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END NOTE: RUSSIA AND THE WEST COMPETE OVER UKRAINE'S FOREIGN ORIENTATION IN THE POST-KUCHMA ERA
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RUSSIA AND THE WEST COMPETE OVER UKRAINE'S FOREIGN ORIENTATION IN THE POST-KUCHMA ERA

The holding of Ukraine's third parliamentary elections on 31 March is only the prelude to presidential elections to be held in 2 1/2 years' time when Leonid Kuchma will step down after his second presidential term ends. Russia and the West already have their respective favorite candidates, with Russia preferring Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the Social Democratic Party Ukraine-united (SDPU-o), and the West favoring Viktor Yushchenko, head of Our Ukraine. Both candidates are in their 40s and the election of either will represent a changing of the guard from the older generation that has ruled Soviet and independent Ukraine to this point.

Russia is backing Medvedchuk because, of all the oligarchic parties, only the SDPU-o is able to enter Ukraine's elections as an independent force and still win more than the party of power For a United Ukraine (ZYU), which is composed of five parties. The SDPU-o is also the only oligarchic party with a recognizable leader who has presidential ambitions, and has strong ties to Russia through its heavy involvement in Ukraine's energy market. Ironically, the SDPU-o includes former President Leonid Kravchuk in its top ranks, someone who has always been disliked in Moscow.

Russia is strongly supporting Medvedchuk through Gleb Pavlovskii's Fund for Effective Politics (Pavlovskii is Russian President Vladimir Putin's image-maker). The fund aims to show Medvedchuk as a "statesman" and in a softer light, and has launched an image campaign depicting a casual Medvedchuk, sans tie and wearing a sweater, in an attempt to overcome his image as a cold leader who is distant from the public.

The use of Russian public relations experts in Ukraine began in the 1999 presidential elections, and they are likely to play an increasingly active role in the 2004 presidential elections. The difference between their activities and those of Western organizations and countries who have provided funds for Ukraine's civil society, media, and election monitoring is that Russian involvement is nontransparent, never openly discussed, and unaccountable.

Ukrainian pro-presidential election blocs, which are the main customers of Russian image-makers, therefore have double standards when they only accuse the West of interference in Ukraine's affairs (the only pro-presidential bloc to use a Western PR company is the Greens). Western assistance to Ukraine's elections was characterized in an interview in "Holos Ukrayiny" by the head of ZYU, Volodymyr Lytvyn, as "international administrative resources." Lytvyn was trying to evade the question of ZYU monopolizing "domestic administrative resources" in the elections. U.S. Helsinki Commission members have ridiculed this as harking back to the Soviet era, when Western criticism of human rights abuses was condemned by the Soviet Union as "interference in internal affairs."

Oligarchic parties such as the SDPU-o and ZYU are fanning anti-Western sentiments on television stations they control by accusing the United States of interference in Ukraine's internal affairs and of being behind a so-called "Brzezinski Plan" to replace Kuchma with Yushchenko. "Rossiiskaya gazeta" argued that Western assistance to the Ukrainian elections is merely a cover to support Our Ukraine and obtain a pro-U.S. parliament that "would drive a wedge between Moscow and Kyiv." Such was the theme of the film "PR" aired on ICTV and directed by Charles Clover, a former Kyiv correspondent for the "Financial Times." In his coverage for the "Financial Times," which has since been disowned by the daily, Clover had accused Yushchenko of financial malpractice while serving as chairman of the National Bank.

Russian officials have yet to overcome their penchant for intervening in the internal affairs of CIS states, as evidenced by Viktor Chernomyrdin. The Russian ambassador to Ukraine acts more like a regional governor than an ambassador when he complains about U.S. resolutions on the Ukrainian elections, clearly an area that is normally the preserve of the domestic Foreign Ministry, not a foreign ambassador. Russia would like to see Ukraine continue its tilt toward Russia that began even prior to the "Kuchmagate" scandal in 2000. In the last two years, presidents Kuchma and Putin have met a record 18 times. Russian -- not Western -- capital is becoming increasingly active in the Ukrainian economy, and by 2005 it will influence the production of 70 percent of the goods manufactured in Ukraine.

In the current elections, Russian officials have openly declared their hostility to Yushchenko's Our Ukraine as an anti-Russian, pro-Western, and nationalist bloc. Dmitrii Rogozin, the head of the Russian State Duma's International Relations Committee, has used Soviet-era rhetoric to reintroduce allegations that "Ukrainian nationalists" who are members of Our Ukraine were involved in "criminal activities" during and after World War II.

Russia's open support for the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) and oligarchic/pro-presidential parties in the 2002 elections is due to its prioritization of geopolitical issues in the CIS, as witnessed by its support for Sovietophile and authoritarian regimes in Belarus and communist Moldova. Russian presidential administration chief Aleksandr Voloshin has admitted that Moscow backs ZYU, the SDPU-o, and the KPU, and is hostile to Our Ukraine.

The 2002 parliamentary elections have therefore laid out the framework for the presidential elections in two years' time. As Russia's concern is only geopolitical, it is supporting two of the three political groups in Ukraine -- the communists and oligarchs. In contrast, the West has an interest in both geopolitical and reformist issues in Ukraine and is thus backing the reformist camp; that is, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine.

The first political group that Russia supports in the CIS is made up of communists and Sovietophiles; as is the case in Belarus and Moldova. However, this option is unlikely to be successful in Ukraine. Therefore, Russia is also lending its support to the second oligarch camp, which has been implicated in corruption, prefers a nontransparent economic and political system, and can only envision Ukraine's return to Europe "together with Russia." Russia's favored presidential candidate from this second political group is the SDPU-o's Medvedchuk, who heads Ukraine's most vilified oligarchic group.

Neither the Communists nor the oligarchs are favored by the U.S. and Western organizations such as the EU, and the West is left only with the reformers represented by Yushchenko and Our Ukraine. In contrast to Medvedchuk, Yushchenko has no corrupt past, supports a transparent reform process that the West has long asked Ukraine to implement, and backs Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO independent of Russia.

All three of Ukraine's political groups (communists, oligarchs, and reformers) support Ukraine's membership in the EU. Nevertheless, only the reformist Our Ukraine camp is willing to undertake the necessary domestic policies that would replace rhetoric with real reform.

Over the next two years, both the West's favorite Yushchenko and especially Russia's favorite Medvedchuk will attempt to ingratiate themselves with President Kuchma to obtain his blessing as his successor. As with former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his appointed successor Putin, Kuchma's price for his blessing will be immunity from prosecution, something that Medvedchuk will more easily be able to grant than Yushchenko would.

END NOTE: RUSSIA AND THE WEST COMPETE OVER UKRAINE'S FOREIGN ORIENTATION IN THE POST-KUCHMA ERA
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BELARUSIAN PRESIDENT APPROVES PRIVATIZATION OF FIBER PLANT. Alyaksandr Lukashenka visited the Kuibyshev Artificial Fiber Plant in Mahilyou on 28 March, where he told workers that he approves of a plan to transform their plant into a joint-stock company and sell some amount of shares to nonstate owners, Belarusian Television reported. "I'll select [such investors] who will be working for you... As the president, I'm obliged to prevent you from being enslaved, as was done in Ukraine, the Baltics, and Russia," Lukashenka pledged. Presidential spokeswoman Natalya Pyatkevich told journalists that Lukashenka has agreed to the signing of an investment agreement with the Swiss-based United Technology Corporation, Belapan reported. She added that the corporation has promised to boost sales and increase the number of employees of the Kuibyshev plant from 3,144 to 4,000, as well as to preserve and develop the plant's social infrastructure. JM

OUR UKRAINE LEADER FEARS VOTE RIGGING. Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the front-running Our Ukraine election bloc, told journalists on 28 March that he fears parties loyal to President Leonid Kuchma hold too much sway over the media and local electoral committees, and alleged that too many ballots have been printed for the 31 March parliamentary election, Reuters reported. "It seems to me that, as Stalin once said, 'The most important thing in the election is not who the electorate voted for, but who counts the votes,'" Yushchenko noted. "I fear that the authorities can falsify the election. And there is a lot of evidence for this." Yushchenko also said Russia has interfered in the election campaign in Ukraine by commenting on "which Ukrainian political force is more or less dear" to it, UNIAN reported. JM

UKRAINIAN SOCIOLOGISTS TO WAGE WAR OVER EXIT POLLS? Mykola Tomenko, the director of the Kyiv-based Institute of Politics, told UNIAN on 28 March that the authorities are trying to provoke a "war of sociologists" by having instructed the government-sponsored Ukrainian Sociological Association and the Ukrainian Institute of Sociological Studies (UISS) to conduct an exit poll on 31 March. Ukraine's three independent polling centers -- the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, SOCIS, and the Social Monitoring Center -- announced earlier this month that they will conduct an exit poll on 31 March and ask 18,000 voters at 800 polling stations about their voting preferences. According to Tomenko, the government-sponsored exit poll is intended to discredit the independent initiative by providing differing results of the polling. UISS Director Oleksandr Yaremenko confirmed on 29 March that his institute, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Center of Political Management, is going to poll 8,000 voters in 262 election constituencies on 31 March. Yaremenko denied the allegation that this exit poll is financed by the pro-presidential For a United Ukraine bloc. JM

UKRAINIAN NGOS REPORT BIAS IN TV ELECTION COVERAGE. The Equal Opportunities Committee and the Open Space Association have found in a joint monitoring project regarding the campaign coverage in Ukraine's leading media that the First Channel of Ukrainian Television (UT-1) turned out to be the most biased, "Ukrayina Moloda" reported on 28 March. UT-1 offered the pro-government For a United Ukraine bloc as much airtime as that given to all other contenders combined. Moreover, UT-1 has not said a single critical word about For a United Ukraine. A similar bias was observed in the private Inter Television, which was keen to promote the United Social Democratic Party, while also favoring For a United Ukraine and the Communist Party. Our Ukraine was targeted by Inter as the object of exclusively negative reporting. JM

REHABILITATION OF UPA, UKRAINIAN SS SOLDIERS STILL A CAMPAIGN ISSUE. Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko and Premier Anatoliy Kinakh met on 28 March in a live election debate on 1+1 Television. Referring to an allegedly prepared presidential decree to rehabilitate the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and to a recent decision by the Ivano-Frankivsk City Council to declare veterans of the Ukrainian SS Halychyna Division as freedom fighters, Symonenko accused the government of supporting fascism. "It is time to gather the stones, as the Bible says. It is only by uniting on principles of accord and understanding that society and the state can move forward. A grave is not the place for rallies, it is a place for prayer," Kinakh responded. JM

COURT UPHOLDS OUSTING OF HRACH FROM ELECTION IN CRIMEA. The Crimean Appeals Court on 29 March rejected a complaint by Crimean speaker Leonid Hrach against the resolution of a lower court disqualifying him from the election race to the Crimean Supreme Council, UNIAN reported. The Central District Court in Simferopol on 25 February canceled Hrach's registration as a candidate, saying he misinformed the election commission about his income and possessions (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 25 February 2002). Hrach remains a candidate to the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv on the election list of the Communist Party. The Central Election Commission in Kyiv has found no fault with his declaration on income and possessions. JM

LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT IN KYIV. Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus on 28 March paid a one-day visit to Kyiv, where he met with his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kuchma, Ukrainian media reported. Both presidents signed a declaration providing for the establishment of the Council of the Presidents of Lithuania and Ukraine, which is to convene at least once a year and address the most topical issues of bilateral and regional cooperation. JM

WEB RADIO SERVICE LAUNCHED IN UKRAINE. Panorama Radio Service -- an Internet project sponsored by the Open Society Institute (Budapest), the International Renaissance Foundation (founded by George Soros), the Global Conflict Prevention Fund (Great Britain), and the Canadian Foundation -- has been launched in March, UNIAN reported on 28 March, quoting the project's manager, Vadym Kastelli. Panorama is not going to broadcast news directly but put up its bulletins as audio files on the Internet at http://rsp.kiev.ua. Local radio stations can take the files for broadcasting free of charge. JM

RUSSIA AND THE WEST COMPETE OVER UKRAINE'S FOREIGN ORIENTATION IN THE POST-KUCHMA ERA

The holding of Ukraine's third parliamentary elections on 31 March is only the prelude to presidential elections to be held in 2 1/2 years' time when Leonid Kuchma will step down after his second presidential term ends. Russia and the West already have their respective favorite candidates, with Russia preferring Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the Social Democratic Party Ukraine-united (SDPU-o), and the West favoring Viktor Yushchenko, head of Our Ukraine. Both candidates are in their 40s and the election of either will represent a changing of the guard from the older generation that has ruled Soviet and independent Ukraine to this point.

Russia is backing Medvedchuk because, of all the oligarchic parties, only the SDPU-o is able to enter Ukraine's elections as an independent force and still win more than the party of power For a United Ukraine (ZYU), which is composed of five parties. The SDPU-o is also the only oligarchic party with a recognizable leader who has presidential ambitions, and has strong ties to Russia through its heavy involvement in Ukraine's energy market. Ironically, the SDPU-o includes former President Leonid Kravchuk in its top ranks, someone who has always been disliked in Moscow.

Russia is strongly supporting Medvedchuk through Gleb Pavlovskii's Fund for Effective Politics (Pavlovskii is Russian President Vladimir Putin's image-maker). The fund aims to show Medvedchuk as a "statesman" and in a softer light, and has launched an image campaign depicting a casual Medvedchuk, sans tie and wearing a sweater, in an attempt to overcome his image as a cold leader who is distant from the public.

The use of Russian public relations experts in Ukraine began in the 1999 presidential elections, and they are likely to play an increasingly active role in the 2004 presidential elections. The difference between their activities and those of Western organizations and countries who have provided funds for Ukraine's civil society, media, and election monitoring is that Russian involvement is nontransparent, never openly discussed, and unaccountable.

Ukrainian pro-presidential election blocs, which are the main customers of Russian image-makers, therefore have double standards when they only accuse the West of interference in Ukraine's affairs (the only pro-presidential bloc to use a Western PR company is the Greens). Western assistance to Ukraine's elections was characterized in an interview in "Holos Ukrayiny" by the head of ZYU, Volodymyr Lytvyn, as "international administrative resources." Lytvyn was trying to evade the question of ZYU monopolizing "domestic administrative resources" in the elections. U.S. Helsinki Commission members have ridiculed this as harking back to the Soviet era, when Western criticism of human rights abuses was condemned by the Soviet Union as "interference in internal affairs."

Oligarchic parties such as the SDPU-o and ZYU are fanning anti-Western sentiments on television stations they control by accusing the United States of interference in Ukraine's internal affairs and of being behind a so-called "Brzezinski Plan" to replace Kuchma with Yushchenko. "Rossiiskaya gazeta" argued that Western assistance to the Ukrainian elections is merely a cover to support Our Ukraine and obtain a pro-U.S. parliament that "would drive a wedge between Moscow and Kyiv." Such was the theme of the film "PR" aired on ICTV and directed by Charles Clover, a former Kyiv correspondent for the "Financial Times." In his coverage for the "Financial Times," which has since been disowned by the daily, Clover had accused Yushchenko of financial malpractice while serving as chairman of the National Bank.

Russian officials have yet to overcome their penchant for intervening in the internal affairs of CIS states, as evidenced by Viktor Chernomyrdin. The Russian ambassador to Ukraine acts more like a regional governor than an ambassador when he complains about U.S. resolutions on the Ukrainian elections, clearly an area that is normally the preserve of the domestic Foreign Ministry, not a foreign ambassador. Russia would like to see Ukraine continue its tilt toward Russia that began even prior to the "Kuchmagate" scandal in 2000. In the last two years, presidents Kuchma and Putin have met a record 18 times. Russian -- not Western -- capital is becoming increasingly active in the Ukrainian economy, and by 2005 it will influence the production of 70 percent of the goods manufactured in Ukraine.

In the current elections, Russian officials have openly declared their hostility to Yushchenko's Our Ukraine as an anti-Russian, pro-Western, and nationalist bloc. Dmitrii Rogozin, the head of the Russian State Duma's International Relations Committee, has used Soviet-era rhetoric to reintroduce allegations that "Ukrainian nationalists" who are members of Our Ukraine were involved in "criminal activities" during and after World War II.

Russia's open support for the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) and oligarchic/pro-presidential parties in the 2002 elections is due to its prioritization of geopolitical issues in the CIS, as witnessed by its support for Sovietophile and authoritarian regimes in Belarus and communist Moldova. Russian presidential administration chief Aleksandr Voloshin has admitted that Moscow backs ZYU, the SDPU-o, and the KPU, and is hostile to Our Ukraine.

The 2002 parliamentary elections have therefore laid out the framework for the presidential elections in two years' time. As Russia's concern is only geopolitical, it is supporting two of the three political groups in Ukraine -- the communists and oligarchs. In contrast, the West has an interest in both geopolitical and reformist issues in Ukraine and is thus backing the reformist camp; that is, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine.

The first political group that Russia supports in the CIS is made up of communists and Sovietophiles; as is the case in Belarus and Moldova. However, this option is unlikely to be successful in Ukraine. Therefore, Russia is also lending its support to the second oligarch camp, which has been implicated in corruption, prefers a nontransparent economic and political system, and can only envision Ukraine's return to Europe "together with Russia." Russia's favored presidential candidate from this second political group is the SDPU-o's Medvedchuk, who heads Ukraine's most vilified oligarchic group.

Neither the Communists nor the oligarchs are favored by the U.S. and Western organizations such as the EU, and the West is left only with the reformers represented by Yushchenko and Our Ukraine. In contrast to Medvedchuk, Yushchenko has no corrupt past, supports a transparent reform process that the West has long asked Ukraine to implement, and backs Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO independent of Russia.

All three of Ukraine's political groups (communists, oligarchs, and reformers) support Ukraine's membership in the EU. Nevertheless, only the reformist Our Ukraine camp is willing to undertake the necessary domestic policies that would replace rhetoric with real reform.

Over the next two years, both the West's favorite Yushchenko and especially Russia's favorite Medvedchuk will attempt to ingratiate themselves with President Kuchma to obtain his blessing as his successor. As with former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his appointed successor Putin, Kuchma's price for his blessing will be immunity from prosecution, something that Medvedchuk will more easily be able to grant than Yushchenko would.

CPJ: 2001 WAS A 'PRESS FREEDOM CRISIS'... According to a 26 March report, 2001 was an "annus horribilis" -- a terrible year -- for press freedoms around the world, as repressive nations took advantage of the war on terrorism to crack down on independent media. Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan are listed as among the worst offenders. In a widely respected annual survey, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) documented over 500 cases worldwide in 2001 where journalists were harassed, censored, beaten, tortured, or killed. Altogether, the CPJ found that 37 reporters were killed on the job worldwide, up from 24 in 2000. The CPJ report says most of the killings were not the result of covering conflicts but reprisals for what reporters had written. Among the worst offenders were the governments of China, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Iran. And after four years of decline, the number of reporters in prison jumped 50 percent to 118 in 2001, compared with 81 in 2000. CPJ Executive Director Ann Cooper maintains that the media in the entire former Soviet region is under fire, a situation that only complicates the democratic transition. She suggests that 2002 can be a better year for freedom of the press, but only if the U.S. and Western countries make it a central issue in their relations with repressive nations. (The full CPJ report can be found at http://www.cpj.org/) ("U.S.: Media Monitor Alarmed By World 'Press Freedom Crisis,'" rferl.org, 26 March)

FOREIGN MINISTRY 'BLANKS OUT' KUCHMA'S TREATMENT OF SHAIMIEV. Kazan's "Zvezda Povolzhya" recently reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry was irked by protocol that put Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev side-by-side with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma at Odessa airport, RFE/RL's Kazan bureau reported on 25 March. The weekly asserted that Kuchma demonstrated that he considers Shaimiev a state president, the paper commented, while the Russian Foreign Ministry views Shaimiev as the head of a federation entity. The ministry ordered all television channels to cut a scene of Putin's arrival at the airport, according to the paper. ("RFE/RL Newsline," 26 March)

UKRAINE

TAX POLICE ACCUSE TYMOSHENKO PUBLISHER OF FINANCIAL MACHINATION. The State Tax Authority has accused the antipresidential Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc of using "shadow" financial resources in its parliamentary campaign, Ukrainian media reported on 25 March. The administration said a publishing company controlled by the bloc is involved in money laundering, adding that prices for the bloc's printed campaign materials were kept artificially low. "This conscious lie is made for only one reason -- to withdraw the bloc from the elections, or to issue compromising materials taking into account that we have no time to tell the truth," AP quoted Oleksandr Turchynov of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc as saying. ("RFE/RL Newsline," 26 March)

MEDIA HARASSMENT LINKED TO ELECTION CAMPAIGN. Most cases of judicial and legislative harassment of the media have been linked to the upcoming electoral campaign. The electoral Russian Bloc has asked the Ukrainian Prosecutor-General's Office to close down the paper "Ukrainsko Slovo" for allegedly fomenting ethnic tensions and hatred of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. The electoral headquarters of the electoral bloc For a United Ukraine asked the Central Election Commission and the Prosecutor-General's Office to require the papers "Ukraina molodaya," "Kommunist," and "Selskiye vesti" to refute inaccurate information about the bloc. In Kyiv, the Socialist Party sued 1+1 Television for publicizing "untrue" material on its leaders and for refusing to allow air time to rebut that report. A court in the Chernihiv Novozavodskoi district upheld a suit filed by parliament Chairman Ivan Plyushch against the weekly "Rubezh" published by the city branch of the Socialist Party. The court held that the paper's accusations that Plyushch had "tried to make a career at any cost and to avoid responsibility" were untrue, and ordered the editorial board to publish a refutation of the accusations and publicly apologize to Plyushch. In Lugansk, a cable TV crew was ejected from a club in the village of Verkhnesheverevki when it tried to record a speech by Valery Kolomeitsev-Rybalko, a candidate for parliament. The candidate's bodyguards injured the cameraman, insulted a woman journalist, and damaged a camera. The TV company has filed a complaint with law enforcement agencies. ("Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations CIS Report," 18-23 March)

TV CHANNEL CANCELS DEBATE ON CONTROVERSIAL DOCUMENTARY. The private 1+1 Television on 27 March aired the controversial documentary "Piar" (see End Note below) but canceled a formerly scheduled live debate on it after the airing, Ukrainian media reported. A 1+1 Television presenter apologized to viewers and said that the channel decided to cancel the debate to avoid imminent confrontation in journalistic circles after a group of respected Ukrainian journalists declined an invitation to the debate. They reasoned in a statement that the film is biased and aimed at compromising certain political forces in the run-up to the parliamentary election. UNIAN reported that the journalists who signed the statement -- Yuliya Mostovaya and Serhiy Rakhmanin ("Zerkalo Nedeli"), Maryna Pyrozhuk (Radio Liberty), and Natalya Lihachova -- said the film is "an example of low-standard journalism in which facts are deliberately presented to fit only one -- controversial -- version of events." The documentary, written by a former "Financial Times" correspondent in Kyiv, Charles Clover, suggests that the U.S. took advantage of the tape scandal in Ukraine to exert pressure on President Leonid Kuchma in an effort to depose him and install Premier Viktor Yushchenko. ("RFE/RL Newsline," 28 March)

KYIV TV STATION SEARCHED. The office of Kyiv-based private TV company Ekspress-Inform was searched. The police did not show a search warrant, told the staff to leave the premises, denied access to telephones, and broke a TV camera, Editor in Chief Larisa Holub said. ("Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations CIS Report," 18-23 March)

CPJ: GONGADZE MURDER INVESTIGATION LANGUISHES. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Executive Director Ann Cooper says that she remains dismayed by the lack of progress in the case of Ukrainian journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, who was murdered in late 2000 in a scandal that allegedly involved President Leonid Kuchma. Gongadze's widow, Myroslava, called for the creation of a special international commission to investigate the case, a request that was supported by the CPJ, as well as by the Council of Europe. The Ukrainian government has not responded, and in May of last year the Interior Ministry blamed the murder on the Mafia. ("U.S.: Media Monitor Alarmed By World 'Press Freedom Crisis,'" rferl.org, 26 March)

'PR' (FOR WHOM?): A 'MADE-FOR-UKRAINIAN-TV' FILM

Ukrainian television viewers were introduced to a novelty on 16 March. For the first time, a documentary film allegedly made for U.S. television held its premiere in Ukraine. It was aired on the ICTV channel, a nationwide television station owned by President Leonid Kuchma's son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk.

Written by Charles Clover, the former "Financial Times" correspondent in Kyiv, the movie portrays itself as a documentary on the murder of Ukrainian journalist Heorhiy Gongadze in the fall of 2000. Yet the film seemed more intent on convincing the Ukrainian audience that the killing of Gongadze -- and the subsequent scandal around the recordings made in the presidents office by a member of his security detail, Mykola Melnychenko -- was an American plot to force Kuchma out of office and have him replaced by Viktor Yushchenko, presented in the film as a somewhat dishonest person. The film ignored the fact that Kuchma's revelations on the tapes have revealed to Ukraine and the world that corruption in Ukraine had reached the highest levels of government.

The fact that it was shown in Ukraine two weeks prior to a crucial parliamentary election -- in which Yushchenko's For Ukraine bloc is the leading opposition force to President Kuchma's election allies -- has led many in Ukraine to believe that the film was produced and screened so as to discredit Yushchenko. The film "PR" ("Piar") is slated to be aired a third time on 27 March on the channel 1+1.

Most, if not all, of the people (including the author of this article) who were asked to be interviewed in this film were told that it was being made to sell to public television (PBS) in the U.S. On that basis, many agreed to be interviewed. Yet, nobody at PBS -- neither in the national or in local affiliates -- had heard of "PR." As far as can be determined, "PR" has never been shown on PBS in the U.S.

In trying to prove their point, "PR's" producers used selective quotes from the people they interviewed. They also refused to reveal facts known to them about many events treated in the film and hid information from viewers. For example:

In presenting the authenticity of the "Melnychenko recordings", the producers "cited" the findings of a well-known American investigative company, "Kroll Inc." The movie presented Kroll's findings as proof that the recordings had been spliced together to present a damaging picture of Kuchma and his closest associates plotting the disappearance of Gongadze. Yet, the actual Kroll report on the recordings states that it could not be determined if the recordings had been spliced.

The film also fails to mention that Kroll did not have access to the actual recorder used and did not have copies of the original recordings or their clones.

The only company which did in fact have the original Toshiba recorder and clone copies was the American firm Bek Tek which authenticated the recordings more then a month before "PR" was aired on ICTV. The segments Bek Tek authenticated were those where Kuchma is discussing the removal of Gongadze. According to Bek Tek, these portions of the recordings were not edited in any way, shape or form. Had "PR" examined the content of the Melnychenko tapes and not engaged in dilettantism such as who was behind the tapings and how they were done, under a divan or under a desk; the film might have served a useful purpose.

The author of this article asked Charles Clover if he knew about the Bek Tek conclusions and if they would be included in the film. Clover replied that it was "too late" to include these crucial findings. What was the rush? The answer now is obvious: to show the film on ICTV prior to the Ukrainian parliamentary elections.

The film states that Yushchenko, while governor of the National Bank of Ukraine, conducted a number of dubious, if not illegal, transactions. In the film, there is a close-up of a copy of the "Financial Times" -- was this image meant to imply that this prestigious paper was linked to the film's "findings?" Indeed, the opposite is true: Charles Clover, while "FT" correspondent in Ukraine, wrote a series of articles claiming that Yushchenko had conducted questionable transactions. However, a PricewaterhouseCoopers audit done as a result of his articles found no wrongdoing, nor did a U.S. House of Representatives hearing. In fact, the "Financial Times" had to apologize to Yushchenko for these articles. Although the "PR" producers knew about this apology, they failed to mention it in their film. Was this by design or due to "lack of time?"

"PR" contains many such omissions and half-truths. But the biggest canard is the producers' implication that the U.S. government has tried to have Kuchma removed in the wake of the "tape scandal." The film does so by twisting facts, such as that Freedom House, a respectable U.S. civil and human rights organization, funded anti-Kuchma activities in Ukraine (Freedom House provided a grant of $21,000 for office equipment and a few brochures on democratic government) and that U.S. diplomats "attended anti-Kuchma rallies" (which is what they are being paid to do in order to tell Washington what is taking place). The film also refers to USAID grants for a free media in Ukraine as evidence of U.S. "interference" and points to the international financier George Soros's criticism of Kuchma as yet more proof that the U.S. intended to remove the Ukrainian president.

In the film, Kuchma complains that U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Ukrainian Service broadcasts "17 hours a day" of propaganda against him and his government. In fact, RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service broadcasts 5 hours a day, most of it having nothing to do with Kuchma. Clover was informed of these facts, yet failed to include them in "PR."

Who provided direct or indirect financial backing for the film is not known. Until these various riddles are answered by Powell Productions and Charles Clover, the film "PR" will be viewed as a hatchet job on Yushchenko. Those involved in "PR's" production will be seen as dishonest journalists -- or worse.

P.S. -- A week after "PR" was aired in Kyiv, the BBC premiered a film, "Killing the Story" at the Human Rights Watch Film Festival in London. "Killing the Story" dealt with the same events in Ukraine as "PR." But the BBC requested another security company, RipTech, to authenticate the Melnychenko tapes, which found them to be genuine and unaltered. The BBC film will be aired in England on BBC-2 on 21 April. When asked if it will be shown on Ukrainian television, the film's producers said that this is up to Ukrainian television to decide.