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As the summit meeting of the U.S. and Russian presidents approaches, much of the focus has centered on the rise of a newly authoritarian Russia. Although several of Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent measures have led to calls for a more confrontational U.S. challenge, the scope and scale of this new Russian authoritarianism have been largely domestic and internal in nature. The real challenge of this summit lies well beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, however.
The core issue involves neither an expansion of Putin's presidential power at the expense of democratic institutions nor a renationalization of resources at the expense of oligarchic networks. The underlying problem is the steady reassertion and consolidation of Russian power and influence throughout the former Soviet space. For the infant states along the Russian periphery, the threat is not from internal Russian authoritarianism but from external Russian activism.
This is most evident in the states of the South Caucasus, whose independence is impeded by a combination of internal weakness, structural vulnerability, and regional discord. The region has also been particularly vulnerable to the success of a more sophisticated Russian tactic of utilizing energy as leverage. This has involved a pattern of the Russian Gazprom and Unified Energy System (EES) firms actively targeting and acquiring key elements of the energy sectors of its smaller, vulnerable neighboring states. The strategy, as articulated by Anatolii Chubais, is one of forging a new "liberal empire" using the Russian control over nearby energy sectors as platforms for exporting electricity and projecting power in new ways. It is from this perspective that Russia seeks to supply power to Iran, Turkey, and China.
There is also a broader geopolitical asset from this energy policy. Aside from the obvious importance of high oil revenues for the Russian state budget, energy is a key component of Russian relations with both the United States and Europe. In fact, Russian natural-gas exports account for one-third of the European Union's gas needs and almost 90 percent of the energy needs for the new EU member states from the former Soviet bloc.
For Moscow, the manipulation of energy dependence has largely supplanted the more traditional use of military power to maintain its influence and, as part of its broader strategy, has bolstered its effort to forge a deeper integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russian energy policy has followed this pattern from the Baltic states to Central Asia. But nowhere has it been more evident than in the energy sectors of Georgia and Armenia.
For Armenia, it has led to outright Russian ownership of much of the country's natural-gas and electricity distribution networks and management of the sole nuclear power plant. For Georgia, the already troubled electricity distribution network is now Russian-owned, ironically, after the pullout of the previous owner, a U.S. firm.
Against this backdrop of a more sophisticated Russian policy of control, there are two important trends that only threaten to prolong a pronounced erosion of statehood and sovereignty among the states of the Caucasus.
First, as demonstrated in the pre-summit agenda, attention to the needs of the Caucasus will most likely be eclipsed by larger issues. This trend of prioritizing the bigger issues, albeit significant in and of themselves, does nothing to curb a the deeper rise of Russian power over its former Soviet neighbors and does everything to foster a frustration and disappointment with the United States among these fragile democracies.
For the United States, a discussion beyond issues of democracy and the rule of law within Russia will be limited to broader geopolitical challenges. These include the need for Russian help in containing Iran to an agreement controlling the spread of portable surface-to-air missiles, or Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).
Moreover, the tendency of bilateral relations to be dominated by a shared emphasis on security, as seen in the parallel U.S. and Russian views on the war on terrorism, is a fundamental Russian advantage. The brutality of the Chechen conflict, for example, has been accepted far too readily as a blanket justification for ever harsher Russian security policies, rather than revealing the dangers of the conflict's spillover into Ingushetia, Daghestan, and, most recently, Kabardino-Balkaria. And it has mostly served as a foil to deflect any intrusive examination of Russian policy in the region.
The second trend affecting the Caucasus stems from a new modification in the course of Russian policy. Specifically, there are signs that the defeat of Russian interests in the recent Ukrainian Orange Revolution has affected Russian policy toward its neighbors. The significance of the Ukrainian case for Russia is unique, however, and more profound from Moscow's perspective, for two reasons.
First, unlike Georgia's Rose Revolution, Russia played no role in mediating or managing events in the case of the Ukrainian drama. Throughout the period of dramatic but peaceful change in Georgia, Russia played a fairly active role, culminating in the downfall of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. It was also Russia that mediated a calm restoration of Georgian central control over the Adjaran fiefdom of Aslan Abashidze, even to the point of providing him with a protected escape into Russia.
Yet the Russian role in the Ukrainian case was profoundly lacking. It found itself divorced from the reality of Ukrainian politics and devoid of any real leverage as the crisis escalated.
The second reason for the significance of the Ukrainian lesson for Russia stems from the realization that no amount of leverage or intimidation can overcome an empowered citizenry mobilizing behind the appeal of an effective alternative figure. This belated recognition of the potency of a combination of an engaged civil society with an engaging opposition candidate raises serious doubts over the future of the remaining authoritarian states.
This Russian apprehension is driven in large part by an already pronounced loss of state power and status, and is exacerbated by the inherent fragility of such strongman states. For Moscow, it is one thing to lose ground to the West in terms of NATO expansion or U.S. basing rights in Central Asia and the Caucasus, but it is quite another thing to have CIS members spin out of the Russian orbit from their own independent velocity.
Thus, the imperative for Russian policy is now one of preemption, to consolidate existing control while moving to prevent, or at least forestall, the rise of a "rainbow of revolutions" well beyond the case of the rose or the orange. The most recent example is in Moldova. With general elections set for early March, Moldovan security forces have already detained or expelled more than 20 Russian intelligence operatives in the past three weeks alone.
Yet Moscow can be consoled by two reassuring factors. For one, it seems unlikely that the coming presidential summit will even recognize the significance of the Ukrainian lesson. And second, for the Russian position in the Caucasus, the lack of a serious or even united opposition in either Armenia or Azerbaijan removes the threat of another abrupt change of government, at least in the near term. But both factors will merely spur greater Russian efforts to impede deeper democratization and immobilize potential political opposition.
Aside from a failure to grasp the true issues of importance, however, the true challenge for the United States in handling its summitry with its Russian partner is in forging a balance between the broader geopolitical needs of Russian cooperation with the imperatives for securing the statehood and sovereignty of the weak states of the Caucasus.
But until that balance is found, the Caucasus will most likely remain very much a region at risk.
BELARUSIAN BANK SUSPECTED OF MONEY LAUNDERING CHANGES NAME. Infobank, a privately owned Belarusian bank accused by the United States of money laundering, has changed its name to Trastbank, Belapan reported on 22 February. In August, the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Infobank as an institution of "primary money-laundering concern" (see "RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report," 31 August 2004). "Infobank laundered funds for the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein that were derived from schemes to circumvent the United Nations oil-for-food program, including illegal surcharges and inflated contracts," the U.S. Department of Treasury said in a statement. "Proceeds from the illegal surcharges and inflated contracts either were returned to the Iraqi government -- in violation of UN [oil-for-food] program conditions -- or were used to purchase weapons or finance military training through Infobank and its subsidiary." JM
U.S. PRESIDENT ENCOURAGES UKRAINE'S EURO-ATLANTIC COURSE. U.S. President George W. Bush met with his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko in Brussels on 22 February, on the sidelines of a Ukraine-NATO Commission session (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 22 February 2005), Ukrainian and international media reported. "We want to see Ukraine integrated into both the European Union and the North Atlantic alliance," Reuters quoted Yushchenko as saying at a news conference after the meeting. But the Ukrainian president also exercised caution. "Let me say clearly that Russia is our strategic partner," Yushchenko said. "Ukraine's policy on NATO is in no way directed against any other country, including Russia." Bush referred to Ukraine's recent political makeover in his address to a NATO summit in Brussels earlier the same day. "As a free government takes hold in that country [Ukraine] and as the government of President Yushchenko pursues vital reforms, Ukraine should be welcomed by the Euro-Atlantic family," the U.S. president said. JM
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT DOES NOT WANT COSTLY BIRTHDAY PRESENTS. The family of President Viktor Yushchenko has asked Ukrainians not to give him expensive gifts for his 51st birthday on 23 February, Ukrainian media reported on 22 February, quoting his press secretary Iryna Herashchenko. ''During the time of Yushchenko's presidency there will be no loud receptions, magnificent celebrations on birthdays, no car cavalcades, luxurious bouquets and super-expensive gifts," Herashchenko told journalists. Ukrainian media on 23 February quoted the congratulatory birthday message Russian President Vladimir Putin sent to Yushchenko. "I highly appreciate the results of [our] recent meeting in Moscow [on 24 January] and the constructive character of relations that have been established between ourselves," Putin wrote. "I expect that the continuation of our direct dialogue will serve the development of equal and mutually advantageous Russian-Ukrainian cooperation in all spheres." JM
ROMANIAN PRESIDENT SAYS DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE COULD BE MODEL FOR MOLDOVA. Speaking at the special NATO-Ukraine summit in Brussels, Romanian President Traian Basescu said on 22 February that he hopes that Moldova follows the examples of the democratic developments in Georgia and Ukraine, according to a statement from the president's office. Basescu also said that faster internal reforms in Ukraine will result in more intense cooperation between that country and Western institutions, especially with NATO. "The future of Ukraine is in the framework of the democratic community of European nations," Basescu said. "Europe will be neither complete nor free until Ukraine, Moldova, and the South Caucasus are anchored in the Euro-Atlantic community." UB
As the summit meeting of the U.S. and Russian presidents approaches, much of the focus has centered on the rise of a newly authoritarian Russia. Although several of Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent measures have led to calls for a more confrontational U.S. challenge, the scope and scale of this new Russian authoritarianism have been largely domestic and internal in nature. The real challenge of this summit lies well beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, however.
The core issue involves neither an expansion of Putin's presidential power at the expense of democratic institutions nor a renationalization of resources at the expense of oligarchic networks. The underlying problem is the steady reassertion and consolidation of Russian power and influence throughout the former Soviet space. For the infant states along the Russian periphery, the threat is not from internal Russian authoritarianism but from external Russian activism.
This is most evident in the states of the South Caucasus, whose independence is impeded by a combination of internal weakness, structural vulnerability, and regional discord. The region has also been particularly vulnerable to the success of a more sophisticated Russian tactic of utilizing energy as leverage. This has involved a pattern of the Russian Gazprom and Unified Energy System (EES) firms actively targeting and acquiring key elements of the energy sectors of its smaller, vulnerable neighboring states. The strategy, as articulated by Anatolii Chubais, is one of forging a new "liberal empire" using the Russian control over nearby energy sectors as platforms for exporting electricity and projecting power in new ways. It is from this perspective that Russia seeks to supply power to Iran, Turkey, and China.
There is also a broader geopolitical asset from this energy policy. Aside from the obvious importance of high oil revenues for the Russian state budget, energy is a key component of Russian relations with both the United States and Europe. In fact, Russian natural-gas exports account for one-third of the European Union's gas needs and almost 90 percent of the energy needs for the new EU member states from the former Soviet bloc.
For Moscow, the manipulation of energy dependence has largely supplanted the more traditional use of military power to maintain its influence and, as part of its broader strategy, has bolstered its effort to forge a deeper integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russian energy policy has followed this pattern from the Baltic states to Central Asia. But nowhere has it been more evident than in the energy sectors of Georgia and Armenia.
For Armenia, it has led to outright Russian ownership of much of the country's natural-gas and electricity distribution networks and management of the sole nuclear power plant. For Georgia, the already troubled electricity distribution network is now Russian-owned, ironically, after the pullout of the previous owner, a U.S. firm.
Against this backdrop of a more sophisticated Russian policy of control, there are two important trends that only threaten to prolong a pronounced erosion of statehood and sovereignty among the states of the Caucasus.
First, as demonstrated in the pre-summit agenda, attention to the needs of the Caucasus will most likely be eclipsed by larger issues. This trend of prioritizing the bigger issues, albeit significant in and of themselves, does nothing to curb a the deeper rise of Russian power over its former Soviet neighbors and does everything to foster a frustration and disappointment with the United States among these fragile democracies.
For the United States, a discussion beyond issues of democracy and the rule of law within Russia will be limited to broader geopolitical challenges. These include the need for Russian help in containing Iran to an agreement controlling the spread of portable surface-to-air missiles, or Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).
Moreover, the tendency of bilateral relations to be dominated by a shared emphasis on security, as seen in the parallel U.S. and Russian views on the war on terrorism, is a fundamental Russian advantage. The brutality of the Chechen conflict, for example, has been accepted far too readily as a blanket justification for ever harsher Russian security policies, rather than revealing the dangers of the conflict's spillover into Ingushetia, Daghestan, and, most recently, Kabardino-Balkaria. And it has mostly served as a foil to deflect any intrusive examination of Russian policy in the region.
The second trend affecting the Caucasus stems from a new modification in the course of Russian policy. Specifically, there are signs that the defeat of Russian interests in the recent Ukrainian Orange Revolution has affected Russian policy toward its neighbors. The significance of the Ukrainian case for Russia is unique, however, and more profound from Moscow's perspective, for two reasons.
First, unlike Georgia's Rose Revolution, Russia played no role in mediating or managing events in the case of the Ukrainian drama. Throughout the period of dramatic but peaceful change in Georgia, Russia played a fairly active role, culminating in the downfall of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. It was also Russia that mediated a calm restoration of Georgian central control over the Adjaran fiefdom of Aslan Abashidze, even to the point of providing him with a protected escape into Russia.
Yet the Russian role in the Ukrainian case was profoundly lacking. It found itself divorced from the reality of Ukrainian politics and devoid of any real leverage as the crisis escalated.
The second reason for the significance of the Ukrainian lesson for Russia stems from the realization that no amount of leverage or intimidation can overcome an empowered citizenry mobilizing behind the appeal of an effective alternative figure. This belated recognition of the potency of a combination of an engaged civil society with an engaging opposition candidate raises serious doubts over the future of the remaining authoritarian states.
This Russian apprehension is driven in large part by an already pronounced loss of state power and status, and is exacerbated by the inherent fragility of such strongman states. For Moscow, it is one thing to lose ground to the West in terms of NATO expansion or U.S. basing rights in Central Asia and the Caucasus, but it is quite another thing to have CIS members spin out of the Russian orbit from their own independent velocity.
Thus, the imperative for Russian policy is now one of preemption, to consolidate existing control while moving to prevent, or at least forestall, the rise of a "rainbow of revolutions" well beyond the case of the rose or the orange. The most recent example is in Moldova. With general elections set for early March, Moldovan security forces have already detained or expelled more than 20 Russian intelligence operatives in the past three weeks alone.
Yet Moscow can be consoled by two reassuring factors. For one, it seems unlikely that the coming presidential summit will even recognize the significance of the Ukrainian lesson. And second, for the Russian position in the Caucasus, the lack of a serious or even united opposition in either Armenia or Azerbaijan removes the threat of another abrupt change of government, at least in the near term. But both factors will merely spur greater Russian efforts to impede deeper democratization and immobilize potential political opposition.
Aside from a failure to grasp the true issues of importance, however, the true challenge for the United States in handling its summitry with its Russian partner is in forging a balance between the broader geopolitical needs of Russian cooperation with the imperatives for securing the statehood and sovereignty of the weak states of the Caucasus.
But until that balance is found, the Caucasus will most likely remain very much a region at risk.
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
A Survey of Developments in Belarus and Ukraine by the Regional Specialists of RFE/RL's Newsline Team
UKRAINE
MOSCOW STEPS IN TO CHECK KYIV'S EUROPEAN DRIVE. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Kyiv on 21 February to remind the new, pro-Western government of President Viktor Yushchenko that it has some important obligations in the "eastern direction" left to it by its predecessor.
In September 2003, then-President Leonid Kuchma signed an accord on the CIS Single Economic Space uniting Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
"Under the present conditions, when the European markets are closed for us,... it's better to have a real bird in the hand than two in the bush," Kuchma commented at that time. But the situation has since changed.
The same day that Lavrov was visiting Kyiv, Ukraine and the EU signed a three-year Action Plan envisaging EU support for Kyiv's bid to obtain market economy status in the coming months, to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), and to sign a free-trade agreement with the EU. Moreover, President Yushchenko was to leave the same day for Brussels to take part in a Ukraine-NATO Commission session, where he reiterated Ukraine's commitment to closer rapprochement with NATO. Lavrov's trip to Kyiv thus appeared to be primarily a check of Kyiv's true intentions under the Yushchenko presidency, who has recently set Ukraine's priorities as remaining in an "eternal strategic partnership" with Russia and seeking vigorous Euro-Atlantic integration at the same time.
"Russia is Ukraine's eternal strategic partner," Yushchenko reportedly told Lavrov in Kyiv, which might have been expected. But subsequently, perhaps having remembered how nasty Moscow behaved toward him during the Ukrainian election campaign, Yushchenko went on in a less suave mood: "But I would not like to comment on all the pages of our bilateral relations. If we are friends, we should turn these pages." Additionally, Yushchenko told Lavrov what the latter was predictably prepared in advance to hear: "But it is important that our relations with the East do not block our path to Europe."
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk appears to have been equally noncommittal and smooth with Lavrov. "We face the need to develop a strategic partnership under agreements reached by our presidents," Lavrov told Tarasyuk. To which Tarasyuk responded: "If we are talking about a free-trade zone [within the CIS Single Economic Space], in principle this would not cause any problems in terms of our integration with the European Union or our membership in the World Trade Organization. If we are talking about a deeper level of integration [within the CIS Single Economic Space], there could be problems."
It might sound peculiar, but both Yushchenko and Tarasyuk might still be less than fully aware of the level of integration -- or problems, for that matter -- stipulated by the accord on the Single Economic Space. The text of that accord has never been made public in either Ukraine or any other signatory country, and Yushchenko's legal experts are now reportedly studying it to advise him as to what the document actually commits Kyiv to doing. Judging by earlier press reports, the agreement calls for the formation of a free-trade zone and a customs union of the four states, as well as a high level of political coordination of their economic and financial policies. Kuchma reportedly signed the accord with a reservation saying that Ukraine would commit itself only to those provisions that did not contradict its constitution.
The Verkhovna Rada ratified the agreement on the creation of the Single Economic Space comprising Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in April 2004, also reportedly unaware of its verbatim provisions. Opponents of the agreement, who at the time included Yushchenko's Our Ukraine, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, and the Socialist Party, argued that its full implementation would deprive Ukraine of any prospect of joining the European Union.
Only Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko appeared to have unambiguously lifted Lavrov's spirits during the visit. According to Lavrov, Tymoshenko "clearly confirmed" to him that Ukraine is interested in the further development of the Single Economic Space. But Lavrov should know that Tymoshenko's pledges or ideas are not always in line with those of Yushchenko. For example, last month Tymoshenko suggested that Ukraine might seek NATO membership jointly with Russia. "My personal view is that Ukraine and Russia cannot find themselves in qualitatively different, let alone mutually hostile, defense [alliances]," Tymoshenko wrote in a Russian newspaper in January. Prudently, Yushchenko has remained silent on this idea in Brussels this week, while promising to develop strategic partnerships with both the EU and Russia.
Russian press comments on Lavrov's trip to Kyiv can be aptly summarized by a subhead in "Kommersant-Daily" that reads: "Sergei Lavrov was given a warm indifferent reception [in Kyiv]." Russian reporters underscored the fact that Lavrov's visit was primarily an exercise in diplomatic verbosity and has brought no practical results in bilateral relations. At the same time, most Russian press comments admitted that in the current situation, Kyiv has no apparent reason to be especially eager for integration with Russia, in particular, or with the Single Economic Space in general. Even if both Kyiv and Brussels carefully avoid mentioning any prospects or time frames for Ukraine's EU or NATO membership, Russian commentators now appear to realize that such integration options for Kyiv have become considerably less fantastic than they were just several months ago. (Jan Maksymiuk)
UKRAINE, EU SIGN THREE-YEAR ACTION PLAN. The European Union and Ukraine signed a joint "action plan" on 21 February, laying the groundwork for political and economic reforms in the country over the next three years. Both sides carefully avoided addressing the controversial issue of Ukraine's long-term relations with the bloc. Ukraine has made it clear it eventually wants to join the EU, but there is currently little enthusiasm for the prospect among the bloc's member states.
At a signing ceremony, EU and Ukrainian representatives agreed to make the most of the moment -- and leave the really difficult questions for another day.
Jean Asselborn, the foreign minister of Luxembourg who currently chairs the EU Presidency, said the bloc is committed to supporting the "ambitious program of political and economic reforms" launched by the administration of President Viktor Yushchenko.
Asselborn said the reforms will open a "new perspective" in EU-Ukrainian relations. He said the EU offers immediate support to Ukraine, but he made it clear this will happen within the European Neighborhood Policy and not a with a membership perspective.
"The European Union has underscored its commitment to support Ukraine at this key moment -- really a key moment -- in its history," Asselborn said. "We have adopted an EU-Ukrainian Action Plan within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. The putting into practice of this plan must start immediately."
Asselborn and other EU officials studiously sidestepped questions of whether or when Ukraine might be able to join the bloc. They repeatedly pointed to the need first to see the "action plan" put into practice. The plan will run over three years and the EU has previously made clear it will not take a stand one way or the other until then.
Yushchenko and other top Ukrainian officials have, in recent weeks, said the country hopes to start talks with the EU on a closer relationship eventually leading to full membership, as soon as 2007.
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleh Rybachuk, who represented his country at the Action Plan signing ceremony in Brussels on 21 February, was careful not to offend his hosts' sensibilities and refrained from restating the time frame.
He praised the "friendly smiles" he saw on 21 February and limited himself to comments about the reform challenge facing the new government.
"I'll tell you that one message that I'm getting to Brussels -- now you have a very responsible Ukrainian government, you have very responsible partners, and if we put our signatures on something, there is no way we're not going to deliver it," Rybachuk said. "So I would repeat, again, our commitment to this Action Plan."
Rybachuk said if Ukraine "proves itself" it could receive more concrete offers, without specifying what those might be. Rybachuk also said he "does not want to spoil" the relationship with the EU by moving too fast.
One EU official said privately after the meeting that the bloc was very satisfied with Rybachuk's low-profile approach.
Diplomats say giving Ukraine an EU-membership perspective is not a popular idea among the bloc's 25 member states. Only Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania fought -- and failed -- to upgrade the key reference in the 21 February EU foreign ministers' declaration to Ukraine's membership ambitions. It reads: "The EU acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine's European choice." This is a formulation used in situations where the EU wants to keep its options open.
The ministers on 21 February approved a 10-item list of additional late concessions to Ukraine, which is attached to the Action Plan. The country is promised support in its bid to join the World Trade Organization, recognition as a market economy -- which would help its exports -- as well as extra funds.
Diplomats say recent developments in Germany caused one late hiccup as the list was finalized. The country's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, currently faces accusations of complicity in long-term visa fraud involving thousands of Ukrainian citizens, among others. As a result, Germany forced a change in the part of the text that refers to the possibility of easing EU visa restrictions vis-a-vis Ukraine. It now mentions unspecified "security requirements," the fulfillment of which is an additional condition for obtaining a visa. (Ahto Lobjakas)
"RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report" is prepared by Jan Maksymiuk on the basis of a variety of sources including reporting by "RFE/RL Newsline" and RFE/RL's broadcast services. It is distributed every Tuesday.