine's upcoming parliamentary elections. It was created in July 2001 by three of Ukraine's nine Russian nationalist and pan-Slavic groups, the Lviv-based Russian Movement of Ukraine, the Russian-Ukrainian Union Party, and the Crimean-based Union (Soyuz) party. Ivan Symonenko, the leader of the Russian-Ukrainian Union Party, is also a leading member of the For a Union of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia (ZUBR) group drawn mainly from communist deputies in all three countries. ZUBR is also registered as an election bloc, thereby dividing the Russian nationalist vote.
The Russian Bloc aims to defend the rights of "compatriots," that is, Russian-speakers in Ukraine. "If you speak Russian and think in Russian, we define you as a Russian," argues Aleksandr Svystunov, the leader of the Russian Bloc and president of Russian Movement in Ukraine. Using that criteria, the Russian Bloc claims that half of the Ukrainian population is by its definition "Russian."
In the mid-1990s, Western scholars, journalists, and intelligence
agencies tended to divide Ukraine into two roughly equal linguistic
groups based on daily language use, rather than on professed "native
language" as registered in the Soviet census. In the 1989 Soviet census
one-third of
Ukrainians listed Russian as their "native language." This perception of
a country divided along linguistic lines was seemingly substantiated by
the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections in July
1994, when western-central Ukraine voted for the incumbent, Leonid
Kravchuk, and eastern-southern Ukraine for Leonid Kuchma.
Upon being elected, Kuchma promised to make Russian an "official language" while keeping Ukrainian as the "state language." The distinction between "state" and "official" is meaningless, however, even though Russian has been made an "official" language in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. Kuchma never fulfilled his election pledge, but in a December 2001 interview in "Trud" he reiterated his belief that Russian should not be defined as a "foreign" language in Ukraine and should therefore have "official" status. Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov have similarly called for making Russian an "official language," a move that would simply institutionalize a situation that already de facto exists.
In November 2001, the Social Democratic Party (United) (SDPU-O) introduced a new draft "Law on Languages" to replace the 1989 law that included a provision making Russian an "official language." But the draft bill vanished from the agenda after SDPU-O head Viktor Medvedchuk was forced to relinquish the post of first deputy speaker following a no-confidence vote.
Support for Russian as an "official" language also comes from the Greens, the Socialists, Yabluko, and Women for the Future. The Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) calls for Russian to be made a second state language. But Our Ukraine, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, and the proKuchma For a United Ukraine oppose making Russian an "official" or state language.
Recent studies have shown that dividing Ukraine into two linguistic groups is convenient for Western political scientists but fails to capture the complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground. Many people use Ukrainian and Russian interchangeably, as in Kyiv, where one-third of the population uses Ukrainian, another third Russian, and the remainder use both languages. A recent study by political scientist Lowell Barrington in the journal "Post-Soviet Affairs" found that 57 percent of Ukrainians base their identity upon citizenship, followed by ethnicity (34 percent), and only finally on language (13 percent). Unfortunately for the Russian Bloc, the latter group is more likely to vote for the KPU.
Besides supporting Russian as a second "state" or "official" language, Russian nationalists in Ukraine have other defining attributes, many of which are jointly held with the extreme left. They tend to view liberal values as "un-Russian," while they promote antiWesternism, anti-Semitism (a feature especially noticeable within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarch), Russia as the natural leader of the eastern Slavs, and defense of the inherited status quo. They likewise denounce as "nationalist" any attempts at affirmative action for Ukrainian culture and language. In addition, they reject being classified as a "national minority" and oppose any moves perceived to be directed against Russian culture and language.
In actual fact, discrimination can occur simultaneously against both the Russian language in Western Ukraine and the Ukrainian language in the Donbas and Crimea. The only death resulting from ethnic violence in Ukraine over the past decade was the murder in Lviv by two Russian nationalists in the spring of 2000 of popular Ukrainian singer Ihor Bilozir. Although the use of Russian has declined in education facilities, in the media Russian-language publications have actually increased. The proportion of publications in Ukrainian and Russian is now 43 and 57 percent respectively. On a visit to Ukraine this week, OSCE High Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities Rolf Ekeus praised Ukraine's record on national minorities.
The Russian Bloc is unlikely to succeed in mobilizing Russians in Ukraine or initiating a mass Russian ethnic movement. Ethnic Russian nationalism has been unable to mobilize the 25 million Russians living in other former Soviet republics, in stark contrast to the role played by Serbian nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. In the March 1998 elections, the Social-Liberal (SLON) Russophile bloc, which also campaigned in defense of Russian language and culture in Ukraine, failed miserably and only obtained 0.9 percent of the vote. The Soyuz party garnered even less (0.7 percent). In a November poll the popularity of the Russian Bloc was only 0.6 percent.
In short, language is not an issue for Ukrainian voters. The main political force that successfully unites Soviet internationalism with Russian nationalism and defense of the Russian language is the KPU, not pure Russian nationalist movements such as the Russian Bloc.
END NOTE: RUSSIAN NATIONALISM COMES UNDER ATTACK IN UKRAINE xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
...THANKS UKRAINIAN COMMUNISTS FOR SUPPORT... The same day the Belarusian president met with Ukrainian Communist Party head Petro Symonenko, who headed a group of Ukrainian lawmakers visiting Minsk. "First of all, I want to thank you for your honesty, fairness, and colossal support -- not for Lukashenka but for the Belarusian people -- that was rendered by the Communist Party of Ukraine and you with your comrades during the last presidential election [in Belarus]," Belarusian Television quoted Lukashenka as saying. JM
UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT PUTS PRESIDENT'S IMPEACHMENT ON THE AGENDA... The Verkhovna Rada on 7 February voted 282 to one to include the issue of impeachment of President Leonid Kuchma in the agenda of its last session, which is scheduled to end by 23 February, Interfax reported. JM
UKRAINE'S CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION ALLOCATES AIRTIME. The Central Election Commission (CEC) on 6 February drew lots to allocate airtime and space in newspapers to political parties and election blocs, UNIAN and Interfax reported. This was done to ensure their rights to state-financed election advertising on the nationwide Ukrainian Television (First Channel), Ukrainian Radio (First Program), and in the governmental "Uryadovyy Kuryer" and parliamentary "Holos Ukrayiny" newspapers. CEC Chairman Mykhaylo Ryabets told journalists that the commission registered 4,113 candidates running in the 31 March parliamentary elections on party lists, and 3,107 candidates in singleseat constituencies. Ryabets added that 268 deputies of the current parliament are seeking re-election. JM
HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT IN KYIV. Hungarian President Ferenc Madl on 6 February met with his Ukrainian counterpart Kuchma, Ukrainian media reported. Madl urged Ukraine to develop closer ties with the EU and NATO. Kuchma took advantage of the meeting with Madl to slam Ukraine's party system. "The Republic of Hungary passed the stage of political forces' structuring long ago. Today there are virtually only two forces vying for the right to have a majority in the future parliament. Those political forces have no differences concerning the country's main lines of development. To my deep regret, I cannot say the same about Ukraine," 1+1 Television quoted Kuchma as saying. "The cloning of political parties and blocs has reached the point of absurdity in Ukraine," Kuchma added. JM
LATVIAN, UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS. Indulis Berzins and Anatoliy Zlenko discussed bilateral relations in Riga on 6 February and agreed to continue working on several draft agreements, including ones on protection of classified information, cooperation in culture, and the fight against economic and financial violations, BNS reported. Zlenko expressed support for Latvia's efforts to join the EU and NATO and noted that joining those structures are also priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy. The ministers decided to form an intergovernmental Latvian-Ukrainian economic commission in Riga in March to enhance economic cooperation, with Berzins noting that Latvia backs Ukraine's efforts to be admitted to the World Trade Organization. SG
POLAND PLANS TO INTRODUCE VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR EASTERN NEIGHBORS IN 2003. The Polish government intends to revoke the agreements on visa-free traffic with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus "late in summer or in autumn" in 2003, PAP reported on 6 February, quoting an anonymous government official. The official added that Poland will stick to this pledge even if EU enlargement does not take place precisely on 1 January 2004. Eneko Landaburu, the director general for enlargement with the European Commission (EC), said EC experts propose that Poland introduce visas for citizens of its three eastern neighbors around a year prior to its EU entry. He made it understood, however, that if Poland suggests a period of a little less than a year and presents "credible guarantees," the EC will accept it, the agency reported. JM
RUSSIAN NATIONALISM COMES UNDER ATTACK IN UKRAINE
In the last week of January, an arson attack took place on the Kyiv headquarters of the Russian Bloc electoral union and editorial office of the "Russkii Mir" newspaper. The fire gutted one room and destroyed office furniture and a computer. The arson attack was preceded by earlier assaults across Ukraine against Russian nationalists, the most recent of which, on 13 January, was directed against the head of the Russian Bloc's Chernihiv branch. The previous month, members of the Russian Youth Movement were beaten up in Kyiv. On all three occasions, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued protest notes demanding that the culprits be brought to justice.
The Russian Bloc is a registered participant in Ukraine's upcoming parliamentary elections. It was created in July 2001 by three of Ukraine's nine Russian nationalist and pan-Slavic groups, the Lviv-based Russian Movement of Ukraine, the Russian-Ukrainian Union Party, and the Crimean-based Union (Soyuz) party. Ivan Symonenko, the leader of the Russian-Ukrainian Union Party, is also a leading member of the For a Union of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia (ZUBR) group drawn mainly from communist deputies in all three countries. ZUBR is also registered as an election bloc, thereby dividing the Russian nationalist vote.
The Russian Bloc aims to defend the rights of "compatriots," that is, Russian-speakers in Ukraine. "If you speak Russian and think in Russian, we define you as a Russian," argues Aleksandr Svystunov, the leader of the Russian Bloc and president of Russian Movement in Ukraine. Using that criteria, the Russian Bloc claims that half of the Ukrainian population is by its definition "Russian."
In the mid-1990s, Western scholars, journalists, and intelligence
agencies tended to divide Ukraine into two roughly equal linguistic
groups based on daily language use, rather than on professed "native
language" as registered in the Soviet census. In the 1989 Soviet census
one-third of
Ukrainians listed Russian as their "native language." This perception of
a country divided along linguistic lines was seemingly substantiated by
the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections in July
1994, when western-central Ukraine voted for the incumbent, Leonid
Kravchuk, and eastern-southern Ukraine for Leonid Kuchma.
Upon being elected, Kuchma promised to make Russian an "official language" while keeping Ukrainian as the "state language." The distinction between "state" and "official" is meaningless, however, even though Russian has been made an "official" language in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. Kuchma never fulfilled his election pledge, but in a December 2001 interview in "Trud" he reiterated his belief that Russian should not be defined as a "foreign" language in Ukraine and should therefore have "official" status. Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov have similarly called for making Russian an "official language," a move that would simply institutionalize a situation that already de facto exists.
In November 2001, the Social Democratic Party (United) (SDPU-O) introduced a new draft "Law on Languages" to replace the 1989 law that included a provision making Russian an "official language." But the draft bill vanished from the agenda after SDPU-O head Viktor Medvedchuk was forced to relinquish the post of first deputy speaker following a no-confidence vote.
Support for Russian as an "official" language also comes from the Greens, the Socialists, Yabluko, and Women for the Future. The Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) calls for Russian to be made a second state language. But Our Ukraine, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, and the proKuchma For a United Ukraine oppose making Russian an "official" or state language.
Recent studies have shown that dividing Ukraine into two linguistic groups is convenient for Western political scientists but fails to capture the complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground. Many people use Ukrainian and Russian interchangeably, as in Kyiv, where one-third of the population uses Ukrainian, another third Russian, and the remainder use both languages. A recent study by political scientist Lowell Barrington in the journal "Post-Soviet Affairs" found that 57 percent of Ukrainians base their identity upon citizenship, followed by ethnicity (34 percent), and only finally on language (13 percent). Unfortunately for the Russian Bloc, the latter group is more likely to vote for the KPU.
Besides supporting Russian as a second "state" or "official" language, Russian nationalists in Ukraine have other defining attributes, many of which are jointly held with the extreme left. They tend to view liberal values as "un-Russian," while they promote antiWesternism, anti-Semitism (a feature especially noticeable within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarch), Russia as the natural leader of the eastern Slavs, and defense of the inherited status quo. They likewise denounce as "nationalist" any attempts at affirmative action for Ukrainian culture and language. In addition, they reject being classified as a "national minority" and oppose any moves perceived to be directed against Russian culture and language.
In actual fact, discrimination can occur simultaneously against both the Russian language in Western Ukraine and the Ukrainian language in the Donbas and Crimea. The only death resulting from ethnic violence in Ukraine over the past decade was the murder in Lviv by two Russian nationalists in the spring of 2000 of popular Ukrainian singer Ihor Bilozir. Although the use of Russian has declined in education facilities, in the media Russian-language publications have actually increased. The proportion of publications in Ukrainian and Russian is now 43 and 57 percent respectively. On a visit to Ukraine this week, OSCE High Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities Rolf Ekeus praised Ukraine's record on national minorities.
The Russian Bloc is unlikely to succeed in mobilizing Russians in Ukraine or initiating a mass Russian ethnic movement. Ethnic Russian nationalism has been unable to mobilize the 25 million Russians living in other former Soviet republics, in stark contrast to the role played by Serbian nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. In the March 1998 elections, the Social-Liberal (SLON) Russophile bloc, which also campaigned in defense of Russian language and culture in Ukraine, failed miserably and only obtained 0.9 percent of the vote. The Soyuz party garnered even less (0.7 percent). In a November poll the popularity of the Russian Bloc was only 0.6 percent.
In short, language is not an issue for Ukrainian voters. The main political force that successfully unites Soviet internationalism with Russian nationalism and defense of the Russian language is the KPU, not pure Russian nationalist movements such as the Russian Bloc.