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IS RUSSIA PLAYING CHICKEN OVER WTO? The daily "Kommersant" wrote on October 26 that Russia might pull out of talks aimed at securing its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) unless an agreement with the United States is reached soon. The paper added that President Putin made this point to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on October 21 in Moscow. Georgia recently held up talks between Russia and the WTO (see "RFE/RL Newsline," October 13, 2006). On October 24, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov told Ukrainian leaders that they should "synchronize" their efforts at joining the WTO with Russia's, London's the "Financial Times" reported on October 25. He added that "Ukraine should have more talks with Russia over joining" that body. The Kremlin has repeatedly blamed the United States for holding up its accession to WTO membership and stressed that Russia will accept only terms that meet its interests. Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov opposes membership outright (see "RFE/RL Newsline," July 17 and 31, and August 18, 2006, and "Russia: WTO Becomes Long-Term Issue For Relations With U.S.," rferl.org, July 24, 2006). But on October 13, German Gref, who is minister of economic development and trade, said in Moscow that Russia and the United States "should reach final agreements in the next two weeks" regarding Russian WTO accession. Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zhukov has also predicted a deal by the end of October. Chief Russian trade negotiator Maksim Medvedkov told "Izvestia" of October 26 that "October isn't over yet" but added that "realistically, I think we can complete this whole process by the middle of next year." PM
EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana acknowledged recently that Kosova's campaign for independence could set a precedent for Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have been saying for months that independence for Kosova would have an impact on the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union and calling for a definition of "universal principles" applicable in all such cases. There have also been hints from Moscow that Russia would not agree in the UN Security Council to independence for Kosova without receiving concessions on territorial disputes closer to home. Is there indeed a link?
The idea of connecting the succession issue in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union is scarcely new. Throughout 1991, one reason many Western policymakers were unwilling to face up to the reality of the breakup of Yugoslavia and recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia was that they were afraid of the impact such developments might have on the USSR.
The fear was that the Soviet Union could implode into a host of warring mini-states that would generate chaos across a large chunk of the Eurasian land mass. It was for that reason that George H.W. Bush, who was then U.S. president, made his famous "chicken Kiev" speech in the Ukrainian capital in 1991, in which he warned lawmakers against embracing "suicidal nationalism."
Some 15 years later, both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have become historical memories. There is some nostalgia for both in some quarters. Putin has openly lamented the demise of the USSR and sought to revive some of its symbols and elements of its political culture. But the reality of the successor states is undeniable, and secondary schools throughout those regions are filled with young people who have lived in or remember only the successor states.
Nonetheless, Kosova continues to wait for international recognition of its independence from Serbia, which has been a reality since the Serbian forces left there in mid-1999. Following the independence of Montenegro in 2006, a final international ruling establishing Kosova as a full-fledged independent state seems to many to be the last stage in the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
In Georgia, Russian-backed separatist movements thrive in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where 90 percent of the population hold Russian passports and where Russian "peacekeepers" are present. Russia maintains that it is a mediator in the conflicts between Georgia and its two would-be breakaway regions, something Georgia vehemently denies. The Transdniester region continues to claim that it is not part of Moldova and exists as a law unto itself. And there remain the long-standing issues dividing Armenia and Azerbaijan.
But Kosova appears headed for independence on the principles of self-determination and majority rule, probably by the end of 2006 or shortly thereafter, if a delay is imposed pending the holding of elections in Serbia. Much of Kosova's claim to independence is based on the genocidal behavior of Serbian forces there in 1998-99, which eventually led to the successful intervention of NATO forces.
Kosova's ultimate legal claim to independence is rooted, however, in the 1974 Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions, which gave it and Vojvodina rights virtually equal to those of the six federal Yugoslav republics, even though they were nominally part of Serbia. All six federal republics have now gone separate ways, starting with Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and ending with Montenegro in 2006. Thus it seems that Kosova is simply the final chapter in an ongoing story. (There is no serious movement in Vojvodina for independence from Serbia, only for autonomy.)
The analogy between this situation with the post-Soviet "frozen conflicts" is a false one, because none of the regions involved in the latter disputes had a status under Soviet law similar to Kosova's. Kosovar representatives sat at the tables of the Yugoslav collective presidency and of the highest echelons of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on an equal footing with those of Serbia, Croatia, and the other republics. But neither South Ossetia nor Abkhazia had rights comparable to those of union republics like the Georgian SSR or Ukrainian SSR.
Putin's suggestion that he might veto Kosovar independence in the UN Security Council unless Western countries agree to South Ossetia and Abkhazia breaking away from Georgia is thus based more on considerations of power politics than of law.
Recent Russian moves against Georgia and Georgians living in Russia, the controversies around the unsolved killing of critical journalist Anna Politkovskaya, questionable Kremlin behavior over the Sakhalin-2 gas production-sharing agreement (PSA) and other PSAs, and remarks by Putin that appeared to make light of serial rape indicate, however, that he will do as he pleases and not be troubled by legal niceties. As some Russian commentators have pointed out, he makes up the rules as he goes along. But as the daily "Kommersant" wrote on October 23, the bulldozer tactics that have served Putin so well at home seem to be his undoing abroad.
BELARUSIAN, UKRAINIAN NGOS RECEIVE GRANTS FROM POLAND'S BATORY FOUNDATION. Four Belarusian and 18 Ukrainian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have received grants over $420,000 in total from Poland's Stefan Batory Foundation, Belapan reported on October 25. The foundation, implementing since 2003 its program of support of democratic changes and the development of civil society, intends to support NGOs' operation and activities aimed at establishing partner relations between NGOs and authorities. The foundation also noted that due to the political situation in Belarus it will not disclose the Belarusian recipients of grants. AM
UKRAINIAN MINISTER HAILS GAS DEAL WITH RUSSIA AS 'BIG VICTORY.' Ukrainian Transportation Minister Mykola Rudkovskyy has said that the agreement with Russia on gas supplies at $130 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2007 is a big victory of Ukrainian diplomacy, Interfax reported on October 25. "We should acknowledge that the price of $130 is a big victory of Ukraine and Ukrainian diplomacy", Rudkovskyy said. He also mentioned that Russia offers gas for Belarus at $200 per 1,000 cubic meters and for Poland at $280, adding that the Ukrainian price opens the way for Ukraine's economy to grow by 7 percent or higher. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary welcomed the Ukrainian-Russian agreement. However, Pawel Zalewski, a politician in the ruling party, noted that gas again "appears to be a political instrument." AM
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT SEES NO REASON FOR SIMULTANEOUS WTO ACCESSION WITH RUSSIA. Oleksandr Chalyy, deputy head of the presidential secretariat, said on October 25 that the question of Ukraine's simultaneous accession to the WTO with Russia is illogical, Interfax reported. "The position of the Ukrainian president is clear on that [question]," Chalyy said. During a meeting between Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov on October 24, the latter reportedly brought up some possible negative consequences of Ukraine joining the WTO ahead of Russia. According to Chalyy, Yushchenko assured Fradkov that Ukraine's "accession will not pose any danger to the Russian Federation." The same day, Ukrainian Finance Minister Mykola Azarov said that the Russian side meant the terms of the accession rather than its date. AM
EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana acknowledged recently that Kosova's campaign for independence could set a precedent for Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have been saying for months that independence for Kosova would have an impact on the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union and calling for a definition of "universal principles" applicable in all such cases. There have also been hints from Moscow that Russia would not agree in the UN Security Council to independence for Kosova without receiving concessions on territorial disputes closer to home. Is there indeed a link?
The idea of connecting the succession issue in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union is scarcely new. Throughout 1991, one reason many Western policymakers were unwilling to face up to the reality of the breakup of Yugoslavia and recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia was that they were afraid of the impact such developments might have on the USSR.
The fear was that the Soviet Union could implode into a host of warring mini-states that would generate chaos across a large chunk of the Eurasian land mass. It was for that reason that George H.W. Bush, who was then U.S. president, made his famous "chicken Kiev" speech in the Ukrainian capital in 1991, in which he warned lawmakers against embracing "suicidal nationalism."
Some 15 years later, both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have become historical memories. There is some nostalgia for both in some quarters. Putin has openly lamented the demise of the USSR and sought to revive some of its symbols and elements of its political culture. But the reality of the successor states is undeniable, and secondary schools throughout those regions are filled with young people who have lived in or remember only the successor states.
Nonetheless, Kosova continues to wait for international recognition of its independence from Serbia, which has been a reality since the Serbian forces left there in mid-1999. Following the independence of Montenegro in 2006, a final international ruling establishing Kosova as a full-fledged independent state seems to many to be the last stage in the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
In Georgia, Russian-backed separatist movements thrive in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where 90 percent of the population hold Russian passports and where Russian "peacekeepers" are present. Russia maintains that it is a mediator in the conflicts between Georgia and its two would-be breakaway regions, something Georgia vehemently denies. The Transdniester region continues to claim that it is not part of Moldova and exists as a law unto itself. And there remain the long-standing issues dividing Armenia and Azerbaijan.
But Kosova appears headed for independence on the principles of self-determination and majority rule, probably by the end of 2006 or shortly thereafter, if a delay is imposed pending the holding of elections in Serbia. Much of Kosova's claim to independence is based on the genocidal behavior of Serbian forces there in 1998-99, which eventually led to the successful intervention of NATO forces.
Kosova's ultimate legal claim to independence is rooted, however, in the 1974 Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions, which gave it and Vojvodina rights virtually equal to those of the six federal Yugoslav republics, even though they were nominally part of Serbia. All six federal republics have now gone separate ways, starting with Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and ending with Montenegro in 2006. Thus it seems that Kosova is simply the final chapter in an ongoing story. (There is no serious movement in Vojvodina for independence from Serbia, only for autonomy.)
The analogy between this situation with the post-Soviet "frozen conflicts" is a false one, because none of the regions involved in the latter disputes had a status under Soviet law similar to Kosova's. Kosovar representatives sat at the tables of the Yugoslav collective presidency and of the highest echelons of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on an equal footing with those of Serbia, Croatia, and the other republics. But neither South Ossetia nor Abkhazia had rights comparable to those of union republics like the Georgian SSR or Ukrainian SSR.
Putin's suggestion that he might veto Kosovar independence in the UN Security Council unless Western countries agree to South Ossetia and Abkhazia breaking away from Georgia is thus based more on considerations of power politics than of law.
Recent Russian moves against Georgia and Georgians living in Russia, the controversies around the unsolved killing of critical journalist Anna Politkovskaya, questionable Kremlin behavior over the Sakhalin-2 gas production-sharing agreement (PSA) and other PSAs, and remarks by Putin that appeared to make light of serial rape indicate, however, that he will do as he pleases and not be troubled by legal niceties. As some Russian commentators have pointed out, he makes up the rules as he goes along. But as the daily "Kommersant" wrote on October 23, the bulldozer tactics that have served Putin so well at home seem to be his undoing abroad.