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But a significant shift in that policy could be seen this year. In January, Russian President Vladimir Putin linked the issue of unrecognized states to the anticipated resolution of the status of the Serbian province of Kosova. "If someone believes that Kosovars can get full state independence," Putin said, "why should we refuse the same for the Abkhaz and South Ossetians?"

Since then, Putin has several times referred to Kosova as a model for the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. In doing so, Putin appears eager to mobilize the support of Spain, Turkey, China, India, and other countries with their own separatist difficulties.

Assuming sufficient turnout, the results of the Transdniestrian and South Ossetian referendums will be the same -- a resounding "yes" for independence, with an eye on eventual union with Russia. (Abkhazia, for its part, will not hold a similar plebiscite, but will pursue its own drive for independence based on the results of its 1994 referendum.)

But the results are largely meaningless. While Russian law provides for the adoption of foreign states into the federation, the provision applies only to regions subject to international law, which South Ossetia and Transdniester are not.

Why, then, are the referendums being held? One reason is Moscow's desire to keep the conflicts simmering in order to hamper Georgian and Moldovan NATO and EU bids. But there is a second possible reason as well -- an ambition among Soviet nostalgists to set a precedent for reintegrating former Soviet territory with Russia, with the eventual aim of creating a new but familiar superstate -- a kind of USSR-2.

Economist Mikhail Delyagin, the director of the Moscow-based Globalization Institute, offered perhaps the best description of the concept in a commentary published on September 11 in "Nezavisimaya gazeta." The recognition of the breakaway regions, he wrote, "will launch a real, not fictitious, reintegration of the post-Soviet space."

He added: "The disintegration of the USSR turned us into a divided nation. This applies to not only Russians, but also Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Belarusians, and others. And we should recognize ourselves as being divided people moving toward reunion."

Other pundits find the idea appealing as well. The economic analytical site iamik.ru, for example, in August published a 25-page report proposing a possible course for Russia's policy goals through 2015. They include the creation on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States a state, or superstate, comprising a population of 300 million and based on a common market and currency.

Another similar project, published on panarin.com, proposes the creation by 2014 of a new state, Eurasian Rus. It begins with the unification of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Armenia, all by 2008. By 2010, this hypothetical superstate will have grown to include Mongolia, Serbia, Macedonia, Greece, and Bulgaria. Four years later, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, North and South Korea, and all of Eastern Europe will have joined the club as well.

However fantastic such a project may seem, the breadth of its ambitions cannot be ignored, especially considering that Russia's leading Unified Russia party has already labeled itself the party of "historical revanchism" with an eye to the 2007 parliamentary elections.

UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT CONDEMNS PREMIER'S STANCE ON NATO. President Viktor Yushchenko said on September 15 that Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych's statement in Brussels the previous day about Ukraine not being ready for a NATO Membership Action Plan (see "RFE/RL Newsline," September 15, 2006) was "wrong," Ukrainian and international news agencies reported. "I believe this argument...represents a point of view that is wrong, does not meet national interests, and must be corrected," Reuters quoted Yushchenko as saying at a news conference after talks with Yanukovych that Yushchenko described as "not particularly pleasant." JM

DID TRANSDNIESTRIAN LEADER PONDER PLEBISCITE ON MERGER WITH UKRAINE? Petro Poroshenko, secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council in 2005, said in an interview with the Kyiv-based Channel 5 on September 17 that Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov considered the idea of holding a referendum on the unification of the breakaway Moldovan region of Transdniester with Ukraine. "I can confirm that during my personal meetings with Smirnov, he more than once expressed the intention of holding a referendum on joining Ukraine," he said. Poroshenko called the September 17 referendum in Transdniester on secession from the Republic of Moldova and a potential merger with Russia a "dangerous precedent." "It could be easy to move after this to self-determination for Ossetia, Abkhazia, and a referendum in Crimea on secession," Poroshenko added. JM

There are many reasons to expect Moscow's deteriorating ties with the West will continue their downward trend this autumn. But the key one may be growing differences over the breakaway regions of Transdniester, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia and their stated desire to proclaim independence from Moldova and Georgia.

The issue pushing the frozen conflicts to the fore are two independence referendums -- one in Transdniester on September 17, the second in South Ossetia on November 12.

Russia, which has long acted as support for the separatist regions, is looking at the plebiscites in two ways: a chance to bring the regions into the Russian fold, and -- more importantly -- a way to begin a reconsolidation of the post-Soviet republics under the patronage of Moscow.

The West is steering clear of the votes. The Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe, the European Union, and the United States have all disavowed the referendums, saying that, in support of the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, they will not recognize the results. Moscow, meanwhile, has stopped short of indicated whether it will recognize the ballots, but says it has long respected the "principle" of such referendums.

The situation in each of the three breakaway enclaves is different, but there is one thing they have in common. Since their formation in the wake of the Soviet collapse -- via armed conflicts aided, directly or otherwise, by the Kremlin -- they have all served Moscow as useful levers against Chisinau and Tbilisi.

In its support of Tiraspol, Sukhum(i), and Tskhinvali, Russia has aimed to keep restive Moldova and Georgia within its orbit. But that strategy has intensified over the past several years, as both Chisinau and Tbilisi made plain their aim of Euro-Atlantic integration and potential NATO and EU membership.

Now, for Moscow, the separatist regions can be used as more than just a thorn in the side of Moldova and Georgia. They are bona fide roadblocks on their path to Western integration. Both the NATO and the EU prohibit the accession of states with unsettled border or territorial disputes. Moscow, therefore, is interested in seeing the conflicts stay frozen as much as Chisinau and Tbilisi would like to see them thaw.

Russia has worked hard to cement its influence in the three breakaway regions, providing both military and economic support. First and foremost, Moscow has been very liberal in the provision of Russian passports to enclave residents. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 85 percent of the population is estimated to hold Russian documents and receive social benefits and pensions as Russian citizens. That figure in Transdniester is considerably lower, but perhaps not for long. Russia's ambassador to Moldova, Nikolai Ryabov, last week announced that a new fast-track process for receiving Russian passports has been launched in Tiraspol.

Until recently, Moscow's support of Transdniester, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia shopped short of recognizing outright their "independence" from Moldova and Georgia. Moreover, the Kremlin on many occasions stressed its loyalty to the notion of territorial integrity. This stance clearly reflected Kremlin fears that a pro-separatist position would fuel independence ambitions in places where it is decidedly inconvenient for Moscow, most notably Chechnya.