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MOST OF ALL, RUSSIANS FEAR ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. The All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) on 17 May released the results of a survey asking Russians what they fear most, lenta.ru reported. The research, which was conducted in 100 population centers on 23-24 April and in which more than one response could be selected, found that 70 percent of Russian fear a major collapse of living standards, up to and including famine. Sixty-seven percent fear terrorist attacks on strategically important sites, while 59 percent fear ecological catastrophe. Fifty-eight percent of respondents said they fear that the Russian nation could disappear as a result of the demographic crisis. Forty-seven percent worry about the possible exhaustion of Russia's natural-resources reserves, including reserves of oil and natural gas. Forty-six percent fear the collapse of the political structure in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election, while 42 percent said they fear the possible loss of national territory, such as Kaliningrad Oblast or Primorskii Krai. Just 20 percent said they fear unrest or revolution similar to what happened recently in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. RC

MINISTER: KAZAKHSTAN SHOULD PULL TROOPS FROM IRAQ Kazakh Defense Minister Colonel General Mukhtar Altynbaev said on 17 May that Kazakhstan should pull its troops out of Iraq at the end of July, Reuters reported the same day. "We fully met our international obligations," a spokesman quoted Altynbaev as saying. "My opinion is it's time to think of withdrawal or maybe not sending new troops after the term of the current detachment expires at the end of July." Kazakhstan's 27 troops in Iraq are mostly engineers. One was killed along with seven Ukrainians in January while detonating an ammunition cache. BW

Increasing international attention to and condemnation of human rights abuses in Mari El, a Finno-Ugric republic in Russia's middle Volga region, has infuriated Russian commentators, three of whom have suggested that this focus is part of a broader plot to destabilize Russia, overthrow Russian President Vladimir Putin, and seize control of Russia's nuclear weapons.

On 12 May, the European Parliament unanimously passed a resolution denouncing the violation of human rights, media freedom, and democratic procedures in Mari El, and its members called on officials in both Moscow and the republican capital of Ioshkar-Ola to live up to their commitments to observe these rights. The resolution, advanced by representatives of the three independent Finno-Ugric countries -- Estonia, Finland, and Hungary -- comes on the heels of three other indications that the international community is beginning to turn its attention to what is taking place in Mari El that few outsiders have kept track of.

First, earlier last week, members of the U.S. Congress sent a letter to Igor Nikitin, the president of the Russian Association of Christian Churches, expressing their "deep concern" about the actions of Russian police against Christian groups in the middle Volga (see http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=news&id=3334).

Second, the Federal Union of European National Minorities, at its meeting in Budapest the week before, took up the issue of the mistreatment of the Mari and other ethnic groups in the middle Volga (http://www.mari.ee/rus/news/polit/2005/05/01.htm). At that meeting, Vladimir Kozlov, a Mari opposition leader, described the threats his people face. As a result of what Kozlov described as the "Mariphobic" policies of the current Russian leaders of Mari El, there are now no ethnic Maris in the Russian Federation Duma or Federation Council. And the number of ethnic Maris in the republic's bureaucracy has fallen from more than 30 percent in 2000 to only a handful now. Moreover, Russian officials there have cut back Mari language media and instruction in schools so that the linguistic future of that nation is in doubt. They have also sought to close down all independent media there and they have either sponsored attacks or looked the other way when independent journalists -- including Kozlov -- have been beaten or even killed.

Third, these developments have occurred as politicians, analysts, and human rights activists from around the world continue to add their signatures to a Finnish-prepared appeal on behalf of the Mari people. That document, posted on the web at the end of February, has been signed by almost 10,000 people from some 60 countries (http://www.ugri.info/mari/). Not surprisingly, Russian officials in Mari El -- who like most regional leaders there have been used to being able to operate almost completely out of the public eye -- have denounced these statements as the invention of what they say are a small group of malcontents who do not reflect the views of the Mari El people. But neither these officials nor Moscow writers are able to continue to maintain that stance given the outside criticism. And, at the end of last week, three commentaries on a Russian nationalist website offer some disturbing analyses of just why some in Moscow believe that the West is now devoting so much attention to a Mari issue so far way. In the first of these articles, Aleksandr Yeliseyev argued that the vote in the European Parliament must serve as a wake up call for Russians about the West's intentions (http://www.rustrana.ru/article.php?nid=9066). And he suggests that following Poland, Estonia, Finland, and Hungary have decided to use European institutions to weaken Russia. Consequently, Yeliseyev said, everyone must recognize that the Mari people are not really responsible for what is happening: their supporters from abroad are. But, at the same time, he insists that the Kremlin already understands "the entire seriousness of the Finno-Ugric factor" in Russian politics. Indeed, Yeliseyev said, this understanding lies behind ongoing efforts to unite Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast with the ethnically Russian Perm Oblast and plans to fold the republics of Mari El and Chuvashia into Kirov Oblast. The question Yeliseyev ended with is the following: will such administrative measures be enough? As he has in other articles, Yeliseyev answered in the negative, arguing that the Mari El issue and the involvement of Europeans in it reflects "a crisis of Russian statehood" which he says is just as clearly in evidence in foreign as in domestic affairs.

In the second article, Andrei Smirnov, who writes frequently on geopolitical topics for a variety of Russian nationalist websites, argued that the West's current obsession with the Mari reflects the coming together of two trends
(http://www.rustrana.ru/print.php?nid=9072).

On the one hand, he said, "the time of giants has passed, and the epoch of minorities -- sexual, intellectual, and national -- has arrived." Consequently, he continued, it should come as no surprise that people around the world are devoting far more attention to the Mari than their numbers -- approximately 670,000 -- would appear to justify. And on the other, the West in general and the Finno-Ugric countries in particular have decided to exploit the unhappiness of a numerically small people against a large one -- in this case, the Russians -- for their own purposes, he wrote. The small people, of course, are not in a position to defeat the large one on its own, but together with other small peoples, especially if they are backed by stronger outside elements, that "small" people can repeatedly "attack [the large one] from various sides and not let it live in peace," he concluded.

The Russian Federation, Smirnov added, is "not in a position to support" the cultural institutions of minority nationalities in the way that the Soviet government did, and it should not apologize for that fact, especially since these minorities "for some reason or another have not assumed a proportional part of Soviet-era debts." Instead, he suggested, Moscow should take the offensive on this issue, pointing out to the world that many Estonians, Finns, and Hungarians fought on the side of Adolf Hitler during World War II and that the policies of these three states both then and more recently have left much to be desired. And, at the same time, Smirnov concluded, the Russian authorities must move quickly against any manifestation of separatism by these groups lest it grow into what Smirnov called "a catastrophe" for the Russian Federation similar to what the end of the Soviet Union represented for everyone involved.

The third Moscow analyst, Sergei Pakhmutov, argued that those in both Moscow and the West who are now paying attention to Mari El and trumpeting their support for the cause of the Mari people in fact have far broader and more sinister motives (http://www.rustrana.ru/print.php?nid=9065). According to Pakhmutov, "antigovernment" figures in Russia itself -- including Irina Khakamada, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Garri Kasparov, and "other odious politicians of the left-liberal direction," hope to launch Ukrainian or Kyrgyz-style uprisings in Russian regions like Mari El in order to trigger a countrywide explosion that would help them oust President Putin.

But he wrote that those standing behind them, the Finno-Ugric countries in the first instance and the European and American "special services" as well, are playing the key roles in this effort of promoting "an Orange-style revolution" in a republic which, until recently, few had ever heard of. The reasons for that, Pakhmutov continued, should be obvious, and they have nothing to do with human rights, media freedom, or democracy. Instead, they are about control of Russia's most fearsome weapons. Mari El hosts several of the Russian Federation's most important weapons factories. In addition, he noted that the middle Volga republic is the home of a strategic rocket forces facility where advanced RS-12M missiles are based and also arms dumps which contain many of the Russian Navy's most advanced torpedo and artillery weapons systems. Even if many Russians are not aware of that, Pakhmutov said, Russia's "internal and external enemies" are. And so, working together, these enemies hope either to bring to power a new regime in Mari El that will be less interested in defending Russia's military interests or to destabilize the situation to the point that the international community might decide that UN "blue helmets" would have to be introduced.

If that were to occur, Pakhmutov said, it would transfer effective control over a significant part of Russia's nuclear arsenal to the United States. Of course, Pakhmutov concluded, none of this is inevitable. But neither is it impossible, and he urged that the Russian government be sensitive to what he argued is the fact that the West and its allies in Russia frequently pursue geopolitical goals under the banner of protection for the human rights of ethnic minorities. Yeliseyev, Smirnov, and Pakhmutov, of course, do not speak for the Russian government as a whole, and their arguments likely would be dismissed by many in Moscow as extreme and hyperbolic. But no one should ignore what they say, however farfetched and even paranoid their words may be. Indeed, if one ignores some of their more baroque comments, the arguments of the three parallel those of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, have advanced in recent days and suggest that many in Moscow back an even harder line against non-Russian groups in the Russian Federation and their supporters abroad. To the extent that proves to be the case, it will entail far-reaching and potentially explosive consequences not only for the Mari people, other non-Russian groups, and those both in Moscow and the West who are concerned about their fates but also for the future of the Russian Federation as a whole.

BELARUS OPPOSITION DAILY WARNED, SUED FOR LIBEL. Belarus's Information Ministry has issued a warning to the only opposition daily "Narodnaya volya," the second warning received by the newspaper this year, RFE/RL's Belarus Service reported on 16 May. Two official warnings issued to a publication within a year are sufficient for the authorities to close it. The ministry said the daily released false information by publishing the names of five people under a manifesto of the opposition movement Will of the People, which was launched in February (see "RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report," 11 March 2005). Simultaneously, the five people in question have sued the daily for libel, saying they did not sign the manifesto and demanding a total of 250 million Belarusian rubles ($116,000) in damages from the newspaper. "Narodnaya volya" Editor in Chief Iosif Syaredzich told RFE/RL that the ministry effectively assumed the prerogative of a court by denying his newspaper a chance to publish a correction, assuming that it made a mistake, an option allowed by the media law. Meanwhile, Will of the People leader Alyaksandr Kazulin suggested that the authorities might have used pressure to make the five people revoke their signatures. "People supporting [our manifesto] are pressured to withdraw their signatures by way of threats and blackmail," he said. JM

UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT WRANGLES OVER ARREST OF FORMER GOVERNORS. Lawmakers from the opposition caucuses of the Social Democratic Party-united and the Regions of Ukraine on 17 May blocked the parliamentary rostrum following an abortive vote on putting on the agenda an appeal to Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav Piskun to release from detention former Donetsk Oblast Governor Borys Kolesnykov and Transcarpathian Oblast Governor Ivan Rizak, Ukrainian news agencies reported. The motion to discuss the appeal regarding Kolesnykov and Rizak was passed by a sufficient number of deputies in a repeat vote after a recess. Kolesnykov was arrested in early April on charges of extortion (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 21 April 2005), while Rizak was detained on 13 May on charges of abuse of power and of driving a former rector of Uzhhorod University (Transcarpathian Oblast) to commit suicide. The opposition believes the arrests of Kolesnykov and Rizak are the current authorities' revenge on allies of former Premier Viktor Yanukovych during the 2004 presidential campaign. JM

UKRAINIAN PREMIER FOGS REPRIVATIZATION ISSUE. Yuliya Tymoshenko on 16 May denied that the government has prepared a list of 29 companies that were privatized under objectionable circumstances in the past and will soon be subject to a review, the "Ukrayinska pravda" website (http://www2.pravda.com.ua/) reported. Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh and President Viktor Yushchenko said on 12 and 13 May, respectively, that those privatization deals would be reviewed. Tymoshenko told journalists that the government will instead propose a law on the revaluation of privatized properties. "The [draft law] includes no list [of companies], only criteria [for revaluation]," Tymoshenko said. "We will not allow anybody to manipulate the selecting or revaluation of companies that belong to the opposition or to those who are now in power. As the prime minister I'll tell you that I'm against any [reprivatization] lists because they are fraught with partiality." JM

UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT SEEKS TALKS WITH RUSSIAN COMPANIES TO AVERT FUEL CRISIS. Viktor Yushchenko on 16 May called for negotiations with Russian oil companies to end a deepening fuel crisis in Ukraine, Ukrainian news agencies reported. Yushchenko said the crisis can be averted if the Ukrainian side adopts a "more clear position" on fuel price controls. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Tymoshenko has denied that the government's price controls were responsible for the current shortage of gasoline in the country, and she accused Russian oil companies of trying to undermine the new Ukrainian government (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 16 May 2005). Tymoshenko is proposing to urgently adopt a law on temporarily canceling customs duties on oil imports to defuse the fuel crisis. LUKoil and TNK-BP reportedly introduced rationing at their Ukrainian gasoline stations on 16 May, establishing a limit of 10 liters of gasoline per vehicle. JM

MOLDOVAN PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF EUROPE HEAD MULL TRANSDNIESTER PROBLEM. Vladimir Voronin discussed the settlement of the Transdniester conflict with Council of Europe Secretary-General Terry Davis in Warsaw on 16 May, on the sidelines of a Council of Europe summit, Moldovan Radio reported. Voronin told Davis that representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as well as Moldovan and Transdniester officials met in Vinnytsya, Ukraine, the same day to discuss a conflict-settlement plan proposed by Ukraine. Voronin said the plan is expected to include three key aspects: a special status for the Transdniester region, the establishment of legal control along the Transdniester stretch of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. JM

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC

RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report Vol. 7, No. 19, 17 May 2005

A Survey of Developments in Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova by the Regional Specialists of RFE/RL's Newsline Team.

SPY AGENCIES OPEN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SEASON FOR BELARUS. Last week the head of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, accused Western nongovernmental organizations of plotting a government overthrow in Belarus during the 2006 presidential election. The Belarusian KGB swiftly and eagerly echoed these charges, claiming additionally that it has already thwarted specific steps taken by ill-wishers of the Belarusian government in this direction. The allegations of the Russian and Belarusian Chekists seem to have inaugurated an international publicity and propaganda campaign focused on Belarus's 2006 vote.

Speaking in the Russian State Duma on 12 May, Patrushev said the U.S.-based International Republican Institute held a meeting in Bratislava in April with the directors of its offices in CIS countries to discuss "the possibility of the continuation of velvet revolutions in the post-Soviet territory." In this context, Patrushev added: "$5 million has been allocated in 2005 for the implementation of programs by this nongovernmental organization to finance opposition movements in Belarus. [The organization] is currently considering involving the leaders of the Ukrainian 'orange' [activists] for training opposition members in Belarus and creating a network of opposition youth organizations."

The following day U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher rejected Patrushev's charges that U.S. nongovernmental groups are part of a Western conspiracy to unseat Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka as "completely false, most of them ridiculous." "The work that nongovernmental organizations do in terms of promoting democracy, educating people in democracy, helping the growth of civil society is open, is transparent," Boucher said. "Our election aid in Belarus and elsewhere is for civic participation in the election process, balanced media coverage, nonpartisan political party training, election monitoring, and election administration. These programs are nonpartisan, they are transparent, they are peaceful in nature and we'll conduct them in Belarus in order to support efforts to build civil society and democracy."

Steven B. Nix, the International Republican Institute's Regional Program Director for Eurasia, told RFE/RL on 13 May that his organization's program for Belarus averages about $500,000 a year. "We don't have $5 million, so I'm not sure what connection [Patrushev's allegation may have to] the IRI," Nix said. "We provide technical assistance and training to political parties and nongovernmental organizations in various countries.... We provide training how to build organizational structures; perhaps, communications; perhaps, public relations -- all the things political parties try to do from a functionality standpoint."

Whatever foreign NGOs may say about what they do in Belarus, they are surely unable to convince the Belarusian KGB that their activities are not tantamount to political subversion. It is simply because the mere ideas of "democracy" and "civil society" are highly subversive for the Lukashenka regime. "Apart from [what Patrushev said], the KGB possesses other data that confirm the intention of foreign organizations, funds, and private individuals to spend significant sums to export the revolution [to Belarus]," Belarusian KGB Deputy Chairman Viktor Vyahera said on Belarusian Television on 12 May. "These activities are under our control, and we have already thwarted concrete steps."

And Vyahera's chief, KGB Chairman Stsyapan Sukharenka, said the following day on Belarusian Television that international conferences and seminars for Belarusian pro-democracy activists serve for training "the so-called colored revolutionaries from the radical Belarusian opposition." "Moreover, we have information that on the territory of adjoining countries bases are being created to train militants who will subsequently be used in violent actions of disobedience toward law-enforcement agencies and for destabilizing the situation in society," Sukharenka emphasized. He claimed that the West has already provided $5 million "for a coup in Belarus" and is going to spend as much as $50 million to oust Lukashenka.

Belarusian Television, the main mouthpiece of the Lukashenka regime, noted on 13 May that "the strengthening of an anti-Belarusian campaign abroad and the holding of street protests by the Belarusian opposition" are being accompanied by more and more frequent shipments of narcotics, weapons, and money into Belarus. "This year alone more than 700 small arms pieces were confiscated in Belarus, including those manufactured in the West," a Belarusian Television commentator said over footage showing a stockpile of small arms and explosives.

"It is noteworthy that [law-enforcement bodies] have begun to detect caches with weapons in late April, when the opposition was calling for street protests," the Belarusian Television commentator went on. "On the eve of the so-called Chornobyl Way protest [on 26 April], in which foreign militants [editorial note: presumably, Russian and Ukrainian youth movement activists] took part, stores of small arms and explosives were seized near Minsk and in Brest. According to Interfax, the Interior Ministry is taking into account the possible preparation of terrorist acts and the organization of illegal shipments of arms into the country by opposition activists." In other words, the state propaganda machine has already begun portraying Belarusian oppositionists as dangerous maniacs who are getting ready to kill Belarusians or, as a minimum, to narcotize them during the 2006 presidential election.

Does such propaganda work in Belarus? United Civic Party leader Anatol Lyabedzka, a potential challenger of President Lukashenka in the 2006 election, shrugs off such pre-election propagandistic excesses by the regime. "Only pensioners believe this [propaganda]," he told RFE/RL on 16 May. "After what they were shown [on Belarusian Television] over this past weekend, they went to the pharmacy to buy tranquilizers. These people have been intimidated for the past 11 years to such an extent that I'm really sorry for them." That said, one should not forget that pensioners in Belarus account for one-third of the active electorate, and they usually vote overwhelmingly for Lukashenka. (Jan Maksymiuk)

WASHINGTON SET TO WORK FOR CHANGE IN BELARUS. U.S. President George W. Bush pledged in Riga on 7 May that the United State will remain committed to the advance of democracy in Belarus. "The people of that country live under Europe's last dictatorship, and they deserve better," Bush said at a news conference following his talks with the presidents of the three Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. "The governments of Latvia and Lithuania have worked to build support for democracy in Belarus, and to deliver truthful information by radio and newspapers. Together we have set a firm and confident standard: Repression has no place on this continent."

Bush's words echoed those of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice last month, before and during her trips to Moscow and Vilnius. "Nobody benefits from the last dictatorship in Europe, which is the Lukashenka government in Belarus," Rice reportedly said before departing for Moscow on 19 April. "Belarus has been held back by the nature of that regime. It is not possible to integrate into anything."

While in Vilnius on 21 April for a NATO meeting of foreign ministers, Rice met with members of Belarusian civil society and discussed the situation of Belarus with the participation of EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis. "The point was made very clearly that the 2006 [presidential] elections really do present an excellent opportunity for the international community to focus on the need for free and fair elections in Belarus," Rice told a news conference following that meeting. "The Belarusian government should know that their behavior is being watched by the international community, that this is not a dark corner in which things can go on unobserved, uncommented upon, and as if Belarus were somehow not a part of the European continent."

Rice pledged in Vilnius that the U.S. government would help the Belarusian opposition in four areas: promoting independent media, supporting pro-democracy activism, encouraging an alliance of political parties and civil-society groups for seeking free government, and unifying the opposition around a single candidate to challenge President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in 2006. This was met with a rebuff from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who said in Vilnius on 21 April that Moscow "would not of course be advocating what some people call regime changes anywhere. We think the democratic process, the process of reform cannot be imposed from outside." To which Rice responded: "We can provide support, as both we and the European Union are doing, to the development of civil-society groups and the training of independent media and independent political and civil society forces [in Belarus]. That is the role of outside forces."

It should also be remembered that Rice in January designated Belarus, along with Cuba, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Iran, and North Korea, as an "outpost of tyranny" in the present-day world. And in October 2004, shortly before a controversial constitutional referendum in Belarus, the U.S. Congress adopted the Belarus Democracy Act, a bill intended to promote democratic development, human rights, and the rule of law in Belarus, as well as encourage the consolidation and strengthening of Belarus's sovereignty and independence. The bill authorizes "necessary assistance" for democracy-building activities such as support for nongovernmental organizations, independent media, including radio and television broadcasting into Belarus, and international exchanges. Last week the U.S. Congress passed a supplemental bill appropriating $5 million to support the development of democracy in Belarus in 2005, in addition to the $6.5 million approved for the 2005 fiscal year in November 2004.

Thus, judging by Washington's strong rhetoric and some practical steps, the U.S. government is set to get firmly involved in seeking political change in Belarus. Does it mean that the White House is not afraid of provoking the Kremlin's ire because of what could be seen as encroaching upon Russia's "backyard," as Belarus under President Lukashenka is now and then described by some Western commentators? Arguably it does, at least for two apparent reasons.

First, it is not unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has not commented personally on what Bush and Rice think about the current Belarusian regime, enjoys the situation in which the United States as well as the EU are increasing pressure on Lukashenka. In theory, such pressure could make Lukashenka more pliant and responsive to the Kremlin's idea of integration with Belarus, in which economic integration precedes Russian political advances to Minsk. However, Lukashenka has so far failed to respond adequately. On the contrary, he has managed to obtain a promise from Putin that Russian gas prices for Belarus in 2006 will remain at this year's level, without committing himself to the introduction of the Russian ruble in Belarus, a step sought by Moscow and seen as considerable leverage for control over Belarus's economy in the future.

Second, Washington's increasing assertiveness in dealing with Lukashenka's Belarus can be attributed to a recent shift in the balance of power on Russia's borders, following the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Georgia and Ukraine have become, to quote Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, "agents of democracy" and stepped into the game over the future of Belarus, which has so far been seen primarily as a tug-of-war between Russia and the West. While in Washington in April, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko pledged "to support the advance of freedom in countries such as Belarus and Cuba." And Saakashvili has recently called for organizing a new Yalta conference in order to agree, among other issues, on toughening travel restrictions on Belarusian officials and increasing financial and material support to the Belarusian opposition to induce political change in Belarus.

That said, one should not expect that the Kremlin would enthusiastically embrace the idea of another "colored revolution" in its "near abroad" on the one hand, or that the United States, the EU, and the newly emerged "agents of democracy" could easily make such a revolution happen in Belarus on the other. The Belarusian regime seems to manage a sufficient amount of political repression and economic stability to secure yet another "elegant victory" for Lukashenka in the 2006 presidential election. But staying in power is certainly bound to be increasingly problematic and discomforting for him. Lukashenka failed to attend the V-Day parade on Red Square in Moscow on 9 May not because he did not want to but because he was well aware that among the more than 50 heads of states and governments there, only a few would have shaken hands with or spoken to him. The future seems to be even emptier and gloomier for him. (Jan Maksymiuk)

UKRAINE

POWER-SHARING DEAL IN CRIMEA BOLSTERS TATAR MINORITY. Lawmakers in Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula have approved a power-sharing agreement that ends months of political deadlock and strengthens the role of the territory's ethnic Tatar minority. In the wake of the deal, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko called on the peninsula's three major ethnic communities -- Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars -- to draft a joint memorandum on reconciliation.

Leaders of the Crimean Tatar community, who have for years fought for greater political representation and economic rights on the peninsula, are welcoming the 12 May power-sharing agreement as a step forward.

Under the deal, the Crimean Tatars will receive two ministry portfolios as well as the post of deputy prime minister in the local government. The agreement, which was worked out between Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev and Crimean Prime Minister Anatoliy Matviyenko, ends four months of administrative deadlock on the peninsula.

Matviyenko was appointed prime minister of the peninsula by President Yushchenko in the wake of the Orange Revolution. But Matviyenko found himself unable to form a new government until the 12 May deal was struck, as Tatar legislators boycotted sessions of the regional parliament.

Now, it seems the peninsula's ethnic Russian and Ukrainian majority and their Crimean Tatar counterparts could be opening a brighter chapter in their often strained relations.

Crimean Tatars, who now make up roughly 20 percent of the peninsula's population, were deported by former Soviet leader Josef Stalin to Central Asia in 1944 on the pretext that they had collaborated with Nazi occupiers.

They began to return in large numbers to their homeland after the collapse of the Soviet Union but have faced many difficulties.

Nicola Dell'Arciprete, who monitors events in Ukraine on behalf of the Hague-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, told RFE/RL the Crimean Tatars have two main grievances.

"The two main issues are first of all: land; what the Crimean Tatars consider the land stolen by the Stalinist regime. And the second issue is cultural diversity and linguistic protection of the Crimean Tatars' language," Dell'Arciprete said.

Much of the land the Tatars once lived on and cultivated is now settled by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. The land is fertile and some of it lies on the much-coveted coastline, which is lined with resorts. As a result, many Tatar returnees whose families once prospered have been forced to squat in makeshift settlements, without proper sanitation, roads, and often electricity.

Resolving this issue in an equitable way without causing large-scale social upheaval and inflaming ethnic tensions is one of the long-term challenges facing the government.

Culturally, the Crimean Tatars also want their language to be accorded the official status it enjoyed before World War II. Dell'Arciprete said the 12 May power-sharing agreement goes at least one step in the right direction.

"The new power-sharing agreement also gives to the Crimean Tatars a [television] channel and some media space in their language," Dell'Arciprete said. "This is a very important point for a community in which 86 percent of the young generation are going to school in Russian-speaking areas and learning, first of all, Russian."

As Hanne Severinsen, a member of the Council of Europe's Monitoring Committee on Ukraine, told RFE/RL, the Crimean Tatars have faced alternating periods of welcome and hostility since they began returning home.

"In the beginning, I think, there was a lot of good will," Severinsen said. "And in fact, [the Tatars] gained some land. But also because of economic problems, [their situation] has been stagnating."

Now, the hope is that with their participation in the government, the Crimean Tatars will be able to make more progress in regaining the status they once enjoyed in their homeland. (Jeremy Bransten)

CRIMEAN TATAR LEADER STILL SEEKING JUSTICE AFTER DEPORTATIONS. The name of Mustafa Dzhemilev is synonymous with the Crimean Tatars' decades-long struggle to obtain reparations for their suffering due to the deportations ordered by Soviet leader Josef Stalin in 1944. Dzhemilev, now 61, has spent 15 years in jail for his active participation in the Soviet dissident movement. He served seven prison terms between 1966 and 1986, not only for defending the cause of his people, but also for refusing to serve in the Soviet Army, protesting the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and defending freedom of speech. Dzhemilev was an infant when, on 18 May 1944, Stalin's NKVD secret police deported Crimea's entire Tatar population to Central Asia. He returned home only in 1989 after Soviet authorities permitted the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. Two years later, Dzhemilev was elected chairman of the Qirimtatar Milliy Meclisi, or Crimean Tatar National Parliament, a post he still holds today. Crimean Tatars throughout the former Soviet Union prepare to commemorate the 61st anniversary of their deportation to Central Asia, just days after the Crimean legislature approved a power-sharing agreement giving Crimean Tatars three ministerial portfolios in the regional government. In an interview with RFE/RL ahead of that decision, Dzhemilev described the current situation of the Crimean Tatars.

RFE/RL: Sixty-one years after Josef Stalin's massive deportations, where does the rehabilitation process of Crimean Tatars stand?

Dzhemilev: Many Crimean Tatars -- over one-half, according to our estimates -- have returned home. An estimated 150,000 to 200,000 Crimean Tatars still live outside Crimea, mainly in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. They can't return home mainly for economic reasons. This is why [it was agreed in 1992 that they would get] a certain amount of money from the government of Ukraine and the governments of those countries where they live. Depending on its financial situation, Ukraine each year earmarks a portion of its national budget to the Crimean Tatar issue. Yet, this cannot be said of the other countries where Crimean Tatars live. But our grievances are mainly directed at the Russian Federation. Not only does Russia not provide financial assistance [to the Crimean Tatars], but it also views the whole repatriation issue with hostility because it fears Crimea's demographic balance might be altered to the detriment of its Russian-speaking population -- even though Russians currently account for approximately 60 percent of the peninsula's population. [As for Ukraine], we're still waiting for a law that would restore to the Crimean Tatars all their rights. There is still no official document that says the Crimean Tatars have regained all their rights. The Verkhovna Rada last summer voted a bill called the "Law on the Rehabilitation Of Peoples Deported On Ethnic Grounds" that deals only with the Crimean Tatars' social rights. However, former President [Leonid] Kuchma vetoed this bill. We're now working with the new president, [Viktor Yushchenko], so that he lifts [Kuchma's] veto and signs the bill into law. On top of that, there are a number of other legal issues that have still to be solved. Should Ukraine continue to consider the Crimean Tatars an ethnic minority group, there would never be an end to our problems. We believe that Crimean Tatars should be considered as an indigenous people of Ukraine. Unlike other ethnic minority groups, the Crimean Tatars have no historical motherland outside Ukraine. Unfortunately, this question remains in abeyance.

RFE/RL: Is access to land the main problem facing those Crimean Tatars who have returned home?

Dzhemilev: We're suffering great injustice in this regard. When [after the collapse of the Soviet Union] Ukraine adopted its land code, the peculiarities of the Crimean peninsula were not taken into account. In this legislation there is a paragraph which says that only those who used to cultivate those lands can own them. In other words, that means that only former collective farm workers can claim ownership rights over those lands. But this cannot be applied to Crimea insofar as Crimean Tatars used to work in collective farms in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere. Although 75 percent of Crimean Tatars live in rural areas, they have approximately half as much land as the Russian-speaking population. This problem is particularly acute in [Crimea's] south as a result of the attempts made by the Soviet regime to bar the Tatars from returning to these valuable areas. Before the 1944 deportations, the Crimean Tatars accounted for 70 percent of the population in these regions. Now, they account for less than 1 percent. The lands are being distributed, or sold at cut-rate prices, to oligarchs who live either in Kyiv or in Russia. This generates tensions and permanent conflicts.

RFE/RL: How does Russia interfere in the affairs of the Crimean Tatars?

Dzhemilev: It is mostly a pressure exerted through propaganda efforts which aim to portray the Crimean Tatars as a threat for Ukraine, as a potential second Chechnya. The Russians are trying to set people against [the Crimean Tatars] by suggesting there are extremist organizations among us. In addition, there are some political forces in Crimea -- such as the well-known "Russian Bloc" -- that are very nationalistic and are always trying to block any decision that is taken in favor of the Crimean Tatars. These forces are, of course, supported by Russia.

RFE/RL: Most of those Crimean Tatars who have returned home live in poor conditions. Statistics show that more than 60 percent of them are unemployed. Would you say this is the result of discrimination on the part of regional authorities?

Dzhemilev: Although [Crimean Tatars] account for around 13-14 percent of the peninsula's population, they represent no more than 4 percent of those employed in self-government bodies. In some institutions -- such as the Security Ministry, the Customs Committee, or the Finance Ministry -- this percentage is equal to zero. Of course this is discrimination. The consequence is that the unemployment rate among Tatars is much higher than the average for Crimea, or even Ukraine. Concerning this 60 percent figure, this does not mean that people do not work. Some people have set up their own small businesses, buying and selling things. Of course this is not enough to allow for a stable source of income and, as a consequence, the Tatars' living standards are slightly below the average for Crimea.

RFE/RL: Did you receive firm assurances from Yushchenko that he will lift Kuchma's ban on the draft rehabilitation bill passed by parliament last year?

Dzhemilev: We talked about this with him. He received us on 28 February, and our talks focused on this particular issue. He had asked the Justice Ministry to check whether he could, as Ukraine's new president, lift the veto imposed by his predecessor and sign this bill into law. Our legislation is not clear on this point. Some legal provisions say he has the right to do so. But others say he doesn't. We will therefore probably come to the conclusion that he should lift the veto and that the Rada should re-examine the bill. We would like this to happen before 18 May, which will mark the anniversary of the deportation. However, the first session of the Rada will take place only on the 17th. So I don't know whether we will have enough time.

RFE/RL: Would you say that the former Ukrainian government has done everything it can so that the Crimean Tatars can return home?

Dzhemilev: It would be wrong to say that it did nothing. Each year a portion of Ukraine's national budget was allotted to this end -- even if that was not enough to cover even one-tenth of the needs. President Kuchma used to come regularly to Crimea to meet the Meclis leaders. He would then give orders so that the problems we had discussed would be addressed. But most of the time his orders would be ignored, if not deliberately sabotaged. I would say that only 10 percent of his orders had any effect. On the one hand, [Kuchma] was obviously trying to make things happen. But, on the other hand, we cannot say he was unaware of the selling of lands that was taking place in the south. He must have known that these lands were distributed among people who were close to him and that the Crimean Tatars were denied access to them. In addition, there have been a number of injustices committed against Crimean Tatars. Whenever clashes broke out between representatives of the Russian-speaking population and Crimean Tatars, only the latter were blamed. When, to draw the public's attention to the illegal purchase of lands by the son-in-law of the former speaker of the Crimean Parliament and Communist Party leader [Leonid] Hrach, six young Tatars took these lands by force before clashing with the Russian Cossacks who had been sent against us, they were sentenced to up to nine years in jail -- although there was not a single casualty. By comparison, a few months earlier an entire Tatar family -- including three small children -- had been assassinated and their murderer was sentenced to eight years in jail. In another case, one Tatar had been beaten to death in a police precinct and his torturer had been sentenced to eight years in jail. This gives you an idea of how authorities treat us. A significant part of Crimea's law enforcement agencies work hand in hand with local criminal rings. But we hope this will change under [Yushchenko].

RFE/RL: Have there already been any changes since Yushchenko's election last December?

Dzhemilev: The president has promise to consult the Crimean Tatars regarding all personnel issues. Here in Crimea, only 15.5 percent of the population voted for Yushchenko. We estimate that the Crimean Tatars accounted for 10 or 11 percent of the Yushchenko votes. Were it not for the Tatar factor, Yushchenko would have probably performed as poorly here as he did in Donetsk and garnered only 3 or 4 percent. [Yushchenko] knows that the national-democratic forces are his main support here. Yet, he has already appointed a few officials without talking into account the interests of the Crimean Tatars. This is probably due to the fact that some people in his entourage are defending their own commercial interests and are trying to have their own people appointed to the right jobs. In this regard, one can say that the interests of the Crimean Tatars are, once again, being ignored. (Jean-Christophe Peuch)

"In the European part of the post-Soviet area, the immediate candidate for such developments [government overthrow by popular revolt] is Belarus. This could be very dangerous. Russia, which suffered a defeat in Ukraine where the [presidential] election was lost by the candidate backed by [the Kremlin], will make conclusions for the future. It will seek to avert such [a scenario] in Belarus. Incidentally, the West has decided that such a model works well. Since it has worked in Georgia and Ukraine, Belarus is next in line. They in the West say it clearly now: Belarus should get rid of what is being designated as the last dictatorship in Europe. I fear very much that a Russia-West confrontation in this region could lead to a head-on collision. I mean, Lukashenka is not Kuchma, he will be suppressing any manifestations of protest, especially those by youth. The West may interfere. The West will render a variety of assistance, and Lukashenka will appeal to Russia for the same. And it will be very difficult for us to say 'no' to him. Because Belarus, following [our] failure in Ukraine, has become doubly dear to us -- from the viewpoint of communications, defense, and access to the Kaliningrad exclave. Belarus has practically become Russia's last ally in the post-Soviet area, irrespective of what we think of Lukashenka. The majority of Russia's population, ruling elite, and parliament treat Lukashenka in accordance with the formula of the late [U.S.] President [Lyndon B.] Johnson: He is a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a bitch.... The [Russian] Army will not be used openly [in a possible revolt in Belarus]. But there are special-task forces, interior troops. We can interfere if Lukashenka begins shouting for help and if it becomes clear that his fall would make Belarus follow Ukraine's path toward NATO membership without Russia." -- International security expert Aleksei Arbatov from the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with "Nezavisimaya gazeta" on 13 May.

"RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report" is prepared by Jan Maksymiuk on the basis of a variety of sources including reporting by "RFE/RL Newsline" and RFE/RL's broadcast services. It is distributed every Tuesday.