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PUTIN ENDORSES NEW DRAFT ON NATURAL RESOURCES... President Putin returned to Moscow on 28 October after a three-day visit to Ukraine and met with Natural Resources Minister Yurii Trutnev in the Kremlin to hear his report about a new bill on natural resources prepared by his ministry, RTR and gzt.ru reported. Trutnev told Putin that the draft introduces "serious changes" to the law on natural resources and envisages the transition from a system of licenses to a contract-based system for exploiting natural resources The old licenses will be honored, but the users of natural resources will be encouraged to shift to the new system, which will provide them with more guarantees of their rights, he added. The draft has a provision allowing for revoking licenses if users do not comply with their obligations as far as natural-resource exploration is concerned, Trutnev noted. "This means that we will transfer relations between the state and users of natural resources from an administrative one to a clear legal area," Putin said. VY
AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT VISITS UKRAINE. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev met with Ukrainian Prime Minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych on 27 October during a state visit to Kyiv, Turan reported. Aliyev discussed plans for expanding trade and energy ties between Azerbaijan and Ukraine and reviewed bilateral military relations. Yanukovych is the Ukrainian government's candidate to replace outgoing President Leonid Kuchma. RG
Ukraine, along with Belarus, belongs among the harshest abusers of the freedom of expression not only in Europe, but also globally. Even if the situation of the media in Ukraine is incomparably better than that in Belarus, Ukraine invariably occupies a top place on all lists of suppressors and enemies of the media compiled by various media watchdogs.
Ukraine's significant input in the arsenal of means intended to muzzle the media and journalists is aptly reflected in the introduction of the Ukrainian coinage "temnyk" -- meaning "themes of the week" -- into international usage without translation. Temnyks are unsigned instructions sent on a daily basis from the Ukrainian presidential administration to major television and radio channels, both state-run and private, to tell journalists what news to cover and in what manner. Given that all Ukrainian media outlets must have their licenses renewed every five years, Ukrainian news editors usually follow prescriptions included in temnyks.
It is interesting and instructive in this context to look at how the problem of media freedom is perceived in manifestos of four major candidates in the ongoing presidential campaign in Ukraine: Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, Our Ukraine bloc leader Viktor Yushchenko, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz, and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko. One might expect that Ukraine's media sphere should be a major concern of presidential candidates, primarily those opposed to the government, since they do not have such media opportunities for promoting their candidacies as Prime Minister Yanukovych. The reality, however, is surprising and puzzling at the same time.
The first surprise is that, as regards mere wordage, it is Yanukovych who seems to be concerned about the media more than the other three candidates. Yanukovych declares: "State policy in the information sphere will ensure the implementation of constitutional rights to freedom of expression and information, the defense of national interests, and the development of independent media." The next paragraph in his manifesto can also be referred to generally defined freedom of expression: "The participation of broad circles of society in the formation and implementation of state policy and the legislative process, political pluralism, open dialogue, constructive cooperation, common responsibility -- this is how we will overcome the alienation of the state mechanism from the life needs of man." And that is all about media matters in the prime minister's presidential platform.
Yanukovych's manifesto, as regards both substance and style, is typical of all other presidential manifestos in Ukraine. In its substance, it tells what should be done but is dead silent on how it can be done and by what means. In its sloppy and blurred style, it is highly reminiscent of the Soviet-era journalistic lingo, which seemed to have been developed to conceal the truth rather than to reveal it.
Turning now to Yanukovych's main rival, Yushchenko declares in his presidential program "Ten Steps Toward the People": "In a renewed Ukraine, the freedom of expression, the vigorous activity of public organizations and political opposition will become a norm -- as a guarantee of state policy in the interests of the people." How Yushchenko intends to renew Ukraine and ensure the freedom of expression, as well as with what political and economic mechanisms, remains a mystery. True, Yushchenko's campaign team have promised to present a detailed plan for resolving major social and economic problems in Ukraine after his victory. One needs to wait patiently.
The biggest surprise awaits us in Moroz's presidential manifesto. Moroz is known as a fiery advocate of the freedom of expression on the Ukrainian political scene. It was Moroz who first publicized the so-called Melnychenko tapes, which suggested that President Kuchma and other top officials may have been involved in the kidnapping and slaying of Internet journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. Therefore, it is extremely puzzling to find that the only reference to media in his presidential platform is a pledge to fight "for overcoming the moral-spiritual crisis in society -- one of the reasons of Ukraine's decline, [and] for the prohibition of the dissemination of violence and cruelty in the mass media." Unbelievable but true.
Now Petro Symonenko. His style seems to be the most colorful of all the manifestos cited above. "The state is undergoing self-destruction, its functions are being taken over by criminal oligarchs, regional and family clans," the chief Ukrainian communist asserts. "They have also captured the majority of media outlets, which are essentially used for demoralizing society, particularly young people. Information policy is being formed by political killers." However, Symonenko does not explain how, if at all, information policy in Ukraine can be formed by more constructive operators.
One of the easiest explanations of why Ukrainian major presidential candidates are so vague and unspecific about the freedom of expression in their manifestos is that they are equally vague and unspecific about almost all other issues they touch upon there. In Ukraine, as in other post-Soviet countries, presidential election campaign are primarily battles of personalities, not of political programs. Therefore, nobody apart from political analysts -- who constitute a negligible part of the electorates -- pays attention to what candidates say in their manifestos, which are usually loose compilations of political slogans and cliches.
It is also not unlikely that presidential candidates in the post-Soviet area, both from pro-government and opposition camps, believe that it is the presidency and the government alone that have the right to define the extent of media freedom, therefore they remain as vague and noncommittal on this issue as possible in order not to go back on their election promises when they win the election.
UKRAINE MARKS LIBERATION DAY WITH MILITARY PARADE. Ukraine marked the 60th anniversary of liberation from German occupation with a military parade on Kyiv's main street on 28 October, Interfax reported. Over 8,000 soldiers and veterans attended the parade, which was watched by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. The parade stand also included Ukrainian Premier and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, Verkhovna Rada speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko, war veterans, military officials, parliamentarians, ministers, and diplomats. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who was also expected to watch the parade, ended his visit to Ukraine the previous day. AM
'OUR UKRAINE' ACCUSES RUSSIAN PRESIDENT OF INFLUENCING VOTERS AHEAD OF VOTE. Oleksandr Zinchenko, chief of opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko's election staff, said on 27 October that the Russian government and President Putin are engaged in a campaign to influence Ukrainian voters on the eve of the election, Interfax reported. Zinchenko said that nothing in Putin's 26 October live speech was worth broadcasting by the three main Ukrainian television channels. According to Zinchenko, the media was forced to replace news about Ukraine with news about Putin's visit to Ukraine, he added. AM
UKRAINIAN JOURNALISTS PROTEST AGAINST PRESSURE ON MEDIA... Some 40 Ukrainian journalists signed a statement on 28 October protesting the pressure exerted on them during the presidential campaign, Interfax reported. "The authorities force TV channels and their owners to present events in a biased way or to hush socially important events," Serhiy Shvets, a journalist from ICTV Channel, announced on behalf of his colleagues from ICTV, New Channel, Tonis, Inter, NTN, and 1+1, the major Ukrainian channels. Their statement demands that "all information programs must report on all socially important events, all news programs must present all views on reported events, [and] all information broadcasted by the mass media must be checked and contain sources of information." The statement stresses the importance of professional coverage of the final phase of the election campaign and urges journalists take such a stance. The same day the number of journalists who had signed the statement increased to 89. AM
SOLANA TELLS VORONIN SSPM AGREEMENT IS FEASIBLE. EU foreign- and security-policy chief Javier Solana said on 28 October that there are sufficient conditions for the Stability and Security Pact for Moldova (SSPM) to be signed at the next OSCE ministerial slated for 6-7 December in Sofia, Flux and Infotag reported, citing the presidential press service. The SSPM initiative was launched by Voronin on 1 June. It envisages guaranteeing Moldova's territorial integrity and democratization process and respecting its ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity. Voronin proposed that the pact be signed by Moldova, Russia, the U.S., the EU, Romania, and Ukraine (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 2 June 2004). Solana, who spoke with Voronin by telephone, also said that signing the SSPM would lead to resolving other issues related to regional security. MS
Ukraine, along with Belarus, belongs among the harshest abusers of the freedom of expression not only in Europe, but also globally. Even if the situation of the media in Ukraine is incomparably better than that in Belarus, Ukraine invariably occupies a top place on all lists of suppressors and enemies of the media compiled by various media watchdogs.
Ukraine's significant input in the arsenal of means intended to muzzle the media and journalists is aptly reflected in the introduction of the Ukrainian coinage "temnyk" -- meaning "themes of the week" -- into international usage without translation. Temnyks are unsigned instructions sent on a daily basis from the Ukrainian presidential administration to major television and radio channels, both state-run and private, to tell journalists what news to cover and in what manner. Given that all Ukrainian media outlets must have their licenses renewed every five years, Ukrainian news editors usually follow prescriptions included in temnyks.
It is interesting and instructive in this context to look at how the problem of media freedom is perceived in manifestos of four major candidates in the ongoing presidential campaign in Ukraine: Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, Our Ukraine bloc leader Viktor Yushchenko, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz, and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko. One might expect that Ukraine's media sphere should be a major concern of presidential candidates, primarily those opposed to the government, since they do not have such media opportunities for promoting their candidacies as Prime Minister Yanukovych. The reality, however, is surprising and puzzling at the same time.
The first surprise is that, as regards mere wordage, it is Yanukovych who seems to be concerned about the media more than the other three candidates. Yanukovych declares: "State policy in the information sphere will ensure the implementation of constitutional rights to freedom of expression and information, the defense of national interests, and the development of independent media." The next paragraph in his manifesto can also be referred to generally defined freedom of expression: "The participation of broad circles of society in the formation and implementation of state policy and the legislative process, political pluralism, open dialogue, constructive cooperation, common responsibility -- this is how we will overcome the alienation of the state mechanism from the life needs of man." And that is all about media matters in the prime minister's presidential platform.
Yanukovych's manifesto, as regards both substance and style, is typical of all other presidential manifestos in Ukraine. In its substance, it tells what should be done but is dead silent on how it can be done and by what means. In its sloppy and blurred style, it is highly reminiscent of the Soviet-era journalistic lingo, which seemed to have been developed to conceal the truth rather than to reveal it.
Turning now to Yanukovych's main rival, Yushchenko declares in his presidential program "Ten Steps Toward the People": "In a renewed Ukraine, the freedom of expression, the vigorous activity of public organizations and political opposition will become a norm -- as a guarantee of state policy in the interests of the people." How Yushchenko intends to renew Ukraine and ensure the freedom of expression, as well as with what political and economic mechanisms, remains a mystery. True, Yushchenko's campaign team have promised to present a detailed plan for resolving major social and economic problems in Ukraine after his victory. One needs to wait patiently.
The biggest surprise awaits us in Moroz's presidential manifesto. Moroz is known as a fiery advocate of the freedom of expression on the Ukrainian political scene. It was Moroz who first publicized the so-called Melnychenko tapes, which suggested that President Kuchma and other top officials may have been involved in the kidnapping and slaying of Internet journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. Therefore, it is extremely puzzling to find that the only reference to media in his presidential platform is a pledge to fight "for overcoming the moral-spiritual crisis in society -- one of the reasons of Ukraine's decline, [and] for the prohibition of the dissemination of violence and cruelty in the mass media." Unbelievable but true.
Now Petro Symonenko. His style seems to be the most colorful of all the manifestos cited above. "The state is undergoing self-destruction, its functions are being taken over by criminal oligarchs, regional and family clans," the chief Ukrainian communist asserts. "They have also captured the majority of media outlets, which are essentially used for demoralizing society, particularly young people. Information policy is being formed by political killers." However, Symonenko does not explain how, if at all, information policy in Ukraine can be formed by more constructive operators.
One of the easiest explanations of why Ukrainian major presidential candidates are so vague and unspecific about the freedom of expression in their manifestos is that they are equally vague and unspecific about almost all other issues they touch upon there. In Ukraine, as in other post-Soviet countries, presidential election campaign are primarily battles of personalities, not of political programs. Therefore, nobody apart from political analysts -- who constitute a negligible part of the electorates -- pays attention to what candidates say in their manifestos, which are usually loose compilations of political slogans and cliches.
It is also not unlikely that presidential candidates in the post-Soviet area, both from pro-government and opposition camps, believe that it is the presidency and the government alone that have the right to define the extent of media freedom, therefore they remain as vague and noncommittal on this issue as possible in order not to go back on their election promises when they win the election.