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END NOTE: PRESIDENTIAL DECREES MAKE WAVES IN UKRAINE xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

UKRAINE DECIDES AGAINST APPLYING FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP IN FEBRUARY. Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko said on Channel 5 on 18 February that Kyiv is not going to submit an application during the NATO summit in Brussels on 22 February for Ukraine's entry into the alliance. "The question has not reached this level," Hrytsenko said, adding that he believes Ukraine's armed forces may meet NATO standards in the next two to three years. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is expected to meet with the heads of state and government of NATO member countries during the summit in Brussels, within the framework of a Ukraine-NATO Commission session. JM

UKRAINE TO TEMPORARILY EASE VISA POLICY FOR EUROPEANS. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk pledged in Kyiv on 17 February to ease Ukraine's visa regime with regard to many European countries ahead of the Eurovision 2005 song contest in the Ukrainian capital in May, Interfax reported. "The new visa policy should comply with European legislation and standards existing in this sphere," Tarasyuk said, adding that the simplified visa regime will possibly be maintained for the entire summer period. Tarasyuk was speaking at a news conference jointly with EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner. Ferrero-Waldner assured Ukrainians that Brussels' goal is to bring Ukraine closer to the EU. She promised that greater rapprochement in Ukraine-EU relations will be possible after all the provisions of a recently updated Ukraine-EU Action Plan have been fulfilled. The plan is to be approved on 21 February, while President Yushchenko is expected to address the European Parliament on 23 February. JM

UKRAINIAN MINISTER VOWS TO KEEP INTERIOR TROOPS OUT OF POLITICS. Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko on 18 February introduced the new commander of the ministry's Interior Troops, Oleksandr Kykhtenko, to his subordinates, Interfax reported. "Neither the president nor the [Interior] Minister will ever set you political tasks," Lutsenko promised during the ceremony. Kykhtenko's predecessor, General Serhiy Popkov, was reportedly on the verge of bringing special-police troops to Kyiv in late December to break up the Orange Revolution. Kykhtenko said he is working on a project to reform the Interior Troops and rename them into Republican Guards of Ukraine. JM

PRESIDENTIAL DECREES MAKE WAVES IN UKRAINE

New Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who was inaugurated on 23 January, has already issued a number of decrees that raised eyebrows not only among Ukrainian political observers but also among some of his political supporters and allies from the Orange Revolution.

In particular, both the appointment of regional governors and the creation of the Presidential Secretariat seem to open sources of potential controversies and/or conflicts within Ukraine's new governing elite. Simultaneously, these initial presidential moves also offer insight into what appears to be the beginning of a struggle for political influence within Yushchenko's closest entourage.

To start with, the public appointment of 24 oblast administration heads by Yushchenko in the Verkhovna Rada on 4 February, which took place shortly after the appointment of a new Cabinet of Ministers led by Yuliya Tymoshenko, appears to be at variance with the Ukrainian Constitution. As indicated to journalists by lawmaker Viktor Musiyaka from the pro-Yushchenko Our Ukraine bloc, Article 118 of the constitution stipulates that regional governors be appointed following nomination by the Cabinet of Ministers. But in fact, the newly appointed ministers had not even had time to congratulate each other on their new jobs before they heard the names of new governors recited by Tymoshenko from the parliamentary rostrum and before Yushchenko signed a string of relevant appointment decrees.

In theory, a group of 45 lawmakers is sufficient for submitting a petition to the Constitutional Court to challenge the appointments of governors. According to Musiyaka, the Constitutional Court cannot but cancel Yushchenko's regional appointments -- all of Ukraine witnessed in a live television relay of the government's inauguration as the new president was publicly violating the basic law. However, judging by the overwhelming support the new prime minister and the new government's program obtained in the Verkhovna Rada -- 373 and 357 votes, respectively -- such a legal challenge by lawmakers is not very likely at present.

But the situation may turn very nasty for Yushchenko if some of the dismissed governors take court action demanding that they be reinstated in their governorships and paid financial compensation for the period they were unlawfully pushed out of their posts and deprived of their salaries. According to Musiyaka, irrespective of whether former governors will protest or not, Yushchenko urgently needs to cancel his 4 February decrees on governors and issue new ones, following an appropriate nomination procedure by the Cabinet of Ministers.

Why has Yushchenko made such a major legal blunder at the very start of his presidential career? Most likely, it happened because he was heavily preoccupied with satisfying the appetites of his political allies for government jobs and did not have enough time to ponder the procedural side of appointments. Although it is not exactly known who wanted what in the new government, the televised ceremony of appointments in the Verkhovna Rada on 4 February clearly testified to a harsh and up-to-the-last minute fight of Yushchenko's political adherents for the distribution of government jobs. For example, it could be seen that Yushchenko decided on the appointment of Roman Bezsmertnyy as deputy prime minister and Vitaliy Oluyko as Khmelnytskyy Oblast governor at the very last moment, literally minutes before signing the relevant decrees, much to the visible chagrin of Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who had announced that these posts would remain vacant for some time.

The respected Kyiv-based independent weekly "Zerkalo nedeli" has commented that only some 20 percent of new governors can be categorized as Yushchenko's "relatively good" choices, while the other regional appointments are either "weak" or have a "not fully positive character." This should not be seen as a big surprise or overstatement, given that Yushchenko had hardly spoken to any of the 24 governors prior to their nomination or briefed them on their duties in the regions they are to govern. Most likely, Yushchenko made the regional appointments leaning solely on consultations with top political players from his election coalition.

The appointment of Vitaliy Oluyko to the post of Khmelnytskyy governor is a graphic example of what problems Yushchenko may expect from the regions in the future. The appointment of Oluyko provoked a vehement reaction from raion leaders of the Yushchenko election campaign in Khmelnytskyy Oblast, who staged anti-Yushchenko pickets in Khmelnytskyy and Kyiv on 9 February, claiming that Yushchenko made a terrible mistake in awarding the man who worked for his rival, Viktor Yanukovych, during the campaign. The next day Oluyko tendered his resignation and the resignation has reportedly been accepted by Yushchenko. Why did Yushchenko decide on Oluyko at all? Because Oluyko was reportedly recommended by parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, whose People's Agrarian Party has joined a pro-Yushchenko parliamentary coalition and been given a "quota" of government jobs in return.

Another disturbing decree by Yushchenko is that on the creation of the Presidential Secretariat to replace the presidential administration created by former President Leonid Kuchma in 1996. Under the leadership of Viktor Medvedchuk, the presidential administration turned into the chief body of executive power in Ukraine, relegating the Cabinet of Ministers to a minor role. Yushchenko has pledged to strengthen the Cabinet of Ministers and turn the presidential administration into a consultative body dealing primarily with technical and bureaucratic issues of the president's activities. But the decree on the Presidential Secretariat, which was purportedly signed by Yushchenko on 27 January but made public only on 16 February, explicitly gives this body the right "to participate in working out drafts of presidential acts during all stages in the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Security and Defense Council, and other organs of state power" as well as "to ensure and control their implementation."

Some have already protested that the Presidential Secretariat is poised to become Ukraine's "second Cabinet of Ministers." The bureaucratic structure of the Presidential Secretariat, Ukrainian observers note, practically reflects the Kuchma-era presidential administration, even if the secretariat's departments and sections now bear different names. As an innovation, the current Presidential Secretariat includes a mysterious unit called the Presidential Cabinet (kabinet prezydenta) -- whose prerogatives are to be determined in a separate decree -- in addition to the no-less puzzling Presidential Office (kantselariya prezydenta).

Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko told the "Ukrayinska pravda" website on 16 February that the Presidential Secretariat, led by State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko, "fully duplicates" the structure of the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by Tymoshenko and is set to aspire to performing some Cabinet of Ministers functions as well. Tomenko also warned that the State Security and Defense Council (RNBOU), constitutionally headed by Yushchenko but on a daily basis managed by its Secretary Petro Poroshenko, may emerge as yet another center of executive decisions under the Yushchenko presidency, in addition to the Presidential Secretariat, the Cabinet of Ministers, and Yushchenko himself.

Tomenko said he has heard rumors that the post of RNBOU secretary is to be renamed into that of RNBOU deputy head -- that is, the president's deputy in the RNBOU -- in a forthcoming presidential decree on RNBOU new prerogatives. "If everything happens according to such a scenario, we will have one more prime minister, Zinchenko, and a vice president, Poroshenko!" Tomenko predicted. Tomenko is not the only one in Ukraine who is concerned that Yushchenko now may not be so eager to meet the election pledge of running a transparent government, in which the functions and prerogatives of its constituents are clearly defined and not duplicated or overlapped by other bodies. Judging by all appearances, Orange Revolution combatants and brothers-in-arms have already entered a postrevolution stage of internecine warfare in the corridors of power.

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC

RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report
Vol. 7, No. 7, 18 February 2005

A Survey of Developments in Belarus and Ukraine by the Regional Specialists of RFE/RL's Newsline Team

UKRAINE

DOES YUSHCHENKO NEED SECOND THOUGHTS? New Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who was inaugurated on 23 January, has issued a number of decrees that raised many eyebrows not only among Ukrainian political observers but also among some of his political supporters and allies from the Orange Revolution.

In particular, both the appointment of regional governors and the creation of the Presidential Secretariat seem to open sources of potential controversy and possible conflicts within Ukraine's new governing elite. Simultaneously, these initial presidential moves also offer an insight into what appears to be the beginning of a struggle for political influence within Yushchenko's closest entourage.

To start with, the public appointment of 24 oblast administration heads by Yushchenko in the Verkhovna Rada on 4 February, which took place shortly after the appointment of a new Cabinet of Ministers led by Yuliya Tymoshenko, seems to be at variance with the Ukrainian Constitution. As indicated to journalists by lawmaker Viktor Musiyaka from the pro-Yushchenko Our Ukraine bloc, Article 118 of the constitution stipulates that regional governors are appointed to their posts following their nomination by the Cabinet of Ministers. But, in actual fact, the newly appointed ministers had not even had time to congratulate each other on their new jobs before they heard the names of new governors recited by Tymoshenko from the parliamentary rostrum and before Yushchenko signed a string of relevant appointment decrees.

In theory, a group of 45 lawmakers is sufficient for submitting a petition to the Constitutional Court to challenge the appointments of governors. According to Musiyaka, the Constitutional Court cannot but cancel Yushchenko's regional appointments -- all of Ukraine witnessed on live television the government's inauguration as the new president was publicly violating the Basic Law. However, judging by the overwhelming support for the new prime minister and the new government's program in the Verkhovna Rada -- 373 and 357 votes, respectively -- such a legal challenge by lawmakers is not very likely.

But the situation may turn very nasty for Yushchenko if some of the dismissed governors take court action demanding that they are reinstated in their governorships and paid financial compensation for the period they were unlawfully pushed out of their posts and deprived of their salaries. According to Musiyaka, irrespective of whether former governors will protest or not, Yushchenko urgently needs to cancel his 4 February decrees on governors and issue new ones, following an appropriate nomination procedure by the Cabinet of Ministers.

Why has Yushchenko made such a major legal blunder at the very start of his presidential career? Most likely, it happened because he was heavily preoccupied with satisfying the collective appetite of his political allies for government jobs and did not have enough time to ponder the procedural side of the appointments. Although it is not exactly known who wanted what in the new government, the televised ceremony of appointments in the Verkhovna Rada on 4 February clearly testified to a harsh and up to the last minute fight by Yushchenko's political adherents for various government jobs. For example, it could be seen that Yushchenko decided on the appointment of Roman Bezsmertnyy as deputy prime minister and Vitaliy Oluyko as Khmelnytskyy Oblast governor at the very last moment, literally minutes before signing the relevant decrees, much to the visible chagrin of Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who had announced that these posts would remain vacant for some time.

The respected Kyiv-based independent weekly "Zerkalo nedeli" has opined that only some 20 percent of the new governors can be categorized as Yushchenko's "relatively good" choices, while the other regional appointments are either "weak" or don't have a "fully positive character." Which should not be seen as a big surprise or even as an overstatement, given that Yushchenko had hardly talked to any of the 24 governors before their nominations or had briefed them on their duties in the regions they are to govern. Most likely, Yushchenko made the regional appointments leaning solely on consultations with top political players from his election coalition.

Another disturbing decree by Yushchenko is the creation of the Presidential Secretariat to replace the presidential administration created by former President Leonid Kuchma in 1996. Under the leadership of Viktor Medvedchuk, the presidential administration turned into the chief body of executive power in Ukraine, relegating the Cabinet of Ministers to a minor role. Yushchenko has pledged to strengthen the Cabinet of Ministers and turn the presidential administration into a consultative body dealing primarily with technical and bureaucratic issues of the president's activities. But the decree on the Presidential Secretariat, which was purportedly signed by Yushchenko on 27 January but made public only on 16 February, explicitly gives this body the right "to participate in working out drafts of presidential acts during all stages in the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Security and Defense Council, and other organs of state power" as well as "to ensure and control their implementation."

Some have already protested that the Presidential Secretariat is poised to become Ukraine's "second Cabinet of Ministers." The bureaucratic structure of the Presidential Secretariat, Ukrainian observers note, practically reflects the Kuchma-era presidential administration, even if the secretariat's departments and sections now bear different names. As an innovation, the current Presidential Secretariat includes a mysterious unit called the Presidential Cabinet (kabinet prezydenta) -- whose prerogatives are yet to be determined in a separate decree -- in addition to the no less puzzling Presidential Office (kantselariya prezydenta).

Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko told the "Ukrayinska pravda" website on 16 February that the Presidential Secretariat, led by State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko, "fully duplicates" the structure of the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by Tymoshenko and is set to aspire to performing some Cabinet of Ministers functions as well. Tomenko also warned that the State Security and Defense Council (RNBOU), constitutionally headed by Yushchenko but on a daily basis managed by its secretary, Petro Poroshenko, may emerge as yet another center of executive decisions under the Yushchenko presidency, in addition to the Presidential Secretariat, the Cabinet of Ministers, and Yushchenko himself.

Tomenko said he has heard rumors that the post of RNBOU secretary is to be renamed into that of RNBOU deputy head -- that is, the president's deputy in the RNBOU -- in a forthcoming presidential decree on new RNBOU prerogatives. "If everything happens according to such a scenario, we will have one more prime minister, Zinchenko, and a vice president, Poroshenko!" Tomenko predicted. Tomenko is not the only one in Ukraine who is concerned that Yushchenko may not be so eager to meet the election pledge of running a transparent government in which the functions and prerogatives of its constituents are clearly defined and not duplicated or overlapped by other bodies. Judging by all appearances, Orange Revolution combatants and brothers-in-arms have already entered a postrevolution stage of internecine warfare in the corridors of power. (Jan Maksymiuk)

"I do not want to see corrupt authorities. I do not want to know the price for [obtaining the position of] Donetsk Oblast police chief because nobody will pay that price.... I want to tell you: Either you have the honor, as officers, to protect Ukraine, as you've sworn, to the last drop of your blood, or you go to work for mafia bosses.... I don't like the criminal system of power, I don’t like bribes that these authorities used to accept primarily in these walls." -- Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to police officers in Donetsk on 10 February, while introducing newly appointed Donetsk Governor Vadym Chuprun to the regional administration staff; quoted by the "Ukrayinska pravda" website.

"My main message with which I came here is completely Ukrainian. No pathological ideas of separatism or federalism coming from sick people will be developed. I am promising this to you. This is no joke. These people will be held responsible before the law." -- President Yushchenko in Donetsk on 10 February; quoted by the "Ukrayinska pravda" website.

"RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report" is prepared by Jan Maksymiuk on the basis of a variety of sources including reporting by "RFE/RL Newsline" and RFE/RL's broadcast services. It is distributed every Tuesday.

The Kremlin has been shaken by the mass protests sparked by the implementation of the government's controversial reform to convert most in-kind social benefits to cash payments (see "RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly," 4 February 2005). For the first time since President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, his administration has lost the political initiative in the country.

But the wave of protests came spontaneously and caught not only the Kremlin by surprise, but the leftist and national-patriotic opposition as well, and even the Communists, who claim to be leading the demonstrations. As for the rightist or "liberal-democratic" opposition, it seems to prefer to ignore events. As the "Yezhenedelnyi zhurnal" website (http://www.ej.ru) reported on 14 February, the rightists believe the pensioners and other benefits-reform protesters are "not their electorate." The liberals prefer to wait "until the Russian middle class, left with no other choice by the current government, comes out into the streets," the website opined.

Many analysts doubt whether the left or right opposition would really be able to lead the protests, even if they continued to spread. As the Swiss daily "Tages Anzeiger" put it on 14 February, "The social protests in Russia are not a basis for an antiauthoritarian revolution, as they were in Ukraine and Georgia, because the opportunity for a 'birch revolution' was lost in the 1990s." Analysts trace the roots of this political inertia to the crises of both the right ("liberal") and left ("national-patriotic") flanks of the Russian political spectrum.

One such analyst is Ruslan Linkov, the leader of the St. Petersburg branch of the Democratic Russia party. Democratic Russia, which was created at the peak of the antitotalitarian wave of 1989-90, is one of the oldest liberal associations in Russia. Until she was assassinated on 20 November 1998, Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova, one of the staunchest critics of Russia's totalitarian past, headed Democratic Russia. Linkov was Starovoitova's closest aide at the time of her killing, and he was severely injured himself during the attack. He became one of the party's leaders after his recovery.

Linkov wrote an analysis of the political situation for RosBalt on 3 February in which he argued that the post-Soviet elite is in a state of permanent crisis and that neither the left nor the right wings can present an effective challenge to the Kremlin's current course. He begins with the liberal opposition, positing that its current shortcomings can be explained by looking at its origins in the Soviet-era intelligentsia, particularly in the fact that its democratic freedoms came not as a direct result of its own long struggle and sacrifices, but as a by-product of the reforms of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Soviet intelligentsia had "very fragmentary and incidental knowledge of democracy, but nonetheless it considered its experience both crucial and comprehensive," Linkov wrote. Having entered mainstream politics and having been transformed into a new political elite, the "democrats" brought with them a deficit of positive thinking, a crippling inability to cooperate constructively, and lack of proactive plans for the development of democratic institutions, Linkov argued.

Russia's democratic political elite, Linkov wrote, was formed as a strata of political demagogues, not real politicians. Its ambitions -- including its political ambitions -- keep growing, but its political professionalism remains arrested. Its activity in the Duma over the last decade shows not only a poor knowledge of the legislation of advanced democracies, but even an unfamiliarity with the Russian laws that they themselves approved, Linkov claimed.

Linkov singles out the leadership of the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) for particular criticism. During the government offensive against the media empire of former oligarch Vladimir Gusinskii in 1998-2000, the SPS sided with the Kremlin, which argued that the matter was merely a "business dispute" rather than an all-out assault on the independent media. Boris Nemtsov, who was then the head of the SPS Duma faction, said his party's first priority was preserving "the right of private property, and only then, all other freedoms," Linkov wrote. The SPS ignored activists who argued that Nazi Germany had private property, although it lacked many other rights, Linkov noted.

Moreover, although the SPS said a lot about "emancipating business from the state," it failed in practice to provide relief for the business community from excessive taxes and an arbitrary bureaucracy. These failures, Linkov wrote, contributed to the "institutionalization of corruption" in Russia. The rightists, he notes, initiated and pushed through the bankruptcy legislation that, together with tax legislation, is the main lever being used in the case against oil giant Yukos. The democratic elite failed to create a foundation for the democratic development of Russia when it had the chance, Linkov wrote. It failed to create a sufficient legislative basis for a stable democracy.

Linkov also recalled that the idea of political-party reform was born within the SPS, including the idea of raising the barrier for entry into the Duma from 5 percent of the popular vote to 7 percent. The "elitists" within the SPS hoped by this to eliminate their smaller competitors on the liberal flank, but the Kremlin is now successfully using this tool against the SPS and Yabloko, who are now protesting against it.

In addition, Linkov wrote, although until as recently as the last year or so the liberals had key posts in the government, the Duma, and the presidential administration, they made no serious efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chechnya. They did not resist the expansion of the so-called siloviki -- members of the state-security community -- into public institutions of power. The liberals even helped Putin build up the "vertical of power," which was then used to crush the horizontal network of civil society, Linkov argued. He noted that the SPS and Yabloko supported the Kremlin-inspired installation of Valentina Matvienko as governor of St. Petersburg. In this context, their protests now against the elimination of the direct election of regional executive-branch heads seem pretty meaningless, Linkov wrote.

Finally, Linkov said most of the democratic elite ignored human rights as a legitimate arena of political activity, and it is no coincidence that Soviet-era political prisoners and activists such as Sergei Kovalev have preferred to keep their distance.

In conclusion, Linkov argued that the democratic elite has practically died, although it continues to resist its final demise. This resistance, he wrote, is barring the way into politics for a younger and genuinely democratic generation. Moreover, the democratic elite is playing into the hands of the "national-patriotic opposition," which never tires of contrasting the personal wealth of the democrats with the widespread poverty throughout Russia. As a result, the very notion of democracy has become debased.

Turning his attention to the leftist opposition, Linkov argued that it is guided by two conflicting ideological aims -- "Russia for the Russians" and "Russia as an empire." According to polls, about 60 percent of Russians support statements such as, "The Russian nation is one of the world's great nations," and, "Russian Orthodoxy is the greatest Christian confession." About 200 public organizations openly use slogans such as these, Linkov wrote, even though they contradict the idea of imperialist expansion. "Throughout Russian history, patriots have called both for the defense of Russia's borders and for their 'expansion,' while also accusing those peoples who have been colonized against their will of causing harm to the Russians," Linkov wrote.

In addition to defending the greatness of Russia, these patriots also fight against Russia's "numerous" enemies, including the United States, people from the Caucasus, "Judeo-Masons," and many others. The patriots are convinced that the West has taken up arms against Russia and against them personally, Linkov wrote.

The authorities have co-opted many slogans of the national-patriots "because they provide the bureaucracy with a cover of unaccountability" and they allow the Kremlin to push Russia "along its unique historical path" without taking into consideration the democratic norms accepted throughout the developed world, Linkov argued.

At the same time, neither patriotic and statist beliefs nor communist convictions prevent these elites (including the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church) from buying upscale Western gadgetry, luxury cars, and other goods. Patriotism does not prevent many of them from stealing state funds, accepting bribes, or living in extravagant, Western-style mansions. "Our best 'patriots' today are corrupt politicians and officials, the siloviki who are making money through their links with criminals and from the criminals themselves," Linkov charged. These are the same people who keep calling on ordinary Russians to be patient and endure and "to keep believing in Russia's unique path," Linkov wrote.

The bottom line of Linkov's analysis is that only the emergence of fresh political forces can halt the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the current regime in Russia.