In any army, the medical service plays a significant role. A well-organized medical service is important not only because it provides help to the wounded and sick looks after the general health of the soldiers, sees to their proper nourishment and tries to prevent illnesses, especially infectious diseases, but also because its efficient functioning has a major effect on the army's morale. An awareness on the part of the soldier that should he be wounded or fall ill, he will get the necessary medical care, both on the battlefield and behind the front lines, increases his feeling of personal security and makes him more battle-worthy. In establishing the Medical Service, the founders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) tried to make use of the experience gained by the Ukrainian armed forces during the First World War, that is, by the UNR  army and the UHA. 
The nature of the UPA, which waged its struggle on enemy territory and applied partisan tactics, did not allow for an organizational structure like that used in regular armies. The UPA needed to have a centralized leadership, while at the same time allowing insurgent units to have as much autonomy as possible. The same was true of the UPA Medical Service.
The organizational structure of the UPA was not based on regiments and divisions, but rather, was divided territorially into UPA-North, UPA-West, UPA-South and UPA-East.  Each territorial unit was divided into military regions (V.O. -- Voyenna Okruha), which in their turn were divided into military districts (T.V. -- Taktychny Vidtynok). Within each military district, there operated two or three battalions. Each battalion was composed of companies and platoons.
The smallest battle unit in the UPA system to operate autonomously was the company. The platoon operated independently only in exceptional circumstances. In terms of its functioning, the partisan company differed essentially from a company of a regular army, in spite of the fact that it was similarly structured. In a regular army, the training, the technical aspects and especially, the very complexity of the machine which the army is, serve to minimize the individual character of the company. However, in the UPA 's partisan system the company acted largely independently. Two companies having the same number of men with the same training and the same armaments constituted two totally different forces, the worth and weight of which were determined primarily by the characters of the company commanders and the battle-worthiness of the soldiers. Only for larger operations did these autonomous companies join together into battalions; it was even less often that several battalions joined together for common action.
The UPA Medical Service followed the same structure. At the highest levels, that is, from the military district upward, the tasks of the Medical Service were mainly those of organization and coordination. Direct assistance to sick and wounded soldiers was provided by the physicians and medical assistants who were attached to specific battalions, companies or platoons. Companies which were more active and engaged in more operations were given the better qualified medical personnel.
Medical work within UPA units was characterized by an important feature. The companies did not stay in a single location, but were constantly on the move. Normally, companies were attached to a particular territory, where they had their stores of equipment, food supplies and medical stations. However, the units were often obliged to operate on territory other than their own, or to engage in raids at which times they had no access to needed supplies.
The medical personnel who worked within UPA units could not simultaneously work in underground field hospitals. This problem was usually solved by having the more heavily wounded soldiers cared for by the Ukrainian Red Cross (UChKh).
The Ukrainian Red Cross was established in the newly-formed Ukrainian state back in 1918, in accordance with the requirements of the Geneva Convention, and operated during the period of Ukrainian independence up to 1921. With the end of Ukrainian statehood, the UChKh was no longer eligible to be a member of the International Red Cross and could not enjoy the privileges of membership. However, the UChKh continued its activities, not under its own name, but under the cover of other, legal organizations, and helped the victims of the armed struggle, prisoners of war, invalids, widows and orphans.
During the Second World War, in the first days of the German occupation of Ukraine, Ukrainian physicians and community activists renewed the activity of the the UChKh without asking permission from the occupying force. 
In June, 1941, at the initiative of Ukrainian physicians, a UChKh unit was established in Lviv. Other such units were quickly organized in various locations. The first director of the UChKh in Lviv was Dr. Leonid Kurchaba. Later, the director's tasks were taken over by Dr. Halyna Bilenka-Wreciona (Vretsiona), and then by Dr. Toma Worobec (Vorobets). 
Immediately after the Germans occupied Volyn, the UChKh was organized in Rivne.
In September 1941, the UChKh began activities in Kiev, under the directorship of Prof Fedir Bohatyrchuk. Among those who played an active role in the UChKh in Eastern Ukraine were the writer, Liudmyla Ivchenko, and Dr. Maria Yasenetska.  The UChKh operated not only through the work of its staff, but through the efforts of the public at large. Its main activity in 1941-42 was helping Ukrainian prisoners of war, Red Army soldiers who were being kept in German camps.  The German military command did not officially recognize the UChKh, but to a certain extent, tolerated its activity. With the advent of civilian rule, the Gestapo demanded the eradication of the UCHKh. The occupying power gradually destroyed the whole network of UChKh units through prohibition, threats, arrests and even executions.
In August 1941, the Gestapo arrested Dr. Leonid Kurchaba, the first UChKh director in Lviv; he died in the Monteliupich prison in Krakow. In Kiev, the Gestapo arrested the UChKh leadership, including the director, Prof Fedir Bohatyrchuk, on July 1O, 1942. Those arrested were subsequently released, but the UChKh was obliged to cease its activity. In Volyn, too, UChKh activity was banned Under German terror, the UChKh was no longer able to function on any territory of Ukraine. However, UChKh members continued their humanitarian activities in various ways.
The only place where the UChKh continued to work was within the UPA. It is important to note that the major role in the organization of the UChKh was played by women. In 1943-44, the UChKh's tasks were assumed by the OUN women's network. In 1943, Kateryna Zarytska became the first director of the underground UChKh. After her, the duties were assumed by Halina Didyk, who carried them out until her arrest in 1950. 
Women made a significant contribution to the UChKh and all other sectors of the independence struggle which was waged during and after the Second World War; however, this is a very large topic and deserves to have a separate volume.
The Ukrainian Red Cross was divided into three sections: medical, pharmacy and social services. Collaboration between the UPA Medical Service and the UChKh was so close that it is impossible to clearly differentiate their spheres of the activity. The main difference lay in the fact that the physicians and medical personnel of the UPA Medical Services came under the military command of the company or battalion commander, while UChKh staff working in the field were subject to their UChKh superior and did not come under military command.
The UChKh, or as it was known in some areas, the Health Service, worked at all levels of the underground network, that is, at the Okruha, Nadraion, Raion, and if possible, local unit levels. Underground hospitals and medical centres were established on the Raion or Nadraion levels, but no central field hospitals were built on the regional level. The hospitals were usually small, so that should they be discovered by the enemy, no great losses would occur. Another reason for their small size was that it was very difficult to transport wounded and sick soldiers over long distances. In most cases, the regional UChKh centres were not involved in the administration of hospitals, but only coordinated the activity of the lower cells and saw to staffing, training of personnel and medical supplies.
During wartime, a regular army has a front zone and territory behind the front line, but for UPA, this distinction did not exist. However, for the sake of analogy, one could say that the physicians and medical assistants who worked within UPA units were working at the front, while those who were part of the underground administration, or treated the wounded and sick in medical hide-outs and underground hospitals, were working behind the front lines. The conditions in which the two groups worked were somewhat different, but both were faced with enormous problems. The ever-present threat of being killed existed for everyone. The physician or medical assistant working within an UPA unit took part in battles like any other soldier. Those who worked at medical stations were constantly threatened by the possibility that their "hospital" would be uncovered by the enemy, in which case the likelihood of escape would be minimal.
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The earliest experience of organizing an UPA Medical Service was gained in Volyn. This experience was later applied by medical workers on other territories. When the medical Service had to carry out difficult tasks, it was helped by the UChKh.
In 1941, the UChKh in Rivne was directed by Dr. M. Kornyliv-Vasyliv, and the social service section was headed by the UNR Colonel, Leonid Stupnytskyi, who was later the Chief of Staff of the UPA Supreme Command.
Working in the social service section with Col. Stupnytskyi was the renowned public and political activist, Dr. Kharytia Kononeko. The UChKh existed in Volyn up to the time of the creation of the Reichskonunissariat Ukraine in Rime. When the occupying German force forbade the use of the name UChKh, its medical and charitable work was continued under the main task of the Aid Committee of the city of Rivne. In 1941-42, the main task of the UChKh in Volyn was, as stated earlier, to care for the local population and help Red Army prisoners of war in German camps.
In 1942-43, when insurgent units were first being formed, UChKh activists and some physicians helped to organize medical care and provide supplies for the UPA. The first to suffer for contacts with the underground and providing help to UPA soldiers were the physicians Drs. Hanna and Petro Roshchynskyi in Kremianets in Volyn. They were arrested by the Gestapo on February 23,1943 and executed that same evening at the Kremianets prison.
Col. L. Stupnytskyi, who in 1942 was named commander of the police school in Rivne, went over to the UPA with a whole group of students in 1943. The duties of director of the UChKh social service (later the Aid Committee) were taken over by Dr. Kharytia Kononenko. She maintained contact with Col. Stupnytskyi and looked after staffing and provision of medications for the Medical Service. Kharytia Kononenko was arrested by the Gestapo on July 15, 1943, and executed after three months of the imprisonment.
The UPA began broader operations in Volyn in early spring 1943, and as a result there was an increase in the number of wounded and sick. There arose a need to organize a medical care system, and an underground Ukrainian Red Cross. This task was assumed by the OUN women's network. In areas where no OUN women's network and no underground UChKh existed, the UPA Medical Service was assisted by nationally-concious women and medical professionals.
Early in 1943, underground UPA hospitals were organized on the pattern of regular army field hospitals. They were set up in villages, far from German garrisons, and sometimes in small towns; where possible, small hospitals were also built in forests. This type of hospital system enabled the small force of doctors and medical staff to care for larger numbers of patients in a single place, without losing time in traveling.
It become clear after a certain time that for security reasons, it was not realistic to try to operate larger field hospitals. German raids encompassed even the more out-of-the-way villages, which may have appeared to be safe, and the forests of southern Volyn. Sometimes German military units launched sudden attacks on medical stations, and on many occasions wounded UPA soldiers had to be evacuated from, field hospitals in battle conditions. It was no safer further north, in the Polissia wilderness. Some of the forests there, or at least parts of them, were under the control of Soviet partisans. Because of these threats, hospital staff and patients were assigned in small groups to different locations. Whenever possible, they were located in areas where there were hiding places. Larger field hospitals operated only in regions which were protected by insurgent detachments and from which, in case of enemy attack, the wounded could be systematically evacuated. With the approach of the German-Soviet front, even the system of small field hospitals had to be modified, and the hospitals were moved to underground hide-outs and bunkers.
The activity of the UPA Medical Service depended upon various factors, the main one being the policy of the occupying enemy force in a given territory. On the territory of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the colonial policy of the Germans was merciless and brutal; in Halychyna the terror applied by the regime was not as great. The Germans annexed Halychyna to the General Government as a district with special status because it was formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian state. The occupying power applied a policy of gradual Germanization, but granted some autonomous rights to the local population. The medical system, which came under the German administration, allowed some possibility of free action.
Taking advantage of these easier conditions, Ukrainian physicians tried to protect the health of the local population. Some doctors even managed to get positions with the Medical Guild in Lviv, while others were named county physicians. One such physician who held an important post in the Medical Guild was Dr. Volodymyr Wreciona (Vretsiona), formerly an active OUN member. He tried to use his influence to have Ukrainian doctors appointed to responsible positions in the medical administration. The role played by Dr. Volodymyr Wreciona is explained by Dr. Yaroslav Wojewidka (Voievidka) in the obituary written by him in 1970. 
Ukrainian doctors were also able to have private practices and to work in hospitals and clinics. The UPA command and the directors of the Medical Service and the UChKh took account of all these factors in organizing the UPA medical system on the territory of Halychyna Instead of building up a wide scale UChKh network with large field hospitals, as was initially done in Volyn they organized smaller hospitals and medical stations.
When there were insufficient professional medical personnel in the units, the UPA Medical Service relied on physicians who were practicing in the area. The more seriously wounded and sick were often taken to doctors in outpatient clinics, or brought by night to the physicians' private homes. Sometimes doctors visited sick UPA soldiers in forest hospitals or temporary medical stations set up in villages. In some instances, wounded or sick insurgents were given beds in city hospitals.
The position of the physician carrying out these tasks was extraordinarily difficult. His professional and ethical obligations did not permit him to refuse to give help to a wounded or sick person; however, for living up to his obligations, he was threatened with detention, prison or death.
Physicians who helped the UPA had to act with extreme caution, in secret from the German and Soviet occupying powers. Nobody could know about their activities except for a small circle of trustworthy people; for that reason, it is now impossible to reconstruct a complete list of these doctors' names. Some of these physicians remained in Ukraine, while others made their way abroad. Because of the terror that threatened their families and close associates, they remained silent about their work. Most of these physicians are no longer living; they took the secrets of their collaboration with the underground to the grave with them.
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The UPA Medical Service had to deal with many difficulties: the difficult conditions in which the liberation struggle was taking place, the small number of doctors, the shortage of medications and medical supplies. Depending on the area and the circumstances, UPA physicians and medical assistants provided help to the sick and wounded in different ways. If the situation was relatively peaceful, or in periods of UPA offensive actions, only the lightly wounded remained with their units. Particularly difficult times for the Medical Service were when enemy soldiers were waging major actions against the UPA, blockades of the area were in place, or when UPA companies were raiding through foreign territories. Another difficult time for the wounded was when the UPA units were breaking through the German-Soviet front. At this time, the companies were isolated from their "hospitals " and it was impossible to get the wounded to them.
In order to survive this difficult period, even a healthy and strong soldier had to make a great effort, so how could the seriously wounded cope? They had to share the fate of their units, which often went without food or rest, were constantly on the march or engaging in skirmishes or battles with the enemy, cut of if from populated centres and living out in the rain, snow and cold. During these times, the Medical Service was called upon to do work which went far beyond its capacities. The doctors and medical assistants did everything they could, and they were helped in this by all the soldiers, including the wounded themselves.
It was somewhat easier for UPA doctors to do their work under the German occupation than under the Soviet. Given insurgent conditions, the supplies of medications, bandages and instruments were relatively abundant and the Medical Service still had at its disposal a fairly large number of qualified workers.
In the Carpathians, after the signing of the non-aggression pact between the UPA and the Hungarian army, it became possible to send the seriously wounded to Hungarian hospitals.
However, when UPA units found themselves under Soviet occupation, conditions became much worse. The whole burden of providing help to the sick and wounded now had to be assumed by the UPA-UChKh medical network; all other possibilities disappeared. And the UPA Medical Service and UChKh units were obliged to make increasing use of hide-outs and underground hospitals.
Under the German occupation, hide-outs had not generally been used. At that time, hiding places served mainly for secret storage of medications, medical equipment, food, weapons and ammunition, but less often for housing the wounded. In the beginning stages of the insurgent struggle, the use of hide-outs was scorned, not only by battle units, but by medical units too.
But from the moment of the return of the Soviets, hide-outs and bunkers became a real necessity. In 1945, in some areas, the Soviets threw units of the Red Army, which were returning from Germany, into battle against the UPA, as reinforcements for their militia, NKVD troops and other special units, and the UPA's areas of operation were blockaded. The offensive against the UPA encompassed not only the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, but also the ethnic Ukrainian areas of Poland. However, this campaign against the UPA was not as successful as the Soviet command had expected. The Red Army soldiers, who included a significant proportion of Ukrainians, did not show any desire to fight against Ukrainian insurgents. They were just glad that they had survived the war. In 1945-47, the campaign by NKVD and NKGB and other special units against the UPA increased.
Although the circumstances inside the Ukrainian SSR and in "democratic" Poland were somewhat different, on both territories the UChKh was obliged to carry out its activities in underground hide-outs. The hide-outs were very useful for difficult assignments, including those involving the treatment of the wounded and sick.
Depending on the territory and circumstances, different types of hideouts, or "hospitals", were constructed They did not have a standard form, but rather, reflected the inventiveness of individual insurgents.
Generally, they consisted of only one room; only rarely did they have several rooms. Various types of hiding places were also constructed by the local population. In critical situations, wounded soldiers had to make use of primitive hiding places. In exceptional cases, it was possible for one, and with difficulty, two persons to hide temporarily in a "wolf's hole". This was a hole quickly dug out in the woods and covered with branches.
Hide-outs and underground bunkers were used not only by the UChKh, but also by the UPA and armed underground fighting units. There was no great difference between the hide-outs and bunkers, as both served as secret hiding places for insurgents. The main difference lay in the fact that bunkers were suitable for active defence, whereas hide-outs were suitable only for passive defence. The bunkers were used by battle units and also by the lightly wounded. In case of discovery by the enemy, they resorted to armed resistance and attempted to escape.
Medical hide-outs provided passive defence by virtue of being concealed as much as possible, with all the rules of secrecy observed. In the case of discovery by the enemy, the situation of those in the hide-out was hopeless.
The battle units made use of concealed hiding places mainly in the winter, while the medical personnel and wounded stayed in them in all seasons.
Various methods of construction were used for underground hiding places, depending on whether they were in forests, mountains, plains or populated centres. It was imperative that a hiding place not stand out from its surroundings. The hiding place had a small entrance, through which entered not only able-bodied people, but through which wounded soldiers, food and medical supplies had to be carried in. Every time somebody entered the hide-out, traces were left which could not easily be concealed.
In the construction of underground hiding places, care had to be taken to have sufficient air circulation, toilet facilities and a way of eliminating wastes. One important requirement for a medical hide-out was to have a supply of water. Whenever possible, the hide-outs were built close to streams, from which water could be supplied in various ways. Only occasionally was it possible to find an underground spring -- an invaluable resource for a medical hide-out. In the winter, water was often obtained by melting snow. It was not easy to solve the problem of lighting and heating in medical hide-outs. Gas or carbide lamps were not always available and often only a night light or candle was used With lighting of this type, it was not easy to perform surgery, dress wounds or organize medications.
For reasons of security, it was accepted practice that a hide-out would be built by the insurgents who would later make use of it. The smallest possible number of people were aware of its location. Medical hide-outs, or "hospitals", were usually built in densely-wooded areas by soldiers from battle units. The company commander, in agreement with the UChKh director, would assign this task to one of his squadrons. The soldiers would be taken at night to the place where the hide-out was to be built. While working on its construction, the soldiers were deprived of any contact with the outside world and they did not know exactly where the hide-out was located. In the construction of this type of hiding place, attention had to be paid to a number of details which may appear to be insignificant, but which are of great importance to a person staying in the underground hide-out.
Increasing pressure from the enemy obliged the UPA to perfect its techniques for building hiding places and the acquired experiences proved to be very useful.
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The materials published in this volume of Litopys UPA are organized into five chapters. The first chapter consists of articles about the Ukrainian Red Cross (UChKh). The first article, "The Ukrainian Red Cross in Kiev, 1941-1942", is by the writer Liudmyla Ivchenko, who played an important role in the UChKh in Eastern Ukraine in 1941-42. She gives a brief account of the organization of the UChKh in 1918, and then describes its renewed activity in Kiev in 1941. In her memoir, she names many of the leading workers of this charitable institution.
The next article, "The Ukrainian Red Cross", by Dr. Toma Worobec, has a similar theme. We are publishing the part of the article which describes the work of the UChKh in Ukraine. The author characterizes the activity of this organization in Halychyna and speaks of the care provided to wounded soldiers and other forms of assistance given to the UPA. 
The chapter also includes the article "The UChKh in Halychyna" by Irena Savytska-Kozak, which tells about Kateryna Zarytska and the formation of the UChKh in Halychyna.
The second chapter contains excerpts from the memoirs of military and other authors who, although not workers of the UPA medical system, make mention in their writing of the Medical Service or UChKh in Volyn and Polissia. Unfortunately, there is a lack of documents and memoirs written by medical personnel which would describe the activity of UPA medical units in Volyn.
Colonel M. Omeliusik, the director of the operational unit of the UPA North Command, who was familiar with the UPA's military and administrative structure and its battle operations, also provides some information about medical problems in his article "The UPA in Volyn in 1943".
Other authors from whose memoirs we publish excerpts in this chapter are: Vasyl Mnovskyi ("Nrabenko"), Volodymyr Novak ("Krylatyi"), Maksym Skorupskyi ("Max"), Dr. Mykhailo Danyliuk "Blakytnyi"), Panylo Shumuk ("Boremsky") and Sophia Stepaniuk.
In these writings, the authors describe various aspects of the activity of UPA medical units in Volyn and add to the information provided by Col. Omeliusik. In some cases, they only provide dry data; in others, they paint vivid pictures of what they saw and experienced. The long excerpt from the memoirs of Sophia Stepaniuk gives a portrait of the noted UChKh activist in Volyn, Dr. Kharytia Kononenko.
The third chapter presents memoirs, articles and sketches by authors who served in the UPA Medical Service or underground UChKh units, or who worked with these units.
The sketch by Modest Ripeckyj, based on his personal experiences, describes the formation and work of the Medical Service in the battalion commanded by V. Mizernyi ("Ren").
Bohdan Huk ("Skala"), the author of the article "Physicians and Medical Personnel of the UPA's Military District" limits himself to a factual description of UChKh activity on territory outside of the Ukrainian SSR.
The report by Bohdan Kruk ("Melodia"), "The UChKh in the Current Liberation Struggle", was written in 1947, right after the author's arrival in West Germany. It is published in its original form.
UPA medical workers often made use of curative herbs in the treatment of sick or wounded soldiers. The use of plants for healing has long been popular in Ukraine. In insurgent conditions, there was a lack of necessary textbooks; for that reason, some UChKh workers prepared booklets about the practical application of curative plants. In this chapter, we publish the introductory section of Herbs and Their Use, which was written by the medical student, "Melodia". He served as Health Service (UChKh) officer for the Lemko region.
The memoir by Dr. Vasyl Granas Onyskiv, "Medical Courses Given near Trukhaniv" was written in 1991. The author describes his activities, while still a medical student, as instructor of UChKh medical assistants in the Carpathian Mountains. "Gestapo Brutality in the Kalush Region" is the memoir of the county physician, Dr. Dmytro Kapitan, in which he describes events which he witnessed. Also published here is a letter from Dr. Roman Moroz, formerly chief county physician in Ternopil, in which he speaks of his contact with the UPA.
The third chapter also includes the memoirs of UChKh workers. In a longer work Anna Martyniuk ("Hania") describes her personal experiences as a UChKh medical assistant in the Kholm area and her later experiences in prisons and camps. Natalka Kosarchyn-Marunchakspeaks of her UChKh work in the Khodoriv area, Olena Lebedovych writes about the Uhniv area, Emilia Stefaruk speaks about the Zhabie area of the Hutsul region and Maria Bodnarenko-Ripeckyj, Anna Karvanska-Teliatynska and UPA medical assistant Osyp Levytskyi write about the Peremyshl area.
A separate chapter contains biographies of physicians and leading UChKh figures. It begins with the biographies of UChKh chairwoman Kateryna Zarytska-Soroka and Hanna Didyk. This is followed by biographies of doctors who were holding post in the UPA and about whom information could be obtained: Dr. Yuriy Lypa, Dr. Yuriy Davydenko, Dr. Yaromyr Olesnycky, Dr. Oleksiy Zelenuk and Dr. Volodymyr Maniuch. Also given here are biographical data about physicians who carried out regular medical duties but treated Ukrainian insurgents when the need arose.
The UPA medical system included, in addition to Ukrainian doctors, physicians of other nationalities who worked in various positions or provided medical assistance to Ukrainian insurgents. Most of these doctors were Jewish,  but there were also some Germans, Slovaks and Poles.  A separate section of this chapter is dedicated to the activities of doctors of other ethnic groups.
The article by Dr. Abraham Sterzer, a Jewish physician who was in the UPA in 1943-44 and now lives in Israel, was written in English. The author describes his stay in the UPA and brings up the question of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Dr. Petro Mociuk provides a memoir about Dr. Samuel Neuman, the physician of the UPA officers' school in the Carpathians, who used the assumed name Dr. V. Maksymovych. Brief information is also provided about another physician of the UPA officers' school, Dr. "Kum"; we include a memoir about him which was written by B. Podoliak.
Additionally there are printed copies of the interrogation by the NKVD and the transcript of the court martial of Dr. Varm Shaja Davydovych. He was a physician from Warsaw who escaped the ghetto and joined the medical corps of the UPA in Volyn. 
The last chapter consists of UPA Medical Service and UChKh archival documents. The physicians and medical staff worked in conditions that made record keeping extremely difficult; thus these records were limited to the most essential. Records documenting their activity were stored in secret, but the possibility of preserving them was minimal Of the UPA documents which made their way to the West, very few relate to medical work "The History of illness", "Daily Chronicle", and the monthly reports written by hand by Dr. Yavorskyi ("Yakym") provide a picture of the work of an UPA doctor in the Lemko region.
"Instructions for Platoon Medical Assistants" and the enclosed report form, which was designed by medical assistant "Monomakh " in the Yaroslav-Liubachiv area in 1946, give an idea of the tasks carried out by medical assistants in UPA units.
The reports by megadistrict and district UChKh directors and a company medical assistant from the Kholm-Pidliashshia area in 1946-47 and copies of receipts for incoming and outgoing medications show how closely medical work in the UPA was organized and controlled.
The last document is a copy of the Judgement of the military tribunal of the Krakow district, which in a session held in Sianok on May 16, 1947, passed a death sentence on Rozalia Minko. This 23-year-old village girl, who had four years of education, was sentenced to death for having links with UPA and gathering herbs from which medications were to be made for treating sick and wounded UPA soldiers.
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I would like to thank all those who helped prepare this volume for publication. Special thanks go to Editor in Chief Yevhen Shtendera and to Prof Petro Potichnyj for their editorial assistance and to my wife Marijka for her help at every stage of this project.
I'm grateful to Dr. Bohdan Kruk and Dr. Arethy Kravets for their help in providing documents, Mykola Kulyk for technical assistance, Anton Ivachniuk for linguistic editing, Volodymyr Makar for proofreading, Zonia Keyvan for her translation and to Stepan Shpak for the preparation of the index.