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PENSIONERS CONTINUE TO TAKE THEIR COMPLAINTS TO THE STREETS... Protests against the monetization of in-kind benefits continued on 18 January in various Russian cities for the 10th consecutive day, Russian news agencies reported. In Moscow Oblast there have been 24 unauthorized rallies involving some 10,000 people in 14 districts since 9 January, ITAR-TASS reported, citing the Interior Ministry directorate for Moscow Oblast. St. Petersburg experienced three days of unauthorized rallies starting on 15 January. On 16 January about 1,500 people blocked Nevskii Prospekt, the city's main thoroughfare, RIA-Novosti reported. "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported on 17 January that some demonstrators in St. Petersburg were wearing "the orange color of the Ukrainian revolution." In Samara, a rally was held for the sixth consecutive day on 17 January. In the Siberian city of Angarsk, some 2,000 people blocked traffic along the main streets and gained access to the city administration building. JAC

BANNED KAZAKH OPPOSITION PARTY LOSES APPEAL. An Almaty court on 17 January rejected an appeal by opposition party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) to overturn a 6 January ruling to dissolve the party, Interfax-Kazakhstan reported. After the initial ruling, opposition groups in Kazakhstan accused the authorities of attempting to stifle domestic dissent in response to recent events in Ukraine; international NGOs Human Rights Watch and Freedom House called on the Kazakh government to review the decision. Yevgeniy Zhovtis, who is representing DVK in court, said on 17 January that the party will appeal the latest decision, RFE/RL's Kazakh Service reported. DK

The Crimean Tatars overwhelmingly backed the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, but in the wake of that victory, they face three challenges to their national aspirations: first, the probability of increased Russian meddling on the peninsula, second, the likelihood of growing Islamic fundamentalism there, and third, the possibility of declining support by Western governments that now have a government in Kyiv they like.

The Crimean Tatars face increased Russian meddling in Crimea, some of it by the local Russian community but much of it clearly orchestrated by Moscow. Ethnic Russians -- who constitute the majority of the peninsula's population -- voted overwhelmingly against Viktor Yushchenko.

Some of the more extreme ethnic Russian opponents of the Orange Revolution there organized themselves as Cossack detachments to defend against what they said were Crimean Tatar threats, according to religare.ru, and others urged a vote to put Crimea under Russian control, mignews.com reported.

Even though the Ukrainian presidential election is now over and tempers may have cooled somewhat, Moscow's interests in maintaining its naval base there and in continuing to use Crimea as a counterweight to Kyiv make it likely that Russia will attempt to exacerbate problems there, a development that is likely to hurt rather than help the Crimean Tatars.

One reason for that conclusion involves the second challenge the Crimean Tatars now face, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism there and the ways in which the Russian authorities are seeking to exploit it through their media coverage of this trend.

The Crimean Tatars historically practice a very moderate form of Islam, but in the 1990s both domestic and foreign factors played a role in the appearance there of Wahhabism, and more recently followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir (See the abstract of the paper by Ernst Koudousov, "Wahhabism In The Crimea" at http://www.isorecea.org/abstracts.php and an article by Ya. Amelina at http://www.olmer2.newmail.ru/45_19.htm). Extreme poverty and a sense of hopelessness among many Crimean Tatars have contributed to the growing popularity of radical Islam, but so too have the activities of Muslim missionaries from the Arab world and Central Asia and of both the Russian and the Ukrainian governments, who at various points have shown themselves interested in splitting the Crimean Tatar national movement.

The number of Crimean Tatars involved in these two movements nonetheless remains very small -- no more than 300 Wahhabis and far fewer adepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir are to be found in Crimea -- and most of their leaders currently appear more interested in religious questions than in political action.

But their very existence, the intensive coverage they have received, and the possibility that these groups could threaten or somehow be used to threaten the Crimean Tatar movement have combined to prompt the Crimean Tatar leadership to distance itself from these groups and seek to limit their activities.

Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatars, has repeatedly said that his people have been grateful for almost any outside help they could get, but that they have discovered that some of it from the Middle East either came with strings attached or threatened to divide his people and therefore had to be rejected.

As a result, up to now, the impact of fundamentalist Islam in Crimea has been extremely limited, but Russian authors are increasingly playing up this threat both to frighten Kyiv and the West and possibly to justify continuing Russian involvement there.

One article in the Russian-language "Novyi Region-Krym" suggested that Crimea is following "the Kosovo scenario," a reference seconded by "Spetsnaz Rossii" and one more likely to have an impact on Western audiences than on a Ukrainian one.

And another article suggested by indirection how many in Moscow view the Crimean Tatar movement
(http://www.edinenie.kiev.ua/Actual19/za/mina.htm). It warned that the new government in Kyiv should beware of trying to use the Crimean Tatars as a counterweight to Russian influence on the peninsula lest it embed a threat to its own existence.

There is also a third challenge confronting the Crimean Tatar movement, one with a precedent in this part of the world but not one that the Crimean Tatars have had to deal with before -- the possibility that Western governments will be less inclined to support the Crimean Tatars -- and may even actively oppose them -- now that there is a pro-Western government in Kyiv.

"Now that the West considers Yushchenko to be the champion of Ukrainian reform," Nadir Bekir, a member of the Crimean Tatar assembly, asked a European election monitor rhetorically (http://www.cafebabel.com/en/printversion.asp?T=T&ID=2969), "who will listen should he carry on the same policy of discrimination toward the Tatars?"

Indeed, Bekir suggested, many Western governments may now say to the Crimean Tatars something akin to what they said to the Ukrainians in Mikhail Gorbachev's time: "At least it's Yushchenko that you have now!" And the West will likely do so, he said, even if the new Ukrainian government does little or nothing to help the Crimean Tatars.

Should any such shift in policy happen -- and reports about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Crimea could certainly be used to justify it -- that by itself might lead to a further growth in Islamic fundamentalism there. And that, in turn, could of course make the Crimea a new international flashpoint, a development that would threaten everyone involved.

(Paul Goble, former publisher of "RFE/RL Newsline" and a longtime Soviet nationalities expert with the U.S. government, is currently a research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia.)

UKRAINIAN SUPREME COURT MULLS LOSING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE'S ELECTION COMPLAINT... The Supreme Court on 17 January began examining the appeal by presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych against the official results of the 26 December presidential vote awarding victory to his rival, Viktor Yushchenko, Ukrainian and international news agencies reported. The first day of the proceedings was devoted to procedural and formal matters. The Supreme Court rejected numerous motions by the Yanukovych side, including challenges against the judges, a request to postpone the hearing, and a motion to transfer the case to another court. By law, the Supreme Court has to make its ruling by 21 January. If it rejects Yanukovych's appeal and rules Yushchenko's victory legitimate, the election results announced by the Central Election Commission last week (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 11 January 2005) must be published in official newspapers before Yushchenko can take his oath of office. JM

...AS WINNER'S INAUGURATION EXPECTED THIS WEEK. Parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn told journalists in Kyiv on 17 January that Yushchenko's inauguration as Ukraine's new president could take place on 21 January, Interfax reported. According to Lytvyn, everything connected with the Verkhovna Rada's role in the inauguration ceremony has been done. "We've already had a rehearsal, there won't be any delays," Lytvyn said in an apparent reference to Yushchenko's mock oath of office in parliament on 23 November (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 24 November 2004). Meanwhile, lawmaker Mykola Tomenko from Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc said on 17 January that the best day for Yushchenko's inauguration would be 22 January, the Day of Ukraine's Unity. JM

EU NOT TO CHANGE ACTION PLAN FOR UKRAINE. The European Commission is not going to modify its EU-Ukraine Action Plan within the EU's New Neighborhood Policy, "Ukrayinska pravda" reported on 18 January, quoting European Commission spokeswoman Francoise Le Bail. Le Bail was commenting on rumors that such a change might take place following last week's European Parliament vote calling on the EU authorities to give Ukraine "a clear European perspective, possibly leading to EU membership" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 14 January 2005). Meanwhile, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has told Reuters that he wants to deepen trade and economic relations with Ukraine and grant it market-economy status once the country has showed a commitment to reforms. "In the short term, we are going to work fast to finalize agreements to give Ukraine textiles and steel access to the EU market from 2005," Mandelson said. JM

COUNCIL OF EUROPE SECRETARY-GENERAL ENDS MOLDOVA VISIT. Council of Europe Secretary-General Terry Davis on 17 January ended a three-day visit to Moldova, Infotag reported. During the visit, Davis met with President Vladimir Voronin, Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan, and leaders of opposition parties. Davis told journalists in Chisinau that the council will follow closely the 6 March parliamentary elections in Moldova and that it is highly important for Moldova to demonstrate that the ballot is free and democratic. Flux cited Davis as warning against harassment of the opposition by police ahead of the elections. On 16 January, Davis said on Moldovan Television that a "Ukraine-like scenario" need not and should not be replayed in Moldova. He said the situation in Moldova is totally different and, while elections always produce losers who resent their defeat, fair and free elections result in the democratic choice being acknowledged by those who lose. MS

The Crimean Tatars overwhelmingly backed the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, but in the wake of that victory, they face three challenges to their national aspirations: first, the probability of increased Russian meddling on the peninsula, second, the likelihood of growing Islamic fundamentalism there, and third, the possibility of declining support by Western governments that now have a government in Kyiv they like.

The Crimean Tatars face increased Russian meddling in Crimea, some of it by the local Russian community but much of it clearly orchestrated by Moscow. Ethnic Russians -- who constitute the majority of the peninsula's population -- voted overwhelmingly against Viktor Yushchenko.

Some of the more extreme ethnic Russian opponents of the Orange Revolution there organized themselves as Cossack detachments to defend against what they said were Crimean Tatar threats, according to religare.ru, and others urged a vote to put Crimea under Russian control, mignews.com reported.

Even though the Ukrainian presidential election is now over and tempers may have cooled somewhat, Moscow's interests in maintaining its naval base there and in continuing to use Crimea as a counterweight to Kyiv make it likely that Russia will attempt to exacerbate problems there, a development that is likely to hurt rather than help the Crimean Tatars.

One reason for that conclusion involves the second challenge the Crimean Tatars now face, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism there and the ways in which the Russian authorities are seeking to exploit it through their media coverage of this trend.

The Crimean Tatars historically practice a very moderate form of Islam, but in the 1990s both domestic and foreign factors played a role in the appearance there of Wahhabism, and more recently followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir (See the abstract of the paper by Ernst Koudousov, "Wahhabism In The Crimea" at http://www.isorecea.org/abstracts.php and an article by Ya. Amelina at http://www.olmer2.newmail.ru/45_19.htm). Extreme poverty and a sense of hopelessness among many Crimean Tatars have contributed to the growing popularity of radical Islam, but so too have the activities of Muslim missionaries from the Arab world and Central Asia and of both the Russian and the Ukrainian governments, who at various points have shown themselves interested in splitting the Crimean Tatar national movement.

The number of Crimean Tatars involved in these two movements nonetheless remains very small -- no more than 300 Wahhabis and far fewer adepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir are to be found in Crimea -- and most of their leaders currently appear more interested in religious questions than in political action.

But their very existence, the intensive coverage they have received, and the possibility that these groups could threaten or somehow be used to threaten the Crimean Tatar movement have combined to prompt the Crimean Tatar leadership to distance itself from these groups and seek to limit their activities.

Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatars, has repeatedly said that his people have been grateful for almost any outside help they could get, but that they have discovered that some of it from the Middle East either came with strings attached or threatened to divide his people and therefore had to be rejected.

As a result, up to now, the impact of fundamentalist Islam in Crimea has been extremely limited, but Russian authors are increasingly playing up this threat both to frighten Kyiv and the West and possibly to justify continuing Russian involvement there.

One article in the Russian-language "Novyi Region-Krym" suggested that Crimea is following "the Kosovo scenario," a reference seconded by "Spetsnaz Rossii" and one more likely to have an impact on Western audiences than on a Ukrainian one.

And another article suggested by indirection how many in Moscow view the Crimean Tatar movement
(http://www.edinenie.kiev.ua/Actual19/za/mina.htm). It warned that the new government in Kyiv should beware of trying to use the Crimean Tatars as a counterweight to Russian influence on the peninsula lest it embed a threat to its own existence.

There is also a third challenge confronting the Crimean Tatar movement, one with a precedent in this part of the world but not one that the Crimean Tatars have had to deal with before -- the possibility that Western governments will be less inclined to support the Crimean Tatars -- and may even actively oppose them -- now that there is a pro-Western government in Kyiv.

"Now that the West considers Yushchenko to be the champion of Ukrainian reform," Nadir Bekir, a member of the Crimean Tatar assembly, asked a European election monitor rhetorically (http://www.cafebabel.com/en/printversion.asp?T=T&ID=2969), "who will listen should he carry on the same policy of discrimination toward the Tatars?"

Indeed, Bekir suggested, many Western governments may now say to the Crimean Tatars something akin to what they said to the Ukrainians in Mikhail Gorbachev's time: "At least it's Yushchenko that you have now!" And the West will likely do so, he said, even if the new Ukrainian government does little or nothing to help the Crimean Tatars.

Should any such shift in policy happen -- and reports about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Crimea could certainly be used to justify it -- that by itself might lead to a further growth in Islamic fundamentalism there. And that, in turn, could of course make the Crimea a new international flashpoint, a development that would threaten everyone involved.

(Paul Goble, former publisher of "RFE/RL Newsline" and a longtime Soviet nationalities expert with the U.S. government, is currently a research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia.)